A semiquantitative construct to identify opportunities for technology insertion using a generic description of the land forces, NJ Curtis, PJ Dortmans

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Content: Land Warfare Conference 2001
Sydney November 2001
A Semiquantitative Construct to Identify Opportunities for Technology Insertion using a Generic Description of the Land Forces
Neville J Curtis and Peter J Dortmans Land Operations Division, DSTO
ABSTRACT The Australian Army is undertaking a "concept-led, capability-based" approach to effect the evolution from the current Land Force to a structure best suited to deal with the military challenges in the 15-30 year timeframe. The "Army After Next" (AAN) must be able to articulate concepts and effects to meet the range of potential conflicts, operational environments and Military Strategic Objectives that are currently uncertain. Irrespective of politico-military issues, we can confidently assert that technology will continue to evolve and will be available to Australia, its allies and potential enemies.
This paper discusses the development of a method based upon a conceptual model of the Land Force that incorporates the enduring capabilities or skills that we expect the Army to carry out in achieving their objectives in "conventional" (as we understand military operations now) warfare. A convenient construct is to portray each of these skills (such as engagement, sustainment and decision making) in terms of an influence diagram that links key elements and shows how the higher objective of the skill can be manipulated through technology interventions. We have used this approach to assess potential friendly force and threat force changes on a semiquantitative basis. Thus potential deficiencies can be identified and the influence diagrams used to identify high pay-off and critical areas. These, in turn, will focus our efforts in identifying, developing and incorporating enabling technologies into the future combat force.
1. Introduction The Australian Army, in common with many others, is undergoing a process of continuous modernisation to make best use of advancing technology and to be structured to best meet the dictates of potential operations. Two drivers are in operation: those based on the "push" of existing equipment and formations, coupled with planned short term acquisitions, and those based on the longer term "pull" of future concepts. These future concepts must, amongst other things, be responsive to changes in technology and it is the goal of this paper to discuss how these technology advances can be accommodated in a credible Land Force development process. We approached this exercise in the following manner: · identified means of describing the Land Force in generic terms,
· formulated influence diagrams that show what is to be achieved by the future Land Force and what affects success or failure, · provided a means to identify potential deficiencies and capability gaps, · developed a means to identify technology drivers leading to proposals of technology based solutions, and · determined high pay-off and military critical technologies to support the identification of priority research areas. The overall study will comprise four streams to examine technology exploitation. In increasing order of difficulty these are: 1. how will the current legacy technologies develop in the future?
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2. how can the current legacy technologies be adapted for other military application? 3. how might advances in enabling technologies be adapted for military application? 4. how might new Emerging technologies be given military application? This paper only represents part of the study and is based on linear extrapolation of current issues through a deficiency based approach (stream 1 above). Whilst this is credible for acquisition programs, it nevertheless lacks creativity and is unlikely to result in surprises or radical new ways of military operations ("new concepts"). Nor is it likely to fully incorporate the opportunities presented by "disruptive technologies" [1] (those revolutionary technologies that fundamentally transform society, defence and/or industry). However, this first phase is critical since without this, examination of future concepts merely becomes a presentation of a list of emerging technologies with little concept of their military potential. 2. Nomenclature, taxonomy and method 2.1 Technologies Technology is in the broadest definition the "application of science to do something useful". In the military arena, we come across obvious applications that rely upon enabling technology areas. However these are delineated, it is clear that there is a spectrum from a pure discipline (eg physics), through generic enabling technologies (eg lasers) to established specific military application technologies (eg missile seekers). Together these constitute the military applications. It is pointless, however, to impose a shoe-horn with any one term, and thus for the purposes of this paper we shall only talk in terms of enabling and application
technologies. The distinction will, of course, be subtle at times. 2.2 Inspection taxonomy It is critical for this work to use a taxonomy that is independent of current force structure and thus the generic skills approach was taken. This was originally developed for work with dismounted units [2], but is readily applicable. Briefly, we can divide a military action into three phases of: · planning and preparation, · execution, and · post operation procedures. The execution phase requires particular focus, as most of the technology challenges will be presented in it. As such, we describe the execution phase by a collection of critical technology issues that must be performed to achieve useful military outcomes. Our starting point is then the series of generic skills that are sufficiently distant from current military formations to be less susceptible to bias, whilst still retaining an obvious characteristic: · engagement, · information collection, · sustainment, · communication, · protection, · movement, and · decision making . As a starting point, we must assume that operations 30 years hence will still constitute the fundamental "find, move and kill" paradigm of conventional warfare (where "kill" refers to a spectrum of events from destruction to inhibition of the opposing forces to operate as they wish) [3]. Also, we assume that at least some of the future Land Force will be trained and equipped for conventional operations, at least as the term is currently understood. Thus all operational and tactical military actions, in the execution phase, are
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described in terms of the seven generic skills listed above. 2.3 Influence diagrams to describe Land Force action systems Figure 1 gives a generic description of the process involved in determining the medium level influence diagram, applicable to the individual skills. Four types of variable are noted. The bold item refers to the goal measure and is derived from all other terms in the diagram. Underlined terms refer to influencing factors that derive from the blue [4] force. A useful subset of these relate to the controllable technology based variable (TBV) where the military application technologies become readily
separable; these are convenient places to base further studies. Similar terms exist for uncontrollable, or opposing force capability and environmental terms (italicised). Whilst these terms are not variables that the blue force can directly influence, they are important as system components and are intimately tied to technology development. Of course, the issues raised often appear elsewhere mirrored as a blue force factor. The remaining items (plain text) are intermediate terms where impacts of combinations of technologies emerge. These present opportunities for semiquantitative analysis for identification of the importance of the insertion of various technologies.
feed back function (+/-)
(+/-) (+) activities requiring action
inherent red capability
higher level goal
(+) number of actions conducted
(+) (+)
number of blue entities in system (+/-)
(+) number of red entities in system
(+/-) (+/-)
(+)
efficiency of process
influencing factors (+/-) (+/-)
environmental factors
Figure 1 Generic form of mid-level Influence Diagrams
Each area of the influence diagram can in theory be expanded to extract the key points, though in practice, only the TBVs will provide fruitful information for this technology-based exercise. These TBVs can be expanded up to show the key technology features (KTFs) in a more detailed influence diagram. These KTFs are more easily linked with constituent enabling technologies. Also, in some cases links to the other skill areas appear. Thus generic communications issues, such as rate of information transfer will be located in the information collection diagram.
We have a taken a layered approach to analysis of the generic skills through a hierarchy of influence diagrams. At the highest level we consider the trade-offs between the skills, while in the medium level each skill is examined discretely as more detail is added. Fine detail is added at the lowest level. Whilst we have not attempted to identify a single measure at the highest level (though all skills area contribute to overall capability) we have devised single items that need to be "optimised" [5] at the medium levels (Table 1).
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The purpose of the influence diagrams is to identify those inputs (usually variables) that will optimise (usually maximise) these single measures. If the link is indicated as (+) then increasing A will increase B. This does not however imply that increasing B will increase A. Similarly, if the link is (-) then a reduction is expected and a (+/-) indicates variability. The latter case may be exemplified by information overload ­ as
after a certain point the additional information available is no longer helpful and starts to reduce capability. An additional feature is that of self-reinforcing or moderating feedback loops. We note that these diagrams have been formulated to show a degree of abstraction from the final goal rather than for aesthetics or topology. Thus technology becomes more apparent in going to the right hand side of the diagrams.
Table 1: Measures (goals bolded) for each skill
Skill
Measure
Engagement
Ability to deliver appropriate and targetted blue firepower to disable enemy at an appropriate
rate that restricts their ability to operate
Information
Use of appropriate assets to find and gain useful information on the operational environment
collection
Sustainment
Maintenance of operational momentum through the dynamic use of appropriate assets to
distribute resources and maintain capability assets that satisfies operational requirements
Communication Ability to manage and transfer information securely between units to share useful
information and enhance the appreciation of the situation
Protection
Adoption of strategies to reduce the effect of potential hazards to conduct safe military
operations in an operational environment
Movement
Capacity to relocate units to provide useful transfer of capability assets to conduct military
actions
Decision making Provision of sufficient wherewithal to make good decisions in the conduct of military
operations and thus gain decision superiority
primary measure
mtielitcahrnilyolcorgityical
secondary
(+)
tertiary measure A
(+)
technology based variable A
measure A
(+) (+)
secondary
(+)
tertiary measure B
(+)
technology based variable B
measure B
(+)
tertiary
(+)
measure C (+) technology based
(+)
variable C
(+)
secondary
(+)
measure C
(+)
tertiary
measure D tertiary
(+)
technology based variable D
theicghhnpoaloyg-yoff
measure E
Figure 2: Militarily critical and high pay-off technologies
Ultimately, this process identifies currently legacy technologies. Having achieved this level of detail, we can now probe the current system to determine areas of inadequacy for future operations by
determining through the technique of pessimistic analysis [6]. Answers to · what is the current perception of capability?
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· what is the impact of environment on capability? · how might blue's actions hinder its own capability? and · how might red reduce blue capability? will lead to a set of deficiencies that we might expect for future warfare, if nothing changed. Although subject to revision after consultation with the relevant subject matter experts, we have made an indicative prediction of the technologies and key issues. For brevity, we have only given details for the engagement taxon (Appendices A and B). So, given the construct of the study, we can now identify required enabling technology advances that need to be made to overcome these deficiencies.
We have also identified military critical and high pay-off technologies through the following qualitative rationale (Figure 2). A TBV is military critical if it is the only one that leads to tertiary or secondary level measures, and is high pay-off if it leads to several tertiary measures or directly to a secondary measure. Of course, this exercise depends on how the diagrams are drawn and may reflect bias on the analyst, but it gives a ready indicative method that should be followed by further study. Finally we have used these diagrams as visual cues to identify key questions that could be posed by the investigator.
(-) inherently dangerous (+) less damage sustainment
protection
(-) resources used engagement (+) appropriate actions
(+) better planning
(+) better resupply
(-) overloading
(-) mitigation devices or techniques
(+) better positioning
(-) increased exposure
(-) inhibition of actions
movement
(+) better route planning
information collection
(-) may
(+) better targetting
(+) better positioning
of forces
(+) more material available
(+) focussed
compromise action (+) timely information (-) increased collection quantity of data
information collection
decision making (+) better implementation of decisions Figure 3: High level influence diagram
communication
3. Results 3.1 High level influence diagram Figure 3 shows that although there are several antagonistic trade-offs that need to be considered in the system, there is also
considerable potential for synergies. Indeed, while it is difficult to identify anything other than what appears to be trivial feedback loops between skills at the highest level, an understanding of how technologies impact upon individual skills at the medium
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level is directly translatable into an aggregated understanding of how such technologies impacts upon a force. Therefore, the focus of this methodology is concentrated on the skills as the primary level of enquiry. 3.2 Medium and low-level influence diagrams 3.2.1 Introduction While the high level diagrams provide an opportunity to appreciate the influence of technology in a holistic fashion, interpretation of how particular technologies actually impact on capabilities is determined through a detailed deconstruction of core skills and a subsequent cross skill analysis. Therefore we have developed medium and low-level influence diagrams for each of these skills. In this paper, we display the influence diagrams (medium) for each skill. Herein, we present the full set of medium level influence diagrams for all skills, with more detail provided for the engagement taxon.
3.2.2 Engagement Figures 4 and 5 give the medium and lowlevel influence diagrams for engagement, respectively. The underlined items in each figure represent the major inputting factors over which blue has control. All except "number of blue units providing fire" are technology based. Figure 4 indicates how any enhancement or reduction in the TBVs (namely "blue positioning", "blue targetting capability" and "blue weapon capability") will impact upon the fundamental output of engagement, namely firepower. The red force factors over which we have no control (red weapon capability [7] and red vulnerability) indicate areas where the incorporation of technology may be employed against us. Note that as the latter term will appear again under protection, this time for the blue, it is not further discussed here. The major feedback loop links "blue firepower", "number of red units", "red firepower", "blue loss rate" and "volume of blue fire" in the classic attrition cycle. "Blue targetting capability" and "blue positioning" are potentially high payoff areas.
(-) blue fire power (+)
number of red units
(+)
red fire power
(+) (+) blue loss rate (-)
volume of blue fire
red freedom of action
(+)
(+) (-)
(+)
blue combat
sustainability
(+)
(+)
(+)
red weapon
capability
number of blue units
(+)
providing fire
(+)
(+) (+) (-)
effectiveness of red firepower
blue positioning
effectiveness of blue fire
efficiency of blue fire (+) (+) red vulnerability
(+) (+)
blue targetting capability blue weapon capability
Figure 4: Medium Level Influence Diagram for Engagement
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Figure 5 provides more detail of the TBVs, and identifies where other skills are linked to engagement. Figures 4 and 5 thus provide a mechanism for injecting technology into the system and determining its influence. This, in combination with the data in Appendix A, was abstracted and the requirements identified in Appendix B. These goals then provide the ability to measure the capacity of a particular
technology (or an integrated set of technologies) to influence a particular skill (in this case engagement). When considering new or novel technologies, key questions to consider for engagement within a future warfare context include: what other terminal effects could be delivered? how else might the terminal effect be delivered? what else could the engagement technologies be used for?
volume of red firepower (+)
(+)
red fire power
(+)
number of red targets
(+)
(-) (+)
blue loss rate red freedom of action (-)
volume of blue fire (-) (+)
(+)
blue positioning
(+)
blue combat sustainability (+) (+) efficiency of blue fire
blue targetting (+) capability
(+) blue weapon
(+)
capability
(+)
(+)
PROTECTION (-) (+) MOVEMENT
(+)
(+) acquisition capability (+)
INFORMATION COLLECTION
blue reach (+)
(+) blue range
DECISION MAKING
SUSTAINMENT
accuracy
(+)
(+)
terminal effect
targetting for
tactical effect
Figure 5: Detailed Influence Diagram for part of the Engagement System
3.2.3 Information collection A similar process has been followed for the information collection skill (Figure 6 and Table 2). The inclusion of the variable relating to the "expert use of the pool" introduces several useful feedback loops and this identifies this variable as a potentially high pay-off area (linked to 3 tertiary measures). It is, however, perhaps a different technology interpretation of the system additional to physics based advancements in sensors. Other TBVs comprise "volume of coverage", "wavelength coverage", and "targetted surveillance". Features to consider for future warfare include: how much surveillance information is enough? what form will surveillance take? how can
surveillance be unobtrusive? what type of assets are required to collect information? 3.2.4 Sustainment Figure 7 gives the equivalent information for sustainment. There are no major feedback loops but the system is characterised by several adjacent moderating features (negative feedback loops). Three TBV are apparent: "knowledge of requirements", "efficiency of usage" and "wastage rate". However, none of these can be justified as critical or high pay-off, and reflect the likelihood that enhancements in sustainment are driven by improvements in process rather than incorporation of new technologies. However, new technologies will necessitate new requirements from sustainment assets.
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Features to consider for future warfare include: how can power usage be minimised? how might components be
engineered to optimise distribution? how can the resource constraints imposed by humans on the battlefield be minimised?
number of assets
(+)
collecting information
number of red targets
(+/-)
(+)
(+/-) pool of useful information (+)
expert use of pool rate of loss of currency
(+)
(+)
rate of repeat surveillance (+)
(-)
rate of review and correlation
(+) (-)
pool of confirmed knowledge (+)
(+) rate of new information gaining
number of of potentially detectable red targets
volume covered per unit time by sensor (+) (+) (+) "wavelengths" covered by surveillance systems
effectiveness of
(+)
surveillance
(+)
(+)
targetted surveillance
(+) rate of information
(+)
transfer
Figure 6: Medium Level Influence Diagram for Information Collection
(+)
accuracy of requests (+)
COMMUNICATION knowledge of requirements
number of
(+)
reasonable requests
number of
(+)
pool of available
requests
front line resources
(-)
(+)
(-)
efficiency of usage
(-) (+) (+)
(-)
(+)
number of satisfied resupply requests
(+)
operational
momentum
(+)
wastage rate (+ (-) ) level of forces and supplies in reserve (+) (-)
rate of depletion of
(+) Activity Level of
front line force resources
front line forces
(-)
number of transport
resources
rate of resupply (+) and regeneration
(+)
level of forces and
supplies activated
front line
for advancement
blue force size
(+) (+) (+)
Figure 7: Medium Level Influence Diagram for Sustainment
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3.2.5 Communication Figure 8 shows our analysis of communication. There are 5 diverse TBVs: "(individual) link capacity", "targetting to the right addressee" (both high pay-off), "blue intercept susceptibility" (militarily critical), "environmental propagation", and "vulnerability to red force disruption". Features to consider for future warfare
include: how will bandwidth limitations impact on data transmission? what are the likely requirements for Information Management systems that support all echelons? how can own information security be maintained? how can red communication be disrupted? what level of redundancy within the communication network is required?
targetting to
(+)
right addressee
number of messages received at correct point (+)
(+)
(+)
environmental
propagation
propagation efficiency
(+) link capacity
(-)
useful information transferred securely
number of (-) detrimental intercepts
(+)
(+) (+) (+)
red capacity to intercept (+)
vulnerability to
(-)
red force
(-)
disruption
(+)
blue susceptibility to intercept
timeliness of information transfer
number of
messages sent
(+)
(+/-)
(-)
(+)
need for further
information
number of requests
(+) and replies for information
number of senders/ receivers
Figure 8: Medium Level Influence Diagram for Communication
3.2.6 Protection Protection (Figure 9) has four TBVs: "blue knowledge of own force", "protection against the environment", "inherent blue signature" and "blue self-defence". Interestingly all four can be highlighted, with the first militarily crucial, and the remainder, high pay-off. A further issue of knowledge of the red force is implied from the information collection skill. Feedback loops occur through "hazard reducing activities" and these capture defensive actions to reduce risk. Other considerations for future warfare include: what will constitute a signature in future environments? what is the appropriate balance between self protection and
mobility? how will new concepts and/or technologies obviate the need for troop protection? 3.2.7 Movement This is one of the more complicated skill areas (Figure 10), with 6 TBVs. Many of the technology advances will be made in the civilian sphere as they relate to transport technologies, thus "navigation capability" is the only TBV that will have major Defence effort. Nevertheless, engineering and technology will be important with "terrain mobility" and "navigation capability" both high pay-off areas, with "per vehicle capacity" (and also high pay-off) and "range", militarily critical. Features to
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consider for future warfare include: what are the range requirements of future operations? what will be the scale and
quantity of field assets? what will be the terrain implications for the employment of assets?
number of
blue actions
(-)
(+)
potential hazards
hazard reducing activities (+) (+)
number of
(+)
opportunities
for hazard (+)
(+)
(+) (+)
risk per action (+) (+)
inherent red fire power capability
number of
potentially hazardous
(-)
actions in red
zone of influence
(+)
information acquired by red of blue (+) (-) blue susceptibility to physical environment (-) (+/-) susceptibility of blue (-) (+) force to engagement (-)
(-)
blue knowledge of red force (+) INFORMATION COLLECTION severity of environment (+) blue knowledge of own force (+) inherent blue signature blue self defence protection against the environment
Figure 9: Medium Level Influence Diagram for Protection
(+) requests for new movement
number required to move (+)
number of transport lanes (+)
carrying capacity per vehicle
(+)
(-)
(+)
number of units
transfer of (+)
moved
(+)
capability
(+)
capacity to move ability to move maintenance of mobility
(+) (+) (+)
(+) suitability of transport availability of transport
vehicle range (+)
(-) (+)
turn-around time mobility over
+
(+)
maintenance of
(+)
unit capability (+) unit cohesiveness
navigation capability (+)
terrain
(-)
difficulty of
(-)
degradation
of component units
intervening geography and environment (+)
moved unit (+) degradation factor
breakdown rate
(+) Figure 10: Medium Level Influence Diagram for Movement
(+) red force measures
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3.2.8 Decision making Despite the importance of decision making and the implied tools of situation awareness, it is perhaps one of the areas where technology will still play a lesser role on the battlefield (Figure 11). It is an innate skill relying upon training and, critically, extensive experience ("professional mastery"). Whilst technologies can be applied to these areas, they are not as relevant in this paper, where focus is on the execution phase of actions. Therefore, the impact of technology will focus on the provision of decision support tools, based on the information source ("pool of stored information") and the ability to interrogate ("manipulation of information") and the development of training technologies. Mention should also be made of "accessibility of advice" since in the future virtual advisers may complement human
support to the commander. A potential TBV is "tempo of the operation" though this something that can pass from the control of the blue force. It is expected that the "manipulation of information" and "pool of stored information" TBVs are likely to provide high pay-off. It might also be noted that this skill is intimately linked to "information collection", as one TBV ("pool of stored information") is closely related goal of that skill. Features to consider for future warfare include: what level of visualisation is required in headquarters and what form should it take? what are the implications of the size of field headquarters upon decision making? what aspects of decision making can be automated in the Land environment?
tempo of operation (+) (-)
decision superiority (+)
number of actions
(-)
that require decisions
(-)
information assurance
(+/-)
(+)
time available to
(+/-)
(+)
number of
(-)
decisions made
make decision
manipulation
(+)
of information
(+) (+)
(+)
potential for
(+)
good decision
ability to interpret current issues
knowledge of
(+)
current situation
(+) availability of current information (+)
(+) (+) professional mastery
(+)
pool of stored
(+)
ability to predict
(+)
pool of past experience
information (+)
consequences
(+)
accessibility
of advice
Figure 11: Medium Level Influence Diagram for Decision Making
4. Conclusions The influence diagram method introduced here has proven a useful tool in identifying
technologies currently used to achieve Land Force outcomes. Examination of these has led to statements of goals for skill areas. Projection of likely applicability and
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predicted advances in these technologies allows determination of the likely degree of future deficiency of these as technology solutions. The analysis also provides some solution free questions that could direct future research. The application of the method is also presented. Our analysis has derived an indicative set of military critical technologies and high pay off areas in order to illustrate the utility of the process. On an empirical basis, the following areas (referring to blue capability) are noted as high pay-off: · weapons targetting, · weapons positioning, · expert use of information, · targetted communications, · communications link capacity, · self-defence, · signature, · protection against the environment, · terrain mobility, · navigation, · manipulation of information, and · pool of stored information. The military critical set is considered to be: · communications intercept susceptibility, · knowledge of own force location, · vehicle carrying capacity, and · vehicle range. Whilst the other TBVs were noted as being of moderate priority or importance, further studies need to be made on the degree of deficiency and to eliminate any biases inherent in the analysis. In any case, determining the impact of all technology advances upon TBVs is still recommended. Of course this is only part of the picture since we also need to address what the effect of advances in the currently used
technology will have on future warfare, and this will be the subject of future work. Analysis of streams 2 to 4 then needs to be carried out. Finally, it should be noted that the taxonomy is a means to an end ­ identification of current technology issues 5. References and notes [1] J.L. Bower, C.M. Christensen, Disruptive Technologies, Harvard Business Review, 45-53, 1995 [2] W.S.R. Hobbs, D. Goyne and N.J. Curtis, LAND 125 Soldier Combat System (Project WUNDURRA) Australia"s Soldier Modernisation Program: Past Present and Future, SMI Conference on Next Generation Soldier Technology [Proc], London, 2000 [3] Of course, other outputs of the Army After Next study may direct a higher role for unconventional operations but that represents an unnecessary diversion at this stage. [4] We have used the terms blue or own force and red or opposing force [5] We recognise, of course, that it is a fundamental of systems thinking, that optimising specific components of a system is not necessarily a good idea. The ultimate intent here is to "optimise" in the context of the overall system, but in the first instance we shall look at isolated sub-systems. [6] N.J. Curtis, Planning for the Next Generation of Soldier Modernisation, Land Warfare Conference [Proc] 314-29, Melbourne, 2000 [7] In Army on Army conflict we might expect this to be similar to "blue weapon capability", at least in technology terms. Differences may however occur in asymmetric operations, or when an opposing force uses weapons not acceptable to the ADF.
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Appendix A: Detailed Analysis of the Engagement Skill
TBV/KTFa
Technology
Inherent capability
environmental issues
Blue side hindrances
blue positioning
maximise best operational
require reliable tactical information/ need to
positioning
situation
develop all aspects of full situation awareness
awareness tools
blue targetting capability
maximise
human senses limited range/ may require target to move
difficult in many cases
dangers of fratricide
acquisition
capability
sensors (EO and battle damage assessment difficult/may
operations in target rich
dangers of fratricide
RF)
require target to move
environments and in wet or
dusty conditions
sensors
poor resolution/ requires movement
operations in target rich
dangers of fratricide
(seismic)
environments
sensors
not suitable for battle damage assessment/
operations in target rich
dangers of fratricide
(acoustic)
poor resolution
environments/echoes
maximise
decision support requires reliable information/ need to develop
conflict with most
targetting for aids
all aspects of full situation awareness
dangerous target to firer
tactical effect
blue weapon capability
maximise
energetic
range limited by technology and
weight and bulk will
weapon range materials
doctrine/long range must have terminal
reduce sustainability
(propulsion)
guidance or course correction
and movement
maximise
aiming devices require knowledge of range and environment/ may not be useful for
accuracy
limited use for moving targets/ need
operations in target rich
communications link for beyond firer's
environments and in wet or
visible range aiming/ may expose firer to
dusty conditions
danger whilst being set up
maximise
seekers (EO and require favourable conditions
operations in target rich
accuracy
RF)
environments and in wet or
dusty conditions
course
unlikely to work in build up or
correction
close country if GPS based
maximise
kinetic weapons velocity drop off restricts range/tumbling at behind targets effects may be very high velocities
terminal effects
long range
difficult/may be deflected by may give behind target
intervening vegetation
effects / risk of ricochet
Red side measures potential attacks on the system in set up camouflage/ no movement/ deception camouflage/ flooding/ deception misleading information counter ranging tactics/ spoofs and decoys camouflage/ flooding/ deception electronic interference defeated by armour
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TBV/KTFa maximise terminal effects
Technology directed energy weapons energetic materials (warheads)
Inherent capability no visible effects to ground targets need new design for each advance in armour/ still not effective against brick and soft targets/ fuzes need to be "smarter"
other terms maximise protection
non-lethal agents (materiel) non-lethal agents (personnel) fire and forget technology
may be difficult to tell if a mobility or functional kill has been achieved chemical and physical types needs wide separation of lethal from non-lethal effect still presents a threat if location of fired can be extrapolated
remote targetting armour chemical and biological suits
will still present a risk if human involved only reduces casualties not eliminates/ may only be selectively effective against specific types of weapon only reduces casualties not eliminates
maximise sustainment maximise mobility
chemical and biological agent detection camouflage various military vehicles
may be a lag time between sampling and identification only optimised for limited "wavelengths" and backgrounds / may need to change camouflage according to conditions trade-off between low logistic imprint multipurpose rounds with round effectiveness/ power sources trade-offs of mobility versus lethality and protection
a. Technology Based Variables and Key Technology Features
Environmental issues may affect unintended targets fuzes may be initiated by vegetation or biota area may become impassable if chemicals used avoids permanent neutral casualties/ may be difficult to localise weapons may not be useable in confined spaces must be reliable under all conditions overheating may be a problem heterogenous and anisotropic backgrounds create difficulties multiplicity of environments
Blue side hindrances must be sure of no fratricide presents safety distance issues/ larger warheads reduce sustainability and mobility behind target effects may inhibit use treatment of temporary casualties/ behind target effects may inhibit use fire and forget only feasible if no blue or white casualty threat reduces mobility/ may increase signature possible problems with compatibility with other combat equipment and actions risk of fratricide if hidden to own side availability may encourage profligacy
Red side measures reflection or deflection active self defence (hard or soft kill) deliberate positioning near non-combatants deliberate positioning near non-combatants decoys and spoofing spoofing of means of identification (eg create aerosols) uniform creates a potential cue for sensors limited variety of blue response may be easily countered red force operates in unfavourable environments
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Appendix B: Indicative deduced application and technology areas for engagement
Application area Blue system positioning Acquisition capability Targetting for tactical effect Weapon range Accuracy Terminal effects Protection features Sustainment features Mobility features
Current technology Situation awareness tools Sensors Decision support tools Propulsion Unguided aiming Guided Kinetic weapons Energy weapons Warheads (chemical explosives) Physical and chemical nonlethal effects Various Various Various
Goals Include interpretation and prediction capability. Will need to be robust against information attack on the system. Need to improve surveillance for data collection. Overall suite needs to be able to cope with all environmental conditions (enhanced individual and fused systems are strategies) and red force tactics. Must be able to identify friend, foe and neutral. System must be useable for battle damage assessment. Will need rapid access to information ­ increased surveillance and data backup (stored library) Need to increase range (but absolute value to be determined). Alternative concepts may be required. Need better information links if range is to be extended. Need real time environmental conditions for at-launch course information. Need capability to operate from and to moving targets. Sensors will need to be improved to operate under all conditions (enhanced individual or fused systems are strategies). Ranging should resist red countermeasures. Sensors will need to be improved to operate under all conditions (enhanced individual or fused systems are strategies). Ranging should resist red countermeasures. Weapon should not be affected by red countermeasures. Need higher velocities to increase accuracy, range and effect. Should be specific to the target area and not be a danger from ricochet or overshoot Need to show visible effect, not be capable of redirection and be specific to the target area. Need to be effective against all types of target (armour, earthwork, building), through enhanced explosive fills, construction and fuzing. Must be useable in all environments and explode only at the target zone. Warheads should resist red countermeasures for premature initiation. Must have very large separation between lethal and non-lethal effect for most of the population. Must be targettable to specific zones, not present negative intermediate and behind target effects and only present "no-go" zones if required. Must leave targets in a state that does not require medical attention. Weapons must usable under all conditions with minimum to the firer, other members of the same side or third parties. Reduced numbers of line items ­ multipurpose rounds only if terminal effect is satisfactory. Power sources need to be efficient and effective. Vehicles must operate in zones of own choosing. Need to be optimised for both firing weapons and movement.

NJ Curtis, PJ Dortmans

File: a-semiquantitative-construct-to-identify-opportunities-for-technology.pdf
Title: A Semiquantitative Construct to Identify Opportunities for Technology Insertion using a Generic Description of the Land Forces
Author: NJ Curtis, PJ Dortmans
Author: DSTO
Subject: Land Warfare Conference [Proc] p364-380
Keywords: Military Operations Research, Influence Diagrams, Future Army
Published: Tue Apr 1 16:20:44 2003
Pages: 15
File size: 0.14 Mb


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