New forms of Political Order in North Kivu. The case of the governor Eugène Serufuli, L Jourdan

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Content: Paper presented at the conference "Beside the state. New forms of political power inpost-1990's Africa" Milano, December 2005 New forms of political order in North Kivu The case of the governor Eugene Serufuli Luca Jourdan1 Abstract North Kivu has been dubbed the "African powder-keg" since it is the epicentre of the First African World War, the conflict that has been ravaging Congo since 1996. This image, even if oversimplified, refers to a context characterized by an ongoing war which reproduces itself in a situation of an "endlessly failing but never quite fully failed state". The rivalry between "indigenous people" and people of Rwandan origin continues to foment local conflict and social breakdown. From the eighteenth century to the present, North Kivu has been the destination of a multitude of kinyarwanda speaking migrants, both Hutu and Tutsi, coming from the neighbouring Rwanda. In some regions of North Kivu, such as Masisi, the Banyarwanda (people from Rwanda) are now the majority of the population and the competition between them and the "indigenous inhabitants"- a dispute originally related to land issues ­ has assumed a regional dimension. This complex scenario constitutes the background of the rise of Eugene Serufuli, a Hutu member of the Banyarwanda community who is now the governor of North Kivu. His alliance with Rwanda has made him a key actor in the region, given the incapacity of the Kinshasa government to compete against him. Serufuli has his own militia, the Local Defence Forces, and his own NGO, Tout pour la Paix et le Dйveloppement, and through these two institutions he controls the political and military life and many economic activities. From this point of view, Serufuli's ascent constitutes a significant example of the affirmation of a new form of political order which places itself alongside the central state. Nevertheless this latter, even if weak, continues to be a key actor in the political scene kept alive mainly by Congolese nationalism and international recognition. 1. Introduction: the difficulties of peace The war in Congo can be divided into two phases: 1) the AFDL (Alliance des Forces pour la Libйration du Congo/Zaпre) campaign, an armed movement supported mainly by Rwanda and Uganda and led by Laurent Dйsirй Kabila who in July 1997 became president of the Democratic Republic of Congo (former Zaire), putting an end to 32 years of the Mobutu regime; 2) the RCD (Rassemblement Congolais pour la Dйmocratie) rebellion in August 1998, an armed group supported again by Rwanda and Uganda, the former allies who wanted to reassert their power in Congo after Kabila's "betrayal". Since April 2003, owing to the 2002 Global and All-Inclusive Agreement signed in Sun City (South Africa), Congo has been ruled by a transitional government. This government includes all the former belligerents who share the different posts: one president and four vice-presidents, 28 ministers, 25 vice ministers, 500 deputies and 120 senators, 10 provincial governors and 9 military regional commanders. As a result of this cacophony, the peace process remains uncertain with deadly consequences for the civil 1 I would like to thank the Ford Foundation (USA) which financed the research project "Re-Imagining Peace After Massacres", coordinated by Beatrice Pouligny (CERI, Paris). This project has involved four countries (Bosnia, Cambodia, Congo and Guatemala) and I was country coordinator for the Democratic Republic of Congo.
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population mainly in the East2. The national elections, which were planned for June 2005, have been postponed to March 2006. Furthermore, the ex-belligerents, who are now members of the transitional government, have been many times accused of corruption and mismanagement. Although some positive steps forward have been made - for example, a new law on citizenship was promulgated and a draft of a new constitution should be submitted to a referendum on the 18 December - one of the main obstacles to the peace process is the reunification of the army. The leaders of the various factions continue to hold parallel command chains within the New National army and the soldiers, as well as civil servants, are not regularly paid. As a result, pillaging and corruption are widespread and routinely practiced. This context is a fertile ground for the emergence of new forms of political order among which the ascent of Serufuli is a quite original example.
2. Focus on Eastern Congo Although a multitude of peace agreements have been signed, East Congo is still at the core of continuous tensions. Recently, internal clashes within local militias, the so called Mayi-Mayi, have provoked largescale displacements above all in Katanga where the number of IDPs (internally displaced people) has now reached 280.000. In Ituri, the local militias keep on attacking civilians despite a large presence of UN contingents. In Kivu, the Forces Dйmocratiques pour la Libйration du Rwanda (FDLR)3 - a military and political faction which includes the former Interahamwe geonocidal militias who fled from Rwanda to Eastern Congo in 1994 ­ continues to ravage civilians. Besides, the presence of FDLR militias in Kivu forest and rural areas is considered by Kigali a major threat to its national security, justifying in this way the ongoing Rwandan interference in Congolese internal affairs. Nowadays, the province of North Kivu is ruled by Eugene Serufuli, a pro-Rwanda governor who has been able to build up an articulate power structure. Serufuli was appointed governor in 2000 during the RCD-G rebellion backed by Rwanda. In this article, I will try to analyse the pillars of his power and the strategies he has adopted, both at the local and at the regional levels, to enforce and perpetuate it. At the local level, Serufuli is able to manipulate (of course, this means also to foment) the ethnic rivalries between the Banyarwnada and the "indigenous" populations. In addition, Serufuli has created two major institutions to affirm his power : a Non Governmental Organization, called Tout pour la Paix et le Dйveloppement (TPD), literally "Everything for Peace and Development", and a private militia, called Local Defence Forces (LDF). At the regional level his power is based on a solid alliance with Kigali which gives him economic and military support. Finally, Serufuli resorts to a strategy of "extraversion"4 through the exploitation of the aid industry which likely plays an important role in confirming the local power structures.
2 The International Crisis Group has reported that «as many as 1,000 people a day still die from war-related causes - mainly disease and malnutrition, but also continuing violence». Cfr. ICG, A Congo action plan, Africa Briefing, n. 34, Nairobi/Brussels, 19 October 2005, p. 1. 3 The FDLR have a web site where their political claims are published: http://mitglied.lycos.de/FDLR/ 4 I refer to J.-F. Bayart, Africa in the World: a History of Extraversion, «African Affairs», 2000, 99, 217-267.
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3. The Banyarwanda emergence As I mentioned before, Eugene Serufuli is a Hutu, a member of the large Banyarwanda community in North Kivu. His belonging to this community, as we will see, has played a fundamental role in his political ascent. In order to clarify this aspect I will focus briefly on the history of Banyarwanda. The presence in North Kivu of a large community of Kinyarwanda speakers, the Banyarwanda (literally, people from Rwanda), a mix of Hutu and Tutsi, has always been perceived as a threat by the local chiefs, called bami (sing. mwami), of the "indigenous" populations. There are essentially two key factors at the core of this rivalry : 1) strong competition for land which stirs up bloody conflicts within and between the different communities 2) the Banyarwanda right to participate in Congolese political life which gave rise to an ongoing dispute about their nationality5 that is part of what Mamdamy has called the "crisis of post-colonial citizenship". Historically the Great Lakes Region has always been characterized by important migratory fluxes, even before the colonization period which established previously unknown frontiers. During the decades of the Belgian mandate in Rwanda, the colonial administration encouraged migration from Rwanda to Congo. On the one hand the goal was to relieve the demographic pressure in Rwanda, on the other hand the vast Eastern Congolese regions needed more labour to exploit plantations and mines. In 1937 the colonial administration established the Mission d'Immigration des Banyarwanda (MIB), the Immigration Mission of Banyarwanda, an institution which aimed to manage all the population movements from Rwanda to Congo. The term Banyarwanda started to be used in Kivu during the 1940s in order to define the growing Kinyarwanda-speaking population. Nowadays this category, quite generic, includes6: the Hutu farmers born in Masisi whose parents were transplanted there by the colonial administration; the Kinyarwanda speaking communities of Bwisha and Bwito which in pre-colonial time belonged to the kingdom of Rwanda; the Rwandan migrants ­ mostly Hutu ­ who arrived in Kivu autonomously before and after colonization; the Tutsi breeders settled in Kivu with their herds; and finally a multitude of refugees, mostly Tutsi, who fled persecutions in Rwanda. Since independence, in 1960, the status of the Banyarwanda has always remained uncertain. In 1972 the Congolese government, at that time Zaire, collectively gave Zairean nationality to the Banyarwanda, allowing them access to land and the possibility of political careers. Nevertheless in 1981 the previous law was abrogated and the nationality was revoked creating in this way a situation that Prunier has defined as "identitarian confusion7". Till now, in North Kivu, the citizenship question remains explosive, particularly in Masisi and Rutshuru territories where many
5 The problem of "citizenship" concerns also the Banyamulenge, a Tutsi population installed since a long time in South Kivu who enrolled massively in Kabila's army. On this subject cfr. K. Vlassenroot, Citizenship, Identity Formation in South Kivu: The case of the Banyamulenge, «Review of African political economy», n. 93-94, 2002, pp. 499-515. 6 Cfr. P. Mathieu, P. J. Laurent, A. Mafikiri Tsongo and S. Mugangu Cohabitations imposйes et tensions politiques au Nord-Kivu, 1939-1994 : une trajectoire conflictuelle, in P. Mathieu e J. ­ C. Willame, Conflits et guerres au Kivu et dans la rйgion des Grands Lacs, «Cahiers Africains», 1999, n. 39-40, p. 13, footnote 1. 7 Cfr. R. Pourtier, La guerre au Kivu: un conflit multidimensionnel, «Afrique Contemporaine», special number, L'Afrique face aux conflits, 1996, pp. 15-38.
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Hutu and Tutsi immigrants are still considered Rwandan, that is to say foreigners, and thus ineligible to vote8. At the beginning of the 1990s, Congo entered into a democratic transition process. In August 1991 the Confйrence Nationale Souveraine (CNS) was established in Kinshasa. This transitory institution aimed to lead the country to democratic elections, a project which failed soon after. Mobutu was able to boycott this process by continuous manipulations of ethnic tensions in Kivu, in this way bringing about a drastic escalation of violence between Banyarwanda and indigenous groups, especially Hunde. At that time, at the core of the tensions in North Kivu was the selection of the local representatives to send to the CNS. In 1991 the local administration launched a campaign to identify the national citizens, but the decision to deny nationality to the majority of Banyarwanda gave rise to clashes. The Banyarwanda organized themselves into a political organization called Mutuelle des Agriculteurs des Virunga (MAGREVI) and at the same time the indigenous chiefs were disowned. Tensions increased, and in 1993, tens of Banyarwanda were massacred at the market of Ntoto (Masisi) by ethnic militias formed mostly by young Hunde, Nyanga and Tembo. A year later, in July 1994, with the arrival in Kivu of hundreds of thousands of Hutu refugees from Rwanda, the conflict inevitably degenerated. In short, the Interahamwe militias re-organized themselves in the refugees camps around Goma and Bukavu, benefiting also from the humanitarian aid dispensed by the international NGOs. The re-formed militias started to persecute the Tutsi population living in Kivu (Tutsi-Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge) and to carry out raids inside Rwanda. The anti-Tutsi feeling soon spread to Congo and in May 1996, about 1000 Tutsi, who had sheltered in a monastery called Mokoto in Masisi, were massacred. The year after Kigali supported the creation of the AFDL but the liberation war led by Kabila did not bring peace to the East. In July 1998 the rupture of the alliance between Kabila and Rwanda resulted in another rebellion led by the RCD based in Goma, the capital of North Kivu. It was in this new context that Serufuli appeared on the political scene.
4. Serufuli's ascent. As I argued above, the major aims of the Rwandan government in organizing and supporting the AFDL campaign in 1997 were to secure its borders and protect the Tutsi population (TutsiBanyarwanda and Banyamulenge) living in Eastern Congo. The overthrown of Mobutu's regime, which had lost international support, was considered a necessary step to bring stability to the Great Lakes Region. With the second rebellion in 1998, the political context changed as well as the goals of the Rwandan interference in Congolese affairs. The economic interests started to prevail and the exploitation of the Congolese natural resources ­ minerals, (mostly diamonds, gold and coltan), and other resources such as wood and even cows ­ became the main interest behind the conflict. In the logic of a war-economy, the maintenance of at least a low-intensity conflict has become functional to the economic interests of the various belligerents. As many scholars have underlined, 8 The Parliament promulgated a law in November 2004 that accorded citizenship to all ethnic groups which were in the Congo at independence in 1960. This law did not solve the problem of citizenship since many Banyarwanda arrived in Congo after that date.
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while organizations such as ALIR (Armйe du Libйration du Rwanda) ­ made up of Hutu rebels ­ posed and continue to pose a real threat to Kigali, Rwanda prefers keeping this kind of opposition in check rather than fully destroying it9. In this new context the Rwandan government has opted for a kind of indirect rule over North Kivu. In fact, in the last few years Kigali has tried to reinforce the political and economic power of the Banyarwanda elites. As Koen Vlassenroot has argued, land control was part of this strategy, especially in Masisi where, «on the one hand land was turned into an asset to secure new strategies of economic control, especially after the spectacular increase in the price of coltan . On the other hand, land became a crucial element of a powerful Banyarwanda coalition for its building and consolidation of a new complex of power, profit and protection». Consequently, the ethnic identity has become «a powerful instrument of inclusion and protection for the Banyarwanda community and exclusion for the rest of the population»10. To maintain control over North Kivu through the mediation of the Banyarwanda elite, it was indispensable to keep the Banyarwanda community united. The risk was that the HutuBanyarwanda would join the Hutu rebels, to the prejudice of the Tutsi population in Congo and Rwanda security. To achieve this goal a double strategy was adopted by Kigali and its local allies: on the one hand, many young Banyarwanda, mostly Hutu, were mobilised and enrolled in local militias, called Local Defences Forces, which had to restrain Hutu-rebels; on the other, some HutuBanyarwanda were favoured for positions in the North Kivu political administration in order to gain the full support of their community. This double strategy was fully realised when Eugene Serufuli was named governor of North Kivu: the ascent to power of a Hutu was instrumental in keeping the Banyarwanda united, avoiding the risk that Hutu-Banyarwanda would join Hutu-rebels, while at the same time maintaining this community under the control of Kigali. . Serufuli was born in 1962 in Ruruma, a village in Rutshuru, one of the territories of North Kivu. He studied biochemistry in Goma at the Insitut Mwanga and he continued his studies in medical techniques in Nyakunde (Ituri) and then in Kinshasa. Finally he got a specialisation in public health at the Adventist University in Goma. During the 1990s he worked as an anaesthetist at the General Hospital in Goma and he was at the head of the labour union within the hospital. At first, he played a role in the MAGREVI, the Banyarwanda political organization, and in August 1998 he became a member of the RCD political board. In October 2000 he was named governor of North Kivu. Once he became governor, in December 2000, Serufuli gradually enhanced his power to the point where some commentators considered him as a potential rival of Azarias Ruberwa, the leader of the RCD-G who is now one of Congo's vice-presidents. The new governor soon revitalised and reinforced the two major institutions under his control: a Non Governmental Organization, called Tout pour la Paix et le Dйvelopment (TPD), and a private militia, called the Local Defence Forces (LDF). These two institutions - which are not clearly separate since the TPD employees, in case of 9 Cfr. T. Trefon, S. Van Hoyweghen, S. Smis, State failure in the Congo: Perceptions and Realities, «Review of African Political Economy», n. 93-94, 2002, p. 382. 10 K. Vlassenroot, Land and Conflict: the case of Masisi, in K. Vlassenroot and T. Raeymaekers (Conflict Research Group), Conflict and social transformation in Eastern DR Congo, Gent, Academia Press, 2004, p. 96.
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need, can serve as militiamen in the LDF and vice versa - should be considered as the pillars of Serufuli's power.
5. LDF and TPD: an alternative power structure in North Kivu The Local Defence Forces were originally organized in 1999 by the previous governor of North Kivu, Gafundi Kanamuhanga, a Tutsi-Banyarwandan. LDF is locally called the "armйe du gouverneur", and this means that it is perceived as Serufuli's personal army. Since he was named governor, recruitment has been enlarged to cover the entire North Kivu region and has been forced upon the Banyarwanda community which has also been obliged to make cash payments or give donations to the militia11. Serufuli reinforced this militia with the military support of the Rwandan army12. The LDF soldiers, which now amount to 15,000/20,000, are based in Rutshuru and in the Virunga park where they systematically pillage the local populations since they do not get paid regularly. Given that in Congo the political and the military spheres are not separate, Serufuli has used the LDF to augment his political weight. For example in December 2004, the LDF and the RCD-G army fought in Kanyabayonga against the FARDC, the new Congolese national army which, according to the transitional government in Kinshasa, had to be deployed in North Kivu. After this conflict, which was quite advantageous for the governor, Serufuli was re-named governor of the entire province of North Kivu, extending his authority also to the territory of Beni and Butembo which previously were under the control of Mbusa Nyamwisi, a dissident member of RCD who had turned towards Kinshasa. The agreement for the re-nomination of Serufuli was reached in Kanyabayonga, under the mediation of MONUC which in this way has recognized the authority of the governor over all of North Kivu. In a way, this recognition was inevitable given that the military power of Serufuli is considerable and his exclusion from the North Kivu administration could lead to further clashes involving thousands of civilians. Nowadays, the new Congolese national army (FARDC) has been deployed in North Kivu but, according to local sources, the fifth brigade, which controls the main centres (Goma, Sake, Kirolirwe, Rumangabo, Minova, Numbi, Kalungu and Kalehe) and is led by colonel Nyembo Abdalah, is composed mainly of ex-LDF militiamen. This means that the process of the reunification of the army remains fictitious: Serufuli continues to hold a parallel command chain within the national army and North Kivu, especially the area of Goma, is not yet under the control of Kinshasa. The other pillar of Serufuli's power, as I mentioned above, is the NGO Tout pour Paix et le Dйveloppement which has its headquarter in Goma. TPD was founded in 1998 by some big Banyarwanda landowners and some members of the MAGREVI, the Banyarwanda political organization of which Serufuli was a representative. Once he became governor, Serufuli enhanced the NGO, transforming it into an organ of his economic and political power. Officially, the goal of TPD is to promote peace in the region and reconstruct solidarity among the different ethnic groups through the implementation of development projects in the rural areas of North Kivu and in Goma: 11 On this subject cfr. K. Vlassenroot, Land and Conflict: the case of Masisi, cit., p. 97. 12 On arms flow in North Kivu cfr. Amnesty International, Democratic Republic of Congo: Arming the East, 5 July 2005.
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road rehabilitation, re-construction of schools, rehabilitation of the health system, creation of an agrarian cooperative in Goma etc. The major activity TPD was supposed to commit itself to was the repatriation of mostly Banyarwanda refugees who had left Congo and found refuge in Rwanda. For all these activities, TPD has benefited from the financial support of the Kigali government. In reality, TPD has always worked as a political instrument of the Banyarwanda community in search of political and economic affirmation. In fact, since Serufuli became governor of North Kivu, TPD has become essentially an instrument of control of the political and economic life of the region. The strategy of Serufuli has been to replace all the administrative and traditional authorities with some reliable members of the TPD. Most of the bami (traditional chiefs) of the indigenous ethnic groups, especially Hunde, were replaced with some Banyarwanda representatives who in this way could control the distribution of land. Furthermore, TPD has furnished logistic support to the RCD army and LDF. Furthermore, according to local sources, Serufuli has made a lot of money thanks to his cooperation with the humanitarian aid industry. When Goma was destroyed by the volcanic eruption, in January 2003, the NGO TPD received economic support to implement rehabilitation projects and worked as well as the local partner of several international NGOs. Furthermore Serufuli is part of a network of businessmen which controls the major economic activities, including mineral traffic, food supply and transport for WFP (World Food Programme), a very good business nowadays in Eastern Congo13. To describe the relationship between the governor and the international community and the humanitarian industry, nothing is more eloquent than some local expression I heard during my field research: «Il joue au bouric avec la communautй internationale», and even funnier «il les roule dans la farine». Recently, the Security Council Committee of the UN approved a list of individuals and entities subject to special measures. TPD was judged in the following terms: «implicated in violation of the arms embargo, by providing assistance to RCD-G, particularly in supplying trucks to transport arms and troops, and also by transporting weapons to be distributed to parts of the population in Masisi and Rutshuru, North Kivu, in early 2005»14. What is surprising about this UN list is that the name of Serufuli is never mentioned: it is likely that he is still one of the "untouchables"! 6. Conclusions I chose to analyse the very specific case of Serufuli because in Congo, as well as in many other African countries, the fragmentation of authority has dissolved the boundaries between the public and the private spheres. This is why the political analysis must focus on specific cases, even on the biographical dimension, in order to throw light on the emergent forms of power. Certainly, as a conclusion, some general considerations on the evolution of the Congolese state are indispensable.
13 According to my sources, the major economic activities in Goma are controlled by a triumvirate composed of Mr. Serufuli, Mr. Modй and Mr. Musanganya. The latter has the monopoly of the beer trade and trades in fuel as well. Mr. Modй supplies food to WFP and has a big transport company with tens of trucks which are used by WFP as well. The triumvirate controls also mineral traffic, especially coltan, and they are investing money in some futuristic projects such as the rehabilitation of the Hotel in the Virunga park. ; 14 Cfr. Security Council Press Release, Security Council Committee issues list of individuals and entities subject to measures imposed by resolution 1596 (2005), sc/8546, New York, 1 November 2005.
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Congo is not a failed state: actually, borrowing the brilliant expression of Pierre Englebert , it is like «an endlessly failing but never quite fully failed state»15. What we define as a state, according to a western definition of state, is represented by the Kinshasa central government and its "virtual institutions". From my point of view, what keeps alive this meta-state, is a double force: on the one hand the Congolese nationalism, on the other hand the international community. The fact that the Congolese people show a very strong national identity has been considered as a paradox, due to the historical absence of mutual rights and duties between the state and its citizens. This nationalism can be considered as a legacy of Mobutu's grandeur and to some extent, as Englebert has suggested, the very idea of Congo's grandeur is all that remains for a people that has been dispossessed of its wealth, its peace and much of its dignity16. Without doubt, the war has reinforced the national sentiment which is fed by a very strong anti-Tutsi feeling, given that the Tutsi, in the popular discourse, are considered the major reason for the Congo catastrophe. Even if the origin and the expressions of Congolese national identity were to be invetigated further on, it is clear that nationalism is a major barrier to the disintegration of Congo. Besides, the Congolese state still exists, and likely will continue to exist in the future, because it benefits from international recognition which is indispensable to take advantage of the international flows of aid which, according to the extraversion paradigm, are partially reinvested in the internal political game. As we know, international recognition is a fundamental source of power which can compensate for the lack of internal support and legitimacy. It is difficult for domestic rivals to question the legitimacy of an internationally recognized leader: is it not the case, for example, that Kabila junior, as soon as he was named president, liberalized the economy and re-established relationships with the World Bank and the IMF. In conclusion, the Congolese state remains an instrument for the predation of external and internal resources and this fact explains its residual power and its preservation. Given that national borders remain an inviolable taboo in Africa, the Congolese state will likely survive: consequently the only alternative for Serufuli is to cope with it. Nowadays the governor is fighting for a federalist reform of the state which will allow him to preserve his power and at the same time the Rwandan influence over North Kivu will be based on a legal framework17. The major risk Serufuli is running is to be
15 Cfr. P. Englebert, A Research Note on Congo's Nationalist Paradox, «Review of African Political Economy», n. 9394, 2002, p. 593. 16 Ibid, p. 592. 17 In an interview, Serufuli eulogised federalism affirming that: «Un tel systиme a l'avantage de rapprocher les gouvernants et les gouvernйs, par la simplification des procйdures, la rйduction des distances gйographiques et la rapiditй dans la prise des dйcisions. Toutes ces institutions, publiques et privйes, sauront alors crйer des synergies pouvant amorcer un rйel dйveloppement aux diffйrents niveaux territorial, provincial et national. [...]Le fйdйralisme ne signifie donc pas partition du pays, mais plutфt rapprochement des gouvernants et des gouvernйs, et rйsolution rapide des problиmes locaux. Le fйdйralisme permet encore mieux l'adaptation de certaines lois aux rйalitйs gйographiques, culturelles, йconomiques et sociales locales. Seul le fйdйralisme garantit d'une maniиre permanente une vйritable dйmocratie participative, permet de mieux impliquer la population dans la rйsolution de ses propres problиmes d'une maniиre durable. Ce qui rejoint la conception de l'auto-Prise en charge que nous expйrimentons depuis quelques annйes au Nord-Kivu. [...]De plus, vous conviendrez avec moi que la pratique du fйdйralisme et la responsabilisation des Йtats fйdйrйs nйcessite, pour plus d'efficacitй, un accroissement de ses moyens opйrationnels, dont les finances mises а leur disposition. Ce qui signifie aussi, un partage plus йquitable des recettes publiques entre l'Йtat fйdйral et les Йtats fйdйrйs; ces recettes devront кtre dйvolues prioritairement aux actions de dйveloppement du pays qu'au maintien du train de vie de l'appareil de l'Йtat». Cfr. lesoftonline. net (http://ns30777.ovh.net/~lesoft/pages/phil.php?id=438, consulted on 18/09/2005).
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"excommunicated" by the international community but, as we know, in Africa risk hardly ever discourages politicians from reaching their objectives.

L Jourdan

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