The new member states and the EU, KH Goetz

Tags: member states, integration, Europeanisation, Oxford University Press, accession negotiations, Central and Eastern Europe, membership, European Council, European Union, accession states, transposition, Manchester, civil service, core executive, accession countries, enlargement, Czech Republic, Journal of Common Market Studies, EU integration, Manchester University Press, European Integration, Central and Eastern European politics, domestic effects, Western Europe, national executives, integration process, Eastern European, the European Union, Eastern Europe, Europe, J. Hughes, European Accession, Cambridge University Press, pp, Journal of European Public Policy, M. Keating, Membership Negotiations, European Journal of Political Research, EU Membership, EU Enlargement
Content: The New Member States and the EU Klaus H. Goetz forthcoming in Simon Bulmer and Christian Lequesne (2004) Member States and the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press). SUMMARY Compared to the EU-15, the ten new EU member states are characterised by distinct patterns of integration and Europeanisation. Their experiences so far have been shaped by a phased process of gaining entry to the EU and `anticipatory and adaptive Europeanisation'. The capacity of the new members influence the integration process is limited as a consequence of their diverse interests and weak intraregional coordination amongst the Central and Eastern European states. Europeanisation has affected polity, politics and public policies, but such effects have been shallower than in long-standing member states. Introduction What is distinct about the experiences of integration and Europeanisation of the ten states that have become members of the EU in May 2004 when compared to the other countries and regions analysed in this volume? Three considerations stand out: · The nature of the new members' relationship to the EU: When the new members ­ Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia ­ acceded to the EU on 1 May 2004, this marked the culmination of a long-drawn out process. Cyprus and Malta had association agreements with the EU since the early 1970s and had applied for EU membership already in 1990. The Central and Eastern European countries successively followed suit between 1994 and 1996. From 1991 onwards, they had developed institutionalised ties to the EU in the form of the `Europe agreements', which `provided for cooperation in political, economic, cultural and other areas ­ including a large degree of liberalisation of trade in nonagricultural goods ­ and for the adoption of important parts of EU rules and policies (...) The preamble of the agreements recognised membership as the wish of the associated states, without affirming it as the aim of the EU' (Avery 2004: 35). For the majority of countries, accession negotiations started in March 1998 (negotiations with Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and Slovakia were opened in February 2000) and negotiations were closed in April 2003 (see Tables 1A and 1B). The experience of integration and Europeanisation of the ten new members has, therefore, so far been one of a phased process of gaining entry to the EU, on the one hand, and `anticipatory and adaptive Europeanization' (Бgh 2003), on the other. The nature of their relationship to the EU has been that of applicants, candidates, negotiating partners, and acceding countries rather than of full members. The patterns of Europeanisation that have emerged up to now are likely to reflect their `outsider' status. Thus, they were, until recently,
primarily `downloaders' of EU law, policies and practices, i.e., `policy-takers', with only limited opportunities for `uploading' country-specific preferences and priorities as `policy-makers'. Accordingly, `impositional' Europeanisation is more likely than in member states that have been able to influence, if not determine, the acquis communautaire. Following full membership, this pattern is set to change, especially in policy areas of central concern to the new members. Yet, as the experience of Southern enlargement during the 1980s suggests, their `uploading' efforts are bound to remain selective for the foreseeable future, reflecting, in part, their status as medium-sized, small or even micro-states (with the obvious exception of Poland). Tables 1A and 1B about here · The nature of the EU's approach to the new members: The run-up to May 2004 differed decisively from previous enlargements of the EU. Key differences included: an extended period of gradual approximation and adaptation, which lasted for some 15 years; a much greater emphasis on the adoption and full implementation of the acquis prior to accession than had been the case in the 1980s, when Greece, Portugal and Spain had joined; the detailed attention paid to domestic institutional capacity to implement the acquis; wide-ranging conditions for membership in the form of the `Copenhagen criteria' adopted in 1993, which included `stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, Human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; the existence of a functioning market economy, as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; the ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union'; the emergence of an informal acquis, i.e. norms and expectations against which the applicants would be measured that were not part of the legal obligations of membership that applied to the EU-15; the creation of an elaborate machinery for monitoring and assessing the candidates' progress on their way towards meeting the accession criteria; and a reliance on conditionality (Grabbe 2002; Smith 2003), whereby progress on the way to full entry was linked to meeting often highly specific conditions, targets and deadlines. This distinct approach to enlargement reflected concerns of both the EU Commission and the EU-15 member states over the consequences of adding ten new member states. These concerns centred on the functioning of the institutions of the EU, notably the Council of Ministers, but also the Commission and, to a lesser extent, the European Parliament; the tensions between widening and the prospects of a further deepening of integration; and, perhaps most significantly, the question of how the political, economic and security interests of existing member states and their power in the EU could be safeguarded. In a nutshell, the EU strategy was to ensure that the political, economic and social costs of domestic adaptation would largely accrue prior to full membership, so as to minimise the burdens on the enlarged EU-25.
Table 2 about here · The nature of the new members' relationships to each other: Although there are important commonalities in their experiences of integration and Europeanisation, the new members do evidently not form a cohesive group. Malta and Cyprus have not much in common, beyond their status as Mediterranean islands. The Central and Eastern European accession countries. are, in themselves, a heterogeneous grouping, including the Baltic states, which emerged from the break-up of the Soviet Union; Slovenia, which declared its independence from Yugoslavia in 1991; the Czech Republic and Slovakia, which became sovereign states in January 1993; Hungary and Poland. With the exception of Poland, all are medium-sized, small or micro states, and they differ significantly in terms of key socio-economic data (see Table 2). Political ties amongst the Central and Eastern European countries are weak, and, in some cases, strained, not least because of the existence of ethnic minorities in neighbouring countries (the relationship between Slovakia and Hungary may serve as an example). Attempts to strengthen such bonds, including the formation of the `Visegrad group' of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, have had only very limited success. Helen Wallace (2001) has stressed the importance of functional, territorial and affiliational linkages in understanding the historical trajectory of European integration in Western Europe, resulting in a `distinctive pattern of integration: multi-framework, multi-layer, multi-lateral and multi-purpose' (p. 12). This pattern is contrasted to that found in Central and Eastern Europe with `a segmented history, followed by recent attempts to define European engagement by achieving incorporation within the west European-defined transnational system. This move `towards' western Europe is now beginning, but only beginning, to be flanked by more local patterns of linkage. There are also tragic instances of de-linkage where (joint functions) tasks, territory and (affiliation) trust are all contested'. (p. 11) One immediate consequence for the integration process is that the diversity of interests, preferences and priorities of the new members `hit' the EU in an unmediated way, since little, if any, effective intraregional aggregation of positions appears to take place. The manner in which the accession negotiations were conducted did little to encourage the applicants to co-ordinate their views. Thus, `the "bilateral nature" of the process (...) was an important structural factor of the negotiations (...) it rendered it difficult for the applicant countries to present a common front to the EU' (Avery 2004: 39). This weakness of intraregional co-operation and co-ordination does not mean that the new member states are condemned to being weak `uploaders' in the EU policy process, but it certainly makes for turbulence and unpredictability. In addition to these factors fostering distinct patterns of integration and Europeanisation in the new member states, three further aspects ought to be noted at the outset: · The nature of the new members' relationships to existing member states: The horizontal dimension of European integration consists, at its core, of a series
of `special relationships', of which the Franco-German alliance has, perhaps, been the most celebrated. Enlargement has added decisively to this tapestry of special relationships, some of which are historically and politically highly charged. One need only mention the examples of Poland and Germany; Cyprus and Greece; Hungary, Slovenia and Austria; or Malta, Italy and the UK (on the latter see Baldacchino 2002). These ties indicate a potential for interstate co-operation and strategic alignment, but, in some cases, they also mark a source of conflict. Inevitably, they promote further bilateralisation and multilateralisation of relationships amongst the EU member states. · EU integration as part of a broader dynamic of state and nation-building, domestic transformation, and Western integration: EU integration and Europeanisation in the ten accession states can only be properly understood if considered in the context of the broader political and economic transformations that these countries have been undergoing over the last 15 years or so. Three such transformations stand out. First, since the late 1980s, the Baltic states, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia have experienced historically momentous processes of state-building, and, in some cases, nationbuilding. In the cases of Cyprus and Malta, too, integration, on the one hand, and state and nation-building, on the other, have been closely intertwined (Cini 2001). Second, as regards the Central and Eastern European members, their integration policies strongly interacted with a post-Communist dynamic of democratisation, marketisation and liberalisation. Third, EU integration proceeded alongside, and was influenced by, the accession countries' selective integration into other forms of international co-operation, notably through membership in the Council of Europe, the OECD and, most importantly, NATO (see Table 3). These `grand' transformations unfolded contemporaneously and had a mutual influence on each other. Table 3 about here To draw attention to specific features and basic conditions of integration and Europeanisation does not mean to ignore important precedents and parallels both with previous enlargements - the integration dimension - and the Europeanisation experiences of the EU-15, especially if one takes account of developments outside the North-Western core of the founding members. For instance, post-war Germany provides a paradigm for understanding the connection between state (re-)building and integration, and the Southern enlargements to Greece, Portugal and Spain of the 1980s illustrate the linkage between democratisation, liberalisation and integration. Spain also provides a Case Study of how EU integration and integration into NATO were linked, even at a time when defence and foreign security were outside the EU acquis. Weak horizontal ties, too, are nothing new in the EU. Greece has long served as an example, and, perhaps more surprisingly, Portugal and Spain have often been said to have a `back to back' rather than `face to face' relationship. Moreover, some of the specificities of the experiences of the countries considered here are bound to be of a transitional nature, whilst others are likely to persist in the medium and long-term. Nonetheless, as argued in the Conclusion, the new members, whilst forming a heterogeneous grouping, add decisively to existing diversity in the EU. As a
consequence, experience of integration and Europeanisation of the North-Western founder members of France, Germany and the Benelux countries, in particular, is becoming ever more exceptional (Dyson and Goetz 2003a), whilst, at the same time, losing some of its ideational attraction as a template to be followed by more recent members. The specific, although not necessarily unique, facets of integration and Europeanisation in the new member states also have implications for the analytical lenses employed in studying domestic polity, politics and public policy effects of accession. Two deserve highlighting: · Discussions of Europeanisation `Eastern-style' have tended to stress the `hierarchical' and `impositional' aspects of domestic `adaptation', fostered by `conditionality' (Grabbe 2002; Smith 2003). `Top-down' ­ as opposed to `bottom-up' - dynamics are often seen to play a more prominent role in shaping Europeanisation in the recent accession states when compared to longstanding members. As noted earlier, there has been immense pressure on the part of the EU to ensure the full adoption and `effective and efficient' implementation of the acquis prior to membership, and there are examples of intensive involvement of the EU in promoting institutional change even in areas such as the establishment of civil service systems where formal EU competences are minimal (Dimitrova 2002; Scherpereel 2003). Yet, this hierarchical perspective on Europeanisation should not obscure the `usage' of EU integration (Jacquot and Woll 2003) by domestic actors for their own purposes. More recent work on Europeanisation in Western European countries has emphasised `the use that domestic actors make of the EU in order to legitimate policy reforms, to develop new policy solutions, and to alter policy beliefs' (Dyson and Goetz 2003b: 18). But these `usages' are not restricted to the policy dimension; they can also, for example, be observed in the field of electoral and party competition, where the politics of Euroscepticism has emerged as an influential force in several of the new members (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2004). There is, as yet, little systematic research on this bottom-up dimension of Europeanisation in the new member states (but see Featherstone 2001), though there is no reason to doubt its importance. · Drawing on the insights of the Europeanisation literature that focuses on Western Europe, a strong case can be made that the institutional and policy effects of accession, in particular, have been more immediate than in other parts of the EU (Grabbe 2001; Goetz 2001). Oft-cited reasons include, inter alia, the weakness of institutional `cores' in the post-Communist states notably those which only came into being after the fall of Communism ­ which are less likely to offer resistance to `adaptive pressures' than the deeply embedded state institutions of Western Europe; evident crises of performance and legitimacy of domestic institutions, which encourage policy transfer and learning from foreign experiences; and the existence of institutional and policy `voids', so that Europeanisation involves not so much adaptation, but rather the ab ovo creation of new actors, institutions and policies.
On the other hand, and this is less often remarked upon, there are equally good arguments to suggest that Europeanisation effects, whilst more immediate, may also be less profound and that patterns of `institutionalisation for reversibility' prevail (Goetz 2002). Thus, the new members had little incentive to invest in `deep' Europeanisation that would `lock in' specific institutional and policy arrangements prior to full membership precisely because of their weak uploading capacity as demandeurs. They could hope that, as full members, they would be able to challenge, or escape altogether, some of the constrictions that a negotiation process that was structured to favour the existing members had imposed on them. `Rationalist' arguments suggesting a pattern of wide-ranging, but relatively shallow, effects are underscored by more constructivist understandings of Europeanisation, which stress the importance of learning and socialisation and note that institutions are not just constructed around interests, but norms and values. In the new member states, such learning and socialisation effects are likely to be, up to now, less deep because of their shorter period of intensive engagement with the EU and, for most of the time, an `outsider' status. They are equally likely to be less extensive, since, as discussed below, active engagement with the integration process has, up to now, been restricted to political, administrative and economic йlites. Under conditions of shallow institutionalisation, fluidity and uncertainty (on the latter see Grabbe 2003: 318ff), strategic interest-based `rational' behaviour by domestic actors is more likely than action according to a `logic of appropriateness'. As Schimmelfennig (2003) has shown, both need to be considered in understanding decision-making about enlargement; both should also be kept in mind when one tries to explain differing trajectories of Europeanisation in the new member states. Between Enlargement and domestic politics: The History of the European Issue The story of the evolution of the European issue in the accession countries can be told from two perspectives: an enlargement perspective; and a domestic politics perspective, which concentrates on the domestic circumstances that have shaped the quest for EU integration. The first perspective ­ enlargement - has tended to dominate so far, not least because this story is in some respects easier to tell, with clear landmark decisions along the path to full EU membership. The main steps on the part of the EU towards the integration of the ten new members are well-documented (see, for example, Mayhew 1998; Baun 2000; Torreblanca 2001; Papadimitriou 2002; Cremona 2003; Cameron 2004). After the fall of Communism, there was an early wave of goodwill and of help and assistance, which was partly bilateral and partly channelled through the European Union. In the pronouncements of both the EU and the leaders of existing member states, but also the new post-Communist political йlites, an early linkage was established between democratic transition and consolidation and European integration. Democracy was confirmed as a key condition for eventual EU membership (on the evolution of this condition see Verney 2002). At the same time, and not least with reference to the historical experiences of Germany, Italy and the Southern enlargements of the 1980s, the contribution of integration to underpinning a successful regime transition was underlined.
The chronology of enlargement differed somewhat from country to country, but the main sequence of events varied little, at least as far as the Central and Eastern European countries were concerned: early assistance after the fall of Communism; the conclusion of `Europe agreements' with the post-Communist states from 1991 onwards; the development of a `pre-accession' strategy on the part of the EU from 1993; applications for EU membership between 1994 and 1996 (Malta and Cyprus had applied for membership in 1990); the development of a `reinforced' accession strategy from 1997; the conclusion of `accession partnerships'; the opening of accession negotiations in March 1998 (or February 2000 in the cases of Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and Slovakia,); the conclusion of the negotiations in spring 2003, following the European Council in Copenhagen of December 2002; the signing of the Act of Accession in April 2003; and accession in May 2004. The last of the annual pre-accession `country reports', monitoring the countries' preparations for membership, were published in November 2003, but despite the many severely critical remarks that had survived the politicised editing process, enlargement had turned from a distant aspiration to a certainty. The overall trajectory of the EU's decision-making vis-а-vis the accession states can be described as the evolution of an increasingly differentiated `composite policy' (see Sedelmeier and Wallace 2000, where a concise overview of the Main Stages of the evolution of the EU approach can be found). In this composite policy, `decisions about the macro level of policy, to determine the overall objectives and parameters of policy' needed to be co-ordinated with `decisions about the specific detail and substance of policy, generally dealt with by the various policy-makers that have the relevant technical expertise and decisionmaking competences' (ibid.: 429). Table 4 about here The thrust of the EU's approach changed markedly over time, as its position became more elaborated and differentiated. Whilst initially the approach was principally enabling and assistance provided was to some extent `demand-driven', the `reinforced accession strategy' launched at the 1997 Luxembourg European Council, was, at heart, about ensuring the full adoption and implementation of the acquis by the prospective new members. The provision of pre-accession funding through the PHARE, ISPA and SAPARD instruments was `supply-led', for although the Central and Eastern European accession countries played a role in the definition of the projects for which these funds were to be used, the EU authorities defined their objectives and had to authorise their use (see Table 4).1 The `accession partnerships', concluded as part of the same strategy, provided `rather little scope for the candidates themselves to shape their pace and content, causing considerable criticism that the language of partnership disguises rather thinly the imposition of EU priorities' (Sedelmeier and Wallace 2000: 452). Tellingly, `from a legal point of view, they are not agreements but unilateral acts' (Maresceau 2003: 31). Overall, as accession approached, the European Commission, largely driven by the demands of existing member states, notably those sharing borders with the accession countries and the 1 ISPA: Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-accession; PHARE: an assistance programme launched in 1989 for Hungary and Poland only, but subsequently opened to all ten CEE applicants (i.e. the eight new member states, Bulgaria and Romania); SAPARD: Special Assistance Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development.
major net contributors and net recipients of the EU budget, increasingly hardened its stance on the comprehensive pre-accession adaptation. At the same time, the financial conditions of the first years of full membership worsened considerably between what had been agreed at the 1999 Berlin European Council and the deal that was offered at the conclusion of the negotiations (see Table 5): `in the field of regional policy they represented only 137 euros per head of population for the new members in 2006, compared with 231 euros per head for Greece, Spain and Portugal and in the field of agriculture they were based on a phasing-in of the EU's scheme of `direct payments' to farmers commencing at 25 per cent in 2004 and rising to 100 per cent over a long transitional period of ten years' (Avery 2004: 54). This increasingly `self-interested' approach on the part of the EU and its most powerful member states was, at least in part, informed by the universally recognised need to synchronise political, institutional and policy reforms in the prospective new members with institutional and policy reforms in the EU so that both sides would be `ready for each other'. The Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice, agreed in 1997 and 2000, respectively, and the European Convention, which proposed its draft of a European constitution in autumn 2003, constituted important milestones in reforming the EU itself, so as to increase its own `absorption' capacity and ensure its future functioning. Western politicians were also sensitive (or had to be seen to be sensitive) to public opinion in their own countries, which, in several key member states, was far from universally supportive of enlargement (see Table 6). Tables 5 and 6 about here Compared to the enlargement perspective, the evolution of the domestic histories and politics of EU integration in the ten new members is more difficult to sketch, but one key commonality may be noted. This has been the existence of a solid domestic йlite consensus in favour of EU integration, which, despite contestation from directly affected interests, such as agriculture or the coal and steel industries, was not fundamentally challenged, with the exceptions of Malta and, for a while, Slovakia. For example, the Euroskeptical musings of former Czech Prime Minister and now President, Vбclav Klaus (Brugge 2003), did little to slow down the integration process (although they may well have helped to delay domestic institutional and policy reform). Public opinion surveys and, in particular, the results of the accession referenda held in 2003 underscored that the political йlites in the accession countries had managed to carry the people with them ­ no mean feat in the often sharply partisan settings of post-Communist politics (see Tables 7 and 8). With the exception of Malta, there were no close referenda results, although there was considerable variation in voter turnout. What is, perhaps, in the longer term more significant than the results of the accession referenda is the fact that all bar one of the new members felt it necessary to hold such referenda (and several are committed to hold referenda on the future European Constitution). This provides an indication that as integration progresses it cannot be restricted to an йlite project, but is reliant on the active support of the citizens of the new members.
Tables 7 and 8 about here Negotiating Accession and Beyond: The European Diplomacy of the New Member States The scope for substantive bargaining between the EU and the prospective member states was strictly limited from the outset. The acquis was declared sacrosanct, and the Commission's strategy was to allow transitional arrangements only where the financial costs of its full implementation immediately upon accession would be prohibitive, as applied most notably in the field of environmental policy. This does not mean, however, that the negotiations amounted to little more than windowdressing. There were intensive discussions over the timing and sequencing of national measures for the transposition of EU legislation into national law, the opening and closing of the 31 policy `chapters' around which the negotiations were structured, and, in particular, over what constituted satisfactory adoption and effective implementation of the acquis. Recent research on transposition and implementation of EU legislation in the EU-15 highlights that there is a considerable degree of discretion and interpretation when it comes to determining what constitutes compliance (Bцrzel 2003; Falkner et al. 2004). This was also evident in the wide-ranging annual progress reports (see Figure 1), which seemed, in many instances, based on highly subjective assessments and were themselves subject to intense discussions between the EU authorities and the applicants, within the Commission and between the latter and the member states (notably those holding the Presidency of the Council). The European diplomacy of the accession states was, therefore, for the most part about what could be regarded as acceptable domestic institutional and policy responses. There were, of course, exceptions where matters of `high politics' were involveD. Examples included the highly conflictual relations between Slovakia and the EU between 1994 and 1998 under the leadership of Prime Minister Meciar (Malovб and Rybб 2003); the intense high-level international diplomacy surrounding the resolution of the partition of Cyprus (Nugent 2000); or the thorny issue of citizenship policies and the protection of national minorities in the Baltic states (Gelazis 2003). Figure 1 about here In the diplomacy of the accession states, size and tactical and strategic calculations mattered. Poland is generally regarded as having been the most assertive negotiator, safe in the knowledge that there would be no enlargement without it. This assertive stance has, of course, continued since. Thus, Poland was one of the signatories of the `Letter of Eight' of January 2003, which supported the US position on Iraq, a stance that brought it in direct and open conflict with France and Germany. In December 2003, it was Poland, together with Spain, that was widely held responsible for the failure to agree on a European Constitution at the Rome European Council. Already in 2000, William Wallace (2000: 537) predicted that `Polish governments are likely to prove as important players as Spanish, with as determined a commitment to the promotion of their perceived interests'. The approach of the EU and key member states, notably France and Germany, during the accession negotiations, may help to
explain this conflictual diplomacy. Prior to the conclusion of the accession negotiations, Attila Бgh (2003: 152), one of the most perceptive analysts of Central and Eastern European politics, noted that Poland might follow in the footsteps of Spain as a `very tough negotiating partner', `if the incumbent members socialize the new members again to a heavy fight for their national interests through the merciless use of their political and economic overweight in the closing accession negotiations in Copenhagen'. Viewed from this perspective, Polish intransigence in Rome may have been the price the old member states have had to pay for the manner in which they shaped the conditions of membership. Patterns of Europeanisation I: Polity and Politics What domestic effects associated with EU integration may be observed so far in the new member states? And how have these effects been produced? As far as the EU impact on the polity ­ the public institutions of the state ­is concerned, the experience of Western Europe would suggest that governmental-administrative institutions and here, in particular, linkage institutions at the central level of government, have been most immediately affected. Linkage refers to `the institutional arrangements that link national executives and EU authorities and the institutional practices that have evolved at the national level to support national-EU connections' (Goetz 2000: 212). In the context of the accession states, this has meant, up to know, particularly those governmental and administrative actors, structures and procedures that were in charge of the accession negotiations; the transposition of the acquis; and the management of pre-accession funds. There is already a good deal of research on this issue, with work on Hungary (Бgh 2003: 91ff.), Slovenia (Fink Hafner and Lajh 2003), Lithuania (Nakrosis 2003), Poland (Zubek 2002), and comparative studies covering a range of countries, including the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia (Lippert et al. 2001; Laffan 2003). As in Western Europe (Kassim et al. 2000; Wessels et al. 2003), the new member states differ as regards the degree to which linkage functions have been concentrated within specialised units; patterns of interministerial co-ordination; and the role of the chief executive and his staff in domestic-EU linkage. For example, in the Slovenian case, `despite the formally crucial role assigned to the Government Office for European Affairs in managing EU issues (...) in practice a relatively polycentric model developed (...) In the vertical co-ordination, the Prime Minister played the key co-ordinating role in cases of politically sensitive questions. The Negotiating Team as an expert group ensured the prevalence of expertise over political and factional interests in the negotiating process, and the Council of Ministers played the role of the ultimate national executive unit for EU affairs' (Fink Hafner and Lajh 2003: 166; emphases in the original). By contrast, in Poland, after a prolonged period during the 1990s, when `the Polish core executive lacked sufficient resources to effectively direct, coordinate and advise line ministries in the transposition process' (Zubek 2002: 6), there was a major shift towards a much more centralised approach in 2000, which included `strong leadership from the prime minister and the minister for European affairs' and `reinforced central and hierarchical coordination mechanisms' (ibid.: 11). Some observers have argued that the creation of specialised executive units dealing with accession, transposition and pre-accession funds has fostered fragmentation at
the level of central government, as such units constitute organisational `islands of excellence' or `enclaves' (Goetz 2001; Nunberg 2000); certainly, dealing with EU business has, on the whole, tended to increase the autonomy of executive actors. For example, a recent study of Czech civil servants concerned with EU accession has found that involvement in EU business brings a `significant degree of institutional autonomy towards domestic politics since civil servants tend to be more sensitive to signals from the EU institutions than those from their Political Leadership. This sensitivity is most pronounced with those who are most exposed to the EU' (Drulбk, Cesal and Hampl 2003: 651). There are several reasons to explain why there has been a pronounced tendency to the emergence of distinct `EU core executives', which are, to a greater or lesser extent, separated from the rest of the administration. Negotiating entry and ensuring legal transposition of the entire acquis posed challenges of a different quality and magnitude from those associated with day-to-day EU business in long-standing member states. It was much more akin to the `high politics' of shaping member states' basic relationships with the EU than the `low politics' surrounding individual policy decisions. In this connection, it is worth recalling that even in Germany, which has a low degree of centralisation and hierarchical co-ordination in EU matters (Goetz 2003), the range of actors is radically reduced and the core executive dominates when fundamental issues, notably treaty revisions, are at stake. The EU itself insisted on dealing with a small range of authoritative interlocutors, stressing the need for an effective lead from the centre. It commissioned the SIGMA unit at the OECD to develop `baselines' for effective interministerial co-ordination and the EU's progress reports regularly commented on this issue. Perhaps most crucially, centralisation is a less challenging form of co-ordination than network-based solutions, which require higher levels of stability, predictability and trust amongst actors than tend to obtain in many Central and Eastern European executives, in particular (Dimitrov, Goetz and Wollmann, forthcoming). Other dimensions of state organisation where the EU influence has been documented in some detail include the development of the civil service (Bossaert and Demmke 2003; Dimitrova 2002; Verheijen 2002; Scherpereel 2003), and decentralisation and regionalisation (Brusis 2002; Hughes et al. 2001; Hughes et al. forthcoming; Keating and Hughes 2003). As regards the former, major efforts were made from the mid1990s to promote civil service reform in the post-communist countries, not least through the formulation of `baselines' for civil service development, which were developed by OECD-SIGMA on behalf of the EU. These baselines strongly favoured the establishment of career civil services based on the principles of a Weberian depoliticised bureaucracy. Technical and financial assistance was made available to the CEE applicant states to develop their civil service systems, both through the SIGMA programme and through PHARE projects. The need for the adoption of a comprehensive set of civil service legislation, and its effective implementation, was regularly emphasised in the annual progress reports on accession. Nonetheless, despite such a targeted approach to shaping state organisation, the results, in terms of creating non-politicised civil service systems, appear to have been, at best, modest, especially where legislation owed more to external exhortations than a domestic reform consensus (Meyer-Sahling 2004). This was, for example, the case in the Czech Republic, which was the last amongst the CEE accession states to adopt
a civil service law in 2002, despite repeated and detailed interventions by EU actors for many years (the law is expected to come into force in January 2005) (for a detailed analysis see Scherpereel 2003). Even this law, in the view of SIGMA, falls far short of what is desirable. Thus, SIGMA's (2003: 5) Public Service and Administrative Framework Assessment for the Czech Republic noted that although the law was `a positive step towards bringing the Czech civil service system closer to those of the EU Member States', `the law has many shortcomings, inconsistencies, and confused wording and structure, which may multiply interpretation issues and implementation problems (...) It is (...) unlikely that civil servants as defined by this law will be in place before 2008 (...) the positive effects of this law, if any, will begin to be seen only in five to eight years, which represents an unforeseeable future'. In a similar manner, the EU sought to promote effective decentralisation of the administrative systems of the post-Communist states and was generally in favour of strengthening subnational governments at local and regional levels. To be sure `the perception that the European Commission required the establishment of political regions is as false in central and eastern Europe as in the west' (Keating 2003: 57); but, `the Phare programmes and the early phases of adaptation to the EU involved an expectation that there would be widespread regionalization in candidate countries' (ibid.: 58). However, recent work on administrative and political decentralisation and regionalisation in the region notes, `how divergent endogenous interests and pressures triumphed over external convergence pressures, and resulted in a diversity of institutional outcomes' (Hughes 2003: 190). Drawing on the insights of the comparative Europeanisation literature neither the lack institutional convergence despite common external pressures nor the very limited success of institutional transfer, as in the case of the civil service, are surprising. Even those who stress the relevance of institutional `misfit' in triggering Europeanisation (Bцrzel, in this volume) are quick to point out that associated adaptive pressures are mediated through domestic actors and institutions, which are of principal importance in shaping national institutional trajectories. Power asymmetries during the accession negotiations between the EU and existing members, on the one hand, and the applicants, on the other, do not necessarily imply that Europeanisation follows a topdown logic. Rather, as noted earlier, they may encourage `institutionalisation for reversibility' ­ as EU pressures lessened, and once accession was `in the bag', domestic preferences could strongly reassert themselves, with the result that, as in Hungary (Бgh 2003: 113ff.) administrative and political decentralisation and regionalisation initiatives are effectively stalled. Turning to integration effects on politics ­ electoral behaviour, parties and party systems ­ again we know from the comparative Europeanisation literature that effects vary very considerably amongst the longer-standing member-states. In some, such effects are pronounced (see, e.g., Egeberg, in this volume); in others, such as Germany, they are strictly limited (Anderson, in this volume). In Malta, the Labour Party has adopted a strongly Euroceptic stance and campaigned vigorously against accession (Cini 2001; Pace 2002). The results of the accession referendum underlined the degree of division on the issue amongst the Maltese people. In Central and Eastern Europe, too, Eurocepticism `is already an integral party of the party systems' (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2004: 24), with high party-based Euroscepticism particularly pronounced in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia and Slovakia.
Interestingly, `soft Euroscepticism seems to be expressed by some mainstream parties' and it `is expressed by opposition parties and by parties in government' (idem: 15). However, given the fluidity of party systems in parts of Central and Eastern Europe, the future persistence of these orientations is far from certain and there are important precedents of parties, such as the Greek Socialists that have converted from an initially strongly Euro-critical stance to staunch supporters of integration. Patterns of Europeanisation II: Public Policy Effects There can be no doubt that the adoption of the acquis has had profound policy effects across a very wide range of domestic public policies in the accession states, even tough legal transposition does not equal effective implementation. The transposition of the acquis has meant the export of a highly evolved and differentiated policy regime to a set of countries the majority of which are at a significantly lower level of socio-economic development than the EU average. The full consequences of such an ambitious exercise will only become fully apparent in the coming years, as the political focus moves from transposition to effective implementation, and as the new members become subject to the normal compliance procedures applying in the EU. Optimists expect accelerated modernisation in the economic and social systems of the new members and stress its benefits; pessimists emphasise that most new member states still have a steep mountain to climb before they catch up with the less prosperous of the existing member states and highlight the potential for economic and social dislocation that EU integration entails. Can policy regimes that were developed for some of the most socio-economically advanced countries in the world be transferred to Central and Eastern Europe, in particular, without massive domestic disruption? In addressing this question, the experience of the Southern European countries, most notably Greece, but also Portugal and Spain, is of special relevance. It points to the likelihood of persistent compliance problems in key policy areas; suggests that socio-economic convergence will be matter of decades, not years; underlines the importance of large-scale financial transfers, notably through the EU structural and cohesion policies, to foster convergence and to cushion the domestic effects of market liberalisation (as noted earlier, it is extremely unlikely that the EU will agree to transfers to the new members comparable in magnitude to those that have gone to Southern Europe in the past); and raises the possibility of a Europeanisation pattern that, as in Southern Europe, might be characterised by the coexistence of `dynamism, asymmetry and fragmentation' (Featherstone and Kazamias 2001: 3). The expectation of a distinct, though not necessarily unique, pattern of integration and Europeanisation for the longer term is reinforced by the fact that the ten new members will, for the foreseeable future, remain outside the Euro zone. Under the terms of accession, they are expected to join at a future date to be determined the Exchange Rate Mechanism II, which links the currencies of member states that are not part of the euro area to the euro. They are committed to adopt the euro, if they have fulfilled the Maastricht criteria. Early adoption of the single currency has been a top priority of the new members, but EU Finance Ministers and the European Central Bank made it clear in the spring of 2003 that the ten accession state, for their own interest, might be
best advised not to adopt the euro for several years. Since then, economic and fiscal data in the majority of cases have worsened, so that the head of the EU Economic and Finance Committee warned the eight Central and Eastern European countries in September 2003 to relinquish their hopes of early entry to the euro area. Whilst they will soon be subject to many of the disciplines and co-ordinating mechanisms associated with ERM II, the new members will not be participants in ECOFIN and, as a consequence, remain outside the decision-making core of monetary politics in the EU. Thus, a pattern of `differential' membership will be strengthened, and, in a vital area of EU policy-making with a profound influence on wider economic and fiscal policy, they will remain `policy-takers' rather than `policy-makers'. Thus far, policy effects have mainly been debated in the cases of a broad range of economic policies (reflecting their centrality in the integration project and their close interconnection with post-Communist liberalisation, privatisation and marketisation); environmental policy (not least because in this field the need for transitional arrangements was obvious given the costs associated with the implementation of the EU's regime); agricultural policy (the EU's most costly policy and, given the importance of the rural economy for many of the new members, especially Poland, politically highly sensitive); and structural and cohesion policies. However, in policy terms, there have been two further features that set apart the 2004 accessions from previous enlargements: the high profile accorded to justice and home affairs; and the link between enlargement and foreign and security policy. In part, the prominence of justice and home affairs does, of course, reflect the rapid extension and intensification of the acquis in these areas; but it is also owed to the domestic security concerns that many of the EU-15 associate with enlargement, including, for example, illegal immigration and people smuggling, asylum, drug trafficking, organised crime, and effective controls of the EU's borders. The prospect of enlargement, and the security fears it has conjured up, have had a decisive `feedback' effect on EU policy, as, for instance, the creation of a European border police demonstrates. A similar feedback mechanism has also been evident in the case of foreign and security policy. Both the EU applicants, perhaps most notably the Baltic states and Poland, and the EU itself saw EU integration as a means of increasing security after the fall of Communism; security concerns were also central to the EU's approach vis-а-vis Cyprus. The need to respond to post-Cold War conditions was the chief driver behind the development of the EU's common foreign and security policy. At the same time, however, events leading up to the war on Iraq and subsequent reactions have exposed faultlines between the traditional core of the EU ­ France and Germany ­ and both old and new members. It is too early to reach any definitive conclusions about policy effects in the new members. But at least as far as the majority of CEE members is concerned, the pattern that is emerging suggests that enlargement has added decisively to the diversity of EU-member state relations. This growing diversity is grounded in (i) major question marks over the capacity, and, in some instances, willingness on the part of the new members to ensure compliance; (ii) the existence of transitional arrangements affecting both the implementation of the acquis in the new member states, the EU funding regime, and restrictions on the freedom of movement of labour imposed by existing member states; (iii) the exclusion of the new members from the single currency for the foreseeable future; and (iv) the intense involvement of the EU in
citizenship, minority politics and inter-community relations which has no precedent in the EU-15. The mixture of features differs from country to country, but their cumulative effect is unmistakable. Conclusions What lessons does the experience of integration and Europeanisation of the EU-15 hold for the new members? What will the new members add to EU-member state relations? Finally, what are the implications of enlargement for our understanding of Europeanisation, in particular? The contributions to this volume provide ample evidence for the existence of differential forms of EU membership and differential patterns of Europeanisation. The member states participate in the EU in different forms and with differing intensities, and they exhibit a high degree of variation in the incidence and strength of Europeanisation effects, most markedly as regards electoral behaviour, political parties and party systems (Ladrech, in this volume). There are noteworthy parallels in accounts of integration and Europeanisation in Southern Europe, on the one hand, and CEE, in particular, on the other. They include selective `uploading'; selective `downloading'; asymmetry and fragmentation in domestic responses to EU integration; and the close interaction between integration and Europeanisation, on the one hand, and democratisation and modernisation, on the other. Turning to our understanding of EU-member state relations, the new member states heighten the problematique of large states versus small and even microstates in the EU. Power asymmetries are set to become more pronounced, and are heightened by the fact that intraregional ties are weak or more or less non-existent. The proliferation of small states in the EU largely undermines calls for subsidiarity; it also involves a further pluralisation of EU-member state relations. It is already evident that enlargement has further promoted the search for intensified co-operation amongst the core member states, as recent Franco-German initiatives underscore. Thus, `the "shrinking" core may turn out to be a "harder core"' (Dyson and Goetz 2003a: 376). Finally, the experience of the new members shows that `misfit' is not a necessary precondition of Europeanisation in polity or policy terms, and carries no explanatory power when it comes to politics. Both institutional settings and policy regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, in particular, have been very fluid, a fact that static accounts of match and mismatch find difficult to accommodate. They privilege a topdown view of Europeanisation, and neglect `bottom-up' Europeanisation through domestic institutional and policy entrepreneurs. In settings where institutions are far from fixed and their socialising effects generally limited, domestic actors' `usage' of Europe is critical. FURTHER READING For accounts of events leading up to the 2004 enlargement of the EU see Baun (2000), Cameron (2004), Mayhew (1998), Papadimitriou (2002) and Torreblanca (2001). For in-depth studies of how the new members have responded to accession see Бgh
(2003) on Hungary; Cordell (2000) on Poland; Pettai and Zielonka (2003) on the Baltic states; Rupnik and Zielonka (2003) on the Czech Republic and Slovakia; Fink Hafner and Lajh (2003) on Slovenia; several articles on Malta in South European Society and Politics, 2002, Volume 7, No 1; Featherstone (2000) on Cyprus. Grabbe (2003) and Goetz (2002) discuss Europeanisation in post-Communist contexts. WEBSITES Comprehensive information on the EU's approach to enlargement can be found on the sites of the European Commission: and of the European Parliament: The site of the Commission also contains links to the official websites of the ten new members focussing on accession. The site of the Centre for European Reform contains up-to-date analyses of accessionrelated information. BIBLIOGRAPHY Бgh, A. (2003) Anticipatory and Adaptive Europeanization in Hungary (Budapest: Hungarian Centre for Democracy Studies). Avery, G. (2004) `The Enlargement Negotiations', in F. Cameron (ed.), The Future of Europe: Integration and Enlargement (London: Routledge), pp. 35-62. Baldacchino, G. (2002) `A Nationless State? Malta, National Identity and the EU', West European Politics, 25 (4), pp. 191-206. Baun, M. J. (2000) A Wider Europe: The Process and Politics of European Union Enlargement (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield). Bцrzel, T. A. (2003) `Guarding the Treaty: The Compliance Strategies of the European Commission', in T. A. Bцrzel and R. A. Cichowski (eds.), The State of the European Union. Volume 6: Law, Politics, and Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 197-220. Bossaert, D. and Demmke, C. (2003) Civil Services in the Accession States: New Trends and the Impact of the Integration Process (Maastricht: European Institute of Public Administration).
Brugge, P (2003) `Czech Perceptions of EU Membership: Havel vs. Klaus', in J. Rupnik and J. Zielonka, J. (eds.) (2003), The Road to the European Union. Volume 1: The Czech and Slovak Republics (Manchester: Manchester University Press), pp. 180198. Brusis, M. (2002) `Between EU Requirements, Competitive Politics, and National Traditions: Re-creating Regions in the Accession Countries of Central and Eastern Europe', Governance 15 (4), pp. 531-559. Cameron, F. (ed.) (2004) The Future of Europe: Integration and Enlargement (London: Routledge). Cini, M. (2001) `The Europeanization of Malta: Adaptation, Identity and Party Politics', in K. Featherstone and G. Kazamias (eds), Europeanization and the Southern Periphery (London: Frank Cass), pp. 261-276. Cordell, K. (ed.) (2000) Poland and the European Union (London: Routledge). Cremona, M. (ed.) (2003) The Enlargement of the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Dimitrov, V., Goetz, K. H., and Wollmann, H. (forthcoming) Governing after Communism: Institutions and Policy (Lanham: Rowman& Littlefield). Dimitrova, A. (2002) `Enlargement, Institution-Building and the EU's Administrative Capacity Requirement', West European Politics, 25 (4), pp. 171-190. Drulбk, P, Cesal, J. and Hampl, S. (2003) `Interactions and Identities of Czech Civil Servants on their Way to the EU', Journal of European Public Policy, 10 (4), pp. 637654. Dyson, K. and Goetz, K. H (2003a) `Europeanization Compared: The Shrinking Core and the Decline of `Soft' Power', in idii (eds), Germany, Europe and the Politics of Constraint (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 349-376. Dyson, K. and Goetz, K. H (2003b) `Living with Europe: Power, Constraint and Contestation', in idii (eds), Germany, Europe and the Politics of Constraint (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 3-35. Falkner, G., Hartlapp, M., Leiber, S. and Treib, O. (forthcoming) `Non-compliance with EU Directives in the Member States: Opposition through the Backdoor?, West European Politics Featherstone, K. (2001) `Cyprus and the Onset of Europeanization: Strategic Usage, Structural Transformation and Institutional Adaptation', in: K. Featherstone and G. Kazamias (eds), Europeanization and the Southern Periphery (London: Frank Cass), pp. 141-162.
Featherstone, K. and Kazamias, G (2001) `Introduction: Southern Europe and the Process of "Europeanization"', in idii (eds.), Europeanization and the Southern Periphery (London: Frank Cass), pp. 1-22. Fink Hafner, D., and Lajh, D. (2003) Managing Europe from Home: The Europeanisation of the Slovenian Core Executive (Ljubljana: Faculty of social sciences). Gelazis, N. M. (2003) `The Effects of EU Conditionality on Citizenship Policies and the Protection of National Minorities in the Baltic States', in V. Pettai and J. Zielonka (eds.) (2003) The Road to the European Union. Volume 2: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (Manchester: Manchester University Press), pp. 46-75. Goetz, K. H. (2000) `European Integration and National Executives: A Cause in Search of an Effect', West European Politics, 23 (4), pp. 211-231. Goetz, K. H. (2001) `Making Sense of Post-Communist Central Administration: Modernization, Europeanization or Latinization', Journal of European Public Policy, 8 (6), pp. 1032-1051. Goetz, K. H. (2002) Europeanisation in West and East: A Challenge to Institutional Theory. Paper prepared for 1st Pan-European Conference on EU Politics, Bordeaux, 26-28 September 2002. Goetz, K. H. (2003) `The Federal Executive: Bureaucratic Fusion versus Governmental Bifurcation', in K. Dyson and K. H. Goetz (eds), Germany, Europe and the Politics of Constraint (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 57-72. Grabbe, H. (2001) `How Does Europeanization Affect CEE Governance? Conditionality, Diffusion and Diversity', Journal of European Public Policy, 8 (6), pp. 1013-1031. Grabbe, H. (2002) `European Union Conditionality and the Acquis Communautaire', International Political Science Review, 23 (3), pp. 249-268. Grabbe, H. (2003) `Europeanization Goes East: Power and Uncertainty in the EU Accession Process', in K. Featherstone and C. Radaelli (eds.), The Politics of Europeanization (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 303-327. Hughes, J. (2003) `Regional Convergence and Divergence in an Enlarged EU', in M. Keating and J. Hughes (eds.), The Regional Challenge in Central and Eastern Europe: Territorial Restructuring and European Integration (Brussels: Lang), pp. 183-191. Hughes, J., Sasse, G. and Gordon, C. (2001) `Enlargement and Regionalization: The Europeanization of Local and Regional Governance in CEE States', in H. Wallace (ed.), Interlocking Dimensions of European Integration (Basingstoke: Palgrave), pp. 145-178.
Hughes, J, Sasse, G. and Gordon, C. (forthcoming) `Conditionality and Compliance in the EU's Eastward Enlargement: Regional Policy and the Reform of Sub-national Governance', Journal of Common Market Studies Jacquot, S. and Woll, C. (2003) `Usages of European Integration: Europeanization from a sociological perspective', European Integration online Papers, 7 (12). Kassim, H., Peters P. G. and Wright, V. (eds) (2000) The National Co-ordination of EU Policy: The Domestic Level (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Keating, M. (2003) `Regionalization in Central and Eastern Europe: The Diffusion of a Western Model?', in M. Keating and J. Hughes (eds.), The Regional Challenge in Central and Eastern Europe: Territorial Restructuring and European Integration (Brussels: Lang), pp. 51-67. Keating, M. and Hughes, J. (eds.) (2003) The Regional Challenge in Central and Eastern Europe: Territorial Restructuring and European Integration (Brussels: Lang). Laffan, B (2003) `Managing Europe from Home: Impact of the EU on Executive Government: A Comparative Analysis', Research project report (draft), EU Fifth Framework Programme. Lippert, B., Umbach, G., and Wessels, W. (2001) `Europeanization of CEE Executives: EU Membership Negotiations as a Shaping Power', Journal of European Public Policy 8 (6), pp. 980-1012. Malovб, D. and Rybб, M (2003) `The European Union's Policies towards Slovakia: Carrots and Sticks of political conditionality', in J. Rupnik and J. Zielonka (eds.), (2003) The Road to the European Union. Volume 1: The Czech and Slovak Republics (Manchester: Manchester University Press), pp. 98-112. Maresceau, M. (2003) `Pre-accession' in M. Cremona, M. (ed.) The Enlargement of the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 9-42. Mayhew, A. (1998) Recreating Europe: The European Union's Policy Towards Central and Eastern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Meyer-Sahling, J. (2004) `Civil Service Reform in Post-Communist Europe: The Bumpy Road to Depoliticisation', West European Politics, 27 (1), pp. 71-103. Nakrosis, V. (2003) `Assessing Governmental Capacities to Manage European Affairs: The Case of Lithuania', in V. Pettai and J. Zilonka (eds.), The Road to the European Union. Volume 2: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (Manchester: Manchester University Press), pp. 104-139. Nugent, N. (2000) `EU Enlargement and the "Cyprus Problem"', Journal of Common Market Studies, 38 (1), pp. 131-150.
Nunberg, B. (2000) Ready for Europe: Public Administration Reform and European Accession in Central and Eastern Europe (Washington D.C.: World Bank). Pace, R. (2002) `A Small State and the European Union: Malta's EU Accession Experience', South European Politics & Society, 7 (1), pp. 24-42. Papadimitriou, D. (2002) Negotiating the New Europe: The European Union and Eastern Europe (Aldershot: Ashgate). Pettai, V. and Zielonka, J. (eds.) (2003) The Road to the European Union. Volume 2: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (Manchester: Manchester University Press). Rupnik, J. and Zielonka, J. (eds.) (2003) The Road to the European Union. Volume 1: The Czech and Slovak Republics (Manchester: Manchester University Press). Scherpereel, J. A. (2003) `Appreciating the Third Player: The European Union and the Politics of Civil Service Reform in East-Central Europe'. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, August 2003. Schimmelfennig, F. (2003) `Strategic Action in a Community Environment: The Decision to Enlarge the European Union to the East', Comparative Political Studies, 36 (1/2), pp. 156-183. Sedelmeier, U. and Wallace, H. (2000) `Eastern Enlargement: Strategy or Second Thoughts?', in H. Wallace and W. Wallace (eds.), Policy-making in the European Union, 4th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 427-460. SIGMA (2003) Czech Republic. Public Service and the Administrative Framework Assessment 2003 ( 0603.pdf) Smith, K. (2003) `The Evolution and Application of EU Membership Conditionality', in M. Cremona (ed.), The Enlargement of the European Union (Oxford: OUP), pp. 105-139. Taggart, P. and Szczerbiak, A (2004) `Contemporary Euroscepticism in the Party Systems of the European Union Candidate States of Central and Eastern Europe', European Journal of Political Research, 43 (1), pp. 1-27. Torreblanca, J. E. (2001) The European Union and Central Eastern Europe (Aldershot: Ashgate). Verheijen, T. (2002) `The European Union and Public Administration Development in Central and Eastern Europe', in R. Baker (ed.), Transitions from Authoritarianism: The Role of Bureaucracy (Westport CT: Praeger), pp. 245-259.
Verney, S. (2002) `Creating the Democratic Tradition of European Integration: The South European Catalyst', in H. Sjursen (ed.), Enlargement and the Finality of the EU (Oslo: ARENA, Report No 7/2002), pp. 97-127. Wallace, H. (2001) `Introduction: Rethinking European Integration', in H. Wallace (ed.), Interlocking Dimensions of European Integration (Basingstoke: Palgrave), pp. 1-22. Wallace, W. (2000) `Collective Governance: The EU Political Process', in H. Wallace and W. Wallace (eds.), Policy-making in the European Union, 4th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 523-547. Wessels, W., Maurer, A. and Mittag, J. (eds.) (2003) Fifteen Into One? The European Union and its Member States (Manchester: Manchester University Press). Zubek, R. (2002) Europeanizing from the Centre? Core Executive Configurations and Transposition of Community Legislation in Poland 1997-2002. Paper presented at the EGPA 2002 Conference, Potsdam. TABLES AND DIAGRAMS Table 1.A · TABLE 1A: Dates of Association Agreements, Europe Agreements and Official Application for EU Membership · TABLE 1 B: Dates of the Adoption of Accession Partnerships and the Opening and Closing of Membership Negotiations · TABLE 2: Basic Socioeconomic Data for the New Members · TABLE 3: Dates of Membership of New EU Members in Major international organisations · TABLE 4: Allocations for PHARE, SAPARD and ISPA, 2000 to 2002 (in Euro millions) · TABLE 5: Financial Framework for Enlargement 2004-2006 ­ Indicative Allocation of Commitment and Payment Appropriations COPENHAGEN PACKAGE · TABLE 6: Public Opinion in EU-15 Member States on Accession Detailed by Accession Countries · TABLE 7: Public Opinion on EU Membership in the New Member States · TABLE 8: Results of Accession Referenda
· FIGURE 1: Abridged Reproduction of a Table of Contents in a European Commission `Regular Report on Progress towards Accession'

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