Evolutions of Middle East and North Africa and the Islamic Republic of Iran with the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council, HF Zadeh, MY Joybari

Tags: Iran, Saudi Arabia, Persian Gulf Cooperation Council, protests, Bahrain, Gulf Cooperation Council, Persian Gulf, Cooperation Council, the Council, protesters, Yemen, European Union, security community, The Middle East, Ali Abdullah Saleh, Cooperation, Sheikh Sultan Borghani
Content: J. Politic. Soci. Sci. Vol., 2 (1), 7-16, 2015 Journal of Political & Social Sciences. Vol., 2 (1), 7-16, 2015 Availableonline at http://www.jpssjournal.com ISSN 2148-5127©2015 Evolutions of Middle East and North Africa and the Islamic Republic of Iran with the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council Hossein Faraj Zadeh1, 2, Mohammad Yousefi Joybari1, 2* 1Department of Political Sciences, East Azarbaijan Science and Research Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tabriz, Iran 2Department of Political Sciences, Tabriz Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tabriz, Iran *Corresponding Author Email: [email protected] ABSTRACT: One of the most important events in the Contemporary History of world is Middle East and North Africa changes that due to type of changes and its considerable geographical area have been associated with high national, regional, trans-regional and global impacts. The purpose of this study was to investigate the impact of these developments on the relations between Iran and the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council in regional and cross-regional level. Hence, by analyzing the structure of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council as a security community, we find out that this council has had menacing look to his around and the Middle East and North Africa developments is considered as one of external threats for the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council. Therefore, the Council responded to the threat and these responses have resulted in the intensifying the stress between Iran and the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council. A research method was on the basis of historical, descriptive and analytical to investigate issues. According to conducted research, it was revealed that (i) region evolutions was threatening issue for the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council; (ii) Persian Gulf Cooperation Council has had hard reaction to it; (iii) the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council looked for beyond of its borders to find the source of this threat not as internal issue and civil and political demands. (iv) Council's approach to Iran after evolution in the various issues has led from competition to debate. (v) The continuation of this situation would be result in highlighting the role of trans-regional powers including America. Keywords: Middle East and North Africa, Security community, Regional security arrangements, Regional stronghold, Interference, Threats of identity INTRODUCTION What is referred as the Middle East and North Africa has been an unprecedented series of uprisings, demonstrations and protests mainly in the Arab countries of North Africa and South West Asia including Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, Jordan and the smaller surface of Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Oman, Kuwait, Morocco, in 2010 and 2011 (Teitelbaum, 2011). The fundamental feature of this evolution is its dynamics and high fluidity that has made difficult drawing the horizon for analysts at different local, regional and international levels. This protest on 18 December 2010 with uprising in Tunisia was begun following the self-immolation of Mohammad Bouazizi in protest of corruption and abuse of police. Because of the similar conditions in other countries in the region and the success of the protests in Tunisia, protests were continued with the chains of unrest in Algeria, Jordan, Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, Libya and Saudi Arabia. So far, the three states of Egypt, Tunisia and Libya have fallen as a result of the protests. The interesting point is the speed of development in different countries that this analysis has made it difficult. For example, presidential elections held in this country after the Egyptian revolution and Mohamed Morsi was elected as the first president of the country after the revolution. But a year later, street protests were begun and Morsi was rejected by the Army. However, supporters and opponents of Morsi are still involved on the streets of Egypt. The protests have different responses from the region countries. Some countries have responded to the people's demands, while others tried to calm protesters through political reforms but not too high, and others were chosen repression policy. Following results of the above policies in some countries have led to the revolution and the fall of the regime, and were drawn into violent conflict in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Yemen and the others. Government has tried to attract the protest movement to itself and news from the major political reforms such as Syria, Bahrain and in countries such as Morocco, Jordan and Oman. But the rich countries of the region, includes Saudi Arabia. Also, United Arab Emirates, 7
J. Politic. Soci. Sci. Vol., 2 (1), 7-16, 2015 Algeria, Qatar and Kuwait tried to blackmail their own people through providing economic packages from against more freedom (Bauer, 2011). One of the most important developments in the Middle East and North Africa is changes in the position and activity kind of the Persian Gulf. This changed position can be observed in the behavior of members of the Cooperation Council for the region evolution and against the approaches of various countries. One of the countries that has had particular interpretation on this regional developments and it has been explained in terms of the paradigm of Islamic awakening, Iran that has been effective due to its regional importance of this country, type of behavior and its reaction to the developments on dynamic direction of evolution and the Council. The government officials of Persian Gulf Cooperation Council tried to react against the general approach of the Islamic Republic of Iran when they saw their government existence at risk against these evolutions. This issue can be observed in their reaction regard to Iran's interference in Bahrain's internal developments on the one hand and on the other hand, catapult against the Egypt new government's efforts to reach out to the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the fear of Iran takeover and security threats of it for Persian Gulf Cooperation Council. Persian Gulf Arab states, while considered as part of the Arab world, have essential differences with the rest of the Arab world. Countries of this region have large reserves of oil and gas. They are very rich in economic terms and in the last few decades, have experienced excellent growth. Citizens of these countries know their economic situation excellent or very good. 63% of Emirates people believe that their countries economic is very good. Flourishing economy and high welfare of their people distinguishes them from the rest of the Arab world that are in a bad economic situation. The Persian Gulf region has been distinguished from culturally and politically from the other Arab countries and has had the greater internal homogeneity (Bellamy, 2007). Despite the obvious differences, leaders of six government confirm similar training of Saudi Wahhabism. From eight kingdoms in the Arab world, the six kingdoms are members of the Persian Gulf and their style is in the same rule. The similarities among the Member States of the Persian Gulf and other Arab countries in inside and difference with other Arab countries and Iran in outside, is the bed that form the identities of these countries against others and lead to Within the enterprise and outside the enterprise from the member states of Persian Gulf Cooperation Council. Arab identity with Wahhabi interpretation is differentiation factor of them not only in Iran, but also from other Arab countries. They do not want to accept the Shiites government in Bahrain because the victory of the Shiites in Bahrain, which means the destruction of their identity and create a major fault within the council and the government of the country. Through, social and political protest, as the collapse of the monarchy system is one of its members and the administration of democracy and democratic institutions in the kingdom of their communities and the government. Cooperation Council considered any changes and political reforms in Bahrain in several aspects as a threat to political regimes of southern Persian Gulf. By reviewing developments in the relations between the two sides of this issue can be found out that the developments in the Middle East and North Africa is merely a catalyst in this case and various historical contexts leads to create such an approach. In fact, the main cause of concern in all countries of the Persian Gulf is due to the rise of Shiites in Iraq and to not recognize it by the country, alarmed at the pattern Shiite in the Persian Gulf, Iranian influence in the Arab Middle East and the imbalance of power in the region. Therefore, the purpose of this study was to investigate the impact of these developments on the relations between Iran and the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council in regional and cross-regional level. Bahrain Bahrain was the scene people protests against the Bahraini regime and acts of religious discrimination against the Shiite majority at fourteenth of February 2011 and during these protests, Al Khalifa killed and wounded several hundred with calling auxiliary forces from the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. While Bahrain revolutionaries, despite the acts of Al Khalifa regime in suppressing protests, still with holding protests wanted to call reform in Bahrain and to end the Al Khalifa regime with security repressing against the people (Salehi, 2011). Ministers of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council in May 2011, called for greater cooperation security institutions, exchange ideas and increase efforts to deal with challenges among member countries of the Council that were faced with it in the last time. In their statement remarked that "the security of the Persian Gulf assign as worldwide security and any risks that threaten the area, will threaten all regions "(Katzman, 2013). In this statement, the presence of Saudi and the UAE is considered law in the frame of Peninsula Shield forces in Bahrain. In this military intervention that was performed in March 2011, 1.200 Saudi armored and 600 UAE police forces were occupied key and sensitive positions of Manama city. Kuwait sent its maritime force to help secure of maritime border of Bahrain to this country. The victory of the Shiites in Bahrain, it means destroying the identity of the unit and created a large gap in the Council and transplantation of one of its members of the council in the past three decades to define as other form. Meanwhile, the government changing in this country means as the collapse of kingdom systems in one of its council members and the administration of democracy in societies that kingdom systems rule on them through social and political protests (Salehi, 2011). Syria One of the outside reactions of the Persian Gulf's in the Middle East evolutions was creating role and in other words, intervention Syria's crisis. There are two levels of analysis about the unrest in Syria. Some observers know these 8
J. Politic. Soci. Sci. Vol., 2 (1), 7-16, 2015 unrest just along the popular movements in the Middle East and North Africa. In this sense, Syria like the other Arab countries involve in the political, social and economic problems that people have struggled to struggle against the regime to get rid of these problems (Khorrami assl, 2011). In other words, the problems of protesters and Syrian regime cannot be solved unless one of them recedes. On the other hand, some international observers believe that Syria events has the external source moreover to have the internal source, and Syria's internal problems have created the arena and opportunity to exploit and the competition of regional and international actors. Due to this reasoning, Syria continues was a victim, not only in violent clashes with the army, but also with different policies of regional and international actors (Baroud, 2011). Hence, the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council members have the attitude that Syria has turned into a new realm for Iran-Arab conflict. Among the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council members have the attitude that Syria and Iran-Arab conflict has turned into a new realm. They believe that if Tehran is capable of maintaining the Assad regime from this crisis, has found the victory strategic against the Arab countries. So, they are trying to ignite the Syrian crisis (Rousseau, 2011). Since 1982, Saudi Arabia has practically supplied Salafis in Syria. And many weapons have placed in the hands of Salafi groups that mainly are deployed in the cities of Daraa, Homs, Hamah and Deir ez-Zor (Karami, 2011). United Emirates of Arab, Qatar and Oman use economic tools to put pressure on Syria. On 7 August 2011, Persian Gulf Cooperation Council condemned the repression in Syria and called Bashar al-Assad to accept reform to guarantee civil rights and dignity of the Syrian people. In a statement on 6 February 2012, Persian Gulf Cooperation Council accused the Syrian regime to mass destruction and called their ambassadors from Damascus and expelled the Syrian representatives from capital of their countries. This action of the Persian Gulf deepened Syria's diplomatic isolation. Simultaneously with this decision of Persian Gulf Cooperation Council, France, Italy and Spain did the same action in calling their travel in Syria (Oftedal, 2011). In general we can say that the presence of Persian Gulf Cooperation Council members in Syria has several advantages to these countries: First, these countries can show pale internal critics with revolutionary forces in Syria's in his country that can easily suppress them. Second, they could continue to weaken the crisis in Syria with strengthening the revolutionary forces in Syria and the terrorists in this country. This could weaken the resistance in the region that somehow will strengthen the situation of Iran in the region. Third, consistent with the approach to regional bodies like the Arab League and also, extra-regional powers such as France and the United States can strengthen the attitude of Syrian Arab countries in the Persian Gulf to create considered regional security arrangements. Bahrain Bahrain consider as countries that has long been observed religious, social and political motions and movements. Movements of this country have been great reflex in recent years. 60 percent of the population of this country is Shia and 40% is Sunni. In retrospect, the country's political show conditions and political structures and special relation of government and community in Bahrain and in particular, the Al-Khalifa regime approach underlies any change and protests in this country. The nature of the political regime in Bahrain is a constitutional monarchy. In accordance with the constitution of the country, apparently, the three branches are independent and are not allowed to influence the functions and powers; but in practice, all three branches of government, are under the direct supervision of the Emir of Bahrain that governs the country mid Crown Prince and Prime Minister (that he chooses). According to the constitution of Bahrain, Bahrain's emir is the head of state and his greatest sons determine as substitute in each generation by Emir of time (Mirrazavi and Ahmadi, 2004). After the arrival of Hamad bin Isa in Bahrain, Al Khalifa family began numerous attempts to increase legitimacy. Sheikh Hamd in 2001, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council and got vicarious to this country by holding a referendum on a national charter and its approval by renaming the Emir of Bahrain to the kingdom. In the parliamentary elections of 2002, the most important groups of Shiite such as Muslim unity did not participate in it due to considerations such as constitution, however, this party contributed as the main representative of the Shiite in 2006 and 2010 elections and could won respectively 17 and 18 seats out of 40 seats in Bahrain parliament. It should be noted that the distribution of parliamentary seats in Bahrain's Shiite and Sunni Muslims are in a manner that Shiites are not able to won more than 18 seats out of 40 seats in the parliament. It is worth noting that this Council has little political power and assembly that all its members have been appointed by the king has parliament's main power (Adami, 2012). Discrimination and injustice for Bahrain's Shiites are not limited to elections, but this group suffered discrimination by the government in economic and administrative field. According to the 2003 report of the Bahrain Center of Human Rights, from 572 public and excellent positions, only 101 positions, about 18 percent and from 47 excellent positions only 10 positions (21%) belong to the Shia. Also, Shiites cannot assume high positions in government, including the Department of Defense, the State and Justice in Bahrain. Thus, we see that the gap between government and community in Bahrain remains despite of some reforms in the country and the Shiites has the major grievances of their sovereignty. Therefore, with occurring anti-government protests in country such as Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, Bahrain Shiites began their protest against the Al Khalifa dynasty (Bahreini, 2002). Bahrain protesters had five main application from Al Khalifa: (1) Limiting the power of Al Khalifa by changing the constitution, (2) Increasing the powers of the Council of Representatives, (3) Solving the problem of unemployment and increasing economic 9
J. Politic. Soci. Sci. Vol., 2 (1), 7-16, 2015 opportunities; (4) Replacing the critical posts that are controlled by the Al-Khalifa; and (5) Reforming electoral law and granting more freedom (Kazmen, 2011). This protest that started from February 2011 could reduce objections, through initial giveaway and subsequent violent crackdown was suppressed, but the intervention of Peninsula Persian Gulf Cooperation Council that composed of soldiers Emirates and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia in March 14, 2011 entered to Bahrain with about 1,000 troops and with 500 Emirates forces. In the following days, Jordan also sent some troops to Bahrain. The issues that led the Bahrain crisis to the uncertainty and irreversibility point (Ebrahimi and Salehi, 2012). Two important factors distinguished Bahrain from other kingdom of the Persian Gulf or other countries that had experienced massive protests: First, the demonstrations of this country that had a sectarian feature that include the gap between Shiite protesters against the Sunni majority. Second, the protests in Bahrain are repeated conflicts that existed in the 1990s in this country and by the National Action Charter resolved poorly in 2001 (Ottawa and Movashir, 2011). But Iran announced their support of the protests in Bahrain from the beginning. The Persian Gulf Cooperation Council member stated Iran's actions in flare of deep hostility between the two sides. In May 2011, Gen. Firoozabadi, the General Staff Chief of Armed Forces criticized Saudi troops in Bahrain and stated that: "these unfair and antiIslamic actions will undermine the dignity of Muslims and will threaten the nation's security". Persian Gulf Cooperation Council announced its opposition to such statements and was known it aggressive and reflection of Iran expansionist intentions but the decisive factor approach of Iran towards Bahrain are not material and not objective factors, but the norms that have direct impact on the interests and identities of Iran. Iran's foreign policy competence for this country is continual to the countless chain of influential elements such as "doctrine effects and religious affiliation, historical view and Iranian traditional idealism to friends and enemies and subjective and peripheral environment that the possibility of their weight determination is very hard. The importance of norms and the coordinates of these features, with constructivism approach that is consistent with the understanding how the norms affect identity, can understand the definition of national interest based on foreign policy of a country. With this simplistic construction of identity situation and especially religious identity, today, in particular ideological position in the external environment particularly in the area of public opinion and patterning of the Islamist movements are evident (Adami and Mousavi, 2012). Thus, we see that the internal cohesion of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council members after the changes have increased rather than threat that was imaged for Iran. As Paul Arts believes that "the effectiveness of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council depends to members afraid of threats (internal and external). In time of peace, tensions increase among member governments, the tensions disappear in times of crisis (Arts, 1999). Yemen With the beginning of the transformation of the Middle East and North Africa in Tunisia and Egypt, Yemen was discussed one of the main candidates for the popular uprisings in the region, because of some components and factors; the country was entered into deep crisis. Authoritarianism, economic and administrative corruption, high unemployment especially among youth, spreading the increasing insecurity and the inability or unwillingness of the government to overcome the crisis, result in that Yemen to be ready to accept extensive changes which finally began in February 2011 with Benchmarking of Tunisia and Egypt (Ahmadian, 2011). According to made estimates in July 2010, Yemen's population was 23 million and 823 thousand people. Also, in unofficial sources titles that Shiites form the majority in the age composition of the population (the Shafi'i sect) and Zaidi Shiites have 40 to 45 percent of the population, but Gabriel Baer in his book entitled Population and society in the East, Arabic states Zaidi Shia compose the majority of population (55%). In addition, 2 to 5 percent of the followers of Jafar and Ismaili Shia can be added to the Yemeni Shiite population (Baer, 2003). But regardless of these distinctions and divisions that there are in the context of Yemen's population due to religious (mostly residents of North Yemen and South Yemen have religion of Shafi'i and Zaidi sect), it is important to note that such differentiation in Yemen has historically lost and people did not pay attention to these distinctions, so that all prayers pray in mosques and have common traditions share (Kardan, 2011). In general, Yemeni society is a complex combination of divisions and rifts of tribal and religious that has formed the tumultuous political life of the country. Tribalism has deep historical roots in this country, continues to their influence on political life, society and the economy until this day, as well as. Currently, there are two major tribal alliances in Yemen that each one is set of smaller tribes: the Hashed and Bakil unity. Madh'hij tribe also placed to a lesser extent after them. Bakil had the larger population but is more dispersed than Hashed. Versus, Hashed is the better organized (Kardan, 2011). Strengthen of tribalism, weakness of modern government institutions and lack of common identity among the citizens are of various factors influencing the politics of the country of Yemen. By the same token, these forces affect the internal dynamics of the parties and their political behavior and make it harder to define (Brown and Hamzawy, 2010). Despite of characteristics of tribalism in Yemen, population were faced to the duality of personality's tribal population ­ civil and their level of the loyalty may not give the priority of government on tribe in the past. The transition from a society of tribal loyalty to Civil Society requires increased national awareness and thus, is sort transformation of intellectual priorities of tribal human. This change gain when the collective wisdom occurs in transregional and tribal behavior. Such a development has clearly been observed in Yemen in recent years. Yemenis, 10
J. Politic. Soci. Sci. Vol., 2 (1), 7-16, 2015 especially in 2011, conducted the collective social action for creating changes not from tribal view also, versus tribal loyalties that promised Yemen's transition to a quasi-civil society (Ahmadian, 2011). Crisis began since, Ali Abdullah Saleh was going to sit his son after himself on the throne succession, and hence he had prepared arrangements to do so. In this regard, two weeks before the revolution in Tunisia in January 2011, Sheikh Sultan Borghani, head of Yemen's ruling party parliamentary group, said that his party would demand the removal of the constraints facing the continuation of President Ali Abdullah Saleh's. These comments set off an intense political tension because everyone was worried that it would lead to a continuation of the power and wealth of Saleh to his family (Kardan, 2011). With the revolution in Tunisia and Egypt, Yemen crisis entered to a new phase and protests against Saleh were extended. Against protests, the regime refused to control the crisis with violence and Saleh has repeatedly emphasized to protect the rights of citizens in peaceful assembly and freedom, as well. Saleh has adopted a two-pronged policy in this period: on the one hand, trying to prevent the spread of the protests with using violence against protesters, on the other hand, with presenting plans was trying to protest the overall inhibition (Ahmadian, 2011). One of the proposals that were presented for crisis management was the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council, which was trying to control the crisis in Yemen and the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council members to prevent the spread of the crisis. The importance of this project was the because the neighbor countries requested formally to resignation of Saleh, and United States of America cooperated with the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council in this issue. In fact, the plans of cooperate Council should be investigated in terms of understanding the council with the West in need to crisis control in Yemen. The first initiative that was agreed by foreign ministers of cooperate Council on 3 April 2011 in Riyadh, Involves the resignation of Saleh and form a government from opposition, but Saleh rejected this initiative due to interventionist states of Qatar's prime minister that remarks media his withdraw (Vivian, 2011). This initiative on 10 April was modified, and re-submitted to the government and Yemen opposition from the Council. This time Saleh resignation had changed to transfer his powers to his deputy. The initial version of this initiative, despite of Saleh acceptance, was faced to protesters opposition and Yemen opposition parties. In fact, it seems the opposition coordinated their positions with the demands of the protesters to maintain its credibility among Yemenis (Burke, 2012). Foreign ministers of cooperation Council on 17 April met a delegation of the opposition Yemen in Riyadh and met with a delegation from the Yemeni regime in Abu Dhabi on April 19. The third version of the Council's initiative was the result of the meeting. Abdul Latif Al-Zayani General Secretary of the Cooperation Council went to Sana'a on 21 April and discussed the third initiative. This initiative was more elaborated of the two previous initiatives and contained 10 sections, including Saleh resignation in favor of his deputy 30 days after signing the initiative, and justice immunity of him and his entourage. With the adoption of the initiative by both sides, it was decided that this initiative to be signed in May 2011 in Riyadh. But Saleh excuse intervening of Qatar, and announced will not sign this initiative in the presence of Qatar representatives (Burke, 2012). Three days before the deadline, he said in a speech that will not be granted the government except on the basis of legitimacy. A number of authorities have raised the issue of Saleh's party as president that he refused to sign the initiative, but as head of the party and the supervisor should sign it. This is important point for Saleh because it Reserves his party's position on the political future of Yemen and put him in place of monitor the agreement. However, the Cooperation Council modified the initiative again to be coupled with Saleh demand (Ahmadian, 2011). Under this agreement, Saleh resign and Abd Rabbuh Mansur Al-Hadi, Vice-President, got Yemen's interim president. With the agreement of Yemeni parties and some youth organizations, Al- Hadi was elected as a consensus candidate for the election of presidency and management of the Transition Period, which will take two years- On 21 February 2012 with the acquisition of 99% of the votes cast (Ahmadian, 2011) and the situation of Yemen, according to the signed agreement is in advance. Iran is one of the countries that have a influencing role has studied the developments in Yemen, as well as other countries in the region and analyzes it as its foreign policy in the wake of large-scale Iran strives to continue to support the people of Yemen's revolution as in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya. In this regard, Ramin Mehmanparast, by stating regret of the silence of the authorities and international organizations to suppress protests in Yemen, emphasized that any initiative or action in response to the protests in Yemen should be required to secure, legitimate demands of the people of Muslim in this country. On the other hand, Yemen has become to competition field of Iran and the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council. Persian Gulf Cooperation Council members, particularly Saudi Arabia accused Iran to meddle in the affairs of the country. Opposition groups inside Yemeni, including Houthis reject Iran interference in this country. A tension in Yemen is such that Iran and Saudi accused to further extends in Yemen conflicts. Saudi Arabia claims that its southern border has been observed more incitement of Houthi Shiites, and they have conducted extended Military incitement in this area (Hill & Nonneman, 2011). Saudi Arabia New developments wave in the Middle East that led to serious changes in countries like Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and other countries in the region, has been imposed the effects on Saudi Arabia, which was concerned of their presence peripheral environment. The part of this concern is about this issue that the logic of the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia from extending the Arab Spring in the region can be maintaining of empires, fall of regional unities and the legitimacy challenge (Milani, 2011). 11
J. Politic. Soci. Sci. Vol., 2 (1), 7-16, 2015 Persian Gulf Cooperation Council countries, especially Saudi Arabia, according to the nature of the monarchy and hereditary rule that is based on traditional legitimacy, it is natural that repel against the revolutionary government seeking to establish a rational and legal legitimacy based on the position of the majority of the people. The other concern of Saudi Arabia was fall of Ben Ali states in Tunisia and Mubarak in Egypt as Conservative states of the United States and the West that were considered as the main ally of Saudi Arabia, as well. This concern for Saudi can investigate from several perspectives: first, Saudi Arabia, with falling the main allies, saw himself in worse position than in the past and this result in that to be reduced from the strategic importance of the region in comparison to other competitors. Second, in development of the region, the axis of the so-called conservative of Arab was enjoyed lower bargaining power in an axis nee resistance and this added to concern of Saudi Arabia. Third, the US tried to give up support of them to maintain the status with understanding of the situation in the region after the fall of the knowledge of its regional allies and this increase the concerns of Saudi Arabia. The fourth factor that concerned Saudi Arabia is the increasing role of Iran in increasing the revolutions in the region which can weaken the role of Saudi Arabia and strengthen Iran situation in region and is the matter of concern for the challenge of legitimacy in this country. These countries are trying to amend the lack of domestic legitimacy by strengthening of foreign relations with major powers (Karami, 2011). Saudi Arabia is trying to adopt different strategies in the face of protests by the Shi'ite regions in country: First, Saudi authorities have cracked down protesters. The second strategy is that the protesters are accused of having links with Iran. The third strategy is to differentiate uprising and protests in Shiite region from other areas. This means that the government is trying to show that the Shiites protesters do not have democratic and human rights, but also the demands of the Shiite and sect (Karami, 2011). However, Ramin Mehmanparast, a former spokesman of Foreign Affairs Ministry, was extremely concerned the recent acts of violence of government forces in Saudi Arabia against religious figures and people of eastern Region of this country, which result in killing and wounding a number of people in the area. He expressed hope that the Saudi government considered seriously the legitimate demands of people and avoiding the use of violence against the people (Adami, 2013). Saudi government state reacted to this issue whether for statements of country officials and also in the form of Persian Gulf Cooperation Council statements. Foreign ministers of Persian Gulf Cooperation Council in June 2011 consolidate clear interference of Iran in the internal affairs of these countries. They called Iran's actions as "sovereignty violation, independence and good neighborliness" (Al-Tamimi, 2011). In the thirty-third meeting of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council that held in December 2012, members emphasized on immediate and decisive ending of intervention in the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council countries and their opposition to the policies and actions of Iran that lead to the escalation of tensions and threaten the security and stability of the region. Persian Gulf Cooperation Council's approach to Iran after region evolutions in the Middle East and North Africa One of responses to the Iranian Persian Gulf Cooperation Council to Iran after region evolutions in the Middle East and North Africa is member's actions to the intervention of the council's member countries that in the form of statements and comments of different authorities Cooperation Council member countries become more established in recent years. The peak of the response to the statements by the Iranian authorities has found in the case of Saudi Arabia intervention in Bahrain. Entering Peninsula Shield forces to Bahrain beside the efforts to support Al Khalifa regime's and prevent the spread of protests to the Shiite population living in Saudi Arabia sent a message to Iran that Bahrain deeply was into the sphere of influence of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council and Iran cannot think it like Lebanon or Iraq. In an extraordinary meeting of foreign ministers of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council in April and May 2011, the members stated "flagrant Iranian interference" in the internal affairs of these countries as conspiracy against national security (Guzansky, 2011). Also, in the thirty-third Summit of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council which was held in December 2012, member opposed with continuing intervention in the internal affairs of Cooperation Council states and trying to get Iran to stop these practices. In fact, members of the Council believe that Iran looks to Yemen as launching pad to achieve his ambitions in the Middle East and beyond. They believed that the acquisition of Iran to Yemen is strategically close to Saudi Arabia and with controlling shipping lanes in the Red Sea, this country (Iran) could take an important step in becoming a regional superpower status. In view of the members of the Cooperation Council, Iran looks to the Middle East and North Africa evolution as an opportunity for the development of military capabilities, ensuring nuclear ambitions and keep his Islamic state in the Middle East (Al-Sayed, 2012). But on the other side, Iran rejected the accusations of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council's of Iranian interference in the internal affairs of these countries. Ramin Mehmanparast, a former spokesman of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in December 2011, with calling absurd and unfounded claims of reading intervention of Iran in the internal affairs of Cooperation Council member States as view of the unilateralism of Council member States. He added that Tehran emphasizes on goodwill, mutual respect and avoids interfering in the internal affairs of other countries and considers these three principles as fundamental principles of its foreign policy and states that "military confrontation and violence in this country not only solve any problem but will expand insecurity and instability throughout the region". It seems that the accusations against Iran's Persian Gulf Cooperation Council continues based on Iran's interference in the internal affairs of these countries due to the inability 12
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of these countries in response to the internal protests in these countries and this can lead to increased tensions between Iran and the Council.
CONCLUSION Developments in the Middle East and North Africa were one of the most important events in the early third millennium. According to some, it can be the most important event of the last century in the Arab world. The continuous of protests can be investigated by several other aspects in addition to instability in the countries. First, at the regional level, leading to insecurity and the situation will result in concerning through the countries. An obvious example can be seen in Syria that the civil war has also spread in the region which Lebanon and Iraq also affected. Second, provides the opportunities for competing countries in the region and for increasing influence. It is important that the regional competition after region evolution has intensified greatly among regional powers. Competition of Syria, Iran and Saudi Arabia can be one of the cases. Third, the increasing gap between ethnic and religious upheaval is another dimension of existing status after evolution. Shia - Sunni fighting, the presence of extremist groups such as Alnasreh and putting bombs in Shiite areas of Iraq are examples of religious and ethnic divisions. And finally, it can remember the role of trans-regional great powers in the Middle East and North Africa that can be expected as a result of the continuing crisis in the region. America and Europe support from Syrian opposition and Russia's support of the Syrian government is an example of this situation. Middle East and Persian Gulf Cooperation Council, is not immune to the wave of recent developments as a regional institution. Protests in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia led to respond the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council to the protests. It is important to note that at first, protests took on sectarian unrest in the country that increased the sensitivity of the issue. Shi'ite protests in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia protests in Shia areas of cooperation led to the adoption of security policies to deal with them. Especially, Iran is located in neighboring as Shiite country and the foreign policy in this period was strengthening of Shiites in the region. Highlighting the role of the resistance axis, the Iranian influence in Iraq and to be near Shiite government of this country to Iran were demonstrated this problem. Regardless of the Iranian threat, the nature of the protests was also involved threat for Persian Gulf Cooperation Council. Creating an electoral system, the formation of accountable government, civil institutions, brain circulation, social freedom and.... were issues that basically were incompatible with the nature of the political system of the country. Therefore, it became the only option for them due to the Council's failure to respond to popular demands in repression and intimidation. The countries involved in the protests in the early stages had the defensive approach and tried to quench the protests by various means, including threats, bribes and suppressing. But then, tried to change strategies from activate defensive to offensive. In Figure 1, it can be observed the different adopted strategies from the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council members for the Middle East and North Africa.
Defensive strategy
Initiative Strategy
Aggressive strategy
1. The initial silence on the
protests in Egypt and
The initial
statement on calling
protesters to be calm in
Bahrain, Yemen
3. Military
intervention in Bahrain to
quell protests
4. Different
statements in calling the
foreign origin of the protests
as an intervention in the
internal affairs of countries
5. Suppressing Shia
protests in Saudi Arabia
6. To reaffirm on
Shiite Crescent in the region
and adopting the policy of
Iran's fear
1. Mediation of the
Persian Gulf Cooperation
Council in Yemen and
resignation of Saleh based
on the initiative of Council
2. Closer to Egypt as a
Mohamed Morsi visit to
Saudi Arabia
3. Presenting
membership plan of Jordan
and Morocco in the Persian
Gulf Cooperation Council
4. Presenting
political union plan of Saudi
Arabia and Bahrain in the
Persian Gulf Cooperation
5. Qatar Emir's visit
to the Gaza Strip by Hamas
in close cooperation with
the Council and its distance
from Iran
1. Increasing
purchases from America
and Europe
2. Holding common
exercises with Western
countries in the Persian
3. Interference in the
Syrian crisis through
support of Assad's
opponents, some terrorist
4. Cooperate
America to deploy a
missile defense shield in
Persian Gulf
5. keeping with the
approach of the West on
Iran's nuclear program
Figure 1. Strategies for the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council for evolutions of Middle East and North Africa.
J. Politic. Soci. Sci. Vol., 2 (1), 7-16, 2015 As can be seen, the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council has chosen different strategies against the protests with regard to developments. This council with defensive approach attempted to shut down initially the picket lines in the country by issuing statements in condemning the action and also refer to foreign intervention in neighboring countries. But with the expansion of protests, Council took repression policy and exposed it by intervention in Bahrain. Condition was met with protests from neighboring countries such as Iran. But the council did not simply feel threatened by the protests in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, but also protests continued in the neighboring country in Yemen. And the fear was that protests in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia will become more intense with fall of Saleh in Yemen. Therefore, Council, with presenting proposals to solve the political crisis in Yemen, tried to prevent the outbreak of revolution in this country by Smooth transition of power from Saleh to the other person. Also, an attempt for political union with Bahrain was another Council action which could prevent an escalation of protests in the country. Although, the issue remained as a scheme due to opposition of Iran and some Persian Gulf Cooperation Council members but presenting by Saudi Arabia demonstrated the seriousness of the threat. Also, the Cooperation Council in another effort tried to prevent from taking place evolution in these countries connects with to be member Jordan and Morocco in the Council. The two countries have kingdom system like other Cooperation Council countries. In fact, the main objective of Council was maintaining the political system in the kingdom from attracting these countries as the consistency factor to Cooperation Council members. But in the third step, Cooperation Council tried to push its strategy from activities toward being aggressive. From this point onwards, tensions increased between Iran and the Cooperation Council. Council feels threatening actions in the area and tried to reciprocate. Areas and different issues were considered. Syria was the first and most important sector that the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council intervened in it with the aim of countering with Iran. Armed opposition, diplomatic support from the Syrian opposition coalition and expelling Syrian ambassadors from their countries were the examples of the actions of its members, particularly Saudi Arabia and Qatar in Syria. Conflict of Iran and the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council in Syria, region derived to be secure. The Council action on Iran after the region was to hold common military exercises with trans-regional countries in the Persian Gulf and Oman Sea. This was also the time that some Iranian officials have threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz due to oil sanctions. The most important Council's approach at this stage was strengthening cooperation with the West, especially; the tension between Iran and the West had reached to its peak. Cooperation with America in the Persian Gulf missile defense shield which aims to provide security in cooperation countries to deal with facing threats such as Iran threat are considered as Council actions. Also, keeping with the approach of the West in Iran's nuclear program are considered as other actions to counter threat posed by Iran after the region evolutions. Especially, the P5 + 1 talk with Iran in this period was deadlocked and there was the fears of a military strike on Iran. Even, some officials of the Cooperation Council countries were welcomed military option against Iran. Welcoming Iran oil sanctions and the efforts to replace Iran oil in global markets were accompanied by some Member States in the framework of cooperation with the West. Moreover, the arms purchases of Cooperation Council member countries increased from West during this period. And according to Iran's military achievements and making several rockets from Iran was created fears an arms race in the region. Thus, we see that the relations between Iran and the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council have been severely strained. Subject that we attempt to prove it as our hypothesis; we used the theoretical framework of security in order to prove this hypothesis among the theories of area analysis. Also, other regional theory was one of regional security complex of Barry Buzan or some other such simplistic views of Hedley Bull English School could also be used to prove the hypothesis, but we use this theory due to the inclusion of security and integrity theory for the application of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council. Also, it has been used due to the fact that this theory has evolved over time and theorists, including constructivism had removed it from the mere functionalism. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett gave simplistic structure with emphasis on norms and notions of identity and continuity in the formation of a security community to the idea. Later, Alex Bellamy also tried to complete the approach of Adler and Barnett by examining the interaction of security country with the neighbors. Bellamy tried to give its relations with its neighbors in a "regional castle" regarding to the regional nature of the institution by examining the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council as a stopped convergence. Based on this argument, Bellamy thinks Persian Gulf Cooperation Council as part of the security community that the association has been stopped for several reasons. First, the reasonable expectations of peaceful change cannot be seen in the Cooperation Council. This characteristic emphasis on security community and calls them to repeat collective action, learning and creating habits to create reasonable expectations. Second, Council has been formed not only based on logic of convergence but also because of the historical needs. Perceived threat from the Iranian revolution and Hobbs view to surroundings alongside of challenges like Extremist Islam, socialism, pan-Arabism and some challenges against kingdom led to Persian Gulf countries establish institution as Persian Gulf Cooperation Council to meet the needs of them and immune their political systems of threats facing them. Second, objective norms of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council has been expansionary and norms constituting. A comparative study of the Council Security community, in cooperation with the security of Western Europe that are 14
J. Politic. Soci. Sci. Vol., 2 (1), 7-16, 2015 found in the European Union, we observe that many of governments and communities have been accepted the ideas of European that were part of to Europe secure community during the cold war of secure society. But during the 1990s, high levels of acceptance of democracy, market economy and human rights in Western Europe from communist countries show that the idea of security has expanded beyond its borders. That's why today we see many Eastern European countries are now members of the European Union. But this situation is found in the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council. These institutions have always tried to maintain a certain type of regime to prevent entry of norms and ideas within the security community. This makes the security of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council to avoid extend logic. This is why we see these institutions in the region during the last three decades are not any of your membership. Even, the current membership plan of Jordan and Morocco were conducted with the aims to preserve the kingdom and the perceived threat of regional cooperation was not intended to extend the norms and develop ideas. In fact, the Council presented the plan of Jordan and Morocco membership with fear by the developments in the region and in order to deal with it. Components such as democracy, free elections, citizenship rights, creating civil society as evolutions of middle east and North Africa are in conflict with identifying features of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council's such monarchy system. Based on these, security community of the Cooperation Council carried out reactions against them. Some reactions were performed in the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council. Among them, it can be noted the military intervention in Bahrain, trying to increase the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council members and reduce the boundaries between the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council that was in the form of political union of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. Some of the reactions took place in external environment of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council that intervention in Syria crisis, increasing arms purchases Persian Gulf Cooperation Council from Arab and cooperation with America to deploy a missile defense shield in the Persian Gulf are among them. Also, it conclude the increase of accusing to Iran of interfering in the internal affairs of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council countries, more accompany with the West's approach towards Iran's nuclear program, Persian Gulf Cooperation Council to intervene in Syria crisis, holding common military exercises and efforts to reduce the sphere of influence of Iran In the Middle East. Thus, we see that developments in the Middle East and North Africa led to the escalation of tensions between Iran and the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council, one thing that was mentioned in the research hypothesis. REFERENCES Adami A, 2012. The crisis in Bahrain and Iran's regional security, strategy Quarterly. 21 (62). Adami A, Naj'mieh P, 2013. Saudi Arabia and Iran: the Islamic Awakening Case, Iran Review of Foreign Affairs. 3 (4). Ahmadian H, 2011. The Rise of the Yemen people and the transition from an authoritarian regime. Journal of Strategic Studies, Islam. 12 (45). Al Sayed Kb, 2012. Iran's growing interference in Yemen, The Peninsula. Al Tamimi J, 2011. GCC condemns Iran's interference in affairs of its member states, Gulfnews.com. Arts P, 1999. The Middle East: A Region Without Regionalism or the end of Exceptionalism?, Third World Quarterly. 20 (5). Baer G, 2003. Population and Society in the Arab East, London: Routledge. Bahrain M, 2002. Social and political movements in Bahrain, opinion-makers Institute of Noor. Balfour R, Corina S, 2012. The enlargement of the European Union, Europian Policy Centre. Baroud R, 2011.The Syrian Uprising: U.S. Follows a Failed Bauer M, 2011. Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa in the Wake of the Arab Spring, In "The Future of Security", Klaus Lang, Studies&Comments 13. Bellamy AJ, 2007. Safe communities and neighborhoods; Castles regional or global convergence, translated by Mahmoud Yazdan Fam and Parisa Karimi, Tehran: Publication of Strategic Studies Research center. Brown N, Hamzawy A, 2010. Between Religion and Politics, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Burke E, 2012. One Blood and One Destiny? Yemen's Relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council, The London School of Economics and Political Science, No 23. Guzansky, Y. (2011). The GCC at 30: Shaking off the Dust? Institute for National Security Studies, No. 258. Hill G, Nonneman G, 2011. Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States: Elite Politics, Street Protests and Regional Diplomacy, Chatham House. Karami K, 2011. Spring Arabic and Saudi Arabia: Opus and the reactions. Middle East Studies. 18 (3). Kardan A, 2011. The revolutionary uprising in Yemen, the fields and the internal and external obstacles, Quarterly of scientific - technical, psychological operations. 8 (29). Katzman K, 2013. Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy, Congressional Research Service. Khorrami assl N, 2011. Arab Spring: Syrian Episode. Milani M, 2011. Iran and Saudi Arabia Square off the Growing Rivalry Between Tehran and Riyadh, Foreign Affairs, October. Mir-razavi F, Ahmadi B, 2004, Guide to the region and the countries of the Persian Gulf, Tehran: Contemporary Abrar. 15
J. Politic. Soci. Sci. Vol., 2 (1), 7-16, 2015 Oftedal G, 2011. The Syrian Uprising and its Impact to the Middle East/GCC Region, Stavanger. Ottaway M, Marwan M, 2011. MONARCHIES Chance for Reform, Yet Unmet, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Salehi H, 2011. United Arabic Emirates strategic relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran (2000-2011). Strategic Studies Quarterly. 14 (1). Teitelbaum J, 2011. Saudi Arabia, Iran and America in the Wake of the Arab Spring, BESA Center Perspectives Paper. Vivian S, 2011. Gulf states Seek Saleh's Departure as part of Yemen Accord, Bloomberg. 16

HF Zadeh, MY Joybari

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