Energetic Pictures, emotional costs, Christina's World, target group, distance, energetic costs, slope, effects, target, Proffitt, egocentric distance, depicted, actions, Witt & Proffitt, Witt, distance perception, the control group, drawing pencils, Andrew Wyeth, field notes, alternative hypothesis, Target Group Energetic Cost Drawings, biographical information, behavioral costs, Procedures Energetic Pictures, emotional cost group, costs, control condition, Christina Olsen
1 Running head: ENERGETIC PICTURES Effects of Behavioral Costs of Depicted Actions on Apparent Slope & Distance in Picture Perception William P. Seeley Bates College * Please do not cite without permission. This is the penultimate draft of a paper currently forthcoming in Empricial Studies of the Arts, 28(1)
Abstract (120) Assessments of distance and slope are influenced by the energetic and emotional costs
of anticipated actions. Participant accounts of narrative engagement suggest a means to evaluate whether these are perceptual effects or artifacts of the way participants judge the difficulty of anticipated tasks. Participant accounts suggest viewers simulate events depicted in pictures from the perspectives of their characters. We predicted that if participant accounts are valid then energetic/emotional costs effects should generalize to changes in the interpreted costs of actions depicted in pictures. We asked 92 participants (28 male, 64 female; 83 undergraduate, 9 faculty) to copy the spatial layout of paintings across different interpretations of the costs of depicted actions. Our results confirm this prediction for energetic costs, F(1,43) = 15.771, p < .001 (one-tailed), but not for emotional costs.
Effects of Behavioral Costs of Depicted Actions on Apparent Slope & Distance in Picture Perception The maps Meriwether Lewis and William Clark produced while exploring the vast wilderness of the American Northwest exhibit a curious error: distances between landmarks are systematically overestimated where journal records report that travel was rough and hilly (Stefanucci, Proffitt, Banton, & Epstein, 2005). These systematic cartographic distortions reflect a robust set of perceptual effects attributable to the variable costs of acting in different environments.1 A range of recent studies (Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999; Proffitt, Creem, & Zosh, 2001; Proffitt, Stefanucci, Banton, & Epstein, 2003; Stefanucci, Proffitt, Clore, & Parekh, 2008; Witt, Proffitt & Epstein, 2005; Witt & Proffitt, 2008) demonstrate that apparent slope and egocentric distance are influenced by three non-optical factors: the energetic costs of acting (e.g., fatigue and expected task difficulty), the emotional costs of acting (e.g., fear and anxiety), and physiological constraints on the capacity of an organism to perform an action (e.g., the extent of reach or the graspability of a tool). These effects generalize to interactions with virtual environment
s (Stefanucci et al, 2005) and cases in which participants merely imagine a change in their potential capacity for action (Witt & Proffitt, 2008). The results of these studies demonstrate that perception does not encode the structure of environmental features per se, but rather the relative behavioral costs of engaging in a particular action. The behavioral costs of actions are determined by the conjunction of several factors: environmental features (e.g., slope or distance), the physiological (e.g. fatigue, fitness, or encumbrance) of agents, and the psychological (e.g., anxiety and
self-report of health related) states of agents. Slope perception provides the clearest example of these effects. Participants tend to overestimate the slopes of hills in ordinary contexts: 5° hills appear on average to normal perceivers to be 10°, 10° degree hills look to be 30°, and overestimations of slope are exaggerated when participants are tired after a long run or encumbered by a heavy backpack (Proffitt, 2006). Distance estimations are similarly exaggerated when participants are encumbered by a backpack or asked to throw a heavy ball to a target (Proffitt et al, 2003; Witt, Proffitt, & Epstein, 2004). The rate of overestimation of slope and distance is smaller among physically fit populations of varsity athletes than nonathletic college students
. Distance and slope assessments among elderly participants are correlated with self-perception of health (Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999). Distance and slope estimations are also influenced by the emotional costs of actions. For instance, when participants were positioned on skateboards at the top of a long 7° grade there was a positive correlation between subjective reports of anxiety associated with descending the hill and assessments of apparent slope and egocentric distance (Stefanucci et al, 2008). Finally, the influence of the behavioral costs of actions on the spatial metric of perception is limited to actions agents anticipate performing themselves. Witt et al (2004) divided participants into throwers and walkers. Prior to making distance assessments participants either walked on a treadmill or threw a heavy ball to a target. The treadmill adaptation influenced apparent egocentric distance if participants anticipated walking to a target, but not if they intended to throw a ball to it. Conversely, the throwing adaptation influenced apparent egocentric distance only if participants anticipated throwing a ball to the target after their
distance assessments. The results reported by Proffitt and his colleagues are compelling. However, one can question whether they are due to changes in the way participants perceive slope and distance in their environment or are instead artifacts of the way participants judged the difficulty of anticipated tasks. In order to evaluate this alternative hypothesis one needs a method to directly measure the spatial metric of perception. One means to do so is to ask participants to sketch/copy the rough spatial layout of what they perceive as accurately as possible. In this type of task participants continuously compare what they have drawn against what they perceive. Comparisons of the spatial extent of their drawings across different interpretations of the energetic and emotional costs of anticipated actions can, therefore, be interpreted as a record of change in perceived slope and egocentric distance. Philosophical theories of narrative understanding in picture perception suggest a novel way to implement this strategy. Witt and Proffitt (2008) have shown that energetic cost effects in perception are the result of, and so demonstrate a role for, tacit motor simulation in action planning. Witt defines motor simulation as the act of imagining, either covertly or explicitly, an action without necessarily executing it. More concretely, motor simulation is the act of running a motor program offline, or simulating an action from a first person perspective by activating areas of premotor cortex (PM) associated with motor planning and preparation (Decety, 1996). Theories of narrative understanding can be divided into two types. Participant accounts argue that viewers, spectators, and readers come to comprehend a narrative painting, film, drama, or work of fiction by adopting the perspectives of its characters and
imagining, or simulating, their depicted beliefs, desires, and actions from a firstperson point of view (Goldman, 2006). Observer accounts argue to the contrary that we come to understand the content of a narrative picture, film, drama, or work of fiction from a third-person, or external, point of view (Carroll, 1997/2001; Kieran, 2003). A common theme in these latter types of theories is that spectators and readers are able to infer the content of narrative artworks using tacit folk psychological theories about the relationship between behavior and the beliefs and desires of others. We hypothesized that, if participant accounts are valid then one should find similar perceptual effects across changes in interpretations of the energetic and emotional costs of actions depicted in static images. We chose two paintings by Andrew Wyeth, Christina's World and Winter, 1946, to test our hypothesis. These paintings appear to art historical
ly naпve viewers as realistic depictions of ordinary, emotionally neutral events. However, the central subjects of the paintings were real individuals who suffered from physical disabilities
and personal circumstances
that influence the energetic or emotional costs of the depicted events. Participants were asked to copy the spatial arrangement of key features of the scene depicted in either Christina's World2 (energetic costs) or Winter, 19463 (emotional costs) twice. We predicted that drawings would differ across interpretations of the behavioral costs of depicted actions, indicating that the introduction of salient biographical information had caused art historically naпve viewers to perceive the slopes of depicted hills in the paintings as steeper and the distance between key landmarks as longer. However, we hypothesized that over time feedback from extended focused viewing and the drawing task would correct costs related perceptual distortions. We predicted, as a
result, that longer drawing times would produce more accurate copies of the paintings.
Ninety-two participants were recruited from the general Franklin & Marshall College population, divided into an energetic cost group (EN) and an emotional cost group (EM) (61 EN and 31 EM; 28 males and 64 females; 83 undergraduates and 9 faculty), and compensated with lab credit or paid $5 for their participation. All participants gave consent.
We used four paintings by Andrew Wyeth that are similar in luminance profile and hue: Brown Swiss4 (practice), East Waldoboro5 (practice), Christina's World (energetic costs), and Winter, 1946 (emotional costs). Our two target behavioral costs images, Christina's World and Winter, 1946 were also similar in compositional structure. Images were projected onto a screen using a ceiling mounted VGA projector in a darkened room and presented 25" x 40" on a black field for either 30-seconds, 1-minute, or 3-minutes. Participants sat 7 feet away from the screen at a large utility table. The center of the image was located approximately 18" above participants' line of sight. Participants made their drawings on 24" x 36" sheets of rough newsprint using soft (8b) drawing pencils. The projected size of each image was scaled to roughly match the visual size of the drawing sheet.
Design and Procedures
We used a between subjects Factorial Design
to measure the effects of the behavioral costs of depicted actions and drawing time on perceived slope and distance in the target images. The Dependent variable
was change in the extent of the depicted landscape between drawings 1 and 2. We defined extent in the behavioral costs images as the area of the region between the figure and key landmarks (see results section below). Participants in the energetic costs group were divided into 30-second, 1-minute, 3-minute, and Reverse groups. Participants in the emotional cost group were divided into 30-second and 1-minute groups. Within each of the timing groups participants were divided into a target condition and a control condition. Participants drew either Christina's World (energetic costs group) or Winter, 1946 (emotional costs group) twice: participants in the target condition drew the behavioral costs image once in a naпve condition, prior to the introduction of salient biographical information (drawing 1), and then again in an educated condition after reading a passage describing the salient biographical information (drawing 2); participants in the control condition did not read the salient information about the depicted event between their two drawings of the behavioral costs image. Participants in the Reverse group were asked to read the salient biographical information prior to their first behavioral costs drawing. They were then asked to read a second passage designed to lessen their interpretation of the energetic costs of the event depicted before drawing the painting again. Drawing time for the Reverse Group was one minute. Participants were tested individually. All participants were given 4 sharpened pencils, a pencil sharpener, and an Artgum eraser. We instructed them to copy the spatial arrangement of the key features in the depicted scene as accurately as possible,
but not to worry about how realistically their copies matched the original paintings. We encouraged them to use abstractions to facilitate their drawings (e.g., rectangles for buildings and stick figures for people). These instructions were reinforced prior to each drawing. They were told that their first two drawings were for practice (Brown Swiss & East Waldeboro) and that they might see the same image twice. However, they did not know in advance that they were going to make two copies of the target behavioral costs image. They filled out a written survey after completing drawing 1 to screen for drawing skill, general knowledge of art history
, and interpretation of behavioral costs, after which they took an enforced two minute break. The survey and break served as distractor tasks to take their minds off their first behavioral costs drawing. At the end of the break participants in the target condition for the 30-second, 1-minute, and 3-minute groups read a short, one-page passage: participants in the energetic costs group read a passage that described Christina Olsen's disability and explained that she was depicted crawling home from a visit to her parents' graves in the painting; participants in the emotional costs group read a passage that described the boy running down the hill as anxiously fleeing the train accident that killed N.C. Wyeth and explained that the painting symbolized Wyeth's anxiety about his future at the time. Participants in the Reverse energetic costs group read the biographical story about Christina Olsen prior to drawing 1. Prior to drawing 2 they read a story that debunked the myth that Christina was crawling home from a visit to her parents' graves, described her as actually returning from her vegetable garden, and explained that she and her brother farmed the blueberries that grew in the field (Corn, 1973). Participants filled out a written survey after competing drawing 2 to screen for
familiarity with the paintings, familiarity with Wyeth's work, familiarity with biographical knowledge salient to the events depicted in the paintings, and to evaluate change in the interpretation of the costs of the action depicted in the painting.
Results We defined the extent of Christina's World as the area of the triangle formed by the head of the figure, the front corner of the house (primary landmark), and the point where a vertical line bisecting the head of the figure intersected with the horizon (secondary landmark). We defined the extent of Winter, 1946 as the area of the triangle formed by the head of the figure, the point where the fence meets the horizon (primary landmark), and the peak of the hill (secondary landmark). These area measures enabled us to capture both the egocentric distance between the subjects of the painting and the targets of their action (the Olsen's house and the bush at the top of the road in Winter, 1946), and changes in the extent of the slope of depicted hills. Distances appear longer on hills and exaggerations of egocentric distance on hills are correlated with changes in both apparent slope and the energetic costs of acting. Therefore, we hypothesized that the apparent distance to the secondary landmark would vary with the apparent slope of the hill even though it was not the target of the depicted action. We threw out drawings in which any of these features were omitted. There were 84 remaining pairs of drawings following this procedure (56 EN;28 EM). We used the 1-minute energetic costs target group as control measures for the Reverse group. Energetic Costs
We ran a 2 (condition) x 3 (time) between subjects factorial ANOVA comparing the change in extent (in2) in the 30-second, 1-minute, and 3-minute energetic costs groups, a between-subjects ANOVA on the time variable within each condition for the 30-second, 1-minute, and 3-minute energetic costs groups, and a between subjects one-way ANOVA comparing the results of the Reverse group and the 1-minute target group, using Bonferroni adjusted alpha levels of 0.017 (0.05/3). There was a significant main effect for condition, F(1,43) = 15.771, p < 0.001 (onetailed). Participants in the target group expanded the extent of the landscape in drawing 2 relative to drawing 1 (m = 4.842, sd = 11.778) to a greater extent than participants in the control group
(m = -4.798, sd = 15.654). There was a significant main effect for time, F(2,43) = 4.585, p < 0.01 (one-tailed). The interaction between condition and time was significant, F(2,43) = 10.452, p < 0.001 (one-tailed), indicating that the effect of condition was influenced by the amount of time participants had to make their drawings. There was no significant difference in mean change in extent among the 30-second, 1-minute, and 3-minute energetic costs target groups, F(2,27) = 1.059, p = 0.361 (one-tailed). The differences in mean change in extent between the energetic costs control groups
were significant, F(2,16) = 15.791, p < 0.001 (one-tailed). The 30-second control group was significantly different than each of the 1-minute (md = 25.228, se = 5.370, p < 0.001, one-tailed) and 3-minute (md = 24.483, se = 5.370, p < 0.001, one-tailed) control groups in pairwise comparisons. The differences between the 1-minute and 3-minute control groups were not significant (md = 0.744, se = 6.089, p = 0.904, one-tailed). Differences between the Reverse and 1-minute target group were significant, F(1,15)
= 6.887, p < 0.01 (one tailed). Participants in the Reverse group truncated the extent of the landscape in drawing 2 relative to drawing 1 (m = -9.472, sd = 19.228) relative to participants in the control group (m = 8.990, sd = 9.651) indicating that we were able to reverse the observed energetic costs effects. Insert Figure 1 about here Insert Table 1 about here Emotional Costs A 2 (condition) x 2 (time) between subjects ANOVA was calculated examining the change in extent (in2) between drawing 1 and drawing 2 for participants in the 30-second and 1-minute Emotional Costs groups. There was no significant main effect for condition, F (1,23) = 1.986, p = 0.086 (one-tailed). There was no main effect for time, F (1,23) = 0.011, p = 0.459 (one-tailed) and the interaction between condition and time was not significant, F (1,23) = 0.033, p = 0.4285 (one-tailed). Neither changes in interpreted emotional costs of the action depicted in Winter, 1946 nor time had a significant effect on participant drawings.
Discussion The results of the present study demonstrate that energetic cost effects generalize to picture perception. The introduction of biographical information that increased the energetic costs of the action depicted in Christina's World caused participants to draw depicted distances as longer in their copies, and decreases in the interpreted energetic costs caused them to draw depicted distances as shorter. Motor simulation is the mechanism responsible for energetic cost effects (Witt & Proffitt, 2008). Our results therefore demonstrate that participants simulate Christina Olsen's
perspective and so imagine, or at least anticipate, crawling home across the field in the painting, and provide support for both the participant account of narrative understanding for picture perception and the claim that energetic costs effects are genuine perceptual effects. We introduced the drawing time variable in order to evaluate whether viewing time would influence behavioral costs effects in perception. The main effect of drawing time on the observed energetic costs effects is explained by the performance of the 30 second group. This is consistent with Cohen (2005) who reports that people without significant drawing skills have difficulty copying even simple line drawing
s at timings shorter than 1-minute. We initially hypothesized that participants in the 3minute group would have ample time to analyze the depicted landscape in the painting and correct perceptual distortions due to the energetic costs of depicted actions. We predicted, as a result, that participants in the 1-minute group would expand the extent of the landscape more than participants in the 3-minute group and that the latter would be closer to accurate. This was the case. But, interestingly, the performance of the 3-minute group reflects the structure of distance assessments, not the spatial structure of Christina's World per se per se. There is a critical difference between slope and distance perception. Apparent egocentric distance increases as the energetic cost of actions increase, just as in the case of slope. However, normal perceivers underestimate distances in the environment in standard conditions. Overestimations of distance due to energetic cost effects, unlike the case of slope, more closely approximate the actual distance to the target.6 Participants in the 1minute energetic costs group exaggerated the extent of the depicted landscape in both
drawing 1 and drawing 2. Participants in the 3-minute energetic cost target group underestimated the extent of the landscape on average in their naпve drawings (drawing 1) and were accurate in their educated, or increased energetic costs, drawings (drawing 2) (see Table 2). Therefore, although differences between the 1and 3-minute energetic costs groups were not significant, the performance of the 3minute group more closely matches the structure of distance assessments in ordinary perceptual contexts. Finally, we found no perspectival effects associated with the expansion of the extent of the depicted landscape. However, participants tended to draw a more pronounced crown to the hill in the educated condition (Figure 2). We interpreted this effect to represent an increase in the depicted slope of the hill. Insert Figure 2 about here Insert Table 2 about here Results from the emotional costs group did not support our hypothesis. There are several possible explanations for these results. First, the drawings suggest that participants found it difficult to copy Winter, 1946. Second, the boy in the painting is both running towards, and looking at, the viewer, engaging his or her attention. In contrast, the viewer is situated behind the figure in Christina's World. It may, as result, be harder to adopt the perspective of the figure in Winter, 1946. Third, Cohen (2005) identifies gaze frequency as the source of drawing difficulties for naпve copyists. Skilled copyists adopt regimented gaze strategies. Naпve copyists, on the other hand exhibit erratic gaze strategies. They, therefore, do not look back and forth efficiently between their copies and the original at drawing times shorter than one minute. We speculate that the eyes of the figure engaged the attention of viewers and
produced a similar effect. Finally, emotional costs effects in perception are associated with purposiveness (e.g., anxiety about descending steep slopes). Although the emotional costs story we used describes the figure in the painting as anxiously fleeing, the target of his anxiety is not descending the slope, but rather a past event that transpired beyond the crest of the hill behind him. The conjunction of these factors suggests that complications with the stimuli were a significant contributing factor in the performance of participants in the emotional costs group. The energetic costs results of the present study are consistent with and so lend support to an earlier model for premotor contributions to visual analysis and form recognition (Kozbelt & Seeley, 2007). Kozbelt (2001) reports that artists outperform non-artists in basic visual analysis tasks (e.g., gestalt completion tasks, embedded figure tasks, and recognizing the subjects of blurry photographs) and that their advantages in these tasks are correlated with drawing skill. Kozbelt & Seeley argue that reciprocal connectivity between premotor areas involved in motor preparation and prefrontal areas involved in both spatial working memory
and selective attention facilitate the recognition of sets of visual features that support adequate depiction. These sets of visual features suffice for adequate depiction because they suffice for object recognition. In other words, learning to draw, a motor skill, facilitates seeing the world in terms of the affordances for drawing, a particular type of action, which in this particular case also confers an advantage in visual analysis and form recognition. Proffitt argues that energetic and emotional costs effects are a means to directly encode affordances for action in the spatial metric of perception (Proffitt, 2006). The results of the present study, therefore, suggest that our model for the role of motor
simulation in perception for drawing generalizes to other types of actions and motor skills. It is important to note that very few researchers see the question of our ability to understand the beliefs, motives, and actions of others as an all or nothing matter between simulation and inference. Rather they see simulation and theories of mind as tools whose utility in a context is relativized to the current behavioral and epistemic needs of the organism. One criticism of participant accounts of narrative understanding is that, within the context of this pluralist model, simulation is otiose. The purpose of a text, drama, film, or representational painting is to explicitly represent a set of narrative cues that carry information necessary to reconstruct and comprehend depicted events (e.g., cues that enable a viewer to perceptually recognize the events and behaviors depicted in a painting). This entails that information sufficient to understand the behaviors, thoughts, and feelings of characters is explicitly represented in a successful artwork. Simulation is, therefore, not necessary, for narrative understanding, one need only recover cues sufficient to recognize the depicted event as of a type or as similar to some set of past events encoded one's own episodic memory (Carroll, 1997/2001; Kieran 2003). The results of the present study challenge this view. Salient narrative details needed to recognize the event depicted in Christina's World were explicitly represented in the passages that target group participants read prior to their second drawings. Nonetheless, we observed energetic costs effects in target group drawings indicating that participants simulated the depicted event from Christina Olsen's perspective. Therefore, our study demonstrates a larger role for simulation than
ordinarily countenanced in philosophical theories of narrative understanding. These implications are consistent with general considerations about the cognitive costs of narrative engagement and event recognition in general. Despite the presence of explicit cues in a scene or narrative, the range of stored facts that one would need to recover from declarative knowledge to adequately model the dispositions and emotions of a character or the environmental dynamics of a depicted action is staggeringly large. Simulation is a tool that can be used to model the behavior of agents and characters when this information is not explicitly available. Therefore, cognitive efficiency favors an approach to our understanding of dynamic events that attributes a significant role to simulation. These considerations generalize to theories of narrative appreciation. A full appreciation of narrative turns on a deep understanding of character, or an ability to understand how character dispositions and emotions necessitate depicted actions. Participant and observer accounts differ in their assessment of the qualitative character of deep understanding. Participant accounts argue that deep understanding is a product of our capacity to empathize with characters (Coplan, 2004; Neill, 1996). Empathy relies on our capacity to adopt the perspectives of others and imagine, or simulate, some aspect of their character or experience (Adolphs and Spezio, 2007; Goldman, 2006). Therefore, on the participant account, we are able to make sense of the twists and turns of a plot by embodying those aspects of characters that compel their depicted behaviors. The artistic value of a narrative, in turn, emerges from rich, empathic, imaginative events through which we encounter particular characters and reflect on their actions, dispositions, and emotions. Observer accounts argue, to the
contrary, that the conjunction of explicit narrative cues and folk psychological schema for character types
are sufficient for deep understanding. Furthermore, they argue, our standard responses to fictions are inconsistent with an empathy-based simulation account. Whereas we do fear-for the welfare of characters in horror film
s and pity characters in dramas, we neither run from the theater nor fall into debilitating bouts of grief ourselves. Rather we feel sympathy-for characters because we are able to recognize their dispositions and emotions as of particular types and qualities. Therefore, as in the case of narrative understanding, they argue that simulation is otiose. The results of the present study challenge observer accounts in this context as well. Narrative details sufficient for a deep understanding of Christina Olsen were explicitly represented in the passage that target group participants read prior to their second drawings. Despite the fact that we did not find emotional costs effects, the observed energetic costs effects demonstrate not only that participants anticipated performing the depicted action, but also that they tacitly imagined the behavioral costs of the depicted action (i.e., what it would be like to perform the action) from Christina Olsen's point of view. These results are consistent with implications of the cognitive costs of narrative understanding and event recognition discussed above. Therefore, the results of our study favor an empathy-based model for narrative appreciation that attributes a significant role to simulation.
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Author Notes Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 19th Annual Meeting of the Association for Psychological Science, Washington, D.C.
, May 2007 and the 20th Congress of the International Association for Empirical Aesthetics, Chicago, IL, August 2008. Special thanks
to my student research assistants
Jessica Waughtel, Angelica Appel, and Erica Ofeldt, and to my colleague Meredith Bashaw. Thanks also to Oshin Vartanian and Paul Locher and for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of the paper. Correspondence concerning the paper should be sent to William P. Seeley, Department of Philosophy, Bates College, Lewiston, 73/75 Campus Avenue, ME 04240, ([email protected]
Footnotes: 1. Of course, we cannot rule out the alternative hypothesis that systematic spatial distortions in Clark's maps are due to a memory bias, and so do not reflect a genuine perceptual effect. However, it is a reasonable assumption that the maps were produced from careful FIELD NOTES
and sketches made while travelling the landscape. These notes and sketches would reflect Clark's perception of the landscape at the time he passed through it. If the assumption about Clark's methodology is sound, his systematic cartographic errors reflect the influences of the energetic and emotional costs of actions on perception. Nonetheless, this matter can only be resolved by returning to the field notes from the expedition. 2. See retrieved February 18, 2009: http://www.moma.org/collection/browse_results.php?criteria=O%3AAD%3AE%3A6 464&page_number=1&template_id=1&sort_order=1. 3. See retrieved February 18, 2009: http://www.ncmoa.org/collections/highlights/20thcentury/ 20th/19101950/039_lrg.shtml. 4. See retrieved August 31, 2008: http://www.museumsyndicate.com/item.php?item=15617. 5. See Corn, 1973, p. 100. 6. See Witt et al., 2004, p. Figure 1.
Table 1 Mean Change in Extent (in2) between Drawing 1 and Drawing 2 (one-tailed)
Group Energetic Costs (all)a 30-seconds 1-minute 3-minutes
df F-stat 1,43 15.771
1.455 15.027 8.284 8.138
8.990 9.651 -16.944 6.615
4.079 9.776 -16.199 13.950
-9.472 19.228 8.990 9.651 1,15 6.887 0.010b
Emotional Costs (all) 8.1117
20.160 19.722 21.964
-5.185 -5.505 -4.785
24.806 1,23 1.986 30.011 20.967
a Energetic Costs (all) represents the mean change in extent (in)2 for the combined 30second, 1-minute, and 3-minute energetic costs groups. b Bonferroni adjusted alpha levels = 0.017 (0.05/3)
Table 2. Mean Extent (in2) of Target Group Energetic Cost Drawings and Christina's World
Drawing 1 Drawing 2
1-minute 41.42 50.41
3-minute 36.24 40.32
Christina's World 40.22
Figure Captions Figure 1. Mean change in extent (in.2) for the 30-second, 1-minute, 3-minute, and Reverse energetic costs target and control conditions (top) and the 30-second and 1minute emotional costs target and control conditions (bottom). Figure 2. Examples of drawings from the 1-minute energetic cost groups: drawing 1, naпve condition (top); b) drawing 2, educated condition (bottom). Notice that in the educated condition drawing Christina's ankles are rendered more accurately as emaciated and her left arm is extended as if crawling.