FIGHTING THE SHARK ON THE BEACH: A CASE FOR NON-KINETIC COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY

Tags: Fairfax, VA, Coles, political Islam, extremist organizations, cultural hegemony, participation, Recruitment, counter-terrorism, terrorist tactics, terrorist group, shark attacks, operations, narratives, Salafi jihadist groups, political systems, organizations, intelligence operations, Daesh, Martha Crenshaw, Al Qaeda, Terrorist groups, acts of terror, counter-terror, Y. Omelicheva, recovery programs, Counter-Recruitment, operational capacity, terrorist organizations, George Mason University Terrorism, police officers, natural predator, Biological Lawrence, armed police officers, master narratives, religious boundaries, grounded theory, Psychological Lawrence, Islamic State, marginalization, Shark Nets, non-violent solutions, Violent Extremism, counterterrorism, international authorities, A. Brigitte Coles School
Content: FIGHTING THE SHARK ON THE BEACH: A CASE FOR NON-KINETIC COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY A. Brigitte Coles School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University Terrorism is a tactic manifest in an ongoing war for cultural hegemony. Deeply political in nature, this war stems from a collision between the relativeness of what a "better world" looks like for each individual, and subsequently groups of people. In the case of Islamist extremist organizations, this opinion of what the world should look like is derived from a religious lens. In the instance of the Islamic State of Iraq and Al Sham (ISIS/ISIL/IS/ Daesh), this is specifically the lens of the Salafi-Jihadist movement, with a strong Wahhabi influence. Unlike other Islamist or Salafi jihadist groups, the Islamic State's objective is not to destroy the current system, but is to establish an internationally recognized state where they can participate in the global economy and political systems. This study will attempt to address the pros, cons, and feasibility of solely non-kinetic action against extremist organizations, with an emphasis on Daesh. By addressing the historical precedence for such actions and the impact on the region, this study will culminate in an actionable plan and procedure for non-kinetic action against violent extremism that will have the potential to become standard operations within the fields of intelligence, conflict resolution, and diplomacy. Key Words: Counterterrorism; Non-Kinetic; Islamic State; Negotiation and Diplomacy; Nonviolence Terrorism is a tactic manifest in an ongoing war for cultural hegemony. Deeply political in nature, this war stems from a collision between the relativeness of what a "better world" looks like for each individual, and subsequently groups of people. In the case of Islamist extremist organizations, this opinion of what the world should look like is derived from a religious lens. In the instance of the Islamic State of Iraq and Al Sham (ISIS/ISIL/IS/ Daesh), this is specifically the lens of the Salafi-Jihadist movement, with a strong Wahhabi influence. This war for cultural hegemony is directly related to the concept of "political Islam": the amalgamation of the public and private spheres that creates a non-secular environment in which the politics of a state is correlated to Islamic principles. The hegemony of Islam in the public sphere subsequently Coles, A.Brigitte. Manuscript under review for submission to publication. Fairfax, VA. 2016
shapes the process of the enforcement of social and political norms. Unlike other Islamist or Salafi jihadist groups, the Islamic State's objective is not to destroy the current system, but is to establish an internationally recognized state where they can participate in the global economy and political systems, very similar to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In regards to their counter-terrorism operations against Daesh, the US and Arab Coalitions are at a military standstill. The success of these operations are not only important because of their significance to international security, but also for the deescalation of conflict in Syria. In order to engage in an effective campaign against "terrorism" we must be willing to first recognize that the traditional framework for kinetic action may be fundamentally flawed. In other words we need to be willing to broaden the scope of our perspectives in order to broaden the scope of our possible actions and reactions. Background In order to address alternative methods for counterterrorism operations, a theoretical framework for this analysis needs to be established. This framework will firstly address the definitions of academically disputed terminology and secondly provide a background on Daesh. For the purpose of this study, terrorism will be used as a verb to describe the methodology of organizations in their pursuit of their objectives. Furthermore, it will be defined as the threat of, or use of violence, to achieve a result. Extremism, while a relative term, is common in literature and public discourse surrounding terrorist organizations. We define extremism as any group or ideology that seeks to achieve hegemony of the master narrative Coles, A.Brigitte. Manuscript under review for submission to publication. Fairfax, VA. 2016
within the public sphere. Therefore, violent extremism is any group or ideology that seeks to achieve hegemony of the master narrative within the public sphere through the use of violence. There are several methods by which governments have attempted to address terrorism. One such method, and typically the most common, is kinetic action. Kinetic actions encompasses a wide scope of action including targeted bombing and drone strikes, carpet bombing (or the indiscriminate bombing of both military and civilian targets), tactical strikes, and full scale invasions. A lesser used method of counter-terrorism is non-kinetic action; which includes psychological operations, intelligence operations, coordination with grassroots movements, diplomacy, and negotiation. Non-kinetic action is not necessarily non-violent in nature as it additionally includes the use of enhanced interrogation techniques and psychological stress and manipulation. Daesh operates specifically within the lens of the of the Salafi-Jihadist movement, with a strong Wahhabi influence. They interpret their war as one that supersedes political disagreement but is more concerned with cultural hegemony. This was for cultural hegemony is directly related to the concept of "political Islam": the amalgamation of the public and private spheres that creates a non-secular environment in which the politics of a state is correlated to Islamic principles. The hegemony of Islam in the public sphere subsequently shapes the process of the enforcement of social and political norms. In order to accomplish this hegemony, their objective is to establish a state in which they can implement this concept of political Islam. While they, like most organizations, are not entirely ideologically homogenous, Daesh is a strictly hierarchal organization, whose main objective is to establish a state through the use of terrorism (Al-Hayat Media Center, 2014). According to their monthly publication Dabiq, they are also in search of Coles, A.Brigitte. Manuscript under review for submission to publication. Fairfax, VA. 2016
legitimacy for their state through participation and recognition from international authorities (AlHayat Media Center, 2014). Purpose of the Study Due in part to a lack of societies that proactively institutionalize the processes that mitigate the empowerment of extremist narratives, the past five years have seen the rise of one of the most unique "terrorist organizations": Daesh. Contrasting its predecessors and the majority of the their peers, Daesh is not a network or movement but an organization that has established a de-facto state through the adaption of insurgency and terrorist tactics. They rely on social connections to establish recruitment, but also display the structures of organized states including; an organized military, laws and law enforcement, taxation, and education. Therefore, in order to address Daesh we must engage in non-kinetic solutions at a multi-track level. This study aims to integrate the current theories of non-violent solutions to terrorism and propose a new theory for non-kinetic action that encompasses both proactive and reactive operations. In order to achieve these objectives, we ask: (1) what are current non-violent or non-kinetic methods being used to address terrorism, (2) what are the characteristics of extremist organizations that would increase the probability of success for non-kinetic counter-terrorism operations, and (3) what would a more holistic approach to non-kinetic counterterrorism look like. Method In order to achieve the purpose of the study and develop a non-kinetic method of counterterrorism , a grounded theory methodology was chosen. The objective of a grounded theory is to produce or ascertain a theory, or to conceptualize analytical schema of an occurrence Coles, A.Brigitte. Manuscript under review for submission to publication. Fairfax, VA. 2016
that pertains to a specific situation grounded in the circumstances and the relative perceptions of the participants (Creswell, 2003; Glaser and Corbin, 1967). Cognitive bias posed a risk to the results of the study and was mitigated by the use of a grounded theory method, because it eliminated the necessity of a hypothesis. Procedure To establish common themes, conditions, and opinions surrounding non-kinetic counterterrorism, multiple CASE STUDIES, where non-kinetic operations were employed, were coded and thematized. Additionally coded were unstructured interviews with leaders of Syrian Civil Society, intelligence officers, and activists. Coding was then applied to previously developed models: "Model for Recruitment and Counter-Recruitment" (Coles, 2014)1 and "Model of the Permeability of the Master Narrative" (Coles, 2015)2. Findings While there are many scholars and activists that attempt to address counterterrorism through non-violence and non-kinetic action, current practices are limited to proactive methods and do not address reactive operations. Emerging Theory The act of terrorism is, in essence, a form of direct democracy; or direct communication meant to engage the government and audience in order to facilitate change (Matusitz, 2013). In accordance with Coles' theory presented in "Facilitating Social Change: A Process by Which the Public Sphere can be Influenced to Reject Narratives of Violent Extremism" (2015), the 1 See Figure 1 2 See Figure 2 Coles, A.Brigitte. Manuscript under review for submission to publication. Fairfax, VA. 2016
individual is the primary catalyst that leads to a larger shift in society. As further discussed in "Manipulation of the Public Sphere to Win Cultural Hegemony: The Process by Which Islamic State Uses the Principles of the Overton Window to Engineer Extremism" (Coles, 2014), there are several internal and external factors that facilitate the individual's acceptance of extremist narratives and participation in acts of terror. In order to address the symptoms of participation in terrorist groups and a social acceptance of narratives of violent extremism we need to address the factors for individual recruitment through proactive institutions and reactive procedures. Fighting the Shark on the Beach: Sharks are commonly used to describe a particular group or situation that threatens us, for example the book "Swimming with Sharks Without Getting Eaten" describes ways of maneuvering in difficult situations. When framing methods of counterterrorism, the metaphor of the shark frames the preventative and reactive operations that can be taken to prevent damage from extremist organizations employing terrorist activities. I question though, why we have to swim with the sharks at all? Yes there will always be sharks because they are inherent to the ocean just as groups using terrorist tactics are inherent to violent extremist groups and groups without access to direct democracy. I propose however, a new method of dealing with sharks: fighting the shark on the beach. Keeping the Shark off the Beach Just as most beaches with a high propensity for shark attacks use preventative measures to reduce the probability of attacks; areas that demonstrate the characteristics that facilitate terrorism, as described in "Manipulation of the Public Sphere to Win Cultural Hegemony: The Coles, A.Brigitte. Manuscript under review for submission to publication. Fairfax, VA. 2016
Process by Which Islamic State Uses the Principles of the Overton Window to Engineer Extremism" (Coles, 2014)3, need to implement programs that mitigate the threat of terrorism. Beware of Sharks- Signs and Warnings on the Beach On beaches with a known probability of shark attacks, signs warning of sharks are commonly displayed. This functions as a form of education and awareness for people visiting or living in areas with sharks. Similarly, to mitigate the threat of terrorism, specifically in regards to extremist recruiting, education needs to play a primary role. This education should be pursued in a multi-track initiative focusing non-violence and conflict resolution practice and principles. This also includes incorporating empathy education into formal schooling programs with a focus on inter-faith and inter-culture development. Dolphins- Utilizing the Natural Predator When shark attacks are frequent or feared, many beach authorities will surround the beach with dolphins, the natural defender of sharks. Comparatively, the natural predator of terrorists and violent extremists are those that directly engage with the same population in a nonviolent manner. This requires unifying and empowering national and international bodies of Civil Society, as they provide a non-violent alternative of direct democratic practice. This recommendation encompasses the the principle of reckless behavior (Lackey, 2005): by recognizing and empowering alternative forms of nations and international dispute resolution, government will reduce the threat of the terror by ending the incentive for reckless behavior. This also includes the empowerment of conflict resolution practitioners in all areas of government and education, demonstrating the ability of non-violent intervention to shape policy. 3 See Figure 1 Coles, A.Brigitte. Manuscript under review for submission to publication. Fairfax, VA. 2016
One of the main environmental facilitators of terrorist recruitment is cultural and religious marginalization (Coles, 2014). Additionally, the most susceptible receptors for extremist narratives are those that perceive themselves as marginalized, particular minorities, young people, and women; in countries such as the U.S., police forces and judicial systems are often the structure enforcing this marginalization. In order to address this perceived marginalization this necessitates the reconceptualization of armed Police officers as defenders of property and law to defenders of peace officers. In Iceland, the defining of police officers as peace officers has led to a focus on building domestic infrastructure to support international human rights law and reduced instances of marginalization. The natural predator of the shark is the dolphin just as the natural predator of violent intervention is non-violent peace building. Shark Nets- Reframing Pre-Conceived Boundaries Beaches that have not effectively used shark nets to keep threats from reaching the waters of the beach are more susceptible to shark attacks because they have not defined strategic boundaries. Violent extremism preys on latent counter-narratives that exist within the marketplace of ideas but are not validated by the master narrative within the public sphere (Coles, 2015). Correspondingly, public spheres whose master narratives retain hegemony by actively silencing counter-narratives, as opposed to democratic debate within the market place of ideas, are at a far greater risk of narratives of violent extremisms finding favorable receptors among the silenced4. Implementing effective procedure to prevent this effect lies in re-framing our socially developed and structurally enforced boundaries that perpetuate division and marginalization. This includes implementing programs at a Track II and Track III level that 4 See Figure 2 Coles, A.Brigitte. Manuscript under review for submission to publication. Fairfax, VA. 2016
reframe cultural and religious boundaries to reduce marginalization and institutionalize interfaith and empathy education. Additionally, this requires the implementation of refugee and Immigrant Integration programs that facilitate the provision of basic human needs (Burton; Maslow, 1943). One such necessary program to redefine boundaries is a former terrorist reintegration program. Recovery programs build resilience and reconciliation and limit selffulfilling prophecies within communities where they have been used. Trauma healing is an essential element of this program and has been particularly effective in Norway (Lackey, 2005). By reframing our socially created and structurally enforced boundaries we can re-write our social contracts in a way that promotes unity and mitigates marginalization. When a Shark Reaches the Waters of the Beach You Can... As with all preventative measures, there are circumstances under which they fail. Subsequently when a shark reaches the waters of the beach you have several options: Feed the Shark One common cause of shark attacks among beaches is the tendency of beach-goers to mistake sharks for dolphins and feed them. This was seen directly in the case of the Syrian Revolution. In order to manipulate the conflict, the U.S. government funneled money and weapons into the hands of moderate Syrian rebels, a large amount of whom were later reviled to be terrorist sympathizers and members of Daesh and Jabat Al Nusra. This was also demonstrated during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan when the U.S. provided weapons to the rebels who later became the Taliban. This is an ineffective method of handling the shark because it encourages the shark to attack. Coles, A.Brigitte. Manuscript under review for submission to publication. Fairfax, VA. 2016
Let the Shark Attack You Also an ineffective approach to sharks is passivity. Sharks will be sharks, and sharks are predators. Likewise, groups whose goal is to violence will not hesitate to do so even if they are not directly engaged. Attack the Shark The counterterrorist tactic is to attack the shark, usually in its natural environment as demonstrated by target airstrikes and ground force engagement. In the Ocean the Shark has the Strategic Advantage, so Fight the Shark on the Beach Just as the U.S. and coalition forces are at a military standstill in their campaign against Daesh, fighting the shark in the ocean gives the shark the strategic advantage. In his guidance of the united Arab Revolution against the Ottoman Empire, T.E. Lawrence described the Arab's three-fold advantage over the Turks as mathematical, biological, and psychological. Mathematical During the Ottoman occupation of the of Levant and Arabian Peninsula, the Turkish dilemma was how to maintain large areas with a limited force. This was exacerbated by Lawrence's observation that "rebellions can be made by two percent active in a striking force and, and 98 percent passively sympathetic" (Lawrence, 1991). An invasion of Daesh controlled territory, or fighting the shark in the ocean, would provide a similar mathematical disadvantage because of the number of troops needed to effectively occupy the land, and the level of passive hatred for foreign forces in the region. Coles, A.Brigitte. Manuscript under review for submission to publication. Fairfax, VA. 2016
Biological Lawrence's strategy against the Turks also encompassed a strong understanding of the biology of the forces involved. In their campaign against the Ottomans, the Arabs played to their strengths (knowledge of the terrain, the status amongst the people, and their mobility and invisibility) while targeting the vulnerabilities of the Turks (material and logistical dependancies). In like manner, attacking the shark in the ocean enables the shark to utilize their advantages and prey on the attackers disadvantages. Psychological Lawrence claimed that the Arab insurgents "had won a province when the civilians in it had been taught to die for the ideal of freedom: the presence or absence of the enemy was a secondary matter" (Lawrence, 1991). In their command practice and military strategy, the Arabs concerned themselves more with the thoughts of their soldiers and the surrounding populations than with their actions. Similarly the shark is a predator enabled with the ability to sense the movements of their prey, just as Daesh has the ability to use the current standard operating procedures of the West to anticipate the most probable strategy and fortify themselves against it. Getting the Shark to the Beach In order to reframe the scope of the conflict to the areas where Daesh does not have the strategic advantage the same principles that get the shark to the beach can be used. This goal can be achieved by applying specific principles from the Model for Recruitment and CounterRecruitment (Coles, 2014). Coles, A.Brigitte. Manuscript under review for submission to publication. Fairfax, VA. 2016
Know the Shark The first step in bringing the shark to the beach is to know what type of shark you are dealing with. Analogously, when attempting to alter the scope of the conflict with a terrorist group, analysis is a key principle. For example, the same methodology cannot be applied to Al Qaeda and Daesh because of the differences in their structure, motivation, and goals. Al Qaeda is best defined as a network, while Daesh follows an organizational model because of their hierarchal structure. Additionally, the main goal of Daesh is to establish a recognized state or caliphate (Al-Hayat Media Center, 2014) while their contemporaries were established to cause terror in the "infidels". This step correlated directly with the "Identity" and "Flaws and Blame Phase" of the Model for Recruitment and Counter-Recruitment (Coles, 2014)5. Keep the Shark from Swimming Just as sharks need to continually be swimming to be maintain their safety, terrorist organizations need to continually recruit and spread their message through acts of terror in order to maintain their relevance and momentum. In order to bring the shark to the beach, nets keep the shark from swimming. In Martha Crenshaw's How Terrorism Declines, she argues that the "decline of terrorism results from the interplay of three factors: the government's response, the choices of the terrorist group, and the organization's resources" (Crenshaw, 1991). She goes on to argues that "in some cases, terrorism is self-defeating," and for this reason, "government actions must be seen in context of the internal organizational dynamics and strategy of the opposition groups using terrorism" (Crenshaw, 1991)." Programs geared towards counterrecruitment mitigate the group's ability to build momentum and reduces the group's operational 5 See Figure 1 Coles, A.Brigitte. Manuscript under review for submission to publication. Fairfax, VA. 2016
capacity. Post-terror recovery programs also limit the group's operational capacity and recruitment momentum because they limit fear based participation and mitigate the effects of self-fulfilling prophesy. Trauma counseling is typically an integral aspect of post-terror recovery programs and help to conflict spiral rooted in mitigate trans-generational hatred and chosen traumas (Volkan, 1997). In terrorist safe holds that are also post-conflict or current conflict areas, infrastructure building reduces recruitment momentum and aids in limiting the financial freedom of groups. This step in bringing the shark to the beach corresponds to the "Social Power Phase" and "Projection Phase" of the Model for Recruitment and Counter-Recruitment because it involves reframing the limits of the conflict and projecting new images of the actors involved. Reel the Shark In Once the shark has been analyzed and its movement has been limited, the last step is to reel it in. Applied to counterterrorism, this involves limiting the operational capacity of the group to the point that they are willing to negotiate under the conditions that their needs will be fulfilled, though limited by the terms of the new social contract. The Principle of Coercive Transfer- Expanding the Scope of the Conflict by Reframing Narratives The concept of coercive transfer, also known as "penetration," "external inducement," and "direct coercive transfer", describes external pressures applied by various international actors to achieve homogeneity of states' policies, programs, or responses. Mariya Y. Omelicheva asserts in "Convergence of Counterterrorism Policies: A Case Study of Kyrgyzstan and Central Asia", that, "by perceiving terrorism as a type of criminal offense, the state confines its counterterrorism responses to the prescribed rules of law and the prerogatives of due process. By Coles, A.Brigitte. Manuscript under review for submission to publication. Fairfax, VA. 2016
perceiving terrorist attacks as acts of war, the state relies on the institutions, rules, strategies, and tactics used in the wartime" (Omelicheva, 2009). By limiting our perception of groups that use terrorist tactics, we limit the scope of the actions that we can take against them. By expanding the scope of our perceptions, we expand the scope of possible action. Groups that engage in terrorist tactics are not unitary actors, but rather organizations composed of cells and factions that are ideologically heterogenous (Chai, 1993; Crenshaw, 1981; DeNardo, 1985). Terrorist groups that are follow an organizational model are more likely to manipulated by coercive transfer and other methods of social engineering than terrorist networks. Within every organization there are moderates and extremists, pacifists and activists. Moderates within a terrorist group are more likely to be willing to compromise with a government or international authority than the extremists in the group. Therefore, when alternative methods of interaction, or concessions, are made, moderates will be more likely to engage; subsequently making the extremists more extreme. However, Omelicheva suggests that these extremist will be left with fewer resources and recruits with which to mobilize. She further asserts that "the reduced size of the terror organization and the collaboration in counter-terror that governments demand from moderates with whom they compromise increase the probability that the government will be able to eradicate the remaining terror organization" (Omelicheva, 2009). At the root of coercive transfer is the dependency of some states on states that have authority in the international system. Therefore, states can adopt a convergence of policies through harmonization within a larger external system. Harmonization can be achieved through a recognition of the interdependency of concerns, the significance of mutual efforts, and the presence of a higher international system. By adopting a method of coercive transfer with certain organizations that use terrorism as a tactic, moderates within the organization can be empowered while extremists are crippled. Coles, A.Brigitte. Manuscript under review for submission to publication. Fairfax, VA. 2016
The Model for Applying Coercive Transfer to Counterterrorism Implications This theory has direct implications in both operational construction and policy making. In application to the war on terror and the momentum gained by Daesh, this model and proposed guiltiness for non-kinetic counterterrorism can be used for multi-level coordinated efforts against terrorism. Through the use of this non-kinetic model for counterterrorism, terrorism can be reduced and its momentum halted. It additionally, provides a new foundation for non-kinetic implementation and research regarding alternative methods of violence reduction. Coles, A.Brigitte. Manuscript under review for submission to publication. Fairfax, VA. 2016
Figures Figure 1: The Process for Recruitment and Counter-Recruitment (Coles, 2014) Coles, A.Brigitte. Manuscript under review for submission to publication. Fairfax, VA. 2016
Figure 2: Model of the Permeability of the Master Narrative (Coles, 2015). Coles, A.Brigitte. Manuscript under review for submission to publication. Fairfax, VA. 2016
Resources Al-Hayat Media Center. "The Return of the Khilafah." Dabiq 1435, no. 1 (2014): 1-50. Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan. 2003. "An Adverse Selection Model of Terrorism." Paper to be presented at the Annual Meetings of the International Studies Association and the Annual Meetings of the Midwest political science Association. Burton, John. Conflict: Basic Human Needs. New York: St. Martins Press. Chai, Sun-Ki. 1993. "An Organizational Economics Theory of Anti-Government Violence." Comparative Politics 26(1): 99-110. Coles, A. Brigitte. Manipulation of the Public Sphere to Win Cultural Hegemony: The Process by Which the Islamic State Uses the Principles of the Overton Window to Engineer Extremism. Manuscript under review for publication. Fairfax, VA. 2014. Coles, A. Brigitte. Facilitating Social Change: a Process by Which the Public Sphere Can be Influenced to Reject Narratives of Violent Extremism. Fairfax, VA. 2015. Crenshaw, Martha. 1981. " The Causes of Terrorism." Comparative Politics 13(4):379-399. Crenshaw, Martha. 1991. "How Terrorism Declines." Terrorism and political violence 3(3): 69-87. Creswell, John W. Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Method Approaches. 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 2003. DeNardo, James. 1985. Power in Numbers: The Political Strategy of Protest and Rebellion. (Princeton: Princeton University Press). Glaser, Barney G & Strauss, Anselm L., 1967. The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative research, Chicago, Aldine Publishing Company. Coles, A.Brigitte. Manuscript under review for submission to publication. Fairfax, VA. 2016
Habermas, Jurgen. "The Public Sphere." New German Critique No.3 (1974): 49-55. Lackey, Douglas. The Ethics of Terrorism and Counterterrorism. Lancaster: Die Deutsche Bibliothek, 2005. Lawrence, T. E. Seven pillars of wisdom: A triumph. New York: Anchor. 1991. Mahmood, Najib. Non-Offensive Defense and Nonviolence Response to Terrorism. U.S. Army War College: Carlisle, PA. 2008. Maslow, Abraham. A theory of human motivation. Psychological Review, Vol 50(4), Jul 1943, 370-396. Matusitz, Jonathan Andre. Terrorism & Communication: A Critical Introduction. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: SAGE, 2013. Omelicheva, Mariya Y. Convergence of Counterterrorism Policies: A Case Study of Kyrgyzstan and Central Asia, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32:10, 893-908. 2009. Volkan, Vamik D. Bloodlines: From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1997. U.S. Department of State. Patterns of global terrorism. 2000. Coles, A.Brigitte. Manuscript under review for submission to publication. Fairfax, VA. 2016

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