Oligopolies of violence in Africa south of the Sahara

Tags: Oligopolies, Andreas Mehler, West Africa, oligopoly, Africa south, Abidjan, statehood, population, actors, monopoly, African Affairs, security architecture, Africa, monopoly of violence, pp, P. B. Rich, Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix, Ambiguities of Community Policing, Politique Africaine, insurgent groups, Guillaume Soro, Paul B., security services, Robin Luckham, security service, Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du Grand Ouest, Mouvement Patriotique de la, traditional hunters, conflict analysis, security provider, security providers, traditional authorities, private security companies, perspective, physical security, non-state actors, territorial state, Cambridge University Press, International Politics, Macmillan Press, Definitions, local representatives, Political parties, Warlords in International Relations
Content: Andreas Mehler
THEMEN
Oligopolies of violence in Africa south of the Sahara1
This contribution aims at relating different levels of statehood, security, and violence whose interplay has received few attention in the past.2 The state was a distinct subject for political scientists and few economists working on Africa, security was left to practitioners and the intelligence world and violence all too often had to be explained by sociologists and psychologists. The most common catch-words on the state in West Africa ­ while criticised here and there ­ help to understand why a more systematic relationship has to be established: "state collapse" (Zartman 1995, Allen 1999 etc.), "state inversion" (Forrest 1998) "disorder as political instrument"(Chabal/ Daloz 1999), "para-states" (von Trotha 2000) or "fragmented authority" (Van Hoyweghen/Smis 2002). The "anomy state" (Waldmann 2002), used in reference to Latin America, might be added to close the list of very suggestive notions. But how to relate the real types of African states with "security" and "violence"? Early modern concepts of the state, in particular the contract models (supposing that the individual deliberately offers parts of his liberty in order to receive protection in return) give prominence to the guarantee of physical security as the main purpose of statehood. Exercising violence in the public space is a privilege of representatives of the state and it is admitted only in the pursuance of legitimate aims. Only later did the protection of civil liberties and Public Welfare become an equally important criteria for statehood. While all these functions are taken more or less for granted in Europe (although they are not provided consistently), they are blatantly under-performed in West Africa. Since the 1960s, research on the African state has been mainly focussed on its performance in terms of (economic) development (welfare function). For the most part, this contribution will focus on the aspect of the state as a weak provider of physical security - and on alternative providers . After some necessary terminological clarifications, the paper will describe different conditions of statehood in West Africa. Subsequently, it will deal with a perspective "from above" ­ the perspective of the protector or violence actor ­ before turning to the perspective "from below" ­ the perspective of the protected. 1 Oligopolies of violence: A perspective "from above" One of the weaknesses of universal concepts for the (in)capacity of societies to deal with conflicts in an essentially peaceful manner (e.g. "structural stability"3, "human
security", "civilisatory hexagon") is the excessive focus on structure, which is accompanied by an inadequate disregard of the comparably meaningful aspect of agency. In order to grasp motives and behaviour of violence actors (who frequently are protectors at the same time), additional concepts need to be reflected. I want to propose here the concept of "oligopolies of violence". The main assumption of the following may be put this way: The Europe-inspired notion of the state with a monopoly on tax-raising and violence is empirically difficult to find in large parts of Africa; it is only superficially internalised by state officials while it is alive in thinking and discourse as a pretence.4 In Africa south of the Sahara, (empirically) illegitimate monopolies of violence and oligopolies of violence coexist. Both could a) be more or less (empirically) legitimate and b) offer a varying degree of security and orientation.5 Oligopolies comprise a fluctuating number of partly competing, partly co-operating actors of violence of different quality. In this context, ruling is based on a mixture of real repression and permanent readiness to negotiate (in contrast to the symbolic presence of a repressive apparatus and application of rules in the "ideal" European state). Anthropologists (Ethnologists?) and sociologists have worked on the real functioning of relations of domination in West Africa6, but mostly with regard to confined areas of research. The specific interest of political science, however, is rather directed towards the systemic ("macro") and institutional level and forces us to think again on terminology and models. Some elements of economic theory can be helpful here, particularly those focussing on market relations. Economists are intrigued by problems of "imperfect competition" ­ monopolies and oligopolies are usually badly rated with regard to their efficiency. A monopoly can be easily defined: The existence of only one singular provider of a product or service in the (economic) market. An oligopoly is a situation where there are only a few providers of a product or service.7 But varieties are important. In a territorial oligopoly, violence actors may find relatively stable arrangements to attribute zones of control inside states. Within the borders of these areas, they might exert a monopoly of violence. Without the formal attribution of sovereignty by International Law ("juridical statehood"), they lack important political and material resources accounting for a still fluctuant situation, which justifies a separate conceptualisation (Bьttner 2003: 8).
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Andreas Mehler BOX 1 Variety of oligopolies (Oligopoly = "imperfect competition" + "few providers")
Source: A. M.
A second variant is the functional oligopoly, where different violence actors/protectors provide security for different kinds of threats (from different kinds of aggressors) or for specific social categories. Examples include vigilantes working particularly for the protection of merchants at market days (market police), e.g. the Bakassi Boys in Onitsha/Nigeria (Baker 2002, Harnischfeger 2003), or ethnic militias protecting ethnic fellows, which partly applies to the "young patriots" at least in the rural municipalities of Southern Cфte d'Ivoire (Chauveau/ Bobo 2003), or to different Area boys groups in Southern Nigeria (Gore/Pratten 2003). These actors may compete or co-operate with each other.8 The oligopoly (of violence) with a dominant leader is another inspiring notion originating from economic theory: Some 60-80 per cent of a given "market" may be controlled by the dominant leader while the margins are left over for some other entrepreneurs. The "rump state" (in weak(ened), but not yet collapsed states) might quite often find itself in such a position: Its representatives completely control the capital and a certain perimeter outside of it while some sub-contractors provide security in zones not permanently under effective rule. Indirect control over the sub-contractors and marginal entrepreneurs may be exerted by local allies of the state ("traditional" authorities). Oligopolies based on arrangements tend to produce less violent situations. Strong competition between violence actors, however, has converse implications. While competition might be "good" and normal for classical markets
observed by economists, it might be different when it comes to security. Open rivalry between actors of violence is translated into more violence. It is only arrangements between the different security providers that appear to lead to a relatively low level of violence between them ("Oligopolistischer Sicherheitsmarkt"/"oligopolistic security market" ­ Bakonyi 2001). Furthermore, the open "security market" offers few "advantages" for the "consumer" as there is usually no real freedom of choice between different violence actors providing security. The "imperfect market" gives incentives to particular strategies to be embarked on by the violence actors involved. One obvious strategy is a rather direct and crude way to create demand for security by using violence (or threatening to do so) in the first place. When there is a competition for dominance in a certain area, violence will be used in a less restricted way (against the population, to a lesser extent against the adversary). A strategy of co-operative maximisation of gains may lead to a cartel of violence: A small number of oligopolists find arrangements and provide the total amount of a given product/service (again: security). This strategy should lead to less violence. But the nature of the good (security) and the nature of the strategies involved (usage or at least threat of violence) are rather different from the goods dealt with in economist textbooks: Cartels of violence should be rare or ephemeral in practice. Another important qualification concerns the main motivational driving forces. Classical economic theory's understanding of behaviour rests upon the dominant concept
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of the "homo oeconomicus". Yet, in emotionally loaded conflict situations, the rational motivations assumed by this understanding of human behaviour are certainly not the only ones (Mkandawire 2002: 190, Richards/ Vlassenroet 2002). Religious motives and habitual behaviour interfere or maybe even dominate. The currently very prominent role of political economy explanations for war and violence are therefore far too simplistic.9 However, the mechanisms of oligopolies have a high explanatory value for the sometimes fuzzy and complex situations in West Africa. Some authors have used the term "oligopoly of violence" without, however, defining and conceptualising it. But how does it emerge? One explanation interprets the emergence of oligopolies of violence as a reaction to state despotism: As the state appears to be the source of arbitrariness and insecurity, it is imperative to get protected from it (Waldmann 2002, Leander 2002, Bangoura 1996, Elwert 1997, Trotha 2000). Trotha (2000) shows how traditional chiefs behave as protectors against a violent central authority and thus appropriate a regional monopoly of violence ("para-statehood"). The second, opposing interpretation, is built on the state's inability to impose its rule in central questions of sovereignty (monopoly of violence and taxes) upon groups and individuals who compete for those privileges; A weak state thus may break down in the course of a struggle with competing actors of violence. In the final analysis, both explanations may not be contradictory; In any case, despotism is not to be confounded with a strong state. Quite to the contrary: It is a sign of weakness if violence has to be used frequently instead of only threatening with it. From a historical perspective there is nothing particular with state weakness in Africa. Power was rarely absolute in the past (Herbst 2000): Different power-holders used to share responsibilities and thus authority in most African communities and states (Ellis 1999, Bangoura 1996, Blundo 1996). Furthermore, some authors stress that a legitimate monopoly of violence did not exist at all (Bangoura 1996) or had only a limited extension (Herbst 2000, Boone 1998, Kopytoff 1987) ­ the pre-colonial state was a weak one. Some scholars even believe that oligopolies of violence and therefore a high level of actual violence was the historical norm in Africa (Trotha 2000, Le Roy 1997). However, any attempt to "historicise" developments on the African continent contains the danger of creating too narrow and static a perception. Violence actors, security entrepreneurs, and self-help groups emerge, winning or losing influence in a dynamic process. This becomes even more true when taking into account external influences. Reno (e.g. 2001) and others have worked extensively on the relations between the international private sector and local actors of violence (on the sub-state level).
Example: Cфte d'Ivoire The Ivorian example shows best the steadily growing importance of violence actors (see Fцrster 2002). In the Ivorian case, it is widely uncontested that a state with all its major attributions existed during the 1960s and 1970s.10 As early as in the 1990s, so-called traditional Senoufo hunters, the Dozo, got some prominence: As guardians in neighbourhoods in Abidjan, later on more visibly as a kind of security service mainly for the opposition party RDR (Fцrster 2004: 22-24, Kiprй 2002: 11, Bassett 2004: 39-40). Their mythico-magical aura, expressed by the wearing of amulets with ostentation, should not be confounded with backwardness, particularly since a kind of "Internationale" of traditional hunters of the whole sub-region is beginning to take shape (Leach 2004: XIXII). The Malian Ministry of culture has organised a big "festival of the traditional chase" in Bamako ­ with several hundreds of participants from six countries of the region (January 26 to February 1, 2001; Traorй 2004). Already at this time, the media close to the Presidency in Cфte d'Ivoire reacted nervously. These violence actors have roots in history/tradition, but act in a very modern way, organising themselves in a trans-boundary way.11 The ability to mobilise means of violence is most stunning in the case of the insurgent groups emerging in 2002, particularly the Mouvement Patriotique de la Cфte d'Ivoire (MPCI). In its area of control, particularly in their "capital" Bouakй, it has carried out para-state services while the two smaller insurgent movements, the Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du Grand Ouest (MPIGO) and the Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix (MPJ), operating in the West of the country, were rather perceived as marauders. But both account for classical actors of violence. "New" violence actors have to be added: Palpable examples include the two leaders of the rebel movement MPCI and of the so-called "Young Patriots". Both are former student leaders. Guillaume Soro and Charles Blй Goudй can be regarded as "professional youths" and political entrepreneurs. They are successful only because they talk to a youth without perspective in the "appropriate" language. Both led distinct wings of the militant student movement Fйdйration Estudiantine de la Cфte d'Ivoire (FESCI) that initially was an important ingredient of the pro-democracy movement in the early 1990s. They have turned increasingly radical, becoming an important actor of violence in Abidjan, even going as far as to blackmail money and engage in violent crime (Konatй 2003). Young unemployed men are their most important followers, ready to fight and die for vague slogans ("patriotism", "justice"). Once organised, they could well change into an organisation characterised by the sole pursuit of mainly material interests. The country's continuous university crisis alongside the conflict of generations play an underrated role in
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the current situation. There are only a couple of telling descriptions of what motivates young men at a road block ­ it is a mixture of aiming at defending a community and gaining prestige and the interest in collecting informal tolls (Chauveau/Bobo 2003). 2 Changing perspectives: Oligopolies seen "from below" How are actors of violence perceived by the population? To answer that question, perspectives on our research object need to be changed. Certainly, rationalities of violence actors differ significantly from those of the population, the victims of violence or beneficiaries of security services. To understand the ambiguous systemic logic as a whole, both, the security provider's as well as the security receiver's rationalities need therefore to be considered. The mixture of competition and complementarity of rules, claims, and authorities is characteristic for emerging oligopolies. Bierschenk (1999: 339) gives a telling description of the city of Parakou (Benin): FIGURE Ambivalence Protection/Violence
"It is possible to see the area of conflict management as an oligopolistic service market characterised by competition for the competence of conflict management and the ambiguousness of decision-making processes. It is a market of aspirant-mediators who are at the same time originators of conflict." (translation A. M.) In the disastrous cases ­ Benin would definitely not account for them, but rather Liberia or Sierra Leone ­ it could be argued that the population is not concerned at all by a debate on principles of international law that may still be entertained in development co-operation apparatuses, but are far away from the daily needs. The interest to survive and secure the survival of the family is preponderant. A recent survey showed that 36% of all households in Abidjan were victims of acts of violence in 2001-2002 (26% in Lomй, 24% in Bamako, 23% in Cotonou and 21% in Niamey; Roubaud 2003: 72). Physical security and minimum economic safety for the material existence are the main yardsticks for "Human Security". When the state's monopoly of violence is not or no longer (or only in an unacceptable way) enacted, the state (apparatus) becomes a burden for the population and loses its legitimacy as it does not (or only inefficiently) deliver the expected services.12 In such a situation private actors filling the gap might not be viewed per se as illegitimate. The ambiguous role of the "big man" is familiar in other circumstances (e.g. parties and elections). However, first of all he is always a patron in the clientelistic logic and a protector. One and the same person or organisation may become both an agent of intimidation/repression and an agent of protection for different groups of the population or for the same group at different points in time. The ambivalence is obvious, perceptions oscillate between "violence actor" and "protector" (figure 1). Thus, ­ at least for specific parts of the population ­ oligopolies of violence can be legitimate because they are efficient and provide relative security or because they are considered to be the norm rather than the exception and based on certain traditions respectively. This assumption is speculative as long as there are no quantitative surveys, which could measure empirical legitimacy (first useful results can be found in Roubaud 2003).
Source: A. M.
3 Security as an "under-produced public good" From a consumer's perspective, security is a product that is neither produced by the state nor the market in a sufficient quantity. At the same time, the demand is very strong. Robin Luckham has termed security a public good that is "not simply the private property of the State or of particular dominant interests" (Luckham 1998). From a Western
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point of view, it seems odd that it was at all necessary to emphasise the legitimacy of a public claim for security, but the African experience is frequently in contradiction to this "golden rule". This is the context, in which the UNDP (in 1994) developed the concept of "Human Security" and both EU and OECD/DAC introduced the idea of "Structural Stability", both extending the notion of security and stability substantially by including a number of public goods. But what is a public good? "The marketplace is the most efficient way of producing private goods. But the market relies on a set of goods that it cannot itself provide: property rights, predictability, safety (...), and so on. These goods often need to be provided by non-market or modified market mechanisms. Public goods are recognised as having benefits that cannot easily be confined to a single `buyer' (...). Yet once they are provided, many can enjoy them for free. Street names are an example. A clean environment is another. Without a mechanism for collective action, these goods can be underproduced." (Kaul/ Grunenberg/Stern 1999) This definition allows to portray security as an "underproduced good" in Africa. However, we may ask, is it still a public good? And can security be a private good? There are indeed private suppliers of security for private clients. Uniformed men of security companies in all West African capitals are visible proofs. Besides, there are private providers for ­ by definition ­ public clients. In Sierra Leone (1995-96) for instance, the private military company Executive Outcomes was paid by the government to restore security in the capital Freetown and beyond (Southern part of the country; Howe 1998; Bьttner 2003: 10). The contract dealt with the security of government personnel, but a larger segment of the population profited from a "spill-over effect". Did Executive Outcomes produce a public good by private means? Musah and Fayemi (2000) in this case complain about a security concept, which could be termed "security for those who can pay"; but obviously ­ even in those cases ­ not all of the protected paid for the good. Varieties can be detected where security is more or less produced by both public agents and market forces. And finally, private security companies are not the only actors competing with state-sponsored structures. Schlichte and Wilke (2000) describe two phenomena: "Commodification" and "communalisation" of social services and the control of violence. In sum: Security in large parts of Africa is a partly public, partly private and partly collective and always precious good that is simultaneously produced and destroyed by different actors. Thus, the provision of security is permanently insufficient.
4 Definitions The variant of an oligopoly of violence with a dominant market leader is at work when "the state" fulfils its task of providing security only partly, while outsourcing subareas of safety supply to non-statist actors. Some terms that have been used merit to be subjected to a definition. In light of this, the current debate on weak states and conflicts in Africa is characterised by a normative overkill. It would be useful to have a complete overview of all violence actors, their motives and performances. One particular method used in conflict analysis should be helpful: the graphical "Mapping" of all relevant violence actors. In view of creating a "regional security architecture" in West Africa, it would be useful for ECOWAS policy-makers alike to go beyond regular armies ­ and rebel movements ­ to include all potential protectors. There are important dynamics in this field. Only in early 2003 did the local population in the border zone between Cфte d'Ivoire and Liberia witness what has been observed in other places around Africa for quite some time: The recruitment of armed refugees for the use on both sides of the conflict. Presumably, refugee camps will subsist even after a formal end of the Armed Conflict. It will be extremely interesting to see how security will be provided in these camps. New leaders emerging in this context are potentially new violence actors with a sphere of action largely beyond the camps. UN- and ECOWAS-Peacekeeping troops should be included in the mapping, too: They could equally be considered as violence actors or protectors. In Liberia during the early 1990s, the Nigerian ECOMOG troops have earned themselves an ambiguous reputation. political parties or their youth wings could become violence actors ­ examples abound (Mehler 2003). Some traditional authorities have their own police, their own prisons, and openly exert violence. In combination with private security companies, warlords, vigilantes, traditional hunters13, student movements and local representatives of the "rump state", a whole potpourri of violence actors, respectively protectors and security providers, may coexist, which ­ for a more differentiated handling ­ needs to be inspected closely. A first step towards an analysis could allow the creation of a typology. The oscillation between violence actor and protector rules out a simplistic categorisation in "good" and "bad". Violence and power relations may ­ in accordance with Abrahamsen 2003 ­ be understood not only as a tool of repression, but as an identity-forging orientation in the post-colonial context. The following classification differentiates between the nature of the good (security) that is provided and between primary or secondary functions in the oligopoly of violence.
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Andreas Mehler BOX 2 Definitions
TABLE Violence Actors, Protectors, and Security Providers
Source: A. M. 544
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5 Conclusion To resume the argument above, some more or less poignant hypotheses can be formulated: - Oligopolies of violence lead to a moderately high level of violence since each violence actor has to prove his or her ability to use it effectively (as a rule: The more oligopolists the more violence). - The (territorial and functional) border-zones of influence contradictions and uncertainties are particularly high ("on ne sait plus qui est qui" ­ Fцrster 2002), ­ an augmentation of violence particularly in the periphery is typical. - In the eyes of the population, legitimate oligopolies of violence may be an adapted hybrid form of political power. So long as preferable alternatives are absent, they may even be superior to illegitimate monopolies of violence, which tend to guarantee security only for a small minority in power. - Social groups perceiving the construction of monopoly of violence as illegitimate may see legitimate alternatives to the central state in non- or para-state providers of security or even in mere protectors. Security as a public or at least collective good (meaning that individuals could not be excluded from it) can be provided by non-state actors. - The sources of legitimacy of theses actors are a) performance in the provision of the public good security and immediate protection, b) potentially: charisma, c) ideology, symbols, and myths, and d) congruence of basic normative convictions between protectors and protected. - Oligopolies of violence are only rarely cartels of violence with arrangements between the major actors. Competition between them remains; its regulation, however, may lay the foundation for a "security architecture". As this paper wants to prepare the ground for more empirical research, we will additionally point to a range of more practical conclusions that can be drawn. With regard to the research agenda, the following clusters of subjects need more scientific attention: 1. The precise interplay between violence actors/protectors regarding complementarity, active arrangements or contradiction/competition. The interest of political science specifically concerns the routinisation of relations leading even to their institutionalisation (what could ultimately pave the way for "state-building from below"). 2. The varying efficiency of different forms of oligopolies of violence ­ be they homogeneous or heterogeneous,
territorial or functional, with or without a dominant protector or a security provider. 3. The empirical legitimacy of an emerging "order" in the perception of the protected, i.e. the legitimacy of the oligopoly of violence. A profound examination, however, is only feasible by using quantitative surveys. 4. The patterns of exchange between protectors and protected. Since different academic disciplines complement one another, interdisciplinary co-operation is highly recommended. Each discipline has its strength: Sociologists have pointed at the sediment character of authority in African societies, which leads to a plurality of overlapping authority structures (Bierschenk/Olivier de Sardan 1999) and a pluralism of norms (Le Roy 1996, Blundo 2000). Historians point at the character of African cities as "entrepфts" under the competing influence of autochthonous elites, local, and European traders, colonial administrators and post-colonial-elites as well as corresponding patterns of refusal and resistance (Eckert 1991/1999). Geographers increasingly focus on spatial aspects of the social fabric beyond the territorial state. Finally, political scientists deal with the hybrid character of political systems ("deficient democracies", "neopatrimonialism" etc.); i.e. the tension between universal pretence and African reality, as well as with corresponding institutions. Peace studies offers approaches (differentiation between root-causes, aggravating, prolonging, and triggering factors) and methods ("mapping", "Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment") with a certain analytical potential. To sum up: In the spectrum of state ­ violence ­ security relations, there are numerous unexplored possibilities of co-operation between different disciplines. Endnotes: 1 This contribution is an up-dated and shortened version of a discussion paper (in German), itself an elaboration of a lecture given at the Zentrum fьr Afrika-Studien in Basel (27 June 2003). I am indebted to Jan Bachmann, Christine Hentschel, Klaus Wurpts, Till Fцrster, and Tarquin Mйszбros for their comments. 2 The terminology used throughout the paper is influenced by political sociology (Weberian tradition); influences from other disciplines and schools of thoughts gave me additional inspiration. 3 I have developed the related idea of "structural instability" (defined as the incapacity of a society to deal with its conflicts in a peaceful manner) at some length e.g. in Mehler 2002b. For the purpose of this paper it might be sufficient to recall that prolonged economic decline, environmental decay, social injustice, deficient political institutions, the absence of democracy, and unclear succession rules, the disrespect of human rights and exclusion are supposed to be the mutually reinforcing ingredients of "structural instability". 4 Gero Erdmann/Ulf Engel: Neopatrimonialism Reconsidered ­ Critical Review and Elaboration of an Elusive Concept, Entwurf, i.E. (2004).
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5 Normatively tainted notions of legitimacy have no explanatory value. What kind of rule is legitimate or not in a given society has to be thoroughly examined and if possible tested in quantitative opinion polls. 6 Sometimes termed "cultural constructions regarding the nature of political power"(Hoffman 2003:211). 7 "A few" is a vague notion and maybe necessarily so since the context may decide what is regarded to be "a few". In the context of a local security market some 2-8 discernible violence actors may form an oligopoly, more of them would better be termed a "polypoly of violence". 8 A more "ordered" form of policing by self-help groups is thinkable. A specific discussion on virtues and pitfalls of US-inspired "community policing" is beginning to take shape (see Ruteere/Pommerolle 2003). South Africa and Kenya seem to be the African test-cases. 9 Collier/Hoeffler 2000, Berdal/Malone 2000, Addison/Le Billon/ Murshed 2003, Jean/Rufin 1996. See the critical assessments of Marchal/Messiant 2002, Ehrke 2002, and Mkandawire 2000 as well as the slightly more differentiated position in Collier et al. 2003. 10 However, the monopoly of violence was not guaranteed by national security forces but by the French military using deterring means. 11 On transnational networks see Marshall-Fratani 2004. A good description of the historical background of the Ivorian crisis can be found in Akindиs 2004. 12 Increasingly, frequent violent protests in African cities against brutal and corrupt practices (e.g. in Abidjan and Douala; themselves frequently violently disbanded) may illustrate the problem. The quantitative survey by Roubaud for Abidjan shows that one of the most severely criticised public services concerns security/police (although education and urban infrastructure are rated even worse). Roubaud stresses the extremely diverging opinion of respondents, which he explains by the partisan behaviour of the police against the "nordist" population. RDR sympathisers judge the Ivorian justice and fiscal authorities equally badly while a cross-country comparison shows a score well above the regional average. 13 On the ambiguous reputation of the Dozo hunters, see Hellweg 2004:19. Literature: Abrahamsen, Rita (2003): African Studies and the Postcolonial Challenge. In: African Affairs, 102, S. 189-210 Addison, Tony/Le Billon, Philippe/Murshed, S. Mansoob (2003): Conflict in Africa: The Cost of Peaceful Behaviour. In: Journal of African Economies, 11 (3), pp. 365-386 Akindиs, Francis (2004): The Roots of the Military-Political Crises in Cфte d'Ivoire. Uppsala: Nordiska Afriakinstitutet Allen, Chris (1999): Warfare, Endemic Violence & State Collapse in Africa. In: Review of African Political Economy, 81, pp. 367-384 Baker, Bruce (2002): When the Bakassi Boys came: Eastern Nigeria Confronts Vigilantism. In: Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 20 (2), pp. 1-22 ders. (2004): Protection from Crime: What is on Offer for Africans? In: Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 22 (2), pp. 165188 Bakonyi, Jutta (2001): Instabile Staatlichkeit. Zur Transformation politischer Herrschaft in Somalia. Arbeitspapier 3/2001. Universitдt Hamburg ­ IPW. Forschungsstelle Kriege Rьstung und Entwicklung
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Title: Oligopolies of violence in Africa south of the Sahara
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