Polarization, Foreign Military Intervention, And Civil Conflict, SA Bader, E Ianchovichina

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Content: POLARIZATION, FOREIGN MILITARY INTERVENTION, AND CIVIL CONFLICT Suleiman Abu Bader and Elena Ianchovichina Discussion Paper No. 17-14 November 2017 Monaster Center for Economic Research Ben-Gurion University of the Negev P.O. Box 653 Beer Sheva, Israel Fax: 972-8-6472941 Tel: 972-8-6472286
Polarization, Foreign Military Intervention, and Civil Conflict Suleiman Abu Bader and Elena Ianchovichina November 2017 Abstract In a behavioral model of civil conflict foreign military intervention alters the resources available to warring groups and their probability of winning. Such a model highlights the importance of distributional measures along with the modifying effect of the intervention for conflict incidence. The paper confirms empirically the finding in the literature that ethnic polarization is a robust predictor of civil war, but it also finds evidence that religious polarization is positively and significantly associated with civil conflict in the presence of foreign military intervention of nonhumanitarian and non-neutral nature. Such external interventions exacerbate religious polarization leading to high-intensity conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa region, but not in the rest of the world. These results suggest that unlike in the rest of the world where civil conflicts are mostly about a public prize linked to ethnic polarization, in MENA they are mostly about a sectarian-related public prize. The results are robust to allowing different definitions of conflict, model specifications, data time spans and to controlling for other types of foreign military interventions. JEL classification: D74, D31 Keywords: Conflict, polarization, foreign military intervention, Middle East and North Africa. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in the paper are entirely ours and should not be attributed to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent. We thank Shantayanan Devarajan, Aart Kraay, Bob Rijkers, Alexei Abrahams, and participants in a seminar, organized by the Chief Economist Office of the World Bank's Middle East and North Africa region, the 11th Defense and Security Economics Workshop at Carleton University in Ottawa, Canada, and the NBER Conference on the Economics of national security in Cambridge MA, for useful comments on earlier drafts of the paper. Suleiman Abu Bader is a senior lecturer in the Department of Economics at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel, E-mail: [email protected] Elena Ianchovichina is a lead economist in the Chief Economist Office, Middle East and North Africa Region, the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433, USA, Tel: +1 202 458 8910, E-mail: [email protected] 1
I. Introduction Civil wars and other types of political violence have grave consequences for human development and global Poverty Reduction efforts. They disrupt economic activity and investments and destroy human lives and infrastructure, so their effect is usually felt long after peace is restored. The literature on armed insurgencies argues that countries at risk for civil wars tend to be poor (Fearon & Laitin, 2003), politically unstable (Hegre et al., 2001), abundant in lootable resources and unskilled labor (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004), and ethnically polarized (Montalvo and ReynalQuerol, 2005; Esteban, Mayoral and Ray, 2012). Except for Yemen, the countries in the Middle East and North Africa do not fit this profile. Following independence, most Arab countries made substantial socio-economic progress. Nearly all of them achieved middle-income status, reduced extreme poverty, kept vertical economic inequality at moderate levels, and improved access to education and health (Devarajan and Ianchovichina, 2017). Horizontal inequality was moderate as reflected by ethnic and religious polarization levels that were on average below those observed in other regions (Table 1). Following the tumultuous 1950s and part of the 1960s, most of the Arab states remained politically stable between the late 1960s to the early 2000s. Yet, during the same period (from 1965 to 2004), the average incidence of conflict by country in the MENA region far exceeded the corresponding incidence in the rest of the developing world; it was one and a half times higher than the incidence of civil conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa, twice the incidence in Asia, and more than three times the incidence in Latin America and Caribbean (Table 1). The high incidence of civil conflict in these mostly middle-income countries poses a puzzle, the so-called paradox of "political violence in middle-income countries" (Ianchovichina, 2017). This paper 2
explores one potential explanation for this puzzle: the role of non-humanitarian and non-neutral, foreign military interventions.1
Table 1 Averages of some major indicators (per country per period)
External
Conflict Religious Ethnic
(1)/(3)1 (1)/(4)2 (2)/(3) (2)/(4)
Intervention Incidence Polarization Polarization
Int_nh
PRIOCW RELPOL
ETHPOL
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
MENA .370
.267
.470
.525
0.79 0.70 0.57 0.51
SAFRICA .166
.179
.701
.537
0.24 0.31 0.26 0.33
ASIAE .095
.136
.507
.458
0.19 0.21 0.27 0.30
LAAM .084
.086
.404
.646
0.21 0.13 0.21 0.13
Data sources: IMI data (Pearson and Baumann, 1993) for external military interventions of non-neutral and non-
humanitarian type, Int_nh, in (1); PRIO for conflict incidence, PRIOCW, in (2); L'Etat des religions dans le monde
and The Statesman's Yearbook for religious polarization, RELPOL, in (3); WCE for ethnic polarization, ETHPOL, in
(4). Note: MENA stands for Middle East and North Africa; SAFRICA is Sub-Saharan Africa; ASIAE is East Asia;
and LAAM is Latin America. Columns (5) and (6) display numbers for the incidence of external intervention per unit
of religious and ethnic polarization, respectively. Columns (7) and (8) display numbers for the incidence of civil
conflicts per unit of religious and ethnic polarization, respectively.
Previous studies of civil war incidence have emphasized different explanatory factors, but
virtually all have related civil war to domestic factors and processes. Theoretical studies of internal
conflict have focused on grievance-motivated rebellions (Gurr, 1970), the factors creating
opportunities for collective action in mobilization (Tilly, 1978), and the role of rents from conflict
in promoting support for violence (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). Many studies have explored the
hotly contested link between ethnic and religious diversity and social conflict. Fearon and Laitin
(2003) do not find a link between ethnic heterogeneity and conflict, but others insist that ethnic
cleavages may increase the risk of conflict (Ellingsen, 2000; Cederman & Girardin, 2007;
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005) and the duration of civil wars (Collier, Hoeffler, and
Soderbom, 2004).2 Arguing that there is less violence in highly homogeneous and highly
heterogeneous societies, and more conflict, in societies where a large ethnic minority lives side by
1 Other explanations for this puzzle, referring specifically to the period after the Arab Spring, are discussed in detail in Ianchovichina (2017). 2 Collier et al. (1999) argue that the duration of civil wars is positively, though non-monotonically related to the level of ethnic fractionalization of the warring society. The implication is that polarized societies would generate longer civil wars because the cost of coordinating a rebellion for a long enough period could be prohibitively high in very diverse societies. 3
side with an ethnic majority, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) show that ethnic polarization,3 not ethnic fractionalization,4 is a significant explanatory variable for the incidence of civil war. They conclude that ethnic polarization has a robust and significant explanatory power on civil wars in the presence of other indices of fractionalization and polarization, while the statistical significance of religious polarization depends on the particular specification. Esteban and Ray (2011) formalize theoretically the link between distributional measures and conflict incidence and test these links empirically in Esteban et al. (2012). Assuming no external intervention, they find that all three indices of ethnic distribution ­ polarization, fractionalization, and the Gini-Greenberg index ­ are significant correlates of conflict.5 This literature has largely overlooked the role of transnational factors on conflict incidence (Regan 2010), despite the importance given to these factors in popular accounts of civil wars (McNulty, 1999). The research on interventions has focused on three areas: (i) the effect of foreign intervention on civil war duration; (ii) foreign intervention's effect on civil war resolution; and (iii) foreign intervention's effect on peace keeping. Quantitative studies in the first strand of the literature, reviewed in detail by Regan (2010), produces strong evidence that external interventions tend to lengthen civil conflict (Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2000), irrespective of whether they are in the form of direct military involvement, military aid, economic assistance or sanctions, or whether they are designed to be neutral or to favor the government or the opposition (Regan 2000, 2002). Several explanations of this effect have been put forward, with the most popular explanation linked to expected utility (Lake and Rothchild, 1998; Regan, 2002). Foreign intervention provides the 3 Polarization measures capture the distance of the group distribution from the bipolar one where the population is split in half into two large groups. 4 Fractionalization measures capture the extent of diversity in a country or society. 5 This result holds under the assumption that the resources committed by the warring groups come only from individual efforts within countries and that each warring group's probability of winning equals their population share (Esteban and Ray, 2011). 4
resources necessary for one or both sides to carry out insurgency, which lowers the opportunity cost of participating in the war (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004), potentially making rival groups optimistic about the likelihood of a military victory and creating commitment problems.6 The latter could arise because the intervention may reduce incentives for the side that benefits from outside assistance to credibly commit to the terms of a peace deal or to reach such a deal because of the greater number of veto players, especially in the case of multiple interventions on different sides of the warring groups (Cunningham, 2004). The second body of this literature finds evidence for the positive effect of foreign interventions that occur once a peace treaty has been signed on the successful resolution of these wars (Walter, 2002; Doyle and Sambanis, 2000; Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild, 2001; Fortna, 2002; and Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003). Zartman (1989) argues that foreign intervention can create a `hurting' stalemate during which both sides calibrate their expected utility and realize that they must negotiate an end to the war sooner rather than later. Foreign intervention can also help overcome information failures that prevent warring factions from reaching a settlement and shortening the duration of the war (Zartman, 1989, 1995; Brown, 1996; Lake and Rothchild, 1998; Doyle, Johnston and Orr, 1997) and help solve commitment (Brown, 1996) and implementation problems (Hampson, 1996). The presence of third-party guarantees reassures combatants that the treaty is credible and alleviates their safety concerns, making post-treaty demobilization possible and credible (Walter, 1994, 1997, and 2002). The third strand of the literature finds that external intervention reduces the risks of war recurrence once a peace deal is reached and implemented (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000; Fortna, 2002). However, only neutral (UN) and multidimensional7 peacekeeping operations have a positive effect on peace maintenance, according to Doyle and Sambanis (2000). Other types of outside interventions, 6 Fearon (2004) and Salehyan (2004) make similar arguments. 7 Multidimensional operations include involvement in economic reconstruction, institutional reform and election oversight. 5
including monitoring and observer missions, economic reconstruction/institutional reform, and peace enforcement, appear to have no effect on either the duration of the post-war peace or democratization. Few studies in the literature explore the question of how foreign interventions influence the incidence of civil wars and the results of these studies are mixed. Albornoz and Hauk (2014) find that interventions by global superpowers such as the U.S. are a sizable driver of domestic conflict, with the risk of civil war increasing under Republican governments and decreasing with the U.S. presidential approval ratings. Cetinyan (2002) finds that external support does not affect civil war incidence, but it influences the terms of settlement in the event conflict occurs. Gershenson (2002) also looks at this issue but in terms of sanctions, not direct military intervention. He finds that strong sanctions can compel the state to engage rebel demands whereas weak sanctions against the state can weaken the rebel's position. Gleditsch (2007) examines how transnational contagion from neighboring states affects the risk of conflict in a country and concludes that regional factors strongly influence the risk of civil conflict. This paper explores the effect of foreign military intervention on the incidence and intensity of civil war. Our hypothesis is that non-neutral and non-humanitarian external intervention increases the risk of high-intensity conflict that results in many casualties. The question of how different types of outside military interventions affect the intensity of war is distinctly different from the questions explored in the existing literature on intervention which focus on war duration effects8 and not on the causal link between intervention, war incidence and its scale, or how costly a war is in terms of human casualties. This issue is particularly relevant in the context of the increased incidence of high-intensity conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa after the Arab 8 Lengthy wars are not necessarily costly in terms of casualties. 6
Spring; the post-Arab Spring civil wars have led to many casualties and massive destruction (Ianchovichina, 2016). The paper focuses on non-neutral and non-humanitarian external interventions because we expect that this particular type of intervention has the potential to disturb the status quo in a country by increasing the incentives of different groups to raise resources for fighting and thus altering the groups' probability of winning. We also believe that this type of intervention has the highest potential to increase the intensity of fighting and the associated casualties as external support decreases the rebels' dependence on local support and therefore their incentives to protect the local population.
Figure 1 Distribution of Military Intervention Frequency by Type and Region
0.40
0.35
0.30
0.25
0.20
0.15
0.10
0.05
0.00 MENA
SAFRICA
LAAM
ASIAE
Neutral and humanitarian
Non-neutral and non-humanitarian
Data source: IMI data (Pearson and Baumann, 1993).
The global International Military Intervention (IMI) dataset, which provides information on events involving foreign military deployment in countries around the world, indicates that there are large differences in the incidence of external military interventions by type and region. Since 1965 the incidence of non-neutral and non-humanitarian interventions has been highest on average in MENA and lowest in Latin America (Figure 1). In Sub-Saharan Africa ­ the region with the
7
second highest incidence of non-neutral and non-humanitarian interventions ­ the average prevalence of foreign military interventions was less than half of that observed in MENA. By contrast, neutral and humanitarian interventions appear evenly distributed across regions. Appendix Table 1 provides a complete list of military interventions that have been classified as non-neutral and non-humanitarian in the IMI database and that have been implemented around the world following the end of World War II. The data suggest that nearly all MENA countries have been the target of military interventions, but the case of Lebanon ­ a multi-sectarian state ­ stands out. It illustrates the dynamics between external interventions, the onset of the Lebanese civil war and its intensification. Prior to the war, interventions occurred because following the `Black September' 1970,9 the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was pushed out of Jordan and established presence in Lebanon, disturbing the balance among different sects in the country. After 1970 interventions occurred in Lebanon in support of the Shia minority, which was pushed out of Southern Lebanon into the urban peripheries of Beirut.10 These interventions, occurring in the context of shifting population weights, led to increases in sectarian polarization and a struggle for political power, which resulted in a split into pro-Nasser Sunni Muslim camp and pro-Western Christian camp. Eventually, a confrontation erupted between the Lebanese Forces (LF)11 and the Lebanese National Movement (LNM) and sectarian violence escalated, leading to further interventions in a vicious cycle that grew into a large-scale conflict. 9 During the `Black September' conflict, the Jordanian Armed Forces fought with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and forced it to relocate from Jordan to Lebanon. 10 The ruling Alawite minority in Syria viewed the Shia minority in Lebanon as a counterweight against the Sunni majority of Syria and the Palestinians. 11 The LF included the Maronite Christians and the LNM represented a coalition between Druze, Shia, Arab Nationalists, Socialists, Communists and Sunni Militias. The LNM had the support of the PLO. 8
The paper incorporates foreign intervention in a model a la Esteban and Ray (2011). In the model external intervention affects the probability of winning of warring groups12 and the resources available to them and therefore modifies the horizontal distributional measures. External interventions modify the effect of the distributional measures on the risk of conflict as they alter the balance of power among potential warring groups and therefore the incentives of groups to raise war-related resources. In other words, the revised model tells us that the equilibrium level of conflict depends on the distributional measures of inequality, fractionalization and polarization, modified to reflect the effect of military intervention. The theoretical specification does not indicate the direction and strength of the modifying effect­ depending on the type of intervention and the presence of other interventions, it may increase or decrease the risk of conflict or it may have no effect on it. The theory informs the format of the empirical model, which allows us to estimate empirically the direction and strength of the intervention and its modifying effect. We rely on the global International Military Intervention (IMI) dataset for data on different types of external military interventions, the Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO) dataset for civil wars, and the databases on ethnic and religious fractionalization used by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005). Our findings are consistent with the results in the literature (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005; Esteban, Mayoral and Ray, 2012) that ethnic polarization is a robust predictor of civil wars. In addition, we find robust evidence that religious polarization is positively and significantly associated with civil conflict in the presence of non-humanitarian and non-neutral foreign military interventions. Such external interventions exacerbate religious polarization leading to high- 12 The extent to which probabilities shift remains unknown to opponents due to asymmetric information and incentives to dissemble, creating conditions for violence (Fearon 1995). 9
intensity conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa region, but not in the rest of the world. We find no such effect in the case of neutral and humanitarian military interventions. The remainder of this paper is organized in the following way. Section II presents the theoretical model. Section III discusses the empirical model and data and Section IV presents the main econometric results. We discuss endogeneity issues and robustness checks in Section V and present a summary of findings and concluding remarks in Section VI. II. Theory We explore the equilibrium level of conflict attained in a behavioral model in which warring groups choose the amount of resources to commit to a conflict. In the model warring groups can receive external military assistance. This help may be extended for political, economic, or any other reasons and may come in the form of direct military assistance, i.e. a foreign army fighting on behalf of the warring group, or other assistance that alters the groups' chances of winning.13 The model developed by Esteban and Ray (2011) defines the link between conflict and measures of inequality and polarization along non-economic identity markers such as ethnicity or religion.14 These divisions enable groups interested in stoking conflict to channel antagonisms into organized action. This paper argues that external military interventions may deepen perceptions of horizontal divisions and may alter the behavioral incentives of the warring groups to raise warrelated resources. Leaving such influences outside the analysis may therefore overestimate the importance of distributional factors as reasons for civil wars. This paper does not study the motives 13 External assistance at one point can also give warring factions the assurance of support at a later time. However, the extent to which intervention alters the probability of winning remains unknown to opponents due to asymmetric information and incentives to dissemble (Fearon 1995). 14 Polarization may occur along other identity markers such as political ideas, racial, and/or social views. 10
behind intervention15 and do not represent explicitly the preferences of the intervening external parties;16 instead we consider the incentives of the domestic warring factions in the presence of exogenous interventions and in particular, how foreign support may affect warring factions' efforts to raise resources and change their probability of winning.
We consider a country with a population of N individuals belonging to m warring groups.
In each group i, there are Ni individuals and N=Ni, for i=1,...,m. We assume these groups fight
over a budget whose per capita value is normalized to unity and that a fraction of it, , is available
to produce public goods. The winning group enjoys both a public prize,17 whose value is given by
, and a private prize, which is given as the remaining fraction of the budget and can be privately
divided among the members of the winning group once it gets control over the resources.18 Using
the private good as numeraire, uij is the public goods payoff to a member of group i if a single unit
per capita of the optimal mix for group j is produced. Then, the per capita payoff to members of
the
warring
group
i
is

+
(1-),
if
in
case
group
i
wins
the
war
and

in
case
some
other
group is the winner. We assume that > for all i, j with ij. This payoff difference defines
the "distance" across groups: = - .
Individuals in each group commit resources r to influence the conflict's outcome. These resources include time, effort, risk, and finance. The income equivalent cost to such expenditure is c(r) where c is assumed to be increasing, smooth, and strictly convex, with c'(0)=0. If ri(k) is the contribution of resources by member k of group i, then Ri=ri(k) is the total of all resources
15 Foreign interventions may occur for a variety of reasons, some of which may be linked to aspirations for greater economic, political, and ideological influence in a given country. 16 The papers focuses on equilibrium conflict, not equilibrium intervention. 17 The public prize can be enjoyed by all members of the winning group regardless of its population size and includes political power, control over policy, ability to impose cultural and religious values, among other benefits. 18 The private payoff, with a per capita value , could be in the form of administrative or political positions, specific tax breaks, and bias in access to resources, among others. 11
committed by group i. The total of all societal resources devoted to the war is R=Ri, for i=1,...,m and assuming that R > 0, the probability of winning is given by pi=Ri/R. The more resources group i commits to the conflict the higher its chances of success. If an external force provides resources to faction i, then group i's probability of winning will be higher than that suggested by the domestic resources available to this group.
The overall expected payoff to an individual k in group i is given by the following
expression:
() = =1
+

(1-)
-
(()),19
where
ni=Ni/N
is
the
population
share
of
group i. Individuals choose resources r so as to maximize a mix of their own payoff and the group's
payoffs:
() (1 - )() + (),
(1)
where is altruism and is a nonnegative number. If =0, individual k maximizes individual payoff, but if =1 then k acts so as to maximize the group's payoffs.20 Assuming that rj(l)>0 for some l that belongs to j and not i, the solution to the choice of ri(k) is completely given by the interior first-order condition:



=
(()),
(2)
=1
where
(1 - ) +
and



+
1-
for all ji and 0. According to this
condition, the marginal cost of raising funds to fight equals the marginal benefit of fighting for any
member of group i. Esteban and Ray (2011) show that a unique equilibrium exists and that in an
equilibrium, according to condition (2) every individual k of group i makes the same contribution.
19 Since the private good is given in per capita terms, to divide it equally among the winning members of group i, the private good must be scaled up by N. 20 Under some circumstances, discussed in Esteban and Ray (2011), may exceed 1. 12
If we denote the ratio of the win probabilities to the population shares as i=pi/ni and the per capita resources spent on conflict as =R/N, and assume that c(.) is a quadratic function,21 when we substitute for pi and ri in equilibrium condition (2) using the fact that in equilibrium all ri(k)=Ri/Ni, and sum over all i, condition (2) is transformed into the following expression:
()
=


.
(3)
=1 =1
There may be a substantial difference between the probability of winning (pi=Ri/R) and the
population shares (ni) of a warring group i due to foreign military intervention. Therefore, we do not follow Esteban and Ray (2005) who assume that pi=ni,22 implying that the behavioral
correction factor equals 1. Since we do not assume that the probability of winning pi equals the
populations shares ni, we allow i to differ from 1. The intervention may change the relative sizes
of warring groups, and therefore moderate the effect of polarization. It may also promote greater
resource mobilization and risk taking thus incentivizing warring groups to engage in high-intensity
and prolonged confrontations with each. In short, allowing i to differ from 1 and opening the
possibility that ij for ij, enables us to investigate how external military interventions may affect
the probability of civil conflict.
We substitute for and in condition (3) and obtain the following expression:
()
=

=1

=1

(1 [
-
)
+
]
(1 [
-
)
+
] .
(4)

After substituting for i and re-arranging, condition (4) can be rewritten as:
21 Given the assumption of quadratic cost function c()=0.52, it can be shown that c'()=c'(). 22 In other words, Esteban and Ray (2005) assume that there is no deviation of the win probability from the population share. 13
() = [(1-)(1-)(-1)] + [(1-)] + { + (1 - )},


(5)
where Ge is the Gini index modified to reflect the presence of intervention through the behavioral factor parameter :
= . =1 =1
The polarization measure, Pe, is also modified by the intervention as follows:
= 2 . =1 =1
The fractionalization index F is the Hirschman-Herfindahl fractionalization index


= (1 - ) =
=1
=1 =1

and its modified version Fe is given as:
= . =1 =1
The equilibrium per capita conflict condition in the presence of external intervention depends on the modified horizontal distributional measures Ge, Pe, and Fe. 23 This leads us to the following proposition.
23 With the intervention the probability of group i winning the war is not necessarily equal to the population shares (ni). 14
Proposition: Equilibrium per capita conflict24 in a country is determined by the three distributional measures: the Gini index, the fractionalization index, and the polarization index, modified by the influence of external military intervention as given in equilibrium condition (5).
Proof: The discussion after (3) outlines the steps needed to prove that equilibrium condition (4) can be transformed into (5). If there is no external intervention (j=1 for all j) condition (5) reduces to the condition (18) in Esteban and Ray (2011). Since irrespective of whether conflict is over private or public goods, external intervention affects the probability of winning of the warring groups and the resources they raise, altering their effective population sizes, it also moderates the effect of the distributional measures on conflict in a country. As in most cases the distance between groups = - is nonmonetary, it is challenging to arrive at a reasonable estimate of . For this reason, we adopt the approach in Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) and assume that the distances between any pair of distinct groups are the same, with = 1 for all ij and = 0. This assumption allows us to simplify condition (5) and use the distributional measures of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) in the empirical parts of this paper. The simplified condition is:
()
=
(1 [
-
)(1
-
)(
-
1) ]
+
(
+
(1
-
))
+
(1 [
- ) ]
.
(6)
In this case, the equilibrium per capita conflict is determined by a combination of only two distributional measures of polarization (P) and fractionalization (F), and the influence of the intervention on these two types of distributional measures.
24 Equilibrium per capita conflict proxies for the equilibrium per capita resources spent on fighting on average in a country. 15
If the country is populous (i.e. N is large), as in the baseline case in Esteban and Ray (2011), condition (6) transforms into:
() = ( + (1 - )).
(7)
This condition suggests that equilibrium per capita conflict in the large country case depends on the extent of fractionalization and polarization and external intervention has an effect on equilibrium conflict only through its effect on horizontal polarization. If conflict is mostly over a public prize ( = 1), the equilibrium per capita conflict depends only on the polarization measure and the extent to which the intervention polarizes the society. This is consistent with the nature of the public prize, which is linked to the characteristics of the horizontal groups and the individual payoff from it, which is undiluted by one's own group size. The public prize includes the seizure of political power, the setting of norms, the abolition of certain rights or privileges, the establishment of a religious state, the repression of a language and other public aspects that may lead to contention among horizontal group. If conflict is mostly over a private prize ( = 0), the equilibrium per capita conflict depends only on the degree of fractionalization and not on polarization and/or external intervention. This is because the private prize is about access to resources (oil or specific material benefits obtained from special positions of power) and the individual payoff of this type of prize is diluted by the group size. In the general case, it is difficult to discern the effect of external intervention on civil conflict incidence without empirical testing, so next we test empirically the association between external military intervention and conflict prevalence.
16
III. Empirical investigation: model and data
We utilize a logit model for the incidence of civil wars:
P(PRIOCWit 1) X1it1 1 X 2it1 2 Int _ nhis it ,
(8)
in which the inDependent Variables, X1it1 and X2it1, are the relevant distributional and control
variables, respectively; andit is the error term. The distributional factors and some of the control
variables are time invariant; the rest are set at their values in period t-1. The binary explanatory
variable, Int_nhis, is 1 if there has been an external military intervention in at least one of the four
years preceding period t (t-1svariables next.
We study 137 countries over 1960-2005 and divide the sample into five-year periods so we have a total of 946 observations.25 For comparison purposes, we first conduct the analysis for the period 1960-1999, considered by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), but then we estimate the model and test the robustness of the results over the full period up to 2005. We use the Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO) dataset for civil wars to construct the endogenous binary variable of civil war incidence, PRIOCW, which is set at 1 if a civil war occurred in a country i in period t and zero otherwise. In the baseline results we focus on intermediate armed conflict (PRIOCW, categories 3 and 4), defined as a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory, where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in a minimum of 1,000 deaths over the course of the civil war. In the robustness checks, we also consider low-level conflict (PRIO25) associated with at least 25 deaths,
25 The number of observations in a specific empirical model depends on the independent variables included in it, as different variables have different missing observations. In the baseline model, the maximum number of observations is 946. 17
and large scale civil wars (PRIO1000) associated with at least 1,000 per year and per incompatibility (see details in appendix). In the baseline, we consider non-humanitarian and nonneutral military interventions that are likely to be implemented before a civil conflict intensifies and therefore alter the balance of power and the winning probabilities of potential warring groups as discussed in the theory section of this paper. As in Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), the distributional variables are ethnic polarization (ETHPOL), ethnic fractionalization (ETHFRAC), religious polarization (RELPOL), and religious fractionalization (RELFRAC). Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) show that the indices of polarization and fractionalization differ, independent of the data source used in their calculations. We choose the World Christian Encyclopedia (WCE) to obtain the ethno-diversity measure, favoring it to the other two sources: the Encyclopedia Britannica (EB), and the ANM (1964). We do so because according to Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) the most accurate description of ethnic diversity is the one in the WCE. It contains details for each country on the most diverse classification level, which may coincide with an ethnolinguistic family or subfamilies. There are also several sources of data on religious diversity. We adopt the L'Etat des religions dans le monde (ET) data, which are based on a combination of national data sources and the WCE, and provide information on the proportions of followers of Animist and Syncretic cults. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) consider this to be an important factor for the calculation of indices of religious heterogeneity. Since the data used by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) and Esteban et al. (2012) do not contain information on the distributional variables for Lebanon, we construct the indexes of religious and ethnic polarization and fractionalization based on data from Encyclopedia Britannica Book of the Year 2001. 18
The group of control variables includes explanatory variables found to influence the incidence of conflict in earlier empirical studies by Fearon and Laitin (2003), Doyle and Sambanis (2000), and Collier and Hoeffler (2002). Fearon and Laitin (2003) argue that GDP per capita is a proxy for the state's overall financial, administrative, police, and military capabilities. Rebels can expect a higher probability of success in a low-income society with weak state institutions. In addition, a low level of GDP per capita reduces the opportunity cost of engaging in a civil war. The log of real GDP per capita (LGDPC) is set at its value in the previous period in order to reduce the potential endogeneity problem between conflict and the level of real economic activity.26 The log of the population (LPOP) is also included in the set of control variables and is set at its value in the previous period.27 Since the usual definitions of civil war always set a threshold in the number of deaths, we control by population as a scale factor. The size of the population can also be considered an additional proxy for the benefits of a rebellion as it measures potential labor income taxation (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002). Fearon and Laitin (2003) also indicate that a large population implies difficulties in controlling what goes on at the local level and increases the number of potential rebels that can be recruited by the insurgents. Mountains (MOUNTAINS) are included as well since this terrain can provide safe haven for rebels. Long distances from the center of the state's power also favor the incidence of civil wars, especially if there is a natural barrier between them, like a sea or other countries, so we include the noncontiguous state (NONCONT) variable in the set of control variables. As pointed out by Collier and Hoeffler (2002) the existence of natural resources provides an opportunity for rebellion since these resources can be used to finance the war and increase the payoff if victory is achieved. We measure this dependence using the share of primary commodity exports of GDP (PRMEXP) (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002; 26 As in Motalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) we do not use annual data and GDP growth as an explanatory variable due to strong concerns about the potential endogeneity problem between economic growth and conflict. 27 See appendix for data sources for each variable. 19
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005). Finally, in line with the literature we consider the effect of democracy, measured with the level of democracy using the Polity IV dataset score for general openness of the political institutions, transformed into a dummy variable that takes value 1, if the score is greater or equal to 4, and 0 otherwise. As military interventions for humanitarian and peacekeeping purposes are implemented once civil wars have intensified, we focus only on non-humanitarian and non-neutral military interventions, which may occur before an armed conflict begins and are likely to alter the balance of power and the winning probabilities of potential warring groups leading to armed conflict or the intensification of an existing one, as discussed in the theory section of this paper. We use the dataset of International Military Intervention (IMI)28 to define the intervention variable Int_nhis. This data set records interventions that are purposeful, are the result of conscious decisions of national leaders, and involve "the movement of regular troops or forces of one country inside another, in the context of some political issue or dispute" (Pearson and Baumann, 1993). The data set excludes interventions that involve paramilitaries, government backed militias, private security forces, and other military units that are not part of the regular military of the state. The IMI dataset contains a total of 1243 cases of military interventions which meet these criteria for the period 1946-2005; they have been further classified as neutral, supportive of government or rebels, humanitarian, and other types.29 This enables us to define external military intervention as a binary variable, Int_nh, which takes the value 1 if there has been at least one intervention in the target country during the four years preceding the current period and the intervention was not neutral and 28 The IMI project was established in the late 1960s by Frederic S. Pearson and Robert A. Baumann. Under their guidance, 667 cases of international military interventions spanning the years 1946 to 1988 were coded. Emizet N. Kisangani and Jeffrey Pickering expanded the IMI collection to 2005. Many studies have been done using the IMI data set, among others are Peksen (2012), Koga (2011), Sullivan and Koch (2009), Pearson et al. (2006), and Pickering and Kisangani (2006). 29 For the full list of variables consult the International Military Intervention, 1989-2005 notebook at http://www.researchconnections.org/ICPSR/studies/21282. 20
was not for humanitarian matters. In total, there were 178 intervention years of this kind during the period 1946-2005. The complete list of non-humanitarian and non-neutral military interventions by year, intervening country and target country is shown in Appendix Table 1.
Different regions have relatively similar levels of religious and ethnic polarization, but substantially different frequency of civil conflict and external military interventions, as shown in Table 1. In the context of moderate levels of religious and ethnic polarization, the MENA region stands out with the highest incidence of civil conflict and foreign military intervention of the nonhumanitarian and non-neutral type. Figure 2, which is based on the data of Table 1, shows that countries with high incidence of civil conflict are places with higher than average levels of religious polarization (RELPOL) and external military intervention.
Figure 2 External Intervention and Civil Conflict Incidence (per Country per Period) at Different Levels of Religious Polarization
0.3
0.268
0.25
0.248
0.2
0.195
0.2173
0.191
0.181
0.15
0.1 0.089 0.073 0.05
0
Mean-PRIOCW
Mean-Intervention
21
IV. Regression Results We first replicated the major results of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), shown in columns (1), (2), and (4) of Table 2. These results point to the significance of ethnic polarization, not fractionalization, as a determinant of conflict. In their specification, which omits the foreign military intervention variable, religious polarization and fractionalization are not significant predictors of conflict. In other words, their results suggest that civil conflict is driven mostly by ethnic strife over public prizes. A. External Intervention and Polarization When we include the non-neutral and non-humanitarian external military intervention variable (Int_nh), along with the indices of polarization and fractionalization, we find that both the intervention variable and the ethnic polarization index are statistically significant and have the expected positive signs (see columns (3) and (5) of Table 2). This result suggests that, conditional on a given degree of polarization, this type of external military intervention is associated with an increase in the incidence of civil war.30,31 Expression (6) for the equilibrium per capita conflict in the theory section links the incidence of civil war to the distributional measures modified by the presence of non-neutral and non-humanitarian external military intervention. It suggests that the intervention is associated with conflict through its effects on the distributional measures. In the large country case, given by expression (7),32 this effect comes through the influence of the intervention on the polarization 30 The sample used to estimate regression models (3), (5), (6), and (7) includes observations for Lebanon. Similar results are obtained without Lebanon in the data sample. Results without Lebanon are available upon request from the authors. 31 We recognize that there may be reverse causality between intervention and conflict so we interpret the effect on the intervention variable as a conditional association, rather than a causal relationship. 32 The large country case is also the baseline case in Esteban and Ray (2011). 22
measure. We reflect this by including an interaction term between the external military intervention variable and each of the polarization measures. The results, presented in columns (6) and (7) of Table 2, as well as those presented in columns (6) and (7) of Table 3 for the sample extended up to 2005,33 suggest that ethnic polarization is a significant determinant of conflict incidence and that foreign intervention exacerbates the relationship between religious polarization and conflict. In other words, religious polarization combined with external military intervention is significantly and positively associated with civil war.
Table 2 Logit Regressions for the Incidence of Civil Wars (PRIOCW) (1965-1999)
(1)1
(2)2
(3)
(4)3
(5)
(6)
(7)
LGDPPC
-0.28
-0.42*
-0.34
-0.38
-0.28
-0.36
-0.36
LPOP
0.34**
0.40**
0.38**
0.44***
0.39***
0.40***
0.40***
PRIMEXP
-0.90
-1.07
-1.71
-0.86
-1.77
-1.53
-1.49
MOUNTAINS
0.00
-0.00
-0.00
-0.00
-0.00
-0.00
-0.00
NONCONT
0.08
0.28
0.35
0.48
0.47
0.41
0.42
DEMOCRACY
0.07
0.03
0.11
-0.04
0.08
0.14
0.14
ETHFRAC
1.19*
0.17
0.12
0.04
-0.08
-0.35
-0.39
ETHPOL
2.28**
2.60***
2.11***
2.38**
2.59***
2.76**
RELFRAC
-4.45
-2.12
-1.89
-1.98
RELPOL
3.28
1.92
1.32
1.36
Int_nh
1.52***
1.53***
0.44
0.82
Int_nh RELPOL
1.86
1.89*
Int_nh ETHPOL
-0.71
Intercept
-5.82**
-6.29**
-7.00*** -7.54**
-7.71*** -7.15**
-7.23**
N
850
850
859
850
859
859
859
McFadden's R2
0.101
0.123
0.169
0.135
0.176
0.182
0.183
McFadden's Adjusted R2 0.079
0.098
0.142
0.104
0.142
0.146
0.144
1 Refers to column 1 in Table 1 of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005). 2 Refers to column 3 in Table 1 Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005). 3 Refers to column 8 in Table 1 of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005).
33 We include data up to 2005 by adding one period to the sample employed in Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005). We have also added observations for Lebanon, which are not present in their sample. Similar results are obtained with and without Lebanon in the data sample. Results without Lebanon are available upon request from the authors. 23
Table 3 Logit Regressions for the Incidence of Civil Wars (PRIOCW) (1965-2005)
(1)1 (2)2
(3)
(4)3
(5)
(6)
(7)
LGDPPC
-0.37* -0.52**
-0.44*
-0.45*
-0.38
-0.46
-0.46
LPOP
0.37** 0.42**
0.39**
0.46***
0.39***
0.42**
0.42***
PRIMEXP
0.34
0.31
-0.29
0.25
-0.44
-0.11
-0.08
MOUNTAINS
0.01*
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.01
NONCONT
0.35
0.60
0.63
0.75
0.74
0.68
0.68
DEMOCRACY
0.00
0.02
0.12
-0.05
0.08
0.14
0.14
ETHFRAC
1.10*
-0.06
0.01
-0.03
-0.06
-0.30
-0.33
ETHPOL
2.34**
2.47**
2.13**
2.24**
2.42**
2.55**
RELFRAC
-4.52
-2.56
-2.32
-2.35
RELPOL Int_nh
3.18*
2.04
1.37
1.38
1.32***
1.33***
0.02
0.32
Int_nh RELPOL Int_nh ETHPOL
2.16*
2.19** -0.56
Intercept
-5.74** -6.10**
-6.41** -7.23**
-7.12***
-6.63*** -6.69***
N McFadden's R2
937 0.116
937 0.138
946 0.174
937 0.150
946 0.179
946 0.188
946 0.189
McFadden's Adjusted R2 0.097 0.117
0.150
0.124
0.151
0.157
0.155
1 Column (1) shows results for the specification of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), shown in column (1) of Table 1 in their paper, with the dataset extended to 2005. 2 Column (2) shows results for the specification of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), shown in column (3) of Table 1 in their paper, with the dataset extended to 2005. 3 Column (4) shows results for the specification of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), shown in column (8) of Table 1 in their paper, with the dataset extended to 2005.
B. The MENA Effect This section investigates the robustness of the results to the inclusion of regional dummies. This way we address the relationship between geographical heterogeneity and civil conflict. In Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) all countries not located in Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America are included in the reference (base) region. The MENA countries therefore are included in the reference region along with all developed countries and the rest of the world. The inclusion of the MENA countries with the base group poses a problem given the substantially higher incidence of civil wars and foreign military interventions in MENA compared with the rest of the world (Table 1). In line with the fact that conflict incidence is higher in MENA than in the rest of the world regions, the coefficient on the MENA dummy is large, positive, and significant, while all other regional dummies remain statistically insignificant (see column (2) of Table 4). Furthermore, the inclusion of MENA reduces the magnitude and significance of the coefficient on
24
the ethnic polarization (ETHPOL) variable; it becomes significant only at the 10% level. As expected, the association between non-neutral and non-humanitarian foreign military intervention variable, Int_nh, and civil conflict is positive and significant in the 3rd regression model, shown in column (3) of Table 4. The addition of the interactions of the intervention variable with each of the two polarization indices (RELPOL and ETHPOL) in column (4) of Table 4 suggests that the intervention exacerbates the effect of religious polarization on conflict incidence, but it does not have a similar effect on ethnic polarization. We explore the channels through which the MENA regional effect translates into higher incidence of civil conflict with the help of alternative specifications of the regression models in columns (5) through (8) of Table 4. In columns (5) and (6) we show results from the regression model with interactions between the regional dummies and the religious and ethnic polarization indices, respectively. In both cases, the MENA dummy loses its significance, the magnitude of its coefficient goes down significantly, and only the interactions of RELPOL with the MENA and the intervention dummy, respectively, remain significant. Given the different degrees of religious polarization and the incidence of external military interventions across geographic regions, we include a triple interaction term in model (7) that allows us to capture the region-specific dimension of the moderating effect of external intervention on religious polarization. The results show that none of the three variables is significant by itself but the coefficients of the tri-interaction term for MENA is positive, large and highly significant. The interaction terms between the religious polarization and MENA variables and those between the intervention and religious polarization variables are no longer significant too. The final specification in Table 4, shown in column (8), is our preferred specification. It is closest to the specification in Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), shown in column (1), with the difference 25
that we have included the tri-variable interaction between the military intervention dummy, the religious polarization variable, and the MENA dummy.34 The results with this specification indicate that the index of ethnic polarization is a significant explanatory variable for the incidence of civil war and, in the case of MENA, religious polarization combined with external military intervention is significantly associated with conflict. Similar results are obtained with the sample extended to 2005 (Table 5). The result that ethnic polarization is a significant explanatory variable for war incidence is weakened when the sample is extended and the model proposed by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) is used and this distributional variable seizes to be significant in the specification with MENA dummy. However, this variable becomes significant at the 5% level in our preferred specification (8). The magnitude of the interaction effect in nonlinear models does not equal the marginal effect of the interaction term and can be of opposite sign (Ai and Norton 2003). We therefore plot in Figure 3 the predicted probability of intense civil conflict as a function of RELPOL, allowing for shifts in this curve by the two binary variables: Int_nh and MENA, and in figure 4, the marginal effect of Int_nh, differentiating between MENA (MENA=1) and non-MENA (MENA=0) regions. The predicted probability of civil conflict with external intervention in MENA is higher than that in non-MENA countries for any level of RELPOL greater than 0.33 and in both cases the predicted probabilities significantly differ from zero at the 5% significance level (Figure 3). Foreign military interventions of non-neutral and non-humanitarian type increase substantially the predicted probability of these types of conflict in MENA at much lower levels of RELPOL than in the nonMENA case, where substantial differences emerge at the highest levels of RELPOL (Figure 3). In the case of MENA, the marginal effect of external intervention is statistically significant when 34 All interaction terms and dummy variables that were insignificant in specification (7) have been dropped from specification (8). 26
RELPOL ranges between 0.32 and 0.59 while in the non-MENA cases, RELPOL needs to be higher, above 0.6 for external intervention to have a statistically significant effect on conflict incidence (Figure 3). At the averages for RELPOL in the data, the estimated marginal effect of intervention in the case of MENA is about 0.25 compared to 0.07 in the non-MENA case.
Table 4 Logit Regressions for the Incidence of Civil Wars (PRIOCW) in the Presence of
Regional Dummies (1965-1999)
(1)1
(2)2
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
LGDPPC LPOP PRIMEXP MOUNTAINS NONCONT DEMOCRACY ETHFRAC ETHPOL RELFRAC RELPOL Int_nh MENA SAFRICA LAAM ASIAE Int_nhRELPOL Int_nhETHPOL RELPOLMENA RELPOLSAFRICA RELPOLLAAM RELPOLASIAE ETHPOLMENA ETHPOLSAFRICA ETHPOLLAAM ETHPOLASIAE Int_nhRELPOLMENA Int_nhRELPOLAFRICA Int_nhRELPOLLAAM Int_nhRELPOLASIAE
-0.41* 0.38*** -1.15 -0.00 0.09 0.09 0.26 2.35***
-0.41 0.45*** -2.19 0.00 0.44 0.62 0.63 1.96*
Excluded Included Included Included
2.44** 1.03 0.49 1.00
-0.35 0.46*** -2.54 0.00 0.52 0.56 0.41 2.49** 1.28*** 2.09** 1.03 0.51 0.90
-0.40 0.46*** -2.55 0.00 0.42 0.66 0.12 2.21* -2.81 1.91 -0.02 2.22** 0.81 0.40 1.27 2.50*** -0.37
-0.60* 0.54*** -2.67 0.00 0.45 0.66 0.01 2.64** -1.29 -0.88 0.31 0.31 0.11 -0.19 1.18 2.04* -0.59 5.55** 1.84 1.89 0.49
-0.60* 0.50*** -2.61 0.00 0.33 0.64 0.21 2.18** -1.89 -0.31 0.16 0.74 -0.59 -2.45 1.84 2.11** -0.41 5.17* 1.69 0.78 0.54 -0.61 0.98 3.72 -1.22
-0.46 0.49*** -2.81 0.00 0.39 0.72 0.08 2.44** -2.37 1.30 0.25 1.75* 0.90 0.40 1.57* 1.69 -0.82 3.53* 0.71* 1.00 -3.08
-0.50** 0.39** -2.22 0.00 0.48 0.38 0.05 2.59** 1.04 5.43*** 1.04
Intercept
-6.07** -8.40** -9.35** -8.06** -8.06*
-7.23*
-8.70** -6.14**
N
846
859
859
859
859
859
859
859
McFadden's R2
0.127
0.169
0.203
0.240
0.240
0.245
0.237
0.208
McFadden's Adjusted R2
0.093
0.133
0.165
0.179
0.179
0.173
0.176
0.175
1 Column (1) here is column (2) in Table (5) of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), who do not have a dummy variable for MENA and include
the MENA countries into the reference group. 2 Column (2) here is column (2) in Table (5) of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), with the addition of MENA dummy to the regression.
27
Table 5 Logit Regressions for the Incidence of Civil Wars (PRIOCW) in the Presence of
Regional Dummies (1965-2005)
(1)1
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
LGDPPC LPOP PRIMEXP MOUNTAINS NONCONT DEMOCRACY ETHFRAC ETHPOL RELFRAC RELPOL Int_nh MENA SAFRICA LAAM ASIAE Int_nh RELPOL Int_nh ETHPOL RELPOLMENA RELPOLSAFRICA RELPOLLAAM RELPOLASIAE ETHPOLMENA ETHPOLSAFRICA ETHPOLLAAM ETHPOLASIAE Int_nhRELPOLMENA Intercept
-0.45* 0.37** 0.11 0.01 0.41 0.10 0.22 2.05* -4.73 3.47 Excluded Included Included Included -5.81*
-0.53* 0.44*** -1.47 0.01 0.87 0.60 0.38 1.78 -3.93 3.09 2.49** 0.73 0.17 1.27* -7.61**
-0.45 0.44*** -1.74 0.01 0.90 0.60 0.30 2.00* -3.77 2.93 1.08*** 2.27** 0.83 0.20 1.24
-0.52* 0.47*** -1.46 0.01 0.77 0.71 -0.04 2.36 -3.85 2.25 -0.32 2.37** 0.89 0.24 1.54** 2.95*** -0.76
-0.65** 0.53*** -1.63 0.01* 0.77 0.69 -0.07 2.56** -2.49 0.37 -0.07 0.98 0.84 -0.06 1.85 2.58** -0.92 3.91 0.70 1.15 -0.40
-8.39** -8.12** -7.98**
-0.66** 0.51*** -1.64 0.01 0.68 0.68 0.01 2.69 -2.70 0.46 -0.14 1.71 0.60 -1.89 2.46 2.58** -0.80 3.92 0.80 0.44 -0.16 -1.28 0.08 2.84 -1.32 -7.46**
-0.65** 0.50*** -1.64 0.01 0.65 0.65 0.03 2.64 -2.77 0.57 -0.31 1.74 0.63 -1.89 2.46 2.74*** -1.00 3.06 0.72 0.42 -0.36 -1.21 0.12 2.85 -1.232 2.05** -7.42**
-0.56** 0.37** -1.05 0.01 0.74 0.32 0.19 2.21** 1.47*** 4.33*** -5.35**
N
946
946
946
946
946
946
946
946
McFadden's R2
0.154
0.198
0.224
0.238
0.250
0.254
0.257
0.210
McFadden's Adjusted R2 0.120
0.162
0.184
0.195
0.198
0.192
0.193
0.185
1 Column (1) shows results for the specification of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), shown in column (2) of Table 5 in their paper, with the dataset extended to 2005.
28
Pr(Priocw)
Figure 3 Predicted Conflict Incidence
1.5
1
.5
0
0 .05 .1 .15 .2 .25 .3 .35 .4 .45 .5 .55 .6 .65 .7 .75 .8 .85 .9 .95 1 RELPOL
MENA=0, Int_nh=0 MENA=1, Int_nh=0
MENA=0, Int_nh=1 MENA=1, Int_nh=1
Note: This graph is based on the results for the coefficients in specification (7) of Table (5) and the variables set at their means. Figure 4 Marginal Effect of Non-neutral and Non-humanitarian Intervention by Region
.6
.4
.2
Effects on Pr(Priocw)
0
-.2
0 .05 .1 .15 .2 .25 .3 .35 .4 .45 .5 .55 .6 .65 .7 .75 .8 .85 .9 .95 1 RELPOL
MENA=0
MENA=1
Note: This graph is based on the results for the coefficients in specification (7) of Table (5) and the variables set at their means. 29
.5
0
-.5
Figure 5 Differences in the Predictive Margins of Non-neutral and Non-humanitarian Intervention by Region 0 .05 .1 .15 .2 .25 .3 .35 .4 .45 .5 .55 .6 .65 .7 .75 .8 .85 .9 .95 1 RELPOL Note: This graph is based on the results for the coefficients in specification (7) of Table (5) and the variables set at their means. Figure 4 displays the difference between the marginal effects of external intervention in MENA and non-MENA countries along with their 95% Confidence Intervals. The predictive difference between the marginal effects of external intervention on the incidence of civil conflict in MENA and non-MENA regions is statistically significant at the 5% level only when RELPOL varies between 0.32 and 0.53 (Figure 5). Since the average level of RELPOL in MENA is 0.47 and falls in this range, we conclude that the marginal effect of external intervention is much stronger in MENA than in other developing regions. In other words, external intervention of non-neutral and non-humanitarian type worsens polarization along religious lines in MENA, a result which suggests that conflict in the region has been associated with a public prize linked to sectarian norms. 30
C. Robustness checks The literature makes a distinction between military and non-military foreign interventions (e.g., interventions through diplomacy and trade sanctions), but most studies do not distinguish between different types of external military interventions. This paper focuses on non-neutral and non-humanitarian foreign military interventions (Int_nh), but in this section we turn our attention to another type of foreign military intervention ­ an intervention that is neutral, i.e. designed not to favor one warring group over another, and that is done for humanitarian reasons. Our hypothesis is that neutral and humanitarian military interventions (NH) are not significantly associated with conflict. We test this hypothesis by including in our model (8) both types of interventions: Int_nh and NH.
Table 6 Logit Regressions for the Incidence of Civil Wars (PRIOCW) (1965-1999)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
LGDPPC
-0.272
-0.351
-0.355
-0.296
-0.376
-0.380
LPOP
0.397*** .0.418*** 0.419*** 0.453*** 0.477*** 0.477***
PRIMEXP
-1.707
-1.423
-1.380
-2.678
-2.476
-2.428
MOUNTAINS
-0.001
-0.002
-0.002
0.004
0.003
0.003
NONCONT
0.430
0.355
0.364
0.546
0.372
0.369
DEMOCRACY
0.094
0.159
0.152
0.568
0.687
0.683
ETHFRAC
-0.054
-0.329
-0.345
0.366
0.123
0.125
ETHPOL
2.450**
2.672*** 2.909*** 2.120**
2.243** 2.378**
RELFRAC
-2.095
-1.877
-2.055
-2.821
-2.736
-2.854*
RELPOL
1.851
1.208
1.290
2.410
1.733*
1.797
Int_nh
1.473*** 0.349
0.770
1.240*** -0.222
0.011
Int_nh RELPOL
1.918*
1.943*
2.428** 2.433**
Int_nh ETHPOL
-0.755
-0.416
NH
1.011**
0.741
1.176
0.944*
0.078
0.389
NH RELPOL
0.510
0.510
1.404
1.366
NH ETHPOL
-0.792
-0.519
MENA
2.117**
2.220** 2.200**
ASIA
1.033
1.271
1.260
AFRICA
0.855
0.875
0.854
LAAM
0.348
0.378
0.356
Intercept
-8.030*** -7.497*** -7.618*** -9.758*** -9.246** -9.275**
N McFadden's R2 McFadden's Adjusted R2
859 0.184 0.148
859 0.191 0.150
859 0.192 0.145
859 0.219 0.172
859 0.231 0.178
859 0.231 0.173
31
The results presented in Table 6 indicate that the inclusion of neutral and humanitarian external military interventions (NH) preserves our findings of significant and positive association between non-neutral and non-humanitarian interventions and conflict. Only in specifications (1) and (4) in Table 6, NH is positively and significantly associated with the incidence of civil war. However, in all other specifications (columns (2), (3), (5), and (6) of Table 6), which feature the interaction of intervention with the polarization measures, neutral and humanitarian external intervention variable is not significant and neither are its interactions with religious and ethnic polarization. This result implies that only non-neutral and non-humanitarian external military intervention modifies RELPOL and only this type of intervention is associated with conflict regardless of the presence of efforts to intervene in a neutral way for humanitarian purposes. Finally, we also test and confirm the robustness of the results to changes in the conflict intensity and the single-equation logit model specifications (Table 7).
Table 7 Logit Regressions for the Incidence of Civil Wars: Comparing Alternative
Definitions of Civil War (1965-2005)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
Dependent Variable LGDPPC LPOP PRIMEXP MOUNTAINS NONCONT DEMOCRACY ETHFRAC ETHPOL
PRIO25 -0.65*** 0.33** -0.35 0.01 0.99** 0.30 0.23 1.83**
PRIO25 -0.50*** 0.20** -0.33 0.01 0.75* 0.24 0.09 1.41**
PRIO25 -0.73*** 0.35** 0.02 0.01 0.97** 0.33 0.10 2.27***
PRIO25 -0.54*** 0.21** -0.18 0.01 0.76** 0.24 0.04 1.82**
PRIO1000 -0.59*** 0.15 -1.23 0.01 0.93 -0.10 0.78 2.16*
PRIO1000 -0.39** 0.04 -1.67* 0.01 0.85* -0.03 0.84 1.58**
PRIO1000 -0.63*** 0.17 -0.83 0.01 0.88 -0.06 0.38 3.34**
PRIO1000 -0.47*** 0.06 -1.15 0.01 0.79 0.02 0.65 2.86**
RELFRAC RELPOL Int_nh Dependent variable lag Int_nh RELPOL Int_nh ETHPOL Int_nh RELPOLxMENA Intercept N McFadden's R2 McFadden's Adjusted R2
1.14*** 3.05*** -3.20 946 0.196 0.175
1.29*** 2.72*** 1.23 -2.77* 863 0.381 0.357
-0.16 -0.48 1.10 1.70** -1.73 3.29*** -2.78 946 0.204 0.175
-0.58 -0.02 1.61* 2.71*** 1.17 -1.90 1.52* -2.57* 863 0.385 0.353
0.90*** 2.93*** -2.36 946 0.180 0.146
0.69* 3.05*** 2.48*** -2.14 863 0.379 0.339
1.20 -1.06 1.38 1.93* --2.93* 2.82*** -2.69 946 0.195 0.147
1.03 -1.08 1.72 3.07*** 1.57 -3.64** 2.57*** -2.48 863 0.391 0.337
32
V. Endogeneity issues The possible mutual relationship between the dependent variable and two of the explanatory variables raises the issue of endogeneity bias. The real per capita GDP and the external military intervention are two potentially endogenous variables. The risk of conflict is higher in poor countries but civil conflict also affects real per capita incomes due to damage to infrastructure, loss of labor, skills and productivity, causing erosion in per capita incomes over time. Similarly, conflict can lead to external intervention, but it is also possible that external intervention may lead to conflict. The endogeneity bias is likely to be particularly strong in cases of prolonged and highintensity civil conflicts because even if civil conflict onset preceded intervention, the intervention may create conditions that intensify and prolong the conflict. This section discusses how we deal with this issue and presents some robustness checks. Aware of the possible endogeneity with respect to per capita income, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) and Esteban, Mayoral and Ray (2012) use periods of five years for civil wars and the GDP per capita in the beginning of the period. We adopt their approach of dealing with this source of endogeneity bias.35 In this section, we develop a strategy for addressing the endogeneity with respect to external military intervention of the non-neutral and non-humanitarian type. We estimate a version of equation (8) in which we include not only the intervention, Int_nh, but also its interaction with religious polarization, RELPOL: 35 Another way to deal with the endogeneity is by adding the lagged value of the dependent variable to the set of the right-hand side variables. Esteban, Mayoral and Ray (2012) added the lagged incidence of war to the list of explanatory variables to lessen the effect of endogeneity. The use of the lagged dependent variable can be effective, however, only in the absence of serial correlations in the errors of the estimated equation. 33
P(PRIOCWit 1) (X1it1, X , 2it1 Int _ nhis , Int _ nhis RELPOL) .
(8.1)
First, we test for endogeneity of the intervention variable and its interaction with RELPOL separately in the cases of MENA and non-MENA countries. As the Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogeneity test statistic shows, we cannot reject the exogeneity null of these two variables in the case of non-MENA countries even at the 10% significance level. However, we reject the null in the case of MENA countries at the 1% significance level. Therefore, we use a linear probability model (LPM) to estimate equation (8.1),36 while in the case of MENA we employ a two-stage linear probability model (TSLPM). The choice of TSLPM rather than a two-stage logit model is based on the conclusion of Angrist and Kruger (2001) that a linear regression in the first stage generates consistent second-stage estimates in case of an endogenous dummy variable. Moreover, using nonlinear models such as probit or logit to generate fitted values in the first stage for use in the second-stage does not generate consistent estimates unless the nonlinear model happens to be exactly right.
In the first stage, we estimate simultaneously the system of equations (9.1) and (9.2):
P(Int _ nhit 1) F1( X1it , X 2it , X 3it , X 3it RELPOL)
(9.1)
Int _ nhit RELPOL F2 (X1it , X 2it , X 3it , X 3it RELPOL) . (9.2)
This system represents a reduced-form specification for the intervention and interaction variables and includes a vector of instruments, X3it. We consider as potential instruments for intervention the number of bordering countries to country i (BORD) and the total length of the border of country i in kilometers (TOTBORD). This choice of variables is motivated by Gleditsch (2007) who finds
36 We obtain similar results with the logit. 34
that transnational linkages and attributes of neighboring countries can exert a substantial impact on the risk of conflict. He argues that a country is at a substantially higher risk of civil conflict if it has many transborder groups on its territory or if it is located next to a country in conflict or an authoritarian country. During the period of estimation most MENA countries were authoritarian or fragile and many of them hosted transborder groups, including some located in conflict countries, so the likelihood of non-neutral and non-humanitarian external intervention in a specific country is expected to be linked with the number of bordering countries or alternatively with the length of its border. The F test for excluded instruments confirms the strength of both instruments (BORD and TOTBORD). Since intervention interacts with religious polarization in equation (8.1), we also include as an instrument in equations (9.1) and (9.2) the interaction of the instrument with RELPOL. In the case of MENA, the use of BORD as an instrument interacted with RELPOL results in a predicted value of Int_nh x RELPOL whose coefficient is significant only at the 6% significance level. Therefore, we use the alternative instrument, TOTBORD, along with its interaction with RELPOL, which leads to a significant coefficient on the predicted value of Int_nh x RELPOL at the 1% significance level. The Stock-Wright test for the joint significance of all excluded instruments confirms that we can reject the null that the coefficients on all our instruments are zeros. In addition, the Hansen J test of over-identification confirms the null of absence of correlation between TOTBORD and its interaction with RELPOL and the errors in the incidence-of-civil-conflict equation (8.1). These results convey a good evidence of the strength and suitability of our instruments. In the second stage, we estimate the incidence-of-civil-conflict equation (8.1), using the estimates of intervention and its interaction with RELPOL from the first stage. In the 2nd stage the dependent variable is high-intensity conflict (PRIO1000) because of our hypothesis that intervention leads to this type of conflict. Our estimates are efficient for homoscedasticity and robust to heteroscedasticity. 35
Table 8 displays the LPM estimation results for the non-MENA panel in column 2 and the TSLPM estimation results for the MENA countries in columns 3-5.37 The coefficient of Int_nh in column (2) is negative and significant, while the coefficient of the interaction term Int_nh x RELPOL is positive and highly significant. However, the total effect of Int_nh on conflict is insignificantly different from zero.38 ETHPOL is highly significant and positive, and the effects of other traditional variables are in line with those obtained in Esteban, Mayoral and Ray (2012). The results from the first-stage estimation for the MENA panel suggest that the interaction of TOTBORD with RELPOL is a significant determinant of external intervention. This result is in line with the notion that the longer the border of a country in the Middle East the higher the probability of having a transborder ethnic or sectarian group and therefore the higher the probability of external interventions enabled by the presence of a cross-border group. The effect of primary exports on intervention is highly significant and positive in the first-stage estimation, suggesting that in this oil-rich region, external interventions are also driven by a private prize linked to oil resources. The effect of MOUNTAINS is significant and negative as expected because the presence of mountains makes it harder to intervene with boots on the ground. In the secondstage conflict-incidence equation, ETHPOL is an insignificant factor in explaining civil conflict in MENA. The coefficient of the interaction term between predicted intervention and RELPOL is highly significant and positive, which confirms that intervention exacerbates religious polarization and leads to high intensity conflict. Thus, we cannot reject the hypothesis that non-neutral and non-humanitarian intervention is a determinant of civil conflict in MENA. Moreover, it appears that the effects of some of the other exogenous variables (e.g., PRIMEXP and LGDPC) on the 37 We apply the STATA option of variance clustering at the country level. 38 The total effect is that of the external intervention and its interaction with RELPOL and is measured at means of the variables. 36
incidence of civil conflicts are indirect, occurring either through the intervention variable or its interaction with RELPOL. These results suggest that unlike in non-MENA, where conflicts are mostly about a public prize linked to ethnic polarization, in MENA they are mostly about a public prize linked to sectarian polarization.
Table 8. Two-Stages Linear Probability Model Panel 1965-2005
LPM Non-MENA Panel Eq. (8.1) (2)
1st stage Eq. (9.1) (3)
TSLPM MENA Panel 1st stage Eq. (9.2) (4)
2nd stage Eq. (8.1) (5)
Dep. Variable LGDPC LPOP
PRIO1000 -0.054*** 0.023***
Int_nh -0.26 -0.09
Int_nh x RELPOL -0.03 -0.08**
PRIO1000 0.029 -0.012
PRIMEXP
0.048
1.18***
0.05
-0.21
DEMOCRACY
0.016
0.09
-0.11
-0.27**
MOUNTAINS
0.001
0.01
0.002***
0.005**
NONCONT
0.084**
ETHPOL
0.182***
-0.18
0.08
-0.031
RELPOL
-0.055
-2.82
-1.69
-0.064
TOTBORD
-0.000
-0.000
TOTBORDxRELPOL
0.0003**
0.0003***
LAAM
0.022
SAFRICA
0.020
ASIAE
-0.017
LGDPxRELPOL
0.18
-0.03
PRIMEXPxRELPOL
-1.34*
0.30
DEMOCRACYxRELPOL
0.51
0.59*
MOUNTINS*RELPOL
-0.04***
-0.03***
LPOPxRELPOL
0.11
0.12
Int_nh
-0.141**
-0.125
Int_nhxRELPOL
0.424***
1.044***
Constant
0.008
1.94
1.40***
0.010
N
824
122
122
122
Centered R2 Durbin-Wu-Hausman Endogeneity 2
0.597
4.505 ***
0.181
test F test of excluded instruments
11.03***(15% bias)
23.76***(5% bias)
Stock-Wright test for the joint significance
33.48***
of all excluded instruments
Hansen J test
5.361
Notes: ***(15% bias) and ***(5% bias) indicate that we can reject the null hypothesis of weak instrument at the 1%
significance level, using Stock and Yogo (2005) critical values, allowing respectively for 15% and 5% bias of
maximal TSLP relative to the LPM estimator.
37
VI. Conclusions This paper develops the theory behind the link between polarization, foreign military intervention, and civil conflict. Specifically, in a behavioral model of civil conflict external military interventions alter the resources available to warring groups and their probability of winning. In this case, equilibrium level of conflict depends on the distributional measures, modified by the effect of external intervention. It can be shown that in relatively populous countries, the equilibrium level of conflict depends on the level of polarization modified by the intervention, in the case of conflict over a public prize linked to horizontal divisions, and on the level of fractionalization, in the case of conflict over a private prize. We test the model empirically and find that ethnic polarization is a robust predictor of civil conflict and that religious polarization is positively and significantly associated with conflict in the presence of non-neutral and non-humanitarian external military interventions. Such external interventions exacerbate religious polarization leading to high-intensity conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa region, but not in the rest of the world. The results are robust to allowing for different definitions of conflict, model specifications, and data time span and to controlling for neutral and humanitarian external interventions, which are not significantly associated with conflict. It appears that the weak explanatory power of religious polarization on the incidence of civil war found in earlier studies is due to the fact that these studies do not consider the regional heterogeneity and the moderating effect of external military intervention on polarization. These results have important policy implications. They identify non-neutral and non-humanitarian external military intervention as a possible channel for increased risk of high-intensity civil conflict in the Middle East and North Africa. Furthermore, they suggest that unlike in the rest of the world 38
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Appendix Definitions of variables and data sources PRIO25: "Armed conflict" from PRIO: a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths per year and per incompatibility. We consider only types 3 and 4 from the database; these refer to internal armed conflict. If a country has experienced a PRIO25 conflict according to the PRIO dataset in any of the years of our five-year period, this variable takes a value equal to 1. PRIOCW: "Intermediate armed conflict" from PRIO: includes all PRIO25 conflicts that result in a minimum of 1,000 deaths over the course of the conflict. We consider only types 3 and 4 (internal armed conflict). If a country has experienced a PRIO25 conflict according to the PRIO dataset in any of the years of our five-year period, this variable takes a value equal to 1. PRIO1000: "War" from PRIO: same definition as PRIO25 with a threshold of battle related deaths of at least 1,000 per year and per incompatibility. We consider only types 3 and 4 (internal armed conflict). If a country has experienced a PRIO1000 conflict according to the PRIO dataset in any of the years of our five-year period, this variable takes a value equal to 1. m F: Fractionalization, defined as F ni (1 ni ) , where ni is the population share of group i and i1 m is the number of groups. Data on group shares has been obtained from Fearon (2003b) and the Ethnologue project (http://www.ethnolgue.com). DEMOC: Institutionalized democracy. Data source is Polity IV (2011). Democracy ranges from 0 (low) to 10 (high). As in MRQ, DEMOC takes a value equal to 1 if the score is higher than or equal to 4 and 0 otherwise. ETHFRAC: Index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization calculated using the data of the World Christian Encyclopedia (WCE). ETHPOL: Index of ethnolinguistic polarization calculated using the data of the WCE. LGDPPC: Log of real GDP per capita corresponding to the first year of each five-year period. See Esteban, Mayoral and Ray (2012) and Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) for data sources. In our update of the two data sets we used the same sources. In the case of Lebanon, GDP per capita data in PPP prices after 1993. LPOP: Log of population (in millions) in the first year of each five-year period. See Esteban, Mayoral and Ray (2012) and Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) for data sources. In our update of the two data sets we used the same sources. In the case of Lebanon, population data for the whole period of investigation come from WDI. 44
MOUNTAINS: Percent mountainous terrain. The data source is Fearon and Laitin (2003b), who use the coding of geographer A. J. Gerard N. Population, in millions. Source: Maddison (2011). NONCONT: Noncontiguous states, referring to countries with territory holding at least 10,000 people and separated from the land area containing the capital city either by land or by 100 kilometers of water. Source: Fearon and Laitin (2003b). PRIMEXP: Proportion of primary commodity exports of GDP. Primary commodity exports. Source: Collier and Hoeffler (2001). RELFRAC: Index of religious fractionalization. Source: L'Etat des reґligions dans le monde and The Statesman's Yearbook. RELPOL: Index of religious polarization. Source: L'Etat des religions dans le monde and The Statesman's Yearbook. MENA= A dummy that takes the value 1 if a country is a MENA country and 0 otherwise. SAFRICA= A dummy that takes the value 1 if a country is a Sub-Saharan country and 0 otherwise. ASIAE= A dummy that takes the value 1 if a country is an East Asian country and 0 otherwise. LAAM= A dummy that takes the value 1 if a country is a Latin American country and 0 otherwise. Reference group = European and other developed countries. X*Y= is the interaction of variables X and Y. Int_nh: A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if there has been at least one intervention that was not neutral and not humanitarian in nature in the target country during the four years preceding the current year. NH: A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if there has been at least one neutral and humanitarian intervention in the target country during the four years preceding the current year. 45
Appendix Table 1: Non-neutral, non-humanitarian external military interventions, 1945-2005
Intervener
Target
Start End Description and sources
Year Year
PAKISTAN
AFGHANISTAN
1949 1949 Tribal Disp.--Disp. 82/NYT
PAKISTAN
AFGHANISTAN
1989 1996 Pakistan military supports Mujahadeen rebels (RIA, Reuters, UPI)
RUSIA
AFGHANISTAN
1991 1995 Russia attacks rebel bases in Afghanistan (Bercovitch, AP, AFP, UPI)
USA
AFGHANISTAN
1998 1998 US uses cruise missiles to attack suspected terrorist facilities (Xinh, IP, DP)
PAKISTAN
AFGHANISTAN
1998 1998 Pakistani air raids intended to aid Taliban government in Afghanistan (TASS)
MOROCCO
ALGERIA
1963 1964 Border-NYT/Kees/Hasna/Butterw
MOROCCO
ALGERIA
1984 1984 Border Incurs--NYT
DEMOCRATIC
ANGOLA
1975 1976 Ang-Kapln/Klnghof/LeoG/ACR/NYT
REPUBLIC OF CONGO
South Africa
ANGOLA
1976 1979 Anti-SWAPO/Pro-UNITA-LT/NYT
SOUTH AFRICA
ANGOLA
1980 1988 Anti-SWAPO-LTimes/NYT/ARB
SOUTH AFRICA
ANGOLA
1989 1989 S. Africa aids Unita opposition in Angola (GM, Xinh)
NSAs
ANGOLA
1995 1997 UN (UNAVEM III) in Angola to restore peace and reconciliation (UN website)
NSAs
ANGOLA
1997 1999 UN (MONUA) in Angola took over for UNAVEM III mission to restore peace and reconciliation
SOUTH AFRICA
ANGOLA
2000 2002 Namibia pursues rebels into Angola (FT)
QATAR
BAHRAIN
1986 1986 Disputed Islands-Disp87/NYT
CUBA
BAHAMAS
1980 1980 Bahama Fish Zone--NYT/Jessup
USA
BAHAMAS
1980 1980 Bahama Fish Zone--NYT/Jessup
INDIA
BANGLADESH
1991 1991 Indian border guards exchange fire with BDR (Reuters,Xinh)
MYANMAR
BANGLADESH
1991 1991 Myanmar (Burmese guards) attack Bangladeshi camp (Reuter,CT)
MYANMAR
BANGLADESH
1994 1994 Burmese troops lay landmines inside Bangladesh territory (Reuters)
MYANMAR
BANGLADESH
2001 2001 Myanmar exchanges gunfire with Bangladeshi troops (Worldsource)
ZIMBABWE
BOTSWANA
1975 1980 Disrupt Opponents--ARB/NYT
ZIMBABWE
BOTSWANA
1983 1983 Hot Pursuit Rebels-ARB
FRANCE
CAMERON
1960 1960 Anti-Rebel--NYT/LeVine
NIGERIA
CAMERON
1993 2006 Nigeria occupies part of Cameroon in territorial dispute (AFP, African Security Review)
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
CAMERON
2001 2001 Central African Republic dismantles border customs post and occupies a small area of Cameroon (FT)
FRANCE
COTE D'IVOIRE
1966 1966 Anti-Guin/Ghan-ARB/AR
ANGOLA
COTE D'IVOIRE
2002
Angolan troops support Ivory Coast government by protecting airport and the President (AFP)
DEMOCRATIC
CENTRAL AFRICAN 1979 1979 Student Rebel.--ACR
REPUBLIC OF CONGO REPUBLIC
RNSAs
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
2001 2002
COMESSA peacekeeping mission following aborted coup in Central African Republic (BBC, AP, AFP)
CHAD
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
2002 2002
Chadian troops cross into Central African Republic and attack troops and destroy radio station (All Africa, AFP)
RNSAs
CENTRAL AFRICAN 2002 REPUBLIC
CEMAC sends peacekeeping force to Central African Republic (AllAfrica, AFP, FT)
FRANCE
CHAD
1960 1965 Admin. North--Pittman
FRANCE
CHAD
1977 1977 Transport Chad Troops-NYT
LIBYA
CHAD
1979 1981 Invasion-Pittman/USDS-GIST
NIGERIA
CHAD
1983 1983 Island Clash-ARB/Disputes 87
USA
CHAD
1983 1983 Trans. Zairians--ARB
46
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO FRANCE LIBYA FRANCE FRANCE
CHAD CHAD CHAD CHAD CHAD
FRANCE SUDAN ARGENTINA ARGENTINA FRANCE FRANCE TAIWAN PORTUGAL TAIWAN TAIWAN INDIA INDIA REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM VIETNAM VIETNAM VIETNAM FRANCE FRANCE NICARAGUA NICARAGUA NICARAGUA PORTUGAL UGANDA ETHIOPIA CUBA EGYPT FRANCE MOROCCO SENEGAL
CHAD CHAD CHILi ChiLI CHINA CHINA CHINA CHINA CHINA CHINA CHINA CHINA CHINA CHINA CHINA CHINA COMOROS COMOROS COSTA RICA COSTA RICA COSTA RICA DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO
1983 1984 Support Habre--ARB
1983 1983 1986 1990
1984 1987 1987 1990
1991 1992
2004 2004
1958 1982 1946 1950 1950 1952 1954 1958 1962 1965 1974
1958 1982 1946 1950 1950 1952 1955 1979 1962 1969 1974
Support Habre--ARB Support Goukhouni--ARB Oppose Libyans--ARB/NYT France sends limited reinforcement to Chad to aid in repelling Libyan invasion (Reuter, UPI, WT, Xinh, LM) French intervenes in Chad to protect French nationals (WP, FT, CSM, LM) Sudanese conflict leads to bombing into Chad (DP, AFP) Beagle Ch.--NYT Beagle Ch.--Disputes 82 Take Admin.--Viet Backgrnd Korean War--NYT Tai. Str. Bomb Cities-Keesings Border Clash--NYT Taiwan Str.-Disp82/Stolper Taiwan Str. Counter-Shell/NYT Forward Ind. Posts-Maxwell Disp. Territory--NYT/Keesings Paracels-Wash Post/Disp82
1981 1984 1987 1989
1981 1985 1987 1989
1995 1995
1948 1978 1983 1964
1948 1979 1985 1964
Border Clash--WSJ/NYT Border Clash--NYT Border Clashes--Disputes 87 France sends troops and naval vessels to take control of Comoros security (FT, WP, NYT, LM) France intervenes to reverse coup in Comoros (DP, AP, LM) C.R. Civ. War--FoF/NYT Sandan. Revol-- Newsw/LTimes Contra War-NYT/Jessup/FoF/Kees Anti-Ang.Rebel-ARB
1965 1965 Anti-Tshombe Reb-AR/NYT/FoF
1967 1967 Assist Anti-rebel-ARB/AR
1976 1976 Bomb Town--ARB
1977 1977 Shaba I--NYT/ACR/Keesings
1977 1977 Shaba I-ARB/NYT/Keesings
1977 1977 Shaba I--NYT/ARB
1977 1977 Shaba I--Nsweek
47
UGANDA RWANDA UGANDA BURUNDI ANGOLA RWANDA UGANDA CHAD SUDAN RNSAs RWANDA RWANDA PERU PERU PERU ISRAEL ISRAEL FRANCE UKG ISRAEL ISRAEL IRAQ ISRAEL ISRAEL RUSSIA ALGERIA SUDAN ISRAEL ALGERIA IRAQ KUWAIT
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO ECUADOR ECUADOR ECUADOR EGYPT EGYPT EGYPT EGYPT EGYPT EGYPT EGYPT EGYPT EGYPT EGYPT EGYPT EGYPT EGYPT EGYPT EGYPT EGYPT
1977 1977 Shaba I--ARB/LTimes
1996 1998 1996 1998
Rwandan troops enter Zaire after cross border firing to assist Tutsi rebels (AFP, Reuters, LAT) Uganda troops cross into Zaire to attack rebel bases (Herald, Reuters)
1996
Zaire accuses Burundi, whose troops are aiding Tutsi rebels (NYT)
1997 2002 Angola intervenes in Congo in support of rebel leader Laurent Kabila (AP)
1998 2002 Rwanda sends troops to support DRC government opposition groups (AP, Xinh)
1998 2003 Uganda sends troops to DRC to support groups opposed to Kabila (AP, Xinh, DP)
1998 1999 Chad intervenes in DRC in support of Kabila (DP, AP)
1998 1999 Sudan sends troops to DRC in support of Kabila (AP, AFP)
1998 2002 SADC (Namibia,Zimbabwe,Angola) aid Kabila in Congo against rebels (AFP, Xinh)
2004 2004 Rwanda pursues rebels in DRC (Econ., FT, Xinh)
2004
Rwanda pursues rebels in DRC (Econ., FT, Xinh)
1951 1984 1995 1950 1954 1956 1956 1956 1958 1959 1960 1967 1967 1967 1967 1969 1973 1973 1973
1951 1984 1995 1950 1956 1956 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1967 1967 1967 1972 1970 1973 1973 1973
Old Border Dispute-NYT/FoF Border Dispute--NYT Peru carries out air raids against Ecuador in border conflict (IPS, DP, AFP) Gaza Raids--Khouri/NYT Gaza/Raids-Khri/NYT/FoF/Jssp Suez-Khouri/FoF/Ks/Flck-Pwll Suez-Khr/FoF/Ks/F-P/Lld/Dpy Suez-Khouri/FoF/Kees/Dupuy Huleh--NYT/LTimes/Fof Mosul Rebel-FoF/LT/NYT/Butterw Syr DMZ-NYT/vHrn/Khri-MEJ/FoF Six Day War-Khouri/Moore/Kees. Deterrence--Khouri/Kaplan Pre-War/Israel--Jessup Post67-Jessp/NYT/O'Bl/Ks/FoF War Attrition--Khouri/Jessup 1973 War--Whetten 1973 War--Aker 1973 War--Aker
48
LIBYA MOROCCO NORTH KOREA SUDAN TUNISIA ISRAEL LIBYA SOMALIA YEMEN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC SOMALIA ERITREA SENEGAL SENEGAL SENEGAL RUSSIA RUSSIA CZECHOSLOVAKIA SENEGAL GUINEA SENEGAL YUGOSLAVIA BULGARIA TURKEY USA BELIZE BELIZE BELIZE PORTUGAL VENEZUELA SURINAME CUBA USA CANADA CHILI FRANCE NICARAGUA EL SALVADOR NICARAGUA EL SALVADOR NICARAGUA NICARAGUA USA
EGYPT EGYPT EGYPT EGYPT EGYPT EGYPT EGYPT ETHIOPIA ETHIOPIA
1973 1973 1973 1973 1973 1973 1977 1964 1977
1973 1973 1973 1973 1973 1974 1977 1964 1978
1973 War--Aker 1973 War--Aker/Whetten 1973 War--Whetten 1973 War--Whetten 1973 War--Whetten 1973 War--Whetten/Jessup Lib-Egy Raids--NYT Som Irredentism-NYT/Keesings Somal War/Drivers-Kapln-Legum
ETHIOPIA ETHIOPIA
1977 1978 1998 2001
GAMBIA GAMBIA GAMBIA GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC GERMANY GUINEANEA-BISSAU
1971 1980 1981 1953 1961 1985 1990
1971 1980 1988 1953 1961 1985 1990
GUINEANEA-BISSAU 1998 1999
GUINEANEA-BISSAU 1998 1999
GREECE GREECE GREECE GUATIMALA GUATIMALA
1948 1952 2002 1987 1995
1948 1952 2002 1987 1995
GUATIMALA
2001 2001
GUATIMALA
2002 2002
GUINEA GUYANA GUYANA
1970 1970 1970 1970 2000 2000
HAITI HAITI
1959 1959 2004 2004
Invade Ogaden-Jessup/NYT/ACR Eritrean planes bomb Ethiopia and cross into Ethiopian territory (CH, AP, KNS) Retal./Smuggling--ARB Anti-Libyan--ACR/NYT Restore Gov/Confed-NYT/ACR/ARB E. Ger. Riots--NYT/Butterworth Berlin--Kaplan Warn plane--NYT/Facts on File Senegal engages in border clash with Guinea-Bissau over disputed territory (BBC, Xinh, LM) Guinea aids the government of Guinea-Bissau to contain a military rebellion (AP, AFP) Senegal aids Guinea-Bissau's government to help contain a military rebellion (AP, AFP) Balkans--Facts on File/NYT Bul-Gr Is.-NYT/Keesings Turkish jets cross into Greek airspace (AP) Insurgency--NYT/FoF Belize border guards attack Guatemala village (DP, UPI, AFP) Belize troops enter Guatemala in territorial dispute (FT, AP) Belize soldiers cross border and arrest Guatemalans (AP) Guin-B.-NYT/ACR/LTms/AR Border Disp-Disp82/FoF/NYT Suriname gunboats and aircraft move into Guyana in a territorial dispute over oil rights (AP) Raiding Party--FoF/NYT US aids in restoring order in Haiti (AP, AFP)
HAITI
2004 2004 Canada aids in restoring order to Haiti (AP, Barrier)
HAITI HAITI HONDURAS HONDURAS HONDURAS HONDURAS HONDURAS HONDURAS HONDURAS
2004 2004
2004 1957 1976 1980 1981 1984 1986 1986
2004 1957 1976 1981 1982 1985 1988 1988
Chili aids in restoring order to Haiti (AFP, Xinh, AP) France aids in restoring order in Haiti (AFP, UPI) Border Dispute--NYT Border Flareup--Disp.82 Contra War--Keesings Insurgency--Disp82/NYT Contra War--NYT Contra War--NYT Contra War--NYT
49
USA EL SALVADOR NICARAGUA NICARAGUA RUSSIA UKG CHINA PAKISTAN CHINA PAKISTAN PAKISTAN PAKISTAN CHINA CHINA CHINA PAKISTAN BANGLADESH PAKISTAN PAKISTAN BANGLADESH RUSIA IRAQ IRAQ IRAQ IRAQ UKG SYRIA ISRAEL IRAN IRAN RUSIA IRAN ISRAEL IRAN TURKEY FRANCE UKG USA IRAN IRAN USA SYRIA SYRIA SYRIA EGYPT
HONDURAS HONDURAS HONDURAS HONDURAS HUNGARY ICELAND INDIA INDIA INDIA INDIA INDIA INDIA INDIA INDIA INDIA INDIA INDIA INDIA INDIA INDIA IRAN IRAN IRAN IRAN IRAN IRAQ IRAQ IRAQ IRAQ IRAQ IRAQ IRAQ IRAQ IRAQ IRAQ IRAQ IRAQ IRAQ IRAQ IRAQ IRAQ ISRAEL ISRAEL ISRAEL ISRAEL
1988 1988 1989 1989 1991 1991 2000 2000
1956 1958 1962 1965 1965 1965 1971 1971 1975 1979 1981 1990 1991
1958 1959 1962 1965 1969 1966 1971 1972 1975 1979 1985 1990 1991
1991 1991 1999 1999
2001 2001
1946 1966 1972 1979 1980 1946 1963 1967 1969 1972 1973 1980 1981 1982 1983 1991
1946 1966 1974 1979 1988 1947 1963 1967 1969 1974 1975 1982 1981 1988 1987 1991
1991 1991
1991 1991
1993 1993
1994 2003 1951 1954 1957 1958
1994 1951 1955 1958 1958
Contra War--NYT El Salvador air attack against Honduran rebels (UPI, IPS, Xinh) Nicaraguan forces exchange fire with Honduran troops (UPI) Nicaraguan patrol boat fires on Honduran naval vessel in disputed waters (AFP, Xinh) Hung.Rev.--Donelan/Grieve Iceland Fishing--FoF Ch-In Border-NYT/Dsp82/Mxwl/Ks Rann of K.--NYT/MEPD/FoF/Kees Disp. Territory--NYT/Keesings Kashmir-Dsp82/MEPD/Ks/EncyWar Chase rebels--NYT Bangla D.-Jackson/Butter./MEPD Border Clash--NYT Border Dispute--Keesings/NYT Island Dispute--Disputes82 Pakistan exchanges cross-border firing with India in Kashmir region (FT, Indep, GM) Bangladeshi Rifles (BDR) crosses border to return fire on Indian border guards (Reuters, Xinh) Pakistani troops enter Indian zone of Kashmir (UPI, AFP) Pakistani soldiers infiltrate Indian controlled area of Kashmir region, known as the Kargil War (DP, Global Sec.) Bangladeshi soldiers occupy homes in India (AP, Xinh, AFP) Azerbaijan-Butterw/Heravi/Kapl Kurdish War--NYT/FoF Shatt-NYT/Abdulghani/Keesings Kurdish War--NYT/Keesings GulfWar-D82/87/FAf/GIST/S-K/Gs Iran Strike-NYT/Btrw/Ks/Fof Kurdish War-O'Ballance/NYT Six Day War-Khouri/Moore/Kees. River Shipping-Jessp/FoF Shatt/Kurd-NYT/Abdlgni/MEPD/Ks Kurdish War--Kaplan Shell and Retal.--NYT/Jessup Destroy Reactor--FAf/NYT/Perl Gulf-Disp82/87/FAf/Jesp/GIST Kurd Rebel-NYT/FAf/FoF/WashP France moves troops into Iraq from Saudi Arabia (USA Today, Desert Sheild Factbook, Gulf War Chronicle, LM) Britain moves into Iraq from Saudi Arabia (Des. Shield Factbook, USA, Gulf War Chronicle) US moves troops into Iraq from Saudi Arabia (USA Today, Factbook, Gulf War Chronicle) Iranian forces attack Kurdish rebel bases in Iraq (AFP, Xinh) Iran attacks rebel bases in Northern Iraq (AFP) US topples Iraqi government (DP, AFX, CNN) Huleh Drainage--NYT Gal. Attacks-Khouri/NYT/FoF Huleh Drainage--NYT/LTimes Huleh--NYT/LTimes/FoF
50
EGYPT SYRIA SYRIA EGYPT IRAQ IRAQ JORDAN EGYPT EGYPT SYRIA EGYPT SYRIA IRAQ LIBYA ISRAEL UKG ISRAEL ISRAEL ISRAEL ISRAEL SYRIA SYRIA UKG IRAQ SAUDI ARABIA USA UKG ISRAEL ISRAEL IRAQ SAUDI ARABIA ISRAEL USA UGANDA UKG UGANDA UGANDA SAUDI ARABIA UKG SAUDI ARABIA IRAQ IRAN IRAQ BAHRAIN BANGLADESH CZECHOSLOVAKIA EGYPT
ISRAEL ISRAEL ISRAEL ISRAEL ISRAEL ISRAEL ISRAEL ISRAEL ISRAEL ISRAEL ISRAEL ISRAEL ISRAEL ITALY JORDAN JORDAN JORDAN JORDAN JORDAN JORDAN JORDAN JORDAN JORDAN JORDAN JORDAN JORDAN JORDAN JORDAN JORDAN JORDAN JORDAN JORDAN JAPAN KENYA KENYA KENYA KENYA KUWAIT KUWAIT KUWAIT KUWAIT KUWAIT KUWAIT KUWAIT KUWAIT KUWAIT KUWAIT
1960 1962 1964 1967 1967 1968 1968 1969 1969 1970 1973 1973 1991 1986 1948 1948 1950 1951 1953 1956 1956 1957 1957 1957 1957 1958 1958 1965 1967 1967 1967 1968 1953 1976 1982 1987 1989
1960 1962 1967 1967 1967 1968 1968 1970 1969 1970 1974 1974 1991 1986 1949 1957 1988 1951 1954 1956 1957 1957 1957 1958 1958 1958 1966 1968 1970 1970 1953 1976 1988 1989
1961 1961 1973 1975 1980 1990
1961 1961 1977 1988 1990
1990 1991
1990 1991
1990 1991
1990 1991
Syr DMZ-NYT/vHrn/Khri-MEJ/FoF Shelling--Khouri/NYT Water/Fatah/Galilee-Khouri/NYT Subs Shell Coast--Jessup Six Day War--Safran W.Bank Shell--Keesings W.Bank Shell--Keesings War of Attrition--Khouri Syr. Border/DMZ--NYT Golan Clashes--Jessup/FoF 1973War-Monroe-Hockley/Whetten 1973War-Butterw/Whet/Jessup Iraqi Scud attack against Israel (WP,PAL) Attack US Base--FAf/NYT Pales. War--NYT/Jessup Pal.War-Khouri/Keesngs/NYT/FoF Occup. Territ.--NYT/FoF/Khouri Border Clashes-FoF/LTimes Retal Raids-Khouri/Jessup/NYT Fedayeen Retal.-Khouri/Jessup Suez Wartime--NYT Nasserism--NYT Nasserism--Jessup Nasserism/Leb.-NYT/Butterw Nasserism--NYT Air Cover UK--Butterw Iraqi Rev.--Butterw Retal. Fatah--Khouri Six Day War-Khouri/Jessup Pre-War/Israel--Jessup/NYT 1967 War Deter-Keesings Raids/Shell-NYT/Jessup/Kees Attack USSR planes--NYT/Kees. Cattle Raid--ARB/NYT Anti-Poaching--NYT Border Cross-NYT/LTms/FAf/ARB Ugandan air attack on Kenyan Village (AP, Bercovitch) Iraqi Threat--Butterw/Zacher Anti-Iraq-Jessup/Butterw/NYT Deter Iraq-Butterworth/Jessup Border Disp.--Butterw/NYT Gulf War-WSJ/CQ Iraq invades Kuwait and establishes a provisional government (AP,UP, BBC) Bahrain troops part of Persian Gulf Coalition in Kuwait (USA Today, Gulf War Chronical, Desert Shield Factbook) Bangladesh troops part of Persian Gulf Coalition in Kuwait (USA Today, Gulf War Chronical, Desert Shield Factbook) Czechoslovakia troops part of Persian Gulf Coalition in Kuwait (USA Today, Gulf War Chronical, Desert Shield Factbook) Egyptian troops part of Persian Gulf Coalition in Kuwait (USA Today, Gulf War Chronical, Desert Shield Factbook)
51
FRANCE HONDURAS MOROCCO NIGER OMAN PAKISTAN QATAR ROMANIA SAUDI ARABIA SENEGAL SYRIA UAE UKG USA AFGHANISTAN NETHERLANDS SIERRA LEONE FRANCE BAHRAIN OMAN UKG USA UAE USA SYRIA ISRAEL
KUWAIT KUWAIT KUWAIT KUWAIT KUWAIT KUWAIT KUWAIT KUWAIT KUWAIT KUWAIT KUWAIT KUWAIT KUWAIT KUWAIT KUWAIT KUWAIT KUWAIT KUWAIT KUWAIT KUWAIT KUWAIT KUWAIT KUWAIT KUWAIT LEBANON LEBANON
1990 1991 1990 1991 1990 1991 1990 1991 1990 1991 1990 1991 1990 1991 1990 1991 1990 1991 1990 1991 1990 1991 1990 1991 1990 1991 1990 1991 1991 1991 1991 1991 1991 1991 1994 1994 1994 1994 1994 1994 1994 1994 1994 1994 1994 1994 1996 1996 1963 1963 1965 1965
France troops, air, navy part of Persian Gulf Coalition in Kuwait (USA Today, Gulf War Chronical, Desert Shield Factbook, LM) Honduras troops part of Persian Gulf Coalition in Kuwait (USA Today, Gulf War Chronical, Desert Shield Factbook) Morocco troops part of Persian Gulf Coalition in Kuwait (USA Today, Gulf War Chronical, Desert Shield Factbook) Niger provides troops as part of Persian Gulf Coalition in Kuwait (USA Today, Gulf War Chronical, Desert Shield Factbook) Oman provides troops as part of Persian Gulf Coalition in Kuwait (USA Today, Gulf War Chronical, Desert Shield Factbook) Pakistan provides troops as part of Persian Gulf Coalition in Kuwait (USA Today, Gulf War Chronical, Desert Shield Factbook) Qatar provides troops as part of Persian Gulf Coalition in Kuwait (USA Today, Gulf War Chronical, Desert Shield Factbook) Romania provides medical team and NBC experts as part of the Persian Gulf Coalition in Kuwait (USA Today, Gulf War Chronical, Desert Shield Factbook) Saudi Arabia aids in Persian Gulf Coaltion in Kuwait (USA Today, Gulf War Chronical, Desert Shield Factbook) Senegal provides troops for Persian Gulf Coalition in Kuwait (USA Today, Gulf War Chronical, Desert Shield Factbook) Syrian troops in Persian Gulf Coalition in Kuwait (USA Today, Gulf War Chronical, Desert Shield Factbook) UAE troops in Persian Gulf Coalition in Kuwait (USA Today, Gulf War Chronical, Desert Shield Factbook) UK troops, air, naval support for Persian Gulf Coalition in Kuwait (USA Today, Gulf War Chronicle) US restores Kuwaiti government in Desert Storm (USA Today, Gulf War Chronicle) Afghanistan troops aid Persian Gulf Coalition in Kuwait (USA Today, Gulf War Chronical, Desert Shield Factbook) Netherlands provides air defense batteries as part of coalition in Kuwait (USA Today, Gulf War Chronical, Desert Shield Factbook) Sierra Leone provides medical team and troops for coalition in Kuwait (USA Today, Gulf War Chronical, Desert Shield Factbook) French send frigate to aid force in defending Kuwait (UPI) Bahrain sends naval and air force to defend Kuwait (UPI, Xinh) Oman sends naval forces to defend Kuwait (UPI, Xinh) UK bolster US forces opposing Iraq border buildup (Reuters, APF) US build up in Kuwait to respond to Iraqi border build-up (UPI, AP) UAE sends troops and 6 mirages to defend Kuwait (UPI, AFP) US buildup of troops in Kuwait after Iraq's provocation (SDUT, Reuters) Border Clashes--NYT/FoF Fatah--Khouri/NYT
52
ISRAEL SYRIA ISRAEL SYRIA ISRAEL ISRAEL SYRIA FRANCE, ITALY, UK, USA SOUTH AFRICA RNSAs FRANCE UKG EGYPT PAKISTAN USA MOROCCO MOROCCO SENEGAL THAILAND THAITILAND UKG GUATIMALA BURKINA FASO RUSIA FRANCE FRANCE ALGERITREAA FRANCE SPAIN CHINA CHINA CHINA THAITILAND THAILAND ZIMBABWE SOUTH AFRICA SOUTH AFRICA SOUTH AFRICA SOUTH AFRICA ANGOLA CHINA HONDURAS COSTA RICA HONDURAS HONDURAS HONDURAS CAMERON CHAD
LEBANON LEBANON LEBANON LEBANON LEBANON LEBANON LEBANON LEBANON LESOTHO LESOTHO LIBYA LIBYA LIBYA LIBYA LIBYA MAURITANIA MAURITANIA MAURITANIA MALI MALI MAURITIUS MEXICO MALI MONGOLIA MOROCCO MOROCCO MOROCCO MOROCCO MOROCCO MYANMAR MYANMAR MYANMAR MYANMAR MYANMAR MOZAMBIABIQUE MOZAMBIABIQUE MOZAMBIABIQUE MOZAMBIABIQUE MOZAMBIABIQUE NAMIBIA NEPAL NICARAGUA NICARAGUA NICARAGUA NICARAGUA NICARAGUA NIGERIA NIGER
1969 1973 1974 1976 1982 1982 1976 1982
1973 1973 1982 1988 1985 1988 1988 1984
Retal. Raids--NYT/Jessup Isr-Syr Dogfight in L.-NYT PLO-Jsp/FAf/MPD/Pgny/Ks/FoF Leb Civ War-Jessup/NYT/Pogany Leb Civ War-NYT/FAf/MEPD/FoF Southern Zone--NYT Leb Civ War-Jessup/NYT/Pogany Leb. Civil War--Jessup/FAf
1982 1998 1957 1958 1977 1977 1986 1977 1981 1989
1982 1999 1957 1958 1977 1986 1979 1981 1990
1969 1977 1968 1982 1985 1966 1956 1962 1963 1976 2002
1976 1981 1968 1983 1985 1988 1961 1962 1964 1978 2002
1951 1955 1969 1997
1953 1956 1974 1997
1999 1999
1976 1981 1983 1984 1987 1999
1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1999
1960 1980 1984 1985 1986 1991 1998
1961 1981 1984 1985 1988 1991 1998
1993 1993
ANC--ARB/SLPD SADC peacekeepers in Lesotho (AFP, DP, BBC) Alg. Rebels--NYT Nasserism/Iraq--NYT/FoF Lib-Egy Raids--NYT Air Force Troops--NYT Anti-Lib. Bombing--FAf/NYT Anti-Polisario-ACR/MacF Hot Pursuit--NYT Senegal aids nationals in Mauritania after territorial dispute (UPI,Xinhua,BBC, LM) Joint Counter-Ins.--Jessup Joint C-Insur--NYT/Kees./FoF Ethnic Violence--NYT/Keesings Refugee Camps-Kees./NYT/FoF Border-Disp87/FAf/NYT/SLPD Deter PRC--Kaplan/NYT Post-Indep/Alg-NYT/FoF/C-H/Ks Unauth. Airraid--NYT Border-NYT/FoF/Ks/Hasna/Btrw Anti-Polisario-NYT/ACR Spanish forces evict Moroccans from disputed island (AP) Border Sanctuaries--NYT Disputed Territ.--Zacher/NYT Anti-Nat./Guer.--WashP/FoF Thailand shelling in Burma to prevent border crossings (AP) Thailand fires on Burmese ships territorial dispute on Andaman sea (Bernama, Xinh) Zim. Revol (Moz)-NYT/ARB/Kees Raid ANC--ARB/NYT/FAf/AR/ACR Raid ANC--ARB/NYT/SLPD/AR/ACR Transport Rebels--NYT Anti-ANC Raid--SLPD/NYT Namibia allows Angola to attack UNITA within Namibia, end date approx (AP) Nepal Border--NYT/Keesings Border/Contras--Kees./NYT Retal Firing--NYT Down Copter--FoF Contra War--NYT Honduras fires on Nicaraguan patrol boat (UPI) Cameroon attacks Nigeria using helicopter mounted machine guns in territorial dispute (AP, AFP) Chad forces pursue rebels into Niger (BBC, LM)
53
UKG UKG UKG RUSIA YEMEN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC IRAN JORDAN YEMEN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC INDIA INDIA INDIA INDIA AFGHANISTAN AFGHANISTAN RUSSIA RUSSIA AFGHANISTAN INDIA AFGHANISTAN
OMAN OMAN OMAN OMAN OMAN OMAN OMAN OMAN PAKISTAN PAKISTAN PAKISTAN PAKISTAN PAKISTAN PAKISTAN PAKISTAN PAKISTAN PAKISTAN PAKISTAN PAKISTAN
INDIA
PAKISTAN
INDIA
PAKISTAN
USA COLOMBIA USA USA USA ECUADOR ECUADOR ECUADOR ECUADOR ECUADOR
PAKISTAN PANAMA PANAMA PANAMA PANAMA PERU PERU PERU PERU PERU
ECUADOR REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM USA
PERU PHILIPPINES PHILIPPINES
CHINA
PHILIPPINES
MALI
PHILIPPINES
RUSSIA DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO SOUTH AFRICA INDONESIA SAUDI ARABIA
POLAND PORTUGAL PORTUGAL PORTUGAL QATAR
CHINA NORTH KOREA NORTH KOREA
SOUTH KOREA SOUTH KOREA SOUTH KOREA
1952 1957 1966 1973 1973
1972 1959 1977 1973 1976
Buraimi Oasis-Butterw/NYT/D82 Dhofar Reb.-NYT/MEPD/Keesngs Dfr-Jsp/MPD/Tnd/Ptsn/Ks/NT/FoF Transport S.Yem--Kaplan Dhofar Rebel.-Kaplan/Keesings
1973 1979 1975 1975 1981 1982
Dhofar-Jessp/NYT/Keesings/FoF Dhofar-Petrsn/Butterw/Halliday Post-Dhofar-Bidwill/Disp87/MEJ
1948 1965 1965 1965 1979 1980 1980 1983 1983 1984 1989
1949 1965 1966 1966 1979 1980 1982 1988 1988 1987 1990
1990 1990
1998 1998
2004 1959 1959 1988 1989 1953 1978 1981 1995 1997
2004 1959 1959 1988 1990 1953 1978 1981 1995 1997
1998 1998 1974 1974
Kashmir--NYT Kashmir-Disp.82/MEPD/Kees Rann of K.--NYT/MEPD/FoF/Kees Ind-Pak War-Disp82/MEPD/Kees Fire on Refugees--Ltms/DTel Afgh. Insurg.-Jessup/NYT Afgh. War--NYT Afgh War-CSM/Keesings Afgh. Insurg.--WSJ/Keesings Kshmr Glacier-Disp.87/Keesings Afghanistan fires Scuds and RPGs into Pakistan (BC, Xinh, Reuters) India initiates firing into Pakistan after mobilizing troops in disputed territory (Globe,PLC,WP,FT) Indian troops fire on Pakistani troops along Kashmir border (AP) US pursues Taliban insurgents into Pakistan (AFP) Exile Rebel.--NYT Exile Rebel.--NYT Noriega Dispute--NYT US removes Panamanian government (WP, NYT) Insp. Border Markers--NYT Border Dispute--NYT Border Dispute--NYT/Disputes82 Ecuador bombs Peru over border dispute (AFP, DP) Ecuadorean soldiers plant mines in Peru (AFP, Xinh) Ecuador troops cross border into Peru (AP, AFP) Spratly Is.--NYT
1989 1998 1999 1956 1975
1989 1999 1999 1956 1975
US aids Philippine government after coup attempt (AP, UPI, Xinh) China adds structures and troops to reef in waters disputed with Philippines (AP, AFP) Malaysian navy takes disputed Sprately shoal from Philippines (AP) After Poz.Riots--Fejto/Butter Pro-FNLA-Hallett/Legum/LeoG
1975 1975 1992 1950 1992 1999
1975 1976 1992 1953 1992 1999
Occupy-Legum/AR/ARB/Hallett E.Timor-Zacher/Disp.82 Saudi Arabia forces attack Qatar military post (AP,TS) Korean War--Lukacs N.Korea crosses into DMZ in S.Korea (WP, NYT) N. Korea engages in naval battle with heavy shelling against S. Korea over crab fishing rights (SFC, Kyodo)
54
BELGIUM FRANCE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO FRANCE
RWANDA RWANDA RWANDA RWANDA
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO HONDURAS HONDURAS HONDURAS EGYPT YEMEN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC PAKISTAN ARGENTINA
RWANDA EL SALVADOR EL SALVADOR EL SALVADOR SAUDI ARABIA SAUDI ARABIA SAUDI ARABIA SAUDI ARABIA
AUSTRALIA
SAUDI ARABIA
BAHRAIN
SAUDI ARABIA
BELGIUM
SAUDI ARABIA
BANGLADESH
SAUDI ARABIA
CANADA
SAUDI ARABIA
Czech Republic
SAUDI ARABIA
DENMARK EGYPT
SAUDI ARABIA SAUDI ARABIA
FRANCE
SAUDI ARABIA
GREECE ITALY KUWAIT MOROCCO
SAUDI ARABIA SAUDI ARABIA SAUDI ARABIA SAUDI ARABIA
1990 1990 1990 1990 1990 1991 1993 1993 1996 1996
Belgium troops aid Rwandan government from rebel attack (UP, AP, LM) France defends Rwandan government from rebel attack (CT, WP, NYT, LM) Zaire sends troops to aid government of Rwanda (AP, UPI, LM) French troops sent to Rwanda to reinforce existing troops and protect and evacuate French nationals (AP, Indep, UP, LM) Zaire shells across border into Rwanda (Reuters)
1969 1976 1982 1962 1969
1971 1976 1983 1967 1970
Football War--Butter/Disp/NYT Border Flareup--Disp.82 Insurgency--Disp82/NYT Yemen War-NYT/Btrw/Ks/Bdb/Wn S.Y.War & Territ-NYT/Jessp/FoF
1981 1988 1990 1991 1990 1991 1990 1991 1990 1991 1990 1991 1990 1991 1990 1991 1990 1991 1990 1991 1990 1991 1990 1991 1990 1991 1990 1991 1990 1991
Protect Royal Family--NYT ARG provides a destroyer to SAU for Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Desert Shield Factbook, Gulf War Chronicle) AUL provides frigates & supply ship to SAU for Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Desert Shield Factbook, Gulf War Coalition) BAH provides troops to SAU through Gulf Council (USA Today, Desert Shield Factbook, Gulf War Chronicle) BEL provides aircraft & ships for SAU in Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Desert Shield Factbook, Gulf War Chronicle) BNG provides troops for SAU for Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Desert Shield Factbook, Gulf War Chronicle) CAN provides combat aircraft & ships to SAU for Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Gulf War Chronicle, Desert Shield Factbook) CZR provides a chem. defense & hospital units to SAU for Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Desert Shield Factbook, Gulf War Chronicle) Denmark provides 1 warship to Saudi Arabia for Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Desert Shield Factbook, Gulf War Chronicle) Egypt provides ground and paratroops and combat aircraft to Saudi Arabia for Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Desert Shield Factbook, Gulf War Chronicle) France provides troops and Legion, 32 combat aircraft, and large carrier group to Saudi Arabia for Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Desert Shield Factbook, Gulf War Chronicle, LM) Greece provides 1 frigate to Saudi Arabia for Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Gulf War Chronicle, Desert Shield Factbook) Italy provides 8 combat aircraft, 2 frig, 1 supply ship to Saudi Arabia for Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Desert Shield Factbook, Gulf War Chronicle) Kuwait provides troops through the Gulf Council and 25-30 combat aircraft (USA Today, Desert Shield Factbook, Gulf War Chronicle) Morocco provides ground and mechanized infantry troops for Op. Desert Shield in Saudi Arabia (USA Today, Gulf War Chronicle, Desert Shield Factbook, LM)
55
NEW ZEALAND NIGER NETHERLANDS OMAN PORTUGAL QATAR RUSSIA SENEGAL SPAIN SYRIA UAE UKG USA YEMEN IRAQ PORTUGAL MAURITANIA GUINEA-BISSAU GUINEA PNG PNG ETHIOPIA ETHIOPIA ETHIOPIA ETHIOPIA FRANCE MAURITANIA MOROCCO ALGERIA MOROCCO
SAUDI ARABIA SAUDI ARABIA SAUDI ARABIA SAUDI ARABIA SAUDI ARABIA SAUDI ARABIA SAUDI ARABIA SAUDI ARABIA SAUDI ARABIA SAUDI ARABIA SAUDI ARABIA SAUDI ARABIA SAUDI ARABIA SAUDI ARABIA SAUDI ARABIA SENEGAL SENEGAL SENEGAL SIERRA LEONE SOL SOL SOMALIA SOMALIA SOMALIA SOMALIA SPAIN SPAIN SPAIN SPAIN SPAIN
1990 1991
1990 1991 1990 1991 1990 1991 1990 1991 1990 1991 1990 1991
1990 1991
1990 1991
1990 1991
1990 1991
1990 1991
1990 1991
1994 1995
2001 2001
1961 1973 1989 1990
1990 1990
2000 2001
1992 1992
1993 1993
1964 1977 1982 1999
1964 1978 1985 2001
1958 1975 1975 1976 2002
1958 1976 1976 1976 2002
New Zealand contributes a hospital team and one medical transport aircraft for Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Gulf War Chronical, Desert Shield Factbook) Niger provides infantry troops in Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Desert Shield Factbook, Gulf War Chronicle) Netherlands give 18 combat aircraft and 2 frig and 1 supply ship for Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Gulf War Chronicle, Desert Shield Factbook) Oman contributes troops through gulf council in Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Gulf War Chronicle, Desert Shield Factbook) Portugal provides supply ship for Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Desert Shield Factbook, Gulf War Chronicle) Qatar provides troops as a gulf council member in Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Desert Shield Factbook, Gulf War Chronicle) Soviet Union provides guarded missile destroyer, anti-sub warfare ship, 2 supply ships for Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Desert Shield Factbook, Gulf War Chronicle) Senegal provides 500 troops for Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Desert Shield Factbook, Gulf War Chronicle) Spain provides one ship for Operation Desert Shield (USA Today, Desert Shield Factbook, Gulf War Chronicle) Syria in Saudi Arabia to protect it from Iraqi invasion in Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Desert Shield Factbook, Gulf War Chronicle) UAE in Saudi Arabia to protect it from Iraqi invasion in Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Des. Shield Factbook, Gulf War Chronicle) Britain provides troops, aircraft, & naval fleet to SAU for Op. Desert Shield (USA Today, Gulf War Chron., Shield Factbook) US in Saudi Arabia to protect it from Iraqi invasion in Op. Desert Shield (US Today, Des. Shield Factbook, Gulf War Chronicle) Yemen clashes with Saudi Arabia over ill-defined demarcation line (UPI, AFP, Reuters) Iraqi troops fire on Saudi troops in cross border raid (AP, AFP) Guin-B Rev-AHBk/ACR/ARB/NYT/AC Mauritania aids and evacuates nationals in Senegal after territorial dispute (UPI, Xinhua, BBC, LM) Guinea-Bissau engages in border clash with Senegal over disputed territory (BBC, Xinh, LM) Guinea launches artillery attacks against Sierra Leone (AP, AllAfrica, AFP) Papua-New Guinea pursue rebels in Solomon Islands (AP, Reuter, Xinh) Papua New Guinea troops attack village in Solomon Islands (Xinh, UP) Border Clashes-AD/ARB/NYT/Kees Attack Base/Planes--NYT Border Insurg.-NYT/Jessup/Ltms Heavy Ethiopian artillery shelling into Somalia (AFP, Xinh) Defend Sp.Sah/Maur.-NYT Annex/Anti-Polis.-NYT/ARB/ACR Annex/Polisr-NYT/ARB/FoF/Kees Pro-Polisario--NYT/FoF Moroccan soldiers camp on island disputed with Spain (AP, FT)
56
RUSSIA EGYPT USA EGYPT LIBYA UGANDA ERITREA ETHIOPIA USA ERITREA SOUTH AFRICA FRANCE ISRAEL ISRAEL IRAQ ISRAEL EGYPT EGYPT ISRAEL ISRAEL ISRAEL IRAQ ISRAEL JORDAN ISRAEL RUSSIA IRAQ JORDAN KUWAIT MOROCCO ISRAEL SAUDI ARABIA RUSSIA ISRAEL CHINA CHINA CHINA REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM PORTUGAL UGANDA PORTUGAL BURUNDI UGANDA LIBYA BURUNDI FRANCE MYANMAR AUSTRALIA NEW ZEALAND UKG USA
SUDAN SUDAN SUDAN SUDAN SUDAN SUDAN SUDAN SUDAN SUDAN SUDAN SWAZILAND SYRIA SYRIA SYRIA SYRIA SYRIA SYRIA SYRIA SYRIA SYRIA SYRIA SYRIA SYRIA SYRIA SYRIA SYRIA SYRIA SYRIA SYRIA SYRIA SYRIA SYRIA SYRIA SYRIA TAIWAN TAIWAN TAIWAN TAIWAN TANZANIA TANZANIA TANZANIA TANZANIA TANZANIA TANZANIA TANZANIA THAILAND THAILAND THAILAND THAILAND THAILAND THAILAND
1970 1970 1984 1984 1986 1997 1997 1997 1998 1998 1985 1946 1948 1951 1951 1954 1957 1958 1962 1964 1967 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1973 1973 1973 1973 1973 1973 1983 2003 1950 1954 1958 1974
1971 1972 1984 1985 1986 1997 1997 1997 1998 1998 1986 1946 1949 1951 1958 1955 1958 1961 1962 1967 1967 1970 1970 1971 1973 1973 1973 1973 1973 1973 1974 1976 1988 2003 1958 1955 1978 1974
Sud.Civ.War-Kaplan/Wai Sud Civ War-Epirle/NYT/Ks/Time Transport Egy.--AR/ACR Anti-Libya--AR/ACR Sud Civ War-WSJ/NYT/Ks/ACR Ugandan soldiers cross into Sudan in pursuit of rebels (AFP) Eritrea attacks rebels in Sudan (AFP) Ethiopia bombards Sudan and captures POWs (BBC, AFP) US carries out air strikes against suspected terrorist facilities in Sudan (TNS, PI) Eritrea bombards Sudanese town in border clash (AP, Xinh) Raids-ANC/Renamo-SLPD/NYT General Strike--NYT/Jessup Pales. War--NYT Huleh Drainage--NYT Deter Isr.--Keesings/LTms Retal Raid-Khouri/NYT/FoF Tur-Syr-FoF/Ks/Ptran/MPD/NYT UAR Merger-NYT/Jessup Attack Villages-Khouri/NYT Water/Fatah/Galilee-Khouri/NYT Six Day War-Khouri/Moore/Kees. Arab Command-NYT/FoF/Ks/Jessup Golan Clashes--Jessup/Fof PLO Conflict--NYT/Keesings Anti-Guer/Golan-Jessp/NYT/Kees Transport Mor. Troops--Kaplan 1973 War--Whetten 1973 War--Whetten 1973 War--Whetten 1973 War-Whetten/Kaplan 1973 War--Monroe-Hockley 1973 War-Whetten/NYT/Kees/FoF SAM Missiles--FoF/Kees/NYT Israeli air raid on Syria (Int'l Herald, FT, AP) Taiwan Str.-Jessup/NYT/Kees Tai. Str./Islands-Disp82/Kees Tai.Str./Qmoy-Disp82/Keesings Spratly Is.--NYT
1966 1972 1972 1973 1978 1979 1995 1946 1953 1962 1962 1962 1962
1967 1972 1973 1973 1978 1979 1996 1946 1953 1962 1962 1962 1962
Incursions--ARB Bomb/Rebel Incurs--ARB Attack Frelimo-ARB/ACR/LTms/AR Border Raids--ACR/ARB/NYT Incurs/Annex-NYT/ARB/ACR/A/H/S Ug. War Bombing-NYT Burundi pursues Hutu rebels into Tanzania (IPS, AFP, Xinh) Lao Rebel-Adams/Champassak KMT Suppression--NYT Border Deterrence--NYT Border Deterrence--NYT Border Deterrence--NYT Deter Lao Crossing--FoF
57
USA MALI LAOS CAMBODIA MALI CAMBODIA VIETNAM LAOS LAOS MYANMAR MYANMAR MYANMAR FRANCE FRANCE USA IRAQ IRAQ IRAQ DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO SUDAN LIBYA LIBYA KENYA DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO SUDAN BELGIUM DENMARK NORWAY INDONESIA EGYPT YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC IRAN ARGENTINA ARGENTINA COLOMBIA UKG UKG EGYPT UKG UKG RUSIA SYRIA
THAILAND THAILAND THAILAND THAILAND THAILAND THAILAND THAILAND THAILAND THAILAND THAILAND THAILAND THAILAND TUNISIA TUNISIA TURKEY TURKEY TURKEY TURKEY UGANDA UGANDA UGANDA UGANDA UGANDA UGANDA UGANDA UKG UKG UKG UKG UKG UKG UKG UKG UKG UKG VENEZUELA YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC
1966 1969 1975 1976 1977 1980 1980 1980 1985 1992
1976 1976 1978 1978 1981 1980 1987 1982 1988 1993
1999 1999
2005 1956 1961 1957 1962 1965 1974 1965
2005 1960 1962 1957 1962 1965 1974 1965
Counter-Insurg.--NYT Joint Counter-Ins--Jessup/NYT River/Border--NYT/Keesings Border Attacks--Keesings/NYT Joint C-Insur--NYT/Kees./FoF Counter-Insurg.--Keesings Counter-Insurg-WSJ/FoF/NYT Mekong Disp-Disp 87/Keesings Border Disp.--NYT/Disputes 87 Myanmar troops seize Karen rebel camp and maintain presence in Thai territory (NYT, Xinh) Myanmar fires on Thai ship in territorial dispute on Andaman sea (Bernama, Xinh) Burmese troops cross into Thailand (BBC) Alg/Guer-NYT/Jessp/Butterw/Ks Alg/Bzrte-Jesp/Ks/NYT/Btrw/AfD Syr-Tur Disp-NYT/FoF Kurdish Reb.-Kees/FoF/NYT Kurdish War--NYT Kurdish Reb.--FoF Anti-Tshombe Reb-AR/NYT/FoF
1965 1972 1979 1989 1996
1971 1972 1979 1989 1996
1998 1946 1946 1947 1963 1963 1963
1998 1949 1949 1949 1963 1964 1964
Pursue Rebels-Butterworth/ARB Support Amin--ARB/Jessup Oppose Tanz.--NYT/A/H Kenyan troops fire into Uganda (BBC, Bercovtich) Zaire engages in cross border raids against Uganda (AP) Sudanese air raid in Uganda (AFP) Join German Occup.--NYT Join German Occup.--NYT Join German Occup.--NYT Sarawak Raids--James & Small Yem War/Aden-NYT/MEJ/Ks/Bdb/Wn Border War-NYT/Jessp/MEJ/Ks
1965 1965 Border Firing--NYT
1971 1976 1982 1987 1954
1971 1976 1982 1987 1954
Occupy Gulf Is.--Disp.82 Chase UK Ship-FoF/LTimes/R&E Falklands--Disputes 82 Coastal Dispute--NYT UK-Aden--NYT
1958 1959 UK-Aden--NYT/Keesings
1962 1967 Yem War/Butterw/Badeeb/Wenner
1963 1965 Retal Aden-Yem-NYT/Jesp/MEJ/Ks
1966 1966 Aden/Attack Village--MEJ
1967 1968 Yem. Civil War-Kaplan
1968 1968 Yem Repl. Soviets--Kaplan
58
YEMEN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC YEMEN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC YEMEN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC SAUDI ARABIA SAUDI ARABIA ERITREA SAUDI ARABIA SAUDI ARABIA YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC OMAN YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC CUBA UKG PORTUGAL SOUTH AFRICA ZIMBABWE SOUTH AFRICA SOUTH AFRICA SOUTH AFRICA ANGOLA SOUTH AFRICA SOUTH AFRICA
YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC YEMEN YEMEN YEMEN YEMEN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC YEMEN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC YEMEN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC YEMEN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC YEMEN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC ZAMBIA ZAMBIA ZAMBIA ZAMBIA ZAMBIA ZAMBIA ZAMBIA ZAMBIA ZIMBABWE ZIMBABWE
1968 1970 Yem. Civil War--NYT/Jessup
1972 1972 Rebels-Jesp/NYT/Btrw/FoF/Kees
1979 1979 Yem Invas-NYT/Jessp/Ec/Kees
1980 1980 Border & N-S Merger-NYT/Disp87
1994 1995 1995 1998 1998 1998 1969 1970
Saudi Arabia clashes over southern provinces being claimed by Yemen (UPI, AFP, Reuters) Eritrea captures Hanish island after conflict with Yemen (AFP) Saudi Arabia occupies Yemeni territory in dispute (AP, AFP) S.Y.War & Territ-NYT/Jessp/Fof
1972 1972 Rebel Disp.-Jessp/FoF/Keesings
1972 1975 Dhofar Rebel.-Jessp/Keesings
1979 1979 Yem Invas-NYT/Jessp/Keesings
1976 Dhofar Reb.-Peterson/Keesings
1965 1966 1976 1977 1981 1986 1987 2000
1966 1972 1980 1980 1982 1986 1987 2000
1985 1985 1986 1986
Protect from Rhod-- FoF/NYT Ang/MozRebel-Ptman/NYT/ARB/ACR Invade W. Zam.-SLPD/ARB Anti-Rebel-NYT/ACR/ARB/AR/Kees Anti-SWAPO--ACR Bomb Lusaka-SLPD/NYT/FoF/ARB Anti-ANC/Zam.-NYT/FAf Angolan troops fire on Zambian troops patrolling and violate Zambian airspace in pursuit of rebels (Allafrica, BBC) Raid ANC--SLPD Punitive Raid--NYT
59

SA Bader, E Ianchovichina

File: polarization-foreign-military-intervention-and-civil-conflict.pdf
Title: working paper 93-1
Author: SA Bader, E Ianchovichina
Author: estelle
Published: Tue Dec 5 11:33:02 2017
Pages: 60
File size: 1.27 Mb


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