The Four Types of Non-Western Thought, PHJ Pietersen

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Content: The Four Types of Non-Western Thought Herman Johan Pietersen
The Four Types of Non-Western Thought by Herman Johan Pietersen 2015
Copyright © KR Publishing and Herman Johan Pietersen All reasonable steps have been taken to ensure that the contents of this book do not, directly or indirectly, infringe any existing copyright of any third person and, further, that all quotations or extracts taken from any other publication or work have been appropriately acknowledged and referenced. The publisher, editors and printers take no responsibility for any copyright infringement committed by an author of this work. Copyright subsists in this work. No part of this work may be reproduced in any form or by any means without the written consent of the publisher or the author. While the publisher, editors and printers have taken all reasonable steps to ensure the accuracy of the contents of this work, they take no responsibility for any loss or damage suffered by any person as a result of that person relying on the information contained in this work. First published in 2015 Ebook pubished in 2016 eISBN: 978-1-86922-612-1 (PDF eBook) Published by KR Publishing P O Box 3954 Randburg 2125 Republic of South Africa Tel: (011) 706-6009 Fax: (011) 706-1127 E-mail: [email protected] Website: www.kr.co.za Self published by: Herman Johan Pietersen Ebook project management: Cia Joubert, [email protected] cover image: © Shawnhemp | Dreamstime.com, http://www.dreamstime.com/stock- photos-holy-bible-image17746083#res428214"
To all explorers of antinomies
The Four Types in Non-Western Thought
Chapter 1. Fundamental approaches in human thought 1
1.1 Introduction
1
1.2 Ancient bifurcations
2
1.3 Modern thought
4
1.4 An integrated proposal
6
1.5 A spectrum of Non-Western philosophies
10
1.6 Concluding remarks
10
Chapter 2. Speculative Non-Western thought (I)
13
2.1 Indian (Vedanta)
13
2.2 Chinese (Yin-Yang)
16
2.3 Islamic
17
2.3.1 Al-Kindi
17
2.3.2 Al-Farabi
19
2.4 Jewish (Gabirol)
21
2.5 African (Metaphysics)
25
Chapter 3. Scientific Non-Western thought (II)
29
3.1 Indian
29
3.1.1 Nyaya
29
3.1.2 Vaisesika
29
3.2 Chinese
31
3.2.1 Mohism
31
3.2.2 The Logicians
33
3.2.3 The Legalists
33
3.3 Islamic
34
3.3.1 Ibn Sina
34
3.3.2 Ibn Rushd
36
3.4 Jewish (Maimonides)
38
3.5 African (Professional)
41
Chapter 4. Narrative Non-Western thought (III)
43
4.1 Indian (Mimamsa)
43
iii
4.2 Chinese
44
4.2.1 Daoism
44
4.2.2 Zhuangzi
45
4.3 Islamic (Al-Ghazali)
46
4.4 Jewish (Halevi)
48
4.5 African (Ethno-philosophy)
53
Chapter 5. Pragmatic Non-Western thought (IV)
55
5.1 Indian (Patanjali Yoga)
55
5.2 Chinese
57
5.2.1 Confucius
57
5.2.2 Mencius
58
5.3 Islamic
59
5.3.1 Al-Farabi
59
5.3.2 Al-Ghazali
61
5.4 Jewish (Pakuda)
61
5.5 African (Nationalist)
66
Chapter 6. Review of Non-Western thought
69
6.1 Type I thought
69
6.2 Type II thought
70
6.3 Type III thought
71
6.4 Type IV thought
71
6.5 Concluding comment
72
References
73
Bibliography
87
iv
PREFACE The present work brings together the author's previous writing on fundamental approaches in Non-Western (Eastern, Jewish and African) thought. For this purpose the existing material were subjected to minor revision and re-arranged according to each of four main types of human thought. A new chapter was written to provide a concluding review of the contents of the book. The overall project started out as an experiment, a philosophical hypothesis, and repeatedly received clear evidentiary support across a global range of knowledge disciplines, traditions and thinkers in the history of thought. I thank our Creator for the life given to me, to continue to pursue my dream ­ even though in the end we merely `see through a glass darkly.' The search for fundamentals has been a most meaningful and worthwhile part of my life - something which words can never fully express. I am deeply grateful and can only hope that the work will be of value to readers interested in the topic. Herman Johan Pietersen Haenertsburg South Africa [email protected] v
CHAPTER 1 FUNDAMENTAL APPROACHES IN HUMAN THOUGHT 1.1 Introduction The history of thought shows a continuous and unfolding succession of competing ideas and theories concerning, especially, the nature of the true, the real and the good. The struggle between different ideas and systems of thought arose from the very beginning. This is evidenced in, for instance, Heraclitus' rejection of the Pythagorean obsession with number and Plato's opposition to the Ionian pre-occupation with matter. Today, human thought is characterised by many conceptualisations that seems to defy any meaningful overall view. Many different approaches to the nature of truth and reality have emerged over time, for example: rationalism, positivism, realism, nominalism, humanism, utilitarianism, empiricism, pragmatism, behaviourism, naturalism, existentialism, and postmodernism. The question is how to make sense of it all? In striving to find answers to this question, it became clear that the issues the ancients grappled with still provide an important starting point for understanding the nature of the problem. A consideration of different intellectual emphases that continually surface in the history of thought, starting with the Greeks, led to the insight, namely, that a number of axiomatic and interrelated orientations towards knowledge of the world and of human beings underlie and shape the human intellect in its endeavours. Taken together, these dispositions emanate from the same source, namely, the human being. As the body cannot rid 1
itself of its shadow, so human thought cannot be rid of - but is embedded in - prototypical ways of `looking' at and experiencing the world. The current endeavour is a project in meta-theory application, and will focus on a range of prominent philosophical thinkers and approaches. 1.2 Ancient bifurcations It was a major event in the history of humanity when the ancients moved away from being in a state of dependency on powerful forces around them, which they could not fathom and were in awe of, to the awakening of reason. For Plato all things were confounded together until reason gave order. This provided the spark that triggered independent thinking, away from blindly obeying social custom and the gods of tradition. The Greek quest for natural origins changed in about 600 BCE from seeking answers to the question who is the cause of everything (for which the Olympic pantheon, under the leadership of Zeus, typically was the source of explanation), to the question what non-personal, primary force or principle is `behind' or 'in' nature and existence. Cornford 1 describes two traditions, the `scientific' and `mystical' modes of thought, which existed in Greek religion and which influenced the development of Greek philosophy. In Homer's mythological thought (at about 800 BCE) it was still the rule by impersonal force of destiny or fate (Moira), in which everything was assigned to its allotted position or province. Eventually, the family of Olympian gods became the dominant source of answers, but, in turn, had to make room for Reason - the rule by impersonal necessity of law 2
and principle. As the historical record shows, the occurrence
of swings between subjectifying (personal) and objectifying
(impersonal) orientations of mind is an early phenomenon in
human thought.
Basic intellectual differences appear in mythology in the
kind of powers and functions ascribed to, especially, the
Greek gods Apollo and Dionysus. 2, 3 Apollo and Dionysus
were depicted as very different type of Gods, with the
exception that the ancients attributed powers of music, poetry
and the arts to both of them. Figure 1.1 illustrates some of
the contrasts.
Figure 1.1: Apollo and Dionysus as paradigmatic opposites
Apollo
Dionysus
God of temple at Delphi
God of temple at Delphi
Ruled by reason
Ruled by emotions and will
Intellectual, spiritual
Freedom and equality
Purity, radiance, and light
Excitement of life and
growth
Self-restraint and discipline Self-indulgence and passion
God of intellect
God of senses
The conflicting elements in the characterization of these two major deities of the ancient Greek world points to a root distinction in human thought. Apollo is depicted as the aloof deity, the impersonal God of reason, principle and a hierarchical order that is superior to and above desires of the flesh. Dionysus shows just the opposite qualities: of rule by the passions and will; of an unbridled celebration of the senses and of the drive toward equality and Freedom of expression.
3
In the profiles of these mythical figures, the central distinction between the impersonal and personal in human thought emerges. Overall, Greek religion maintained the dominance of Apollo (the God of law and order) over the urges of the Dionysian in human nature, and of the rule of the intellect over the senses. Yet, there was an intuitive understanding that society had to accommodate both forces, in order to avoid the tendency toward excess of each mode of being, if left unopposed. In the course of history, and despite continuing efforts by the rational mind to subdue it, the Dionysian side of human nature kept surfacing. From orgiastic festivals in ancient Greece, to modern rock concerts, of which Woodstock (in 1969) is perhaps the iconic 20th century example; from the temperamental and unruly steed (representing the passions) in Plato's parable of the charioteer, to Freud's modern `unveiling' of the unconscious Id with its sexual libido - the Dionysian drive refuses to be suppressed. 1.3 Modern thought The scholarly literature of modern times shows that bifurcated thought continues unabated. Kant, for instance, aimed to provide a grand metaphysics of mind, yet he also acknowledged the presence of different orientations in the history of thought. At the end of his main work 4 he provides his own taxonomy that reflects basic divisions in human thought. He distinguishes between `intellectualists' and `noцlogists' (Plato, Leibnitz) on the one hand and `sensualists' and `empiricists' (Epicurus, Aristotle, Locke) on the other. According to Kant, 4
the former strives to find truth and certainty in `Reason,' the latter in `Experience' and `sensuous objects.' Kant desired to enthrone Reason by giving the world a comprehensive system of rational, `pure,' concepts of mind a master methodology of Reason that would: "...bring Reason to perfect contentment..." 5 On the other side of the divide, and during the same period, the poet-philosopher, Friedrich Schiller, eloquently described the destructive effects of a one-sided, rationalscientific approach to life. In Schiller the Dionysian resentment against the soul-destroying characteristic of an impersonal and mechanistic way of thought and life rises to the surface: "Like the analytical chemist, the philosopher can only discover how things are combined by analyzing them, only lay bare the workings of spontaneous Nature by subjecting them to the torment of his own techniques...?" 6 His approach is a clear reflection of the romantic (Dionysian) protest and reaction against an impersonal (Apollonian) objectification of nature and human existence. In the 20th century, the political philosopher Isaiah Berlin 7 distinguishes between `formal' and `empirical' categories of thought in relation to human values and ethics. He echoes Schiller's distinction between `sensuous' and `formal' drives; Kant's `sensualists' and `intellectualists' and, prototypically, Plato's account (in the Sophist), of the everlasting battle between the Giants (the `friends of matter') and the Gods of intellect (the `friends of form'). For Bernstein 8 it is a struggle between "objectivism" and "relativism"; between the basic conviction of the existence of some permanent, a-historical truth or knowledge framework and the equally basic view that all such thinking is relative to 5
the varied and changing nature of specific social and cultural contexts.
1.4 An integrated proposal
The various intellectual tendencies, outlined in the previous
section, reflect different aspects or elements of what, at first
sight, seems to be two major streams in the history of
thought. This is conveniently summarized in Figure 1.2.
Figure 1.2: Some contrasts in human thought
Source
#1
#2
Mythology Apollo:
Dionysus:
(Greek)
God of Intellect
God of Senses
Impersonal (Logos) Personal (Mythos)
Order (hierarchy) Freedom (equality)
Plato
Gods (form)
Giants (matter)
Cornford Scientific tradition Mystical tradition
Kant
Intellectualists
Sensualists (Aristotle;
(Plato; Leibniz)
Epicurus)
Schiller
Faculty of Intellect Faculty of Feeling
Berlin
Monists
Pluralists
(hedgehogs)
(foxes)
Utopianism
Romanticism
Snow
Scientific culture Literary culture
However, the list is potentially confusing if it is not borne in mind that these classifications were generated by thinkers and traditions of thought who themselves regarded the world in different ways. They wore different `spectacles,' and therefore adopted different approaches to truth and reality. Kant, for instance, is the analytic philosopher who favoured science and a universally applicable logic of mind. 6
Schiller, his contemporary, is the poet-philosopher who anguished in moving and expressive language about the destructive effect of an impersonal Kantian world of scientific thought, with its `cold' logic, on the human spirit and well-being. The various elements may be reduced to a number of core elements of thought, namely, the: Impersonal (I ­ It) vs Personal (I ­ Thou) Reason (ratio; logic) vs Meaning (will, feeling) Form (abstract ideas) vs Matter (things/senses) At the heart of these descriptions is the most fundamental distinction of all, namely, what the ancients referred to as the One and the Many - in its modern guise known as `monism' and `pluralism.' This was regarded as an axiomatic and very old truth already in the times of Socrates. In Plato's Philebus, Socrates enlightens his conversational partner (Philebus) about the origin of this piece of wisdom, which the ancient oral tradition passed on in the Greek world, describing it as a divine gift from the gods. 9 From the above discussion, two intersecting kinds of polarities may be derived, namely between Objectivist (Apollonian) and Subjectivist (Dionysian) thought and between Empyrean (Plato's `Gods'; the super-sensible) and Empiricist thought (Plato's `Giants'; matter). With reference to the Objectivist-Subjectivist distinction there are, on the one hand, those thinkers and schools of thought that prefer the truths arrived at by the workings of an impersonal, calculating, mind or intellect (in answer to the root question: `what is this?'). This is exemplified by Plato's episteme and known bias toward the immutable truths of logic and mathematics. On the other, are the truths grounded in 7
values, will, and feeling, and in a personal and social context; largely in response to the other enduring question, namely: `how should we live?' The Empyrean-Empiricist distinction, in turn, refers to two basic approaches to the perennial ontological question, namely, `what is the nature of reality?' Throughout the history of thought, even before Plato's formulation almost two and a half millennia ago, answers to this question were given by two different and enduring intellectual camps: the `friends of matter' (Ionian materialism) and the `friends of form' (Pythagorean idealism ). The one group, the giants, exemplified by the Greek Atomists, forever harks to the empirical truths of matter, the sensible, so-called hard facts of nature. The other group, the gods, is forever drawn to the transcendent and metaphysical truths of forms, laws, and principles ­ to an invisible and super-sensible world beyond the human sensory apparatus. Concerning the distinction between empyrean and empiricist approaches, a modern historian of philosophy aptly summarises it: "...whereas for Plato the best thought was freed from sense experience altogether, for Aristotle it remained rooted in sense experience." 11 The classic Western exemplars of objectivist thought are: Plato, the empyrean theorist (conveniently designated as Type I) and the quintessential empiricist thinker, Aristotle (Type II). Types III and IV are best represented in Greek thought by, respectively, Protagoras and the poetic-expressive, subjectivist approach of Sophism, in general, and Plato, as social theorist and reformer. It is important to note that the proposed scheme of basic orientations of mind does not imply that one particular 8
approach is necessarily `better' or `worse' than the other. They
should rather be seen as distinctive modalities or forces of
mind.
For each modality a cluster of typical descriptors has been
identified, as shown in Figure 1.3.
Although variations occur in the extent to which all
elements of each cluster apply to an individual or community
of thinkers and scholars, they are useful in characterizing the
different paradigms of thought. Collectively they do provide,
for each type, a more or less coherent meta-theoretical
profile. A more detailed discussion of the four paradigms of
human thought is provided elsewhere. 12, 13
Figure 1.3: The four modalities of mind
ARISTOTLE: Scientific Question: What is this? Impersonal Description of life/world Reason (rationality) Systematic-analytical Detailed explanation
PLATO: Metaphysical Question: What is behind? Impersonal Essentials of life/world. Reason (rationality) Theoretical-integrative Broad understanding
PROTAGORAS: Narrative Question: What is the story? Personal To praise, tell inspiring stories OR to criticize, tell sad stories, Emphasizes values (humanism) Personal-engaged / experiential Poetic-particular and critical
PLATO: Pragmatic Question: What to do? Personal To change, renew, life/world according to valued ideals Emphasizes values (humanism) Communal-engaged/ ideological Advocacy-general and reformist
9
1.5 A spectrum of Non-Western philosophies
The present work outlines various Non-Western philosophies
as examples of the four main types of modalities of mind.
The selection is shown in Figure 1.4 below.
Fig. 1.4: A spectrum of Non-Western philosophies
TYPE II MODALITY
TYPE I MODALITY
Indian (Nyaya-Vaisesika)
Indian (Vedanta)
Chinese (Mohism/Legalism) Chinese (Yin-Yang)
Islamic (IbnSina/Ibn Rushd) Islamic (Al-Kindi/Al-Farabi)
Jewish (Maimonides)
Jewish (Gabirol)
African (Professional)
African (Metaphysics)
TYPE III MODALITY Indian (Mimamsa) Chinese (Daoism/Zhuangzi) Islamic (Al-Ghazali) Jewish (Halevi) African (Ethno-philosophy)
TYPE IV MODALITY Indian (Patanjali Yoga) Chinese (Confucius/Mencius) Islamic (AlFarabi/Al-Ghazali) Jewish (Pakuda) African (Nationalist)
Chapter two discusses various empyrean philosophies; chapter three attend to scientific (realist) philosophies; chapter four narrative-interpretive approaches, and chapter five addresses pragmatic thought. Finally, chapter six briefly reviews the four types of Non-Western philosophy. 1.6 Concluding remarks There is much, though uncoordinated, evidence in the history of thought of the existence of archetypal orientations of the mind. The theory that is briefly presented in the present 10
chapter proposes an encompassing perspective on the nature and dynamics of these enduring inclinations of the mind. 11
CHAPTER 2 SPECULATIVE NON-WESTERN THOUGHT (I) 2.1 Indian (Vedanta) The Vedanta school of orthodox Hinduism is concerned with `ultimate knowledge,' and has as its main source the most speculative part, namely the Upanishads, of the Hindu Holy scripture, known as the Vedas (Veda means `knowledge'). Whereas other schools of orthodox Hinduism, notably the Mimamsa, interpret the Vedas as requiring rituals of faith, and acts of personal devotion and sacrifice, which is more characteristic of the type III modality of mind, Vedanta thinkers are concerned with the deeper truths and knowledge of the Vedas. This is to be obtained through lifelong study and meditation. The chief principle of Vedanta is the existence of one absolute reality named Brahman ­ the supreme, transcendent Spirit and Ultimate Reality, which is the divine ground of all being. Following Dasgupta, 1 and in relation to the objectivistempyrean modality of mind, core elements of the Vedanta philosophy of Sankara may be noted. It is, firstly, the most metaphysical school of orthodox Hinduism, favoured by those believers with a more macroscopic, philosophical inclination, who rely more heavily on the Upanishads. It refers to a process of thought (`pramana' in Sanskrit) that aims to achieve `right knowledge' (`prama') of the world-soul (Brahman) which is at the centre of the souls (Atman or `self') of individual believers. There is, secondly, no separately existing knower or perceiver but only `knowledge-moments' which are simultaneously knowledge, the knower and the known. Any distinction between knower and known is regarded as mere 13
illusion. It is, as Dasgupta describes it: "...a thoroughgoing idealism [that] brushes off all references to an objective field of experience." 2 Thirdly, Vedanta regards the Upanishads, the most philosophical of Vedic texts, as meant only for the wise those that are able to control the senses and who are: "...disinclined to all earthly joys" 3 - and not to the ordinary mass of Hindu believers. It follows the Upanishads in accepting that the world as it appears is mere magic or illusion (maya) - the only real is the Atman-Brahman (literally: `Self-God'). This is not the separate, unique soul of each individual as in the Christian West, but a collective, pure, world-soul that is to be found at the inner core (the Atman) of each individual person, and which the enlightened believer strives to attain to. It is the ultimate truth that is: "...pure self as pure being, pure intelligence and pure bliss." 4 Vedanta seeks the ultimate truth beneath all appearance of `physical or mental events.' It shows a remarkable similarity to the Platonic notion of a super-sensible reality, except that Plato's ultimate reality is the pure, rational-mathematical hierarchy of forms and of the Good, whilst with Vedanta the ultimate truth is the pure, cosmic Self, beyond a worldly subject and object - hence, the union of Atman and Brahman. It is against all empiricist notions of truth and reality and almost exclusively concerned with purity (a common element in objectivist-empyrean thought), to the extent that, as Dasgupta formulates it: "Unless the mind is chastened and purged of all passions and desires, the soul cannot comprehend this truth." 5 Consistent with the teachings of the Upanishads, Vedanta thinkers believe that there is no `many' anywhere but that 14
truth and reality is One, a state of highest salvation to be attained and which occurs when the human becomes: "...divested of all world-consciousness, or consciousness of himself...and thus reduced to his original purity..." 6 Vedanta is antagonistic towards the Nyaya/Vaisesika (type II) school of Hinduism, and its ideas about physical causation and atomism, yet much more accepting of the Yoga school (type IV) and its methods of self-purification and meditation. This is consistent with the premises of the meta-theory presented in chapter one, specifically proposition four. The Vedanta system of ethics 7 requires the believer to engage in a series of steps and perform a number of duties before he/she can come into possession of the so-called four virtues, which is necessary before one can be properly instructed in the Vedas. Some of these duties, which, in the nature of Vedanta thought, aim at progressive selfpurification, are: studying the Vedas through proper methods; performing various religious (for example daily prayers) and social duties (for example the birth ceremony of a son); avoiding all action motivated by selfish desire; avoiding prohibited action (for example murder). The ethical virtues of the Vedanta school of Hinduism are as follows: (a) Knowledge of what is eternal and what is transient; (b) Disinclination to enjoyments of this life and of the heavenly life after death; (c) Extreme distaste for all enjoyments, and anxiety for attaining the means of right knowledge; (d) Control over the senses (e.g., extreme temperatures); (e) Strong desire to attain salvation. 8 15
2.2 Chinese (Yin-Yang) At the centre of Chinese metaphysics are the concepts of Change and Harmony. Whereas Hindu thought is more purely metaphysical, and concerned with an impersonal and transcendent cosmic power or world-soul, Chinese cosmology is rooted in the concept of dynamic and fundamental forces in nature that relate Heaven, Earth and Humans with one another, in a harmonious way. Again, Hindu metaphysics (Vedanta) is essentially concerned with withdrawal from all earthly things by way of a mystical knowledge through deep meditation, in order to escape Karma (endless cycles of reincarnation) and become one with the perfection of the `Ultimate Reality' (Brahman). Chinese philosophy, on the other hand, is primarily aimed at understanding how humans can live in harmony with the dynamic, reciprocal, forces of nature, which it describes in the poetical-narrative (type III) manner characteristic of Chinese thought generally. A brief sketch of Chinese metaphysics is provided, following A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy by Wing-Tsit Chan. 9 The Yin Yang concept, the origin of which is unknown and goes back to antiquity, holds that everything is the product of two principles or forces: yang (the positive, active, strong and constructive) and yin (the negative, passive, weak and destructive). Together with the Yin Yang theory, another theory, the so-called Five Agents or Elements (namely metal, wood, water, fire and earth) comprise Chinese cosmology. 10 The emphasis in the combined Yin Yang and Five elements theory is on dynamic (not static, mathematical) principles 11 16
and laws of the universe that: "...may be regarded as early Chinese attempts in the direction of working out a metaphysics and a cosmology." 12 The Yin Yang doctrine emphasizes the unity and interrelatedness of nature and humans and is central to Chinese thought and its outlook on life: "...it has reinforced the doctrine of the Mean common to Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism." 13 It serves as cosmological foundation for Chinese ethics and social doctrines as well as the Book of Changes (I Ching or Yijing), that Ng describes as: "...an ingenious and elaborate bricolage of cosmic imaginings and ethico-moral musings, [which] has through the ages in the Chinese world of thinking been viewed as the Ur-classic, the fount of ancient wisdom that promises to enlighten and illuminate our understanding of the workings of the universe." 14 2.3 Islamic 2.3.1 Al-Kindi Islamic philosophy consists of a combination of ideas, with its origins mainly in Socratic and Hellenic philosophy; in Neo-Platonism (with the doctrine of celestial hierarchies by Plotinus, who in turn was influenced by the Gnostics) and in the early Mutazilite movement with its preference for rational interpretations of the Quran. History shows that contrary to developments in the West which led to the dominance of science, the Islamic world was, early on, more inclined towards the truths of faith and Quranic revelation. In retrospect, it is surely one of those momentous historical turns that the eventual triumph of Reason and 17
science in the West were strongly influenced by the intellectual labours and re-introduction to Europe of the Greek classics by thinkers such as Ibn Sina and Ibn Rushd, known, respectively, in Latinized Medieval Europe, as Avicenna and Averroes. In the present section the metaphysics of Al-Kindi and Al-Farabi will briefly be discussed. Al-Kindi (801 ­ 873 CE) is regarded as the founding philosopher of Islam, and as reviews 15, 16 of his ideas indicate, more oriented toward transcendent truths, utilizing the logic of mathematical reasoning and a Neo-Platonic hierarchy of other-worldly forces and entities. He essentially sought to combine Plato and Aristotle in Neo-Platonic fashion. 17 For Al-Kindi Spirit or Mind is the highest reality, substituting Aristotle's Unmoved Mover with the Creator Spirit, 18 and placing the Soul - which generates the various spheres - in a middle position between the Spirit of God and the material world. The human soul emanates from the Soul of the world and, though united with the body, is spiritually independent from it. 19 The highest level, the Spirit, is divided into: God the real Cause and Essence of all; Spirit as reasoning capacity or potentiality of the Soul; Habit or actual possession of the soul; and, lastly, Activity: "...by which a reality within the soul may be carried over to the reality that is without - [which is] the act of Man himself." 20 Al-Kindi has conflicting views concerning the relationship between philosophy and religion, stating at one point that: "...theology is part of philosophy" 21 and at another time that: "...theology occupies a higher rank than philosophy." 22 18
Nevertheless, in the early Islamic world Al-Kindi was the first to conceive God in terms of reason and logic, as the transcendent One, the true efficient cause of everything ­ without form, substance or quality, 23 the One who: "...acts and is never acted upon." 24 Similar to Plato, Al-Kindi divides the soul into the faculties of the rational, the irascible and the appetitive, and indicates his empyrean preference: "He who gets away from the pleasures of the body and lives most of his life in contemplation to attain to the reality of things, is the good man who is very similar to the Creator." 25 2.3.2 Al-Farabi Another major Islamic philosopher with a predominantly metaphysical tendency is Al-Farabi, who is seen as the culmination of the logical and metaphysical efforts of AlKindi and others. 26 Al-Farabi (870 ­ 950 CE) was not interested in the sciences, such as medicine and geography, but preferred to focus on creating a top-down, logical system of thought. His aim was a comprehensive metaphysics that attempted to provide a best possible synthesis of the theories of Plato and Aristotle, within the Islamic context. Al-Farabi 27, 28, 29 favours the empyrean (type I) modality of mind, accusing the religious `dialecticians' (type III mode) of making logically untested statements, and rejects the so-called `natural philosophers' (type II mode) because they are: "...occupying themselves merely with the effect of things, and thus never getting beyond the contrasts of worldly phenomena by attaining to a unified conception of the All." 30 19
Typical of objectivist thinkers in the Platonic tradition, AlFarabi has a low opinion of poetry, relegating it, as Figure 2.2 shows, to the bottom of the ladder of truth. He goes so far as to regard it as nothing more than: "...a lying and immoral absurdity." 31 As objectivist thinker Al-Farabi does not accept the primacy of will and feeling, arguing, contrary to Al-Ghazali, who lived about a hundred years later, that: "The cause of all things is not the will of an almighty Creator, but the knowledge of the Necessary." 32 His metaphysical hierarchy focuses primarily on incorporeal entities and forces at various levels, in descending order, though it includes a number of material bodies such humans, plants and minerals. For AlFarabi, this logical order of the world is at the same time a moral order. 33 Al-Farabi's theory of various `intelligences' (see Figure 2.1) reflects its Platonic (empyrean) inclination, with demonstrative reasoning at the top and poetry relegated to the bottom of the hierarchy. 34 His ethical thought is ruled by the dictates of pure reason, and he is said to have frequently asserted that: "...Reason decides whether a thing is good or evil." 35 Although philosophical reasoning is important for understanding the ultimate nature of human happiness, it is necessary to attend to `deliberative' as well as moral virtues and the `practical arts.' 36 20
Figure 2.1: Al-Farabi's levels of reasoning
TYPE OF:
LEADS TO:
USED BY:
HIGHEST
Demonstrative Certainty
Philosophers
Scholars
Dialectical Sophistical Rhetorical Poetical
Semblance of certitude through good intention Semblance of certitude through bad/false intention Probable opinion Imagery giving pleasure/pain to the soul LOWEST
Theologians Politicians Poets
Al-Farabi insisted that moral virtue be regarded as subordinate to the need for political rulers to first acquire a philosophical understanding. However, his writing shows a general neglect of the particulars of ethics, such as moral habits and character traits, on which he hardly wrote anything. 37 2.4 Jewish (Gabirol) Ibn Gabirol (1021 ­ 1070 CE) is known, and his Fons Vitae (Fountain of Life) 38 attests to it, as a clear example of NeoPlatonism in Mediaeval Jewish thought.
21
The book is concerned with `wisdom as the source of life' and develops a long series of syllogisms and arguments to prove the existence and unity of the `First Essence.' 39 It is a speculative work (which refers to only one other author, Plato) that is presented by its author as being about the root of wisdom, to be elaborated through a series of steps from a knowledge of matter and form through knowledge of the will, to the science of the First Essence. Wisdom is: "...to know the First Essence...The cause of all things is the Prime Essence and Will is the medium between it and all these hylomorphically constituted things..." 40 Figure 2.2 shows the structure and elements of Gabirol's Neo-Platonic system. Figure 2.2: Gabirol's universal substance FIRST ESSENCE (GOD) Universal Intelligence
Will of God
Souls Nature
Elements
Earth
Fire
Water
Air
Corporeal things of experience
22
The Fons Vitae is presented in the form of a dialogue between Master (Gabirol) and pupil and consists almost entirely of a series of syllogistic demonstrations. The Master declares at the outset that the purpose of the book is to provide: "'...proof of the existence of simple substances' and that the Pupil should closely follow the reasoning because it uses the `rules of logic.'" 41 Everything outside of the creator (the First Essence, that is true unity) consists of varying combinations of matter and form (the `universal substance'), with simple (pure) substance being superior to compound substance, in a descending series down to the (least pure) corporeal things of experience. The principle involved is that the more a substance descends the more multiple (hence, less pure) it becomes. On the other hand: "...the more it ascends, the more unified it becomes..." 42 The following short extract from the Fons Vitae shows, by way of example, how Gabirol went about `proving' the existence and unity of the First Author or First Essence as `simple substance.' As one may readily observe and Husik unabashedly states: "One has to wade through pages upon pages of bare syllogisms, one more flimsy than another." 43 An example follows: "If the simple substance is below the compound substance, then the simple substance is created by the compound substance. But the compound substance is created by the simple substance. Therefore the simple substance is not below the compound substance. And since it is not below it, it must necessarily be above it. Hence the following syllogism: A simple substance is above a compound substance. Now the substance 23
that supports the categories is compound. Therefore a simple substance is above a substance that supports the categories." 44 Mediaeval Europe and the Christian Scholastics were not aware that Gabirol (known as Avicebron by the Latins) was a Jew, but made him their own. His basic thesis (of a hylomorphic, universal substance underlying all experience): "...was made a bone of contention between the two dominant schools; the Dominicans, led by Thomas Aquinas, opposing this un-Aristotelian principle, the Franciscans with Duns Scotus at their head, adopting it as their own." 45 Further characteristics of Gabirol's philosophy may be highlighted as follows: 1. He is a monist (Platonist) who identified matter ultimately, with God; 46 2. Like Plotinus he: "...conceives of the universe as a process of a gradually descending series of existences or worlds..."; 47 3. "Man as a microcosm, a universe in little, partakes of both the corporeal and intermediate worlds, and hence may serve as a model of the constitution of the macrocosm, or great universe."; 48 4. Not only material objects but: "...the intelligible or spiritual substances also are composed of matter and form."; 49 5. Creation is the process by which God establishes the universal substance (matter and form), but it must be conceived (in typical Neo-Platonist way) as: "...water flowing from a fountain..." 50 Hence, `Fountain of Life' (Fons Vitae); 24
6. Being of Jewish (non-pantheistic) faith, Gabirol also felt it necessary to introduce a thoroughly un-Platonic element in his system, namely, God's Will. Accordingly: "...God speaks and his Word or Will impresses form upon matter."; 51 7. Husik refers to the mystical element in Gabirol's thought (what Paul Tillich would refer to as `abstract mysticism'), according to which one: "...must raise [one's] intellect to the last intelligible...must purify it from all sordid sensibility, free it from the captivity of nature..." 52 Finally, Husik describes the Fons Vitae as essentially: "...a peculiar combination of logical formalism with mystic obscurity, or profundity, according to one's point of view...it was employed in a lost cause. Neo-Platonism was giving way to Aristotelianism, which was adopted by Maimonides and made the authoritative and standard philosophy." 53 2.5 African (Metaphysics) The literature on African philosophy, especially the writings of black African thinkers, shows that for much of the second part of the 20th century at least, it became imperative to `find,' establish or `carve out' a uniquely African (thus noncolonialist, non-Western) philosophical identity. The problem of establishing a philosophical identity is exacerbated by the fact that often there is no clear line of demarcation between philosophical and anthropological thought and writing in Africa. It is not unusual to open a text purportedly dealing with African philosophy and find that it is substantially about anthropological analyses or cultural 25
critiques of aspects such as the values, mores, customs and habits of life of one or the other African tribe or community. In view of the greater awareness of the undeniable variety of ethnic and cultural traditions across the continent, the choice is increasingly for what, in meta-theoretical terms, may be described as the subjectivist-empiricist mode of philosophizing. This is represented by the indigenous trends of ethno-philosophy and sage philosophy. Metaphysics does not enjoy high priority on the current African philosophical agenda. Nevertheless, a general scheme of African metaphysics is possible and will briefly be described, following Teffo and Roux. 54 The main components of a general African cosmology are as follows: God, the intra-cosmic architect; Ancestors; Humans Plants, animals, minerals African metaphysics consist of a number of principles which control `vital forces' and the relations between them. These form a hierarchy or `chain of being,' with God, the most vital force and `cosmic architect,' at the apex, followed by ancestors, mortal humans and physical nature. 55 The system of vital forces forms a `closed universe' that operates in the manner of a zero-sum game: when one force gains in power or vitality another force has to lose it. 56 African metaphysics has a strong experiential content and does not differentiate, in the Western Cartesian manner, between body and mind or natural and supernatural. 57 In contrast with the Western conception of causality, which is regarded as mechanical by Africans, the African view is teleological and deterministic - it rejects chance events. In 26
this regard a distinction is made between primary causes, namely forces such as spirits, witches or social forces in the community and secondary causes which are influenced by the primary causes, such as the petrol bomb that caused destruction. 58 African thought has a strong social orientation (`I am because we are') in seeking answers to the problems and issues of human existence, often resulting in a blurring of distinctions between metaphysics, social theory and morality. Its essence is: "...the search for meaning and ultimate reality in the complex relationship between the human person and his/her total environment." 59 Although God is the `cosmic architect,' he is part of the created world. Africans in general, therefore: "... do not accept ad hoc interventions by God in the order of nature." 60 Compared to the West, ancestors play an important role in African life, and hence in African metaphysics. They are venerated (not worshiped) and viewed as an integral component of life. Ancestors interact with mortals in a closed, deterministic, universe in which no distinction between the material and spiritual is made: "...the actions of the ancestors are believed to be within the regular pattern of events. The immortals merely happen to occupy a higher status in the order of things than mortals." 61 27
CHAPTER 3 SCIENTIFIC NON-WESTERN THOUGHT (II) 3.1 Indian 3.1.1 Nyaya The Nyaya School of empirical atomism is based on an Aristotelian system of enumeration and logic and specifies four sources of truth or knowledge, namely: perception, inference, comparison and testimony, for which a set of criteria of validity is used. Following an approach of `atomistic pluralism' Nyaya postulates a physical universe consisting of several types of atoms, with Brahman as the supreme force that provides the multitude of atoms with consciousness. The Nyaya system identifies a number of subjects (for example purpose, illustrative instances, premises, argumentation and refutation) as knowledge requirements in order to achieve the highest good. Salvation is said to be attained by the: "...successive disappearance of false knowledge, defects, endeavour, birth, and ultimately of sorrow." 1 Reasoning consists of three kinds of causal inferences: "...from cause to effect, effect to cause, and inference from common characteristics." 2 The objects of knowledge are: "...the self (atman), body, senses and sense-objects, understanding, mind, endeavour, rebirths, enjoyment of pleasure and suffering of pain, sorrow and salvation." 3 3.1.2 Vaisesika Vaisesika thought is aimed at explaining virtue (dharma) virtue being required for prosperity and salvation, with these, in turn, being necessary to ensure the validity and truth of the Vedas. 4 Salvation occurs as a result of true knowledge of the 29
following categories: substance, quality, class concept, particularity and inherence, and their various subcomponents. 5 Similar to the Western empiricist tradition, a basic premise of Vaisesika is the reality or existence of things: "If I or you or any other perceiver did not exist, the things would continue to exist all the same." 6 As a result of a reliance on experience and good or valid reasons, Nyaya-Vaisesika accepts the atomistic doctrine of the four eternal elements, namely: "...earth, water, fire, and air." 7 Nyaya-Vaisesika is a body of thought that does not reduce experience to abstract principle. Neither does it sacrifice the testimony of sense-experience merely for the sake of logical coherence. It is expressed as follows: "The underlying principle is that at the root of each kind of perception there must be something to which the perception is due." 8 The system emphasizes right thinking, which, when a person uses reason to acquire knowledge of all the empirically embedded entities, he/she ceases to be ruled by the passions, attains true knowledge of the self, and becomes liberated. 9 Nyaya-Vaisesika objects to the idea that an invisible, transcendent, power resides in each cause which produces an effect, on the grounds that it is not an empirically observable matter, and therefore not a legitimate hypothesis ­ causes can be satisfactorily explained in terms of molecular activity. 10 As far as the origin of knowledge is concerned, Nyaya-Vaisesika holds that it is based on perception, which is defined as: "...that right knowledge generated by the contact of the senses with the object." 11 30
3.2 Chinese Although there are differences between the Chinese Schools of Mohism, the Logicians and Legalism, especially the latter, many of their doctrines and ideas share the objectivistempiricist orientation in human thought. Mohism (from Mo Tzu, the founder) may be regarded as main representative of the more empiricist-analytical trend in Chinese thought, whilst the Logicians, given the context of a fractious socio-political environment in ancient China, never had strong support or influence and eventually disappeared. They were - unsurprisingly, given the narrative-poetical thrust of Chinese thought - seen as `rhetoricians' who tried to impress with words, instead of contributing to important social values and goals. The School of Legalism may be depicted as a Machiavellian political movement in support of the authoritarian regimes of ancient Chinese rulers, for example, the Ch'in dynasty. However, its doctrines share certain aspects of the Mohist philosophical outlook, hence their inclusion in this section. Main characteristics of the three schools of thought are briefly sketched, following Wing-Tsit Chan. 12 3.2.1 Mohism Consistent with what would be expected according to the meta-theoretical premises presented in chapter one, Mohism (type II mode) and Confucianism (type IV mode) were fierce opponents. 13 The Mohist doctrine emphasized an impersonal and universal love for others, which is the `will of heaven,' while Confucianism, although it acknowledged heaven, followed a humanistic philosophy of individual care and deep 31
respect (filial love), that started with one's parents and family
and extended from there to the rest of society, and its rulers.
In this regard, Mo Tzu is reputed to have said: "If rulers
of the world really want the empire to be wealthy and hate to
have it poor, want it to be orderly and hate to have it chaotic,
they should practice universal love and mutual benefit." 14
Figure 3.1 provides a comparison of distinguishing
characteristics of Mohism and Confucianism.
The Mohists were the earliest Chinese writers on logic and
more `scientific' topics such as geometry, optics and
mechanics - even though in aphoristic and metaphoric style.
Mohist doctrine emphasizes functionality and is against costly
social ceremonies, such as elaborate funerals, and against
artistic expressions, such as music.
Figure 3.1: A comparison of Mohism and Confucianism 15
Mohism (type II)
Confucianism (type IV)
Impersonal concern.
Personal care.
Utilitarian.
Humanistic.
Moral behaviour.
Moral character.
Concept of
Concept of
righteousness.
humanity.
Moral life desirable
The moral life is
because of its benefits.
desirable for its own
sake.
Social benefits are the
Social benefits are
motivation for deeds.
the result of deeds.
Practical.
Idealistic.
32
3.2.2 The Logicians The Logicians followed an Aristotelian approach, and although they gave attention to such concepts as cause, actuality, space, time, relativity and quality, did not discover or put forward any laws of thought or syllogisms and analytical propositions, as in the Western tradition. They preferred expressing themselves in the subjectivist mode, by way of: "...dialogues, aphorisms, and paradoxes instead of systematic and cogent argumentation." 16 The reason why this (type II) tendency did not further develop in China is partly because the general emphasis during those turbulent times was on values (type III and IV modes) and on solving social problems for the sake of harmony and peaceful co-existence - a recurrent theme in Chinese society. But partly it was also because the Chinese were not very interested in the `science of logic.' Evidence can, for instance, be found in remarks of the type III thinker, Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu), who said of the Logicians that: "They are able to subdue other people's mouths, but cannot win their hearts. This is where their narrowness lies." 17 Consistent with the scientific mode of thought, they subscribed to the objectivist view of impersonal care, of the Mohists. 3.2.3 The Legalists Although they were as much political movement as school of thought, the Legalists did emphasize a number of principles and concepts in the objectivist-empiricist modality of mind. Similar to the Mohists, the Legalists were opposed to the Confucian approach of civic virtues and morality, and in favour of power (especially of rulers that they supported) and 33
political control of the state, through a utilitarian approach of generous rewards and severe punishments. 18 They did not worship past sage-kings - such as Yao and Shun by the Confucianists, or Yu of the Mohists - but, in an objectivist-empiricist fashion, emphasized actual results and concrete accomplishments in the present. 19 This orientation is reflected in the words of one of its leading figures, Han Fei Tzu: "To be sure of anything without corroborating evidences is stupidity, and to base one's argument on anything about which one cannot be sure is perjury." 20 Like other Chinese schools the Legalists accepted the correspondence theory of the relation between names and things. However, whereas Confucians focused on its moral meaning and the Logicians emphasized the logical aspect, Legalists were more interested in the theory's application for purposes of political control. 21 3.3 Islamic 3.3.1 Ibn Sina Both Ibn Sina (980 ­ 1037) and Ibn Rushd (see next section) were metaphysical thinkers in the early (Neo-Platonic) tradition of Islamic thought. However, contrary to Al-Kindi and Al-Farabi, their philosophies had a stronger empiricist inclination and in varying degrees took the physical world of bodies and of the senses, philosophically, more seriously than was previously the case. Ibn Sina and Ibn Rushd, although they lived more than a century apart, were trained medical practitioners and scientists, and not inclined to ignore or derogate physical reality. The following discussion is based on de Boer, 22 Shariff, 23 and Butterworth. 24 34
Ibn Sina was essentially a top-down thinker who emphasized demonstrative thinking in deducing everything that exists, from the existence of a: "... First and Necessary Being, whose essence and existence are one." 25 Whereas Al-Farabi, with his more pronounced empyrean inclination, preferred pure reason for its own sake, Ibn Sina looked to the soul and the body. For Ibn Sina: "Matter is the eternal and pure possibility of all that exists, and at the same time the limitation of the operation of the Spirit." 26 At the apex of the Soul is Reason: "...which at first is a mere capacity for Thought, becomes elaborated gradually, in that Material which is conveyed to it by the external and internal senses." 27 Ibn Sina was a scholastic and systematic thinker, with an acknowledged influence on Aquinas and Medieval thought, and created the first comprehensive and detailed system of philosophy in the Islamic world. 28 Like Muslim philosophers before him, Ibn Sina followed an emanation doctrine of Existence or Being, with God, the `Necessary Existent' at the top of the hierarchy, from which the First Intelligence emanates alone. 29 In Ibn Sina's system, God creates the world, which is contingent upon God, as a matter of rational necessity. 30 Following Aristotle, Ibn Sina emphasizes the close connection between mind and body, but whereas Aristotle incorporated Form (mind) and Matter (body) as integral aspects of one Substance, Ibn Sina chooses a dualism of two `substances.' 31 Despite the duality, Ibn Sina's Neo-Platonic thought also emphasizes the spiritual aspect of nature. 32 Ibn Sina adheres to an empiricist epistemology which is representational and based on perception. In this regard he 35
makes a distinction between internal mental faculties and external perception of the five senses ­ his principle being that: "...to every clear idea there must correspond a distinction in reality." 33 Contrary to Aristotle, who distinguishes between morality and politics as different aspects of his practical sciences, Ibn Sina blurs the distinction. He follows the Aristotelian ethics of a balance or mean of moral habits aimed at breaking the hold of the passions and purifying the soul, namely: temperance, courage and wisdom, in addition to which the laws of the prophet and the Quran is to be adhered to. Similar to Aristotle's `intellectual' virtues, Ibn Sina emphasizes the primacy of Reason (`theoretical wisdom') for attaining justice and happiness. 34 3.3.2 Ibn Rushd Compared with his predecessors Ibn Rushd (1126 ­ 1198) is totally enamoured with Aristotle, who was, for him, the most perfect man and thinker. As may be expected, Ibn Rushd's thought is thoroughly empiricist, consisting of many detailed commentaries, interpretations and philosophical `exegeses' of the Greek philosopher's thought. De Boer summarises it as follows: "He goes critically and systematically to work: He paraphrases Aristotle and he interprets him, now with comparative brevity, and anon in greater detail, both in moderate-sized and in bulky commentaries." 35 About six hundred years before Kant, Ibn Rushd separates the spheres of revelation and reason. He actually rejected theology, essentially because it could not be justified rationally. However, he also attempts to justify philosophical 36
reason by appealing to the same Quranic verses that Islamic jurists use in support of their legal doctrines. 36 For Ibn Rushd the world is a dynamic unity, an eternal process of becoming, hence: "...an eternally necessary unity, without any possibility of non-existence or of different existence." 37 This means that Form and Matter are universals that can only be separated in thought, hence: "The essence of the First Mover, or of God, as well as of the Sphere-Spirits, is found...in Thought." 38 In opposition to Ibn Sina's principle of dual emanation, Ibn Rushd (like Aristotle) views the human soul in relation to the body as Form is to Matter: "The soul has an existence only as a completion of the body with which it is associated." 39 Ibn Rushd's philosophy is deterministic ­ everything has a cause, whether internally through acts of thought and the imagination, or externally through the senses, or, as he formulates it in his attempts to accommodate the Creatormind (`Thought in itself'): "...he who denies the existence in this world of the dependence of effects on causes would deny the wise Maker." 40 Against the subjectivist approach (also of Al-Ghazali, who lived before him), Ibn Rushd responds that: "To deny the existence of efficient causes which are observed in sensible things is sophistry, and he who denies them either denies with his tongue what is present in his mind or is carried away by a sophistical doubt..." 41 Ibn Rushd distinguishes between two kinds of knowledge - both being embedded in the reality of existence - individual knowledge of the particulars through the senses and imagination, and universal knowledge, which is the result of 37
the intellect: "The act of the intellect is to perceive the notion, the universal concept, and the essence. The intellect has three basic operations: abstraction, combination, and judgment. When we perceive a universal notion, we abstract it from matter." 42 In ethics Ibn Rushd did not deviate from Aristotle and emphasized the importance of theoretical wisdom and practical morals as acquired habits of good conduct: "...ethics are simply moral habits and character traits, that is, the kind of actions we train ourselves in or are trained in according to the doctrine of the mean." 43 3.4 Jewish ( Maimonides) Showing his objectivist-empiricist mind-set, Maimonides (1138 ­ 1204 CE) is of the opinion that one should only believe what can be grasped with the intellect or perceived by the senses. But, with his own Jewish faith in mind, he also adds: "...or what he can accept on trustworthy authority." 44 After completing a work on revelation and the Jewish Tradition he desired to validate its contents by the use of philosophical analysis. This he accomplished with the Guide of the Perplexed. 45 Maimonides was held in high regard by his contemporaries and also later generations. This is expressed in the popular saying: "...From Moses to Moses there was none like Moses." 46 He firstly wished to establish that the: "...Divine Being of whom the Bible speaks could...be regarded as identical with the Primal Cause of the philosophers." 47 His stated intention was: "...to expound Biblical passages which have been impugned, and to elucidate their hidden and 38
true sense, which is above the comprehension of the multitude." 48 The book opens with an address to his pupil, R. Joseph Ibn Aknin, appealing to him to study it systematically, so that: "...the truth should present itself in connected order..." 49 Beginning each chapter with a Scriptural reference, Maimonides explains that his purpose is to enlighten the religious person who also wants to satisfy his reason. The Guide of the Perplexed is aimed at those educated Jews who are both sound religious believers and have a good background in the sciences (physics, mathematics), but who experience conflict between their faith and the principles of reason. It is for him who: "...finds it difficult to accept as correct the teaching based on the literal interpretation of the Law, and especially that which he himself or others derived from those homonymous, metaphorical, or hybrid expressions. Hence he is lost in perplexity and anxiety..." 50 Maimonides repeatedly states that his work is not about proving the propositions of the philosophers, but to apply them to an explanation of Scripture. He accepts only Aristotle and twenty five of his principles as his own guide, but principle twenty six, namely, the eternity of the universe, is accepted provisionally, so that: "...we shall be enabled clearly to demonstrate our own theory" 51 Maimonides' type II (scientific) mode of thinking speaks clearly in his advice to his student that he must free himself from his passions and only use the dictates of reason. He specifies the following conditions: "...First you must know your mental capacities and your natural talents: you will find this out when you study all mathematical sciences, and are well acquainted with Logic. Secondly, you must have a 39
thorough knowledge of Natural Science, that you may be able
to understand the nature of the objections." 52
Maimonides is decidedly against mysticism (whether of the
type I or III kind). To explain the mystical passages in the
Bible is to go beyond the Law and reason: "...my knowledge
of them is based on reasoning, not on divine inspiration and
is therefore not infallible..." / 53 38
The rest of the book is spent on re-classifying the 613
Talmudic commandments into fourteen groups, with a
chapter on each. This is summarised in Figure 3.2 below.
Figure 3.2: Maimonides' reduction of the 613 Talmudic
commandments 54
Class
Theme
First
Precepts which form fundamental principles
(e.g., on repentance; fasts)
Second Third Fourth Fifth Sixth Seventh Eighth Ninth Tenth
Precepts concerning the prohibition of idolatry Precepts concerning the improvement of the moral condition of humankind Precepts relating to charity, loans, gifts, and e.g., the rules respecting "valuations" Precepts which relate to the prevention of wrong and violence. Precepts respecting fines, e.g., the laws on theft and robbery, on false witnesses Laws which regulate the business transactions of men with each other Precepts which relate to certain days, as Sabbaths and holy days General laws concerning religious rites and ceremonies Precepts which relate to the Sanctuary, its vessels, and its ministers
Eleventh
Precepts which relate to Sacrifices
40
Twelfth Thirteenth Fourteenth
Laws concerning things unclean and clean Precepts concerning forbidden food Precepts concerning forbidden sexual intercourse
Lastly, some additional aspects of Maimonides' thought are: 1. His objectivist treatment, insisting that four things must be removed when considering the nature of God: "...corporeality, affection, potentiality and resemblance to his creatures." 55 This is a thoroughly impersonal approach; 2. He provisionally accepts that the Neo-Platonic conception of `separate intelligences' is the same as Biblical angels, with the exception that they are not eternal (Aristotle), but were created by God; 56 3. As Aristotelian thinker he attempts to harmonize philosophy and the Hebrew Bible, but, as Husik observes: "...he is apparently unaware of the yawning gulf extending between them."; 57 4. Maimonides stressed the importance of intellect over passion: "The intellect determines the will, and not even God's will may be arbitrary"; 58 5. He was certainly not a poet, and even disliked it. 59 With regard to his antipathy toward poets (type III mode) it is interesting to note that Halevi, who was a prominent figure about two generations before him, is not even mentioned by Maimonides.
3.5 African (Professional) In post-colonial Africa a choice for an objectivist-empiricist orientation (mainly modern analytical philosophy that 41
emulates Western science) has become more acceptable, and is referred to as academic or `professional philosophy.' 60 However, Black professional philosophy that, in the African context, deal with Western topics such as epistemology and logic are often not well-received, and its practitioners are, according to Mosley: "...often accused of being sell-outs." 61 Wiredu's solution is a `translation' of Western philosophical concepts into the indigenous languages of Africa. This is to be accomplished without sacrificing the accumulated stock of `folk wisdom' of African cultures and without surrendering to a `linguistic imperialism' of Western philosophical concepts. 62 Professional philosophy in Africa is regarded as being: "...engrained with argument and criticism..." and is the type of philosophy supported by philosophers such as Wiredu, Hountondji, Bodunrin, and Oruka. 63 Criticism of professional philosophy, mostly by proponents of ethno-philosophy, are: (a) that it is too metaphilosophical for the African social and communal context and, therefore, not practical and useful; (b) that it lacks a sufficient literature of its own and focuses too much on critiques of indigenous thought, namely, of ethno-philosophy and sage-philosophy. 64 Professional African philosophers, in turn, are of the view that descriptive accounts of African world views, values, much of it as anthropological discourse, are not philosophy, because it lacks the rational analysis of professional philosophy. The `non-professional' philosophical literature in Africa is challenged by scholars such as Oruka, Wiredu, Bodunrin, Hountondji, and Makinde. 65 42
CHAPTER 4 NARRATIVE NON-WESTERN THOUGHT (III) 4.1 Indian (Mimamsa) The Mimamsa School of thought arose from differences in opinion among priests and believers about the meaning of Vedic texts regarding religious duties, rituals and sacrificial activities, especially the incantations or mantras. Mimamsa (literally: `attempts at rational enquiry') 1 is, meta-theoretically, the opposite of Vedanta and despite the meaning of its name, rejects the use of Reason to gain philosophical knowledge and understanding of the Vedas. Instead, for them, the Vedas exist for and require the daily duties and acts of devotion by ordinary believers. Over time Mimamsa became the primary, legally accepted, source of conduct in these matters, for Hindu believers. Although it attempted rational analysis, the Mimamsa school avoided the formulation of abstract principles about matters such as: cause, space, soul, inference and perception, and were more concerned with exegeses of the Vedic texts. In contrast to Vedanta, Mimamsa became known for its anti-asceticism, and being primarily concerned with `right action,' as opposed to the focus on `right thinking' by Vedanta. It also requires an unquestionable faith in the Vedas and regular rituals and sacrificial performances. Mimamsa regards all knowledge (except memory) as valid in itself, so that it does not require external conditions or certification by any other authority, except the Vedas. It is referred to as: "...the doctrine of the self-validity of knowledge." 2 The corollary is that: "...knowledge is never perceived by us to be dependent on any objective fact, for all 43
objective facts are dependent on it for its revelation or illumination." 3 This school of thought rejects the objectivist mode of mind and does not differentiate between a knower and known, thus: "All knowledge whether perceptual, inferential or of any other kind must necessarily reveal the self or the knower directly." 4 Mimamsa agrees in the main with their type II metatheoretical neighbours, the Vaisesika, in its doctrine of the five elements, yet it differs from the Nyaya in that it did not require or accept external sources (for example the existence of physical atoms) for validating knowledge claims. 5 4.2 Chinese The approaches of Lao Tzu (better known as Daoism or Taoism) and of the mystical poet, Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu), typify the subjectivist-empiricist mode of thought. Both are thoroughly individualist, and emphasize living in harmony with nature, in opposition to the social reformist (type IV) thought of Confucius and Mencius and the more analytical and systematic orientation of Mohism / Legalism (type II). Essential Elements of the approaches 6 of Daoism and Zhuangzi are indicated below: 4.2.1 Daoism The central characteristic of Daoism is its philosophy of living in harmony with nature, not in a quietist manner, but by following the course of nature, in accordance with the principle of `non-action' or wu-wei, meaning: "...simplicity, spontaneity, tranquillity..." 7 44
In contrast to Confucianism, which focuses on the social order and the promotion of old Chinese traditions for living in peace and harmony with others, Daoism stresses the life of the individual and on achieving a state of inner tranquillity and of mystical unity with nature. Daoism, which was meant for the sage-kings as a guide to rule by non-interference in nature, is not a philosophy of surrender to, withdrawal from or conquest of nature (as in the West), but a philosophy of fulfilment of the way of nature. This is reflected in the famous Yijing (also known as: I Ching or Tao-Te-Ching), which is: "...a combination of poetry, philosophical speculation, and mystical reflection." 8 Some of its better-known expressions, indicating its antimetaphysical stance, are: "The Tao (Way) that can be told of is not the eternal Tao; the name that can be named is not the eternal name." 9 Chan provides a meta-theoretically informative comparison of the use of `water' as metaphor: "...while early Indians associated water with creation [type I] and the Greeks looked upon it as a natural phenomenon [type II], ancient Chinese philosophers, whether Lao Tzu or Confucius, preferred to learn moral lessons from it [type III/IV]." 10 4.2.2 Zhuangzi For Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu, 399 - 295 BCE), the foremost exemplar of poetical nature-mysticism in Chinese thought, the pure man: "...becomes a `companion' of Nature and does not attempt to interfere with it..." 11 Whereas Confucianism believes in man's active participation, and in education for developing his potential, in order to fulfil the purpose of nature, Zhuangzi, more 45
pragmatically believes in: "...nourishing nature, returning to destiny, and enjoying Nature..." 12 His pronounced mysticalpoetical orientation became an important source of inspiration in Chinese landscape painting and poetry. 13, 14 Consistent with the characteristics of the subjectivist paradigm, Zhuangzi is in favour of a plurality of perspectives and sceptical about: "...assertions of universality and objectivity that normally accompany knowledge-claims." 15 4.3 Islamic (Al-Ghazali) In Al-Ghazali ("`Islam's convincing proof,' 'the ornament of faith'..." and reckoned to be the equal of four Imams) 16 Islam had one of its most influential thinkers. Initially as Islamic jurist and teacher in Baghdad, and later, after much soul-searching and travelling, as Sufi-believer and reformer, Al-Ghazali (1058 ­ 1110 CE) became a strong critic of the metaphysics of especially Ibn Sina and Al-Farabi. More than five hundred years before Descartes and Hume, Al-Ghazali, as a result of a crisis of doubt and skepticism that assailed him at the peak of a successful career, decided on an approach of methodical doubt. He had no difficulty in accepting the truths of the sciences, and even published treatises on Aristotelian logic, yet he came to the conclusion that neither the truth of the senses (which Descartes regarded as sources of error) nor the metaphysical speculations of the philosophers (which Hume rejected as being `out of touch' with sense experience), provided irrefutable certainty, and, therefore, any peace of mind. Fakhry states it succinctly: "If sense experience is not to be trusted, then by analogy the knowledge of necessary propositions or axioms is not to be trusted either." 17 46
Although Al-Ghazali appreciated the sciences, he was disaffected by their limited scope, in not being able to provide the deepest, most encompassing, truth that only revealed religion can offer. He compares the physicist to an: "...ant who, crawling on a sheet of paper and observing black letters spreading over it, should refer the cause to the pen alone..." 18 However, the truth is that the hand holding the pen is `caused' by a brain that is in turn caused (activated) by the writer's will (qualb or heart), and ultimately by the `hand' (Will) of Allah. In true subjectivist manner Al-Ghazali declares that: "...the heart is not `the piece of flesh situated in the left of our bodies, but that which uses all the other faculties as its instruments." 19 He rejected the metaphysics of the philosophers, his main target, because it was based on fanciful ideas - Neo-Platonic celestial entities, such as `spheres,' `intelligences' and spirithierarchies. According to Al-Ghazali, these were neither selfevident nor logically derivable, and could neither prove nor disprove the truths of revealed religion. Al-Ghazali was seeking a higher authority and certainty, which he eventually found in Sufi mysticism. His explanation of how he regained his intellectual health through a: "...light which God infused into his heart, which indeed is the key to most species of knowledge," 20 is indicative of his preference for the narrative-interpretive realm of mind. Al-Ghazali also revolted against the philosophers' selective use of the Quran to justify or bolster their philosophies, and their often outright rejection of the truths of the Quran. In his Tahafut al-Falasifah (The Incoherence of the Philosophers), he attacked the philosophers, specifically, because of their rejection or denial of: (1) a world created by 47
the eternal God; (2) God's knowledge of the particulars, and
(3) of bodily resurrection.
Sheikh refers to this clash of mindsets in much the same
tone as the struggle between worldviews: "Intellectualistic-
deterministic of the philosophers, voluntaristic -
occasionalistic of Al-Ghazali." 21
Figure 4.1 provides a comparison of the contrasting
positions of Al Ghazali and the Islamic philosophers. It
shows that the struggle between Islamic Faith (Al-Ghazali)
and Reason (the Philosophers) represents a fundamental clash
of meta-theoretical opposites - an Islamic version of the
eternal dialectic and tension between subjectivist and
objectivist thought.
Figure 4.1: Al-Ghazali versus the Philosophers 22
Al-Ghazali (type III)
Philosophers (type I)
The Divine Causality is free The world proceeds from
Creative Might;
God as effect from cause;
There is only one causality, God is the highest Being,
that of the `Willing' Being; and his essence is Thought;
God has cognizance of the God wills the world,
world because he wills it;
because he thinks it as best;
Emphasizes experience
Emphasizes universal ideas
4.4 Jewish (Halevi) In this section and the next, two outstanding subjectivist Jewish thinkers, Judah Halevi (1075 ­ 1141 CE) and Ibn Pakuda (type IV) will be presented, respectively. Though both appreciated the role of reason and philosophy, it mainly served as underpinning for their endeavours, namely: defending the Jewish faith and culture, by Halevi; promoting 48
a religious ethic that went beyond lip service, by Pakuda. The Kitab al Khazari 23 (also known as Khazari or Khuzari) was written somewhere between 1120 and 1140, and is essentially a defence as well as praise of the Jewish religion and way of life, in the narrative-poetic (type III) modality of mind. The Khazari is Halevi's fictional account of the king of the Khazars' search for an appropriate religion for himself and his people in dialogue with representatives from philosophy, Christianity, Islam and a Jewish rabbi. Legend has it that the king became a Jewish convert and that Judaism was the state religion from about 830 CE, onwards. The story came to Halevi's attention and he saw it as an ideal opportunity to defend Judaism. As he relates: "I was asked to state what arguments and replies I could bring to bear against the attacks of philosophers and followers of other religions, and also against Jewish sectarians who attacked the rest of Israel." 24 Figures 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 provide brief extracts from the dialogue, showing the philosopher, Christian scholastic, Islamic doctor and, finally, the Jewish rabbi's response to the king's question on how he should act to become saved. The king was not satisfied with the philosopher's answer, and decided to: "...ask the Christians and Muslims, since one of these persuasions is, no doubt, the God-pleasing one...." 25 He then invited a Christian scholastic to tell him about the nature and practice of the Christian Faith. This was followed by conversations with the Islamist and Jewish rabbi. 49
Figure 4.2: Philosopher vs Khazar King 26
Philosopher
King
God...is above desire and
Thy words are convincing,
intention. Everything is
yet they do not correspond
reduced to a Prime Cause; not to what I wish. ...
to a Will proceeding from this, Yet we find that true visions
but an Emanation from which are granted to persons who
emanated a second, a third, do not devote themselves to
and fourth cause.
study or to the purification
In fine, seek purity of heart in of their souls, whereas the
which way thou art able,
opposite is the case with
provided thou hast acquired those who strive after these
the sum total of knowledge in things. This proves that the
its real essence; then thou wilt divine influence as well as
reach thy goal, viz. the union the souls have a secret
with this Spiritual, or rather which is not identical with
Active Intellect.
what thou sayest, O
Philosopher.
Figure 4.3: Christian vs Khazar King 27
Scholastic
King
I believe that all things are
I see here no logical
created, whilst the Creator is conclusion; nay, logic
eternal; that He created the rejects most of what thou
whole world in six days; that sayest. If both appearance
all mankind sprang from
and experience take hold of
Adam, and after him from
the whole heart, compelling
Noah, to whom they trace
belief in a thing of which
themselves back; that God
one is not convinced they
takes care of the created
render the matter feasible
beings, and keeps in touch
by a semblance of logic.
50
with man; He shows wrath, pleasure, and compassion; ...He speaks, appears, and reveals Himself to His prophets and favoured ones; He dwells among those who please him.
As for me, I cannot accept these things, because they come upon me suddenly, not having grown up in them. My duty is to investigate.
Figure 4.4: Doctor of Islam vs Khazar King 28
Doctor of Islam
King
The unity and eternity of God; Although your book may be
all men are from Adam-Noah. a miracle, it is written in
Reject embodiment.
Arabic; I cannot see its
Return of the spirit to thes
miraculous character...
body in paradise; enjoy eating, I see I must ask the Jews,
drinking, and woman.
because they are the relic of
the Children of Israel.
Figure 4.5: Jewish Rabbi vs Khazar King 29
Jewish Rabbi
King
I believe in the God of
The theory I had formed,
Abraham, Isaac and Israel,
and the opinion of what I
who led the children of Israel saw in my dream thou now
out of Egypt...who sent
confirmest, viz. that man
Moses...Law was given to us can only merit divine
because He led us out of
influence by acting
Egypt, and...because we are the according to God's laws.
pick of mankind.
51
Some additional comments and explanations regarding Halevi's approach follow: 1. For Halevi nothing in the Bible is contrary to the dictates of reason, but he insists that only revelation can make one wise; 30 2. In Judah Halevi the poet got the better of the rationalist, emphasizing that God and the Jewish religion: ".... are not simply facts to be known and understood like the laws of science. They are living entities to be acquainted with, to be devoted to, to love."; 31 3. Husik also notes that Halevi's negative attitude toward philosophy (because it reduces God to an impersonal force) has much in common with the Islamic thinker, Al-Ghazali, from whom he derived much inspiration; 32 4. In contrast to Pakuda's `duties of the heart,' Halevi emphasizes adherence to the ceremonial laws and sacrifices, 33 and is against: "...all manner of asceticism"; 34 5. Halevi places a strong emphasis, more than his predecessors, on free will and is against any kind of `fatalistic determinism'; 35 6. In contrast to the rigorous organization and argumentation of Maimonides (type II), Halevi's Khuzari is: "...a meandering series of discussions and arguments"; 36 7. "The greatest Hebrew poet of all time." 37 52
4.5 African (Ethno-philosophy) The literature on African philosophy, by and large, shows a predilection for what is referred to as `ethno-philosophy,' an approach in the narrative-interpretive realm of thought. A characteristic ingredient of the writing on African thought is the ongoing concern with self-definition, 38 as well as the question of African philosophy's usefulness to society, or as Oladipo formulates it: "...the question of how best to respond to the colonial denigration or underestimation of African cultures and traditions, and of how best to achieve development in Africa without compromising our identity." 39 The historical roots of ethno-philosophy are traced back to the writing of a Belgian priest, Placide Frans Tempels, in the 1950s. Ethno-philosophy reportedly has a large following of anthropologists, sociologists and philosophers. 40 It consists of systematic descriptions of communal thought and wisdom (myths, beliefs, folktales, proverbs), in contrast to logical analysis and argumentation of professional (objectivist) philosophy. Most ethno-philosophical approaches start with the assumption that there is an existing, coherent, body of African thought that is separate from individual African cultures and ethnicities and, secondly, that it is worthwhile exploring and recovering this communal tradition. 41 Apart from ethno-philosophy, related approaches in the subjectivist-empiricist mode of thought in Africa are `culture philosophy' and `sage philosophy'. Oruka, who identified main trends in African philosophy, 42 regards the sequence of historical development as follows: firstly, culture philosophy (of ancient origin), then sage philosophy (occupying the middle ground), and lastly, ethno- 53
philosophy. The thoughts of the sages: "...form significant
raw data for technical philosophical reflections by
professionals." 43 Figure 4.6 highlights the three trends.
Figure 4.6: Ethno-philosophy, Sage Philosophy and Culture
philosophy
Ethno
Sage
Culture
Holistic, communal Thought of
Principles of a
thought;
individual sages; culture;
Written
Wise and
Oral tradition
descriptions of
inspirational
(myths, beliefs,
culture
taboos, values)
54
CHAPTER 5 PRAGMATIC NON-WESTERN THOUGHT (IV) 5.1 Indian (Patanjali Yoga) Compared to the Schools of Hinduism discussed so far (Vedanta, Nyaya-Vaisesika, and Mimamsa) the Patanjali School of Yoga is meta-theoretically most representative of the subjectivist-empyrean realm of thought. It is not a macroscopic ideological system, such as Plato's Republic or Marx's Communist Manifesto. Rather than being a program for collective or social reform, Yoga is about an inner `reform' of soul and spirit that, through release (moksha) from karma, hopes to attain salvation. Following Dasgupta, 1 key elements of the Yoga school of meditative practice and self-purification are sketched below. The Patanjali-Yoga program of purification 2 consists of the following: (a) Yamas: Practise of absolute non-injury to all living beings, Absolute and strict truthfulness, Non-stealing, Absolute sexual restraint, Accepting nothing but the absolutely necessary (b) Niyamas: Practice of external cleanliness by ablutions and inner cleanliness of the mind, Contentment of mind, Bearing all privations of heat and cold, Keeping the body unmoved and remaining silent in speech, Study of philosophy, Meditation 55
(c) Positive relations with others: Thinking of all beings as friends, Kindly feeling for sufferers, Feeling of happiness for the good of all beings, Feeling of equanimity and indifference for the vices of others. The word Yoga means `harnessing' or `yoking' (from its use in the Rg Veda) which reflects its focus on transformation. The emphasis is placed on control of the senses through actions of abstinence such as: "...asceticism and the holy vow of celibacy and life-long study [which] were regarded as greatest virtues and considered as being productive of the highest power." 3 Various moral activities are regarded as indispensable, such as: "...association with good people, abandoning of desires, [and] determined attempts at discovering the truth with fixed attention." 4 In opposition to the objectivist metaphysics of Vedanta and the Nyaya-Vaisesika, Yoga regards knowledge or philosophy as insufficient. It takes the position that a graduated course of meditative practice and inner reform is necessary for liberation: "...before the mind can be fit for this lofty meditation, it is necessary that it should be purged of ordinary impurities." 5 When all the Yoga practices have been diligently performed and all worldly pleasures left behind, one may attain liberation of the mind by: "...constant practice with faith, confidence, strength of purpose and execution, wisdom attained at each advance." 6 56
5.2 Chinese 5.2.1 Confucius Confucius' ideas are characteristic of the subjectivistempyrean realm of thought. He had a lifelong ambition for political mentorship and held high political office for a while. Above all, he wanted to bring sanity to the warring and factional Chinese society of his time, by educating people on how to live right. For Confucius, as a confessed lover of tradition, this meant making the best in ancient Chinese customs and traditions available again; as a `living tradition' contained in a body of maxims and rules that could serve as guide for men and women in all the varied spheres of life in society. The work of Chan 7 serves as source for an outline of the thought of Confucius (551-479 BC) as well as of Mencius (371-289 BC), a prominent Confucian who lived about two centuries after Confucius, and who became a leading figure in the history of Confucianism. At the age of fifty six, Confucius, upon: "...finding his superiors uninterested in his policies...set out to travel (for almost thirteen years) in a desperate attempt at political and social reform." 8 He was concerned with humankind improving its lot in cooperative and harmonious living with others, or as Chan phrases it: "...believing that man `can make the Way (Tao) great,' and not that `the Way can make man great,' he concentrated on man." 9 Believing in the moral perfectibility of humankind, Confucius stressed the concept of the `superior man,' but in a social revolutionary way, by applying the concept of nobility of character and virtue more broadly and not only to hereditary rulers and those of high rank in Chinese society. 10 57
Although he acknowledged and repeatedly refers to the will of Heaven (T'ien), for him: "...Heaven is no longer the greatest of all spiritual beings who rules in a personal manner but a Supreme Being who only reigns, leaving his Moral Law to operate by itself. This is the Way according to which civilization should develop and men should behave." 11 5.2.2 Mencius Mencius, a man very much in the same mould, as well as of similar background, life and career experiences, as Confucius, was a prominent Chinese reformer, who: "...like Confucius...had a sense of mission, if only to suppress `perversive doctrines.'" 12 More so than Confucius, Mencius proclaimed the original goodness of humankind, as shown below: 13 Humans possess the innate knowledge of the good and `innate ability' to do good; If one `develops one's mind to the utmost' one can `serve Heaven' and `fulfil one's destiny'; Evil is not inborn but due to man's own failures and his inability to avoid evil external influences; Serious efforts must be made to recover our original nature; The end of learning is none other than to `seek for the lost mind.' The Confucian program of educational, moral and political reform - the `three items' and the `eight steps' which is the application of its doctrine of humanity (jen, or conscientiousness and altruism), is contained in the Chinese classic, the Great Learning. The elements of this program are outlined below. 58
The Three Items Manifesting the clear character of man, Loving the people, Abiding in the highest good The Eight Steps Investigation of things, Extension of knowledge, Sincerity of the will, Rectification of the mind, Cultivation of the personal life, Regulation of the family, National order, World peace The process of reasoning follows a double sequence of thought, from the `investigation of things' to `world peace' and back. 14 In summary: Confucius was a humanistic reformer for whom the love of social harmony was the main driving force. A giving of oneself to well-mannered servitude to superiors, subordinates parents, peers and family; and educating people in all these relations, were important to him. What had to be relinquished by people was self-centered, immoral conduct that went against the wishes of rulers and of social `best practice.' 5.3 Islamic 5.3.1 Al-Farabi Although not an active reformer (he was too much of a recluse) Al-Farabi's Platonic model or theory of the ideal city is an example of the ideological mode of thought in Islamic philosophy. Although primarily a type III critic and ancient 59
`deconstructionist,' Al-Ghazali also took on the role of religious reformer in his peregrinations, as will briefly be indicated below. Al-Farabi's theory of the democratic city is an elaboration of Plato's system of the ideal Republic or city-state. Plato's POLITICAL THEORY makes provision for five types of city, in descending order of excellence: the Virtuous (Plato's ideal of rule by the aristocracy), the Timocratic, Oligarchic, Democratic and Tyrannical types of city. Following Khalidi, 15 Al-Farabi's system can be shown to end up with nineteen types of city: the imperfect six types of ignorant, immoral and erring cities, to which the virtuous city is added. His `city of indispensables' is a city surviving on bare necessity, with no luxuries, and is Al-Farabi's version of: "...the primitive city devoid of luxuries described by Socrates." 16 Al-Farabi divided Plato's oligarchic city into two cities: the `Vile city,' that pursues wealth and prosperity, and the `Base city,' which pursues sense pleasures. 17 Similar to Plato, Al-Farabi envisages his ideal city as an organic unity in which each individual is assigned tasks and responsibilities according to unique talents and abilities, with the noblest of these activities: "...allotted to the chief, for he stands in the same relation to the city as the heart to the body and is the source of all activities and the origin of harmony and order..." 18 The chief has all the good qualities associated with being a leader, namely: intelligence, a lover of knowledge, defender of justice. He must rise to the level of `agent intelligence,' where he will receive revelation and inspiration. In addition to these philosopher-king (Platonic) attributes, the chief must have: 60
"...communion with the celestial world as if the city is inhabited by saints and governed by a prophet..." 19 5.3.2 Al-Ghazali Al-Ghazali, as the discussion in chapter 4 showed, may primarily be regarded as an acute thinker and critic of metaphysics, in the type III mode of thought. Yet, there is sufficient indication that he had a strong desire to persuade and reform: "...to be the spiritual champion of the Muslim faith", 20 in the advocacy or praxis mode of the type IV realm of thought. As with his father before him, Al-Ghazali strongly identified with the Sufi movement, to the extent of undergoing private and secret instruction in its deeper intricacies and spiritual exercises. He felt the personal urge `to spread the word' and join the Sufi movement as a religious reformer and, toward this end, journeyed to various cities: Damascus, Jerusalem, Alexandria, Mecca, Medina and back to Baghdad. He eventually became a leading figure in the rise of Sufism, and, as de Boer describes it: "...ever since his time Mysticism both sustains and crowns the Temple of Learning in Orthodox Islam." 21 5.4 Jewish (Pakuda) Ibn Pakuda (circa 12th century), wrote the first treatise on ethics in Judaism, entitled Duties of the Heart. 22 Together with Guide of the Perplexed (Maimonides) and Khuzari (Halevi), it became one of the most celebrated works in Judaism. In an empyrean fashion, Pakuda recommends asceticism: "...as a means of removing hindrances to union with God." 23 61
Pakuda is not against philosophy as such, stating about believers that it is: "...the lamp of their reason, which enables them to come to the will of God..." 24 He appreciates the wisdom of philosophy (whether it be `philosophy of nature,' `mathematical wisdom' or philosophy itself), but they are all merely: "...gates which the Creator, Blessed be He, has opened to human beings." 25 He divides the book into ten sections, one for each of the following principles: "...doctrine of the deity;...an examination of creation;...the service of God, trust in God, action for the sake of God alone, submission to God, repentance, selfexamination, separation from the pleasures of the world, love of God. 26 The rest of the work presents a detailed exposition of a range of different ethical imperatives, according to which the Jewish faithful should think and act. At the core of the book is the distinction between `duties of the limb' and `duties of the heart.' His explicit aim is to promote the latter as being the true wisdom and faith for living the religious life. The Torah is divided into `duties of the body' and `duties that concern thought and feeling.' 27 The former he describes as `the ethics of the body' and the latter as `the ethics of the soul.' The duties of the mind and heart: "...have all of them their roots in human reason, and, like some corporeal duties, would be recognized as binding even without revelation." 28 Figure 5.1 presents an example of a range of duties of the heart. The book consists of many invocations and practical suggestions (`gates') for action by the faithful. 62
Figure 5.1: Pakuda's duties of the heart 29
Duty
Description
1 To accept His Unity and worship Him in our hearts.
2 To trust in Him, and humble ourselves before Him.
3 To tremble at the thought that He looks at us--at all
that is revealed and all that is hidden about us.
4 To desire to do His will.
5 To concentrate all our efforts upon good deeds,
motivated only by the love of God.
6 That we should love Him and those that love Him.
7 We should not think sinful thoughts, or to have sinful
desires.
The following are examples of headings of sections 30 in the Duties of the Heart, namely: The duties of the heart are for every time and place; man's obligation of gratitude to God; the gate of love. Figure 5.2 provides a number of habits of those that love God', as they: "...come opportunely to my mind." 31 Figure 5.2: Pakuda's habits of those that love God 32 They know their God with a practical and fruitful knowledge. They have recognised His rule and His restraining power in all those affairs. They have resolved not to be guided by their own preferences, but to rest in perfect trust upon the Creator. They are humble because of the fear of God. When one speaks with them they are wise. When any sin against them they are meek. They are simple in worldly affairs, but at home in discourse about God. Their hearts are full of the love of God. 63
They have rejected all ways of corruption and chosen the best
paths.
They learn the ways of the Prophets and the customs of the pious
to seek examples of doing the will of God.
Birnbaum 33 provides an informative comparison of the
paradigmatic opposites of Maimonides (type II) and Pakuda
(type IV). Figure 5.3 below, summarizes the differences.
The descriptions are self-explanatory and clearly show
how, in substantive detail, the Aristotelian thinker differs
from the Neo-Platonic reformer intent on purifying the
Jewish religion with his emphasis on a higher-order spiritual
and religious code of ethics.
Figure 5.3: Pakuda compared to Maimonides 34
Pakuda (Type IV) Influence of Plato.
Maimonides (Type II) Influence of Aristotle.
The Duties of the Heart speaks to the multitude, in an egalitarian way. The goal of reason is to bring the believer to the creator through a knowledge of Him. The concern with evil is moralistic. Duties of the mind and body are `equal.' Man is the center of Creation. Guards the Jewish tradition at the price of logical rigor. The soul returns to God and to the World to come.
The Guide of the Perplexed is not meant for the multitude. The goal is to effect a reconciliation between reason (Aristotle) and revelation. Concern with evil is philosophical. Truth of mind prior and anterior to tradition. Man is inferior to heavenly intelligences. Rational consistency at the price of Jewish tradition. The Acquired Intellect returns to the Active Intellect.
64
Birnbaum 35 also compares Pakuda and Maimonides's
different conceptions of the role of reason, by presenting
their distinctive parables. This is shown in summary fashion
in Figures 5.4 and 5.5.
Figure 5.4: Pakuda on the role of reason 36
The king wishes to assess the reasoning ability (wisdom) of
his servants by distributing skeins of raw silk among them
Wise servant
Foolish servant
Divides the silk skeins (Bible) Indiscriminately weaves
into three categories:
garments from the whole lot
superfine (duties of the heart), of skeins; ends up with
medium (Law) and inferior inferior products (duties of the
(Tradition) and wears the
limb only) which he tries to
garments woven from each sell for whatever he can, and
type on appropriate
squanders the money on
occasions at the palace.
food and liquor.
The king is happy with what the wise servant did and gives
him a privileged position at court. The foolish servant is sent
into exile.
Figure 5.5: Maimonides on reason 37
The King is concerned about the ability of the masses for
`cognitive truths'
Levels
Distance from the palace
1. (Lowest) Non-believers who have no religion and any
knowledge; they are outside the city
2.
Those who have false doctrines; they are in
the city but with backs to the palace
3.
The masses who observe the
commandments but who are ignorant; they
seek but cannot find the palace
65
4. 5. 6. (Highest)
Those who study and practice the law out of fear, but do not inquire into the truth of their faith; they arrive at the palace and go around it in search of the gate. Talmudists who investigate the principles of religion and physical sciences; access to the vestibule of the palace. Those who are also schooled in the divine science; the metaphysicians (including prophets) who have achieved true knowledge of God and are able to enter the inner court where the king lives.
There are, however, also similarities and agreement between Pakuda and Maimonides on the following aspects, as Birnbaum 38 indicates: 1. Man's perfection lies in the intellectual worship of God; 2. The heart is the seat of the intellect; 3. Desire and evil arise from the material substance in man which is in opposition to intellect; 4. The intellect is the distinct faculty which links man to God; 5. By virtue of reason, the pious and righteous chosen by God ascend to prophecy; 6. Reason is insufficient to grasp the essence of God.
5.5 African (Nationalist) During the colonial era philosophical ideas in Africa were used mostly by rulers such as Julius Nyerere (Tanzania), Kenneth Kaunda (Zambia) and Leopold Senghor (Senegal) 66
for political purposes, 39 as political theories or ideologies in order to gain independence. 40 Nationalist ideologies in the African context emphasise values such as family, humanity and community. More recent writing 41 is concerned with the usefulness of philosophy, in the context of a global society. In the so-called `Newer debate' as to `what African philosophy is for,' Balogun places the emphasis, not only on rational analysis, but more specifically on: "...reconstructive evaluation of both traditional African cultural experience and modern cultural heritage, in pursuit of the goal of useful living for Africans." 42 A more active, socio-political (type IV) role is envisaged for African philosophers, in order that they can: "...fulfil their scholarly obligations to their societies." 43 67
CHAPTER 6 REVIEW OF THE FOUR TYPES IN NON-WESTERN THOUGHT Chapter 1 briefly introduced the nature and characteristics of four fundamental orientations or modalities of mind in human thought. These, prototypical, ways of making sense of life and world goes back as far as recorded history. It runs through all human intellectual endeavours - ancient and modern ­ and has been found 1, 2 to underlie the content of a wide range of scholarly disciplines and schools of thought (Western as well as Eastern). The purpose of the book is to provide evidence of the existence of the four types of thought in a number of divergent non-western philosophical ideas and systems. These include some renowned figures and schools of thought, such as: Vedanta (Hinduism); (Islamic) Al-Ghazali, Ibn Sina (Avicenna), Ibn Rushd (Averroes); Confucius, Zhuangzi (Chinese); Maimonides, Halevi, Pakuda (Jewish), and African ethno-philosophy. Being a selection, not every kind of non-Western philosophy, of which there is a large variety, could be included for analysis. 6.1 Type I thought The thinkers and schools of thought that typify this modality are, essentially, all metaphysicians (speculative philosophers), or at least metaphysically-inclined. The arch-exemplar of empyrean philosophy in the Western tradition is, of course, Plato with his world of super-sensible entities (Forms) that are supposedly more real than the particulars of senseexperience. 69
Plato (through Neo-Platonism) and the works of Aristotle, jointly occupy a central role in Islamic thought. Both AlKindi and Al-Farabi essentially sought to combine Plato and Aristotle in Neo-Platonic fashion within an Islamic context. Vedanta, with its disinclination to allow any earthly influences and impurities of the flesh in its system, is clearly an approach typical of the empyrean paradigm in orthodox Hinduism. A similar role is performed by the Yin-Yang concept, with its emphasis on the harmony of forces, in Chinese thought. Although not currently very topical, metaphysics in the form of a cosmological hierarchy of: nature, humans, ancestors, and God at the pinnacle, form the backbone of African thought. 6.2 Type II thought As in the West, Eastern and African thought also show the presence of the scientific modality of mind. The empiricist (type II) emphasis in Non-Western philosophies is found in: The `atomistic pluralism' and perception as source of knowledge of the Nyaya-Vaisesika; The attention to functionality, logic and scientific topics, of the Chinese schools of Mohism, Legalism and the Logicians; The importance of sense-experience and the principle of causality in the systems of Ibn Sina and Ibn Rushd (both of whom were also medical practitioners); The central importance of Aristotelian concepts in the system of Maimonides (Jewish), who thought that 70
one should only believe what can be grasped with the intellect or perceived by the senses; The influence of Western analytic (scientific) philosophy on African professional philosophy. 6.3 Type III thought Here we, by and large, find the anti-metaphysical stance of thinkers in the subjectivist-empiricist tradition of philosophy. The narrative-interpretive orientation finds expression in: The rejection of Reason (objectivism) by the Hindu School of Mimamsa, for whom the Vedas only require the daily duties and acts of devotion by ordinary believers; The philosophy of living in harmony with nature, of Daoism, and the poetical nature-mysticism of Zhuangzi (Chinese); The religious mysticism (Sufism) of Al-Ghazali, who rejected the metaphysical reasoning of the Islamic philosophers and of knowledge based on senseperception (see type II); The importance for Judah Halevi of defending the Jewish faith and culture, in the narrative-poetical mode; The preference for ethno-philosophy and communal wisdom in African thought. 6.4 Type IV thought The subjectivist-empyrean modality of mind in Eastern and African thought is evidenced in: The program of asceticism and inner salvation of the School of Patanjali Yoga (Hinduism); 71
The philosophy and program of social reform and education of Confucius and Mencius (Chinese); The concern of Al-Farabi to create an Islamic political dispensation that closely follows Plato's rules for ideal city; and the importance of Al-Ghazali in the rise of Medieval Sufism, as well as his desire to be the `spiritual champion' of the Muslim faith; The nationalist-ideological philosophy of African political leaders and thinkers. 6.5 Concluding comment The present analysis leaves little doubt as to the existence and operation of fundamentally different orientations of mind in Non-Western philosophical thought. No thinker (Western or Non-Western) can get away from certain root intellectual stances or points of departure. It is at the root of their concepts, theories and doctrines and reflects often unspoken (if not unrecognized) assumptions about the nature of the true, the real and the good. 72
REFERENCES Chapter 1: Fundamental approaches in human thought 1 Cornford, F. M. (1991/1912). From Religion to Philosophy, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 2 Kirkwood, G. M. (1995). A Short Guide to Classical Mythology, Illinois: Boldchazy-Carducci. 3 Rosenberg, D. and Baker, S. (1992). Mythology and You, Illinois: National Textbook Company. 4 Kant, I. (1934/1787). Critique of Pure Reason, translated J. M. D. Meiklejohn. London: Dent. 5 Ibid., p483. 6 Schiller, F. (1967/1793). On the Aesthetic Education of Man, translated E.M. Wilkinson and L.A. Willoughby. London: Oxford. 7 Berlin, I. (1978). Concepts and Categories: Philosophical Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p171. 8 Bernstein, R.J. (1983). Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics and Praxis. Oxford: Blackwell. 9 Plato, (360 BCE). Philebus, Translated by Benjamin Jowett, p8 [http://classics.mit.edu/Help/permissions.html]. 10 Plato, (1987). The Republic. translated H.D.P. Lee. England: Penguin Books. 11Jones, W.T. (1970). The Classical Mind: A History of Western Philosophy. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich. p243. 12 Pietersen, H. J. (2011). The Four Types of Knowing ­ Metaphysical, Scientific, Narrative and Pragmatic: A MetaEpistemology of Mind, New York: Edwin Mellen Press. 13 Pietersen, H. J. (2014). The Four Archetypal Orientations of the Mind: Foundational, Experiential, Organizational and Actional. New York: Edwin Mellen Press. 73
Chapter 2. Speculative Non-Western thought (I) 1 Dasgupta, S. (1922). A History of Indian philosophy: Volume I. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 2 Ibid., p413. 3 Ibid., p432. 4 Ibid., p436. 5 Ibid., p440. 6 Ibid., p441. 7 Ibid., 8 Ibid., p491 ­ 493. 9 Chan, Wing-Tsit. (1963). A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 10 Ibid., p244. 11 Ibid., 12 Ibid., p245. 13 Ibid., p246. 14 Ng, On-cho. (2008). Introduction: The Yijing and its commentaries, Journal of Chinese Philosophy, p194. 15 De Boer, T.J. (2003). The History of Philosophy in Islam, Translated by E.R. Jones, New York: Islamic Philosophy Online, Inc. 16 Shariff, M.M. (Ed) (2004). A History of Muslim Philosophy. Pakistan: Pakistan Philosophical Congress, at Islamic Philosophy Online, Inc. 17 De Boer, T.J. (2003). The History of Philosophy in Islam. Translated by E.R. Jones, New York: Islamic Philosophy Online, Inc., p81. 18 Shariff, M.M. (Ed) (2004). A History of Muslim Philosophy. Pakistan: Pakistan Philosophical Congress, at Islamic Philosophy Online, Inc. 74
19 De Boer, T.J. (2003). The History of Philosophy in Islam. Translated by E.R. Jones, New York: Islamic Philosophy Online, Inc., p82. 20 Ibid ibid., p83. 21 Shariff, M.M. (Ed) (2004). A History of Muslim Philosophy. Pakistan: Pakistan Philosophical Congress, at Islamic Philosophy Online, Inc., p425. 22 Ibid., p426. 23 Ibid., p428. 24 Ibid., p429. 25 Ibid., p432. 26 De Boer, T.J. (2003). The History of Philosophy in Islam. Translated by E.R. Jones, New York: Islamic Philosophy Online, Inc., p86. 27 Ibid. 28 Shariff, M.M. (Ed) (2004). A History of Muslim Philosophy. Pakistan: Pakistan Philosophical Congress, at Islamic Philosophy Online, Inc. 29 Butterworth, C.E. (2001). Ethics in Medieval Islamic philosophy', Journal of Religious Ethics, pp.224 ­ 239. 30 De Boer, T.J. (2003). The History of Philosophy in Islam. Translated by E.R. Jones, New York: Islamic Philosophy Online, Inc., p88. 31 Ibid., p90. 32 Ibid., p92. 33 Ibid., p92. 34 Shariff, M.M. (Ed) (2004). A History of Muslim Philosophy. Pakistan: Pakistan Philosophical Congress, at Islamic Philosophy Online, Inc., p457. 75
35 De Boer, T.J. (2003). The History of Philosophy in Islam. Translated by E.R. Jones, New York: Islamic Philosophy Online, Inc., p97. 36 Butterworth, C.E. (2001). Ethics in Medieval Islamic philosophy ', Journal of Religious Ethics, p228. 37 Ibid., p229. 38 Gabirol, Ibn Solomon (Avicebron) (1962) The Fountain of Life (Fons Vitae), specially abridged edition, translated from the Latin by Harry E. Wedeck, with an introduction by Theodore E. James, Wisdom Library, a division of Philosophical Library, New York. 39 Pessin, S (2010) Solomon Ibn Gabirol [Avicebron], Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. First published Thursday Sep 23, 2010. 40 James T E (1962) Introduction to: Gabirol, Ibn Solomon (Avicebron) (1962). The Fountain of Life (Fons Vitae), specially abridged edition, translated from the Latin by Harry E. Wedeck, with an introduction by Theodore E. James, Wisdom Library, a division of Philosophical Library, New York, pvii. 41 Gabirol, Ibn Solomon (Avicebron) (1962) The Fountain of Life (Fons Vitae), specially abridged edition, translated from the Latin by Harry E. Wedeck, with an introduction by Theodore E. James, Wisdom Library, a division of Philosophical Library, New York, p1. 42 Ibid., p5. 43 Husik, I (1916) A History of Mediaeval Jewish Philosophy, New York: MacMillan Company, p63. 44 Gabirol, Ibn Solomon (Avicebron) (1962) The Fountain of Life (Fons Vitae), specially abridged edition, translated from the Latin by Harry E. Wedeck, with an introduction by 76
Theodore E. James, Wisdom Library, a division of Philosophical Library, New York, p5. 45 Husik, I (1916) A History of Mediaeval Jewish Philosophy, New York: MacMillan Company, pp. 61 and 62. 46 Ibid., p65. 47 Ibid., p65. 48 Ibid., p65. 49 Ibid., p67. 50 Ibid. p68. 51 Ibid., p69. 52 Ibid., p70. 53 Ibid., p79. 54 Teffo, L.J and A.P.J Roux. (1998). Metaphysical thinking in Africa, in Coetzee, P.H. and A.P.J. Roux (Editors). Philosophy from Africa: A Text with Readings. Johannesburg: International Thompson. 55 Ibid., p138. 56 Ibid. 57 Ibid., p138. 58 Ibid., p139. 59 Ibid., p139. 60 Ibid., p140. 61 Ibid., p141. Chapter 3: Scientific non-Western thought (II) 1 Dasgupta, S. (1922). A History of Indian Philosophy: Volume I, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 2 Ibid., p295. 3 Ibid., p295. 4 Ibid., p296. 5 Ibid., p286. 77
6 Ibid., p311. 7 Ibid., p313. 8 Ibid., 9 Ibid., p313. 10 Ibid., p321. 11 Ibid., p334. 12 Chan, Wing-Tsit. (1963). A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 13 Ibid., p211. 14 Ibid., p217. 15 Ibid., 16 Ibid., p232. 17 Ibid., p232. 18 Ibid., p251. 19 Ibid., p252. 20 Ibid., p253. 21 Ibid., p257. 22 De Boer, T.J. (2003). The History of Philosophy in Islam. Translated by E.R. Jones, New York: Islamic Philosophy Online, Inc. 23 Shariff, M.M. (2004). (Ed). A History of Muslim Philosophy. Pakistan: Pakistan Philosophical Congress, Islamic Philosophy Online, Inc. 24 Butterworth, C.E. (2001). Ethics in Medieval Islamic philosophy, Journal of Religious Ethics, p224 - 239 25 De Boer, T.J. (2003). The History of Philosophy in Islam. Translated by E.R. Jones, New York: Islamic Philosophy Online, Inc., p108. 26 Ibid., p109. 27 Ibid., p112. 78
28 Shariff, M.M. (2004). (Ed). A History of Muslim Philosophy. Pakistan: Pakistan Philosophical Congress, Islamic Philosophy Online, Inc., p480. 29 Ibid., p481. 30 Ibid., p483. 31 Ibid., p487. 32 Ibid., p490. 33 Ibid., p493. 34 Butterworth, C.E. (2001). Ethics in Medieval Islamic philosophy, Journal of Religious Ethics, p232. 35 De Boer, T.J. (2003). The History of Philosophy in Islam. Translated by E.R. Jones, New York: Islamic Philosophy Online, Inc., p146 36 Butterworth, C.E. (2001). Ethics in Medieval Islamic philosophy, Journal of Religious Ethics, p234. 37 De Boer, T.J. (2003). The History of Philosophy in Islam. Translated by E.R. Jones, New York: Islamic Philosophy Online, Inc., p148. 38 Ibid., p149. 39 Ibid., p151. 40 Shariff, M.M. (2004). (Ed). A History of Muslim Philosophy. Pakistan: Pakistan Philosophical Congress, Islamic Philosophy Online, Inc., p550. 41 Ibid., p558. 42 Ibid., p553. 43 Butterworth, C.E. (2001). Ethics in Medieval Islamic philosophy, Journal of Religious Ethics, p236. 44 Friedlander, M. Introduction, In: Maimonides, Moses (1904) The Guide of the Perplexed. Translated from the original Arabic text by M. Friedlander, 2nd Edition, revised 79
throughout. New York: Publications of the Hebrew Literature Society, p32. 45 Maimonides, Moses (1904) The Guide of the Perplexed. Translated from the original Arabic text by M. Friedlander, 2nd Edition, revised throughout. NewYork: Publications of the Hebrew Literature Society. 46 Friedlander, M. Introduction, In: Maimonides, Moses (1904). The Guide of the Perplexed. Translated from the original Arabic text by M. Friedlander, 2nd Edition, revised throughout. New York: Publications of the Hebrew Literature Society, p33. 47 Ibid., p60. 48 Maimonides, Moses (1904) The Guide of the Perplexed. Translated from the original Arabic text by M. Friedlander, 2nd Edition, revised throughout. New York: Publications of the Hebrew Literature Society, p379). 49 Ibid., p103. 50 Ibid., p104. 51 Ibid., p360. 52 Ibid., p452. 53 Ibid., p554. 54 Ibid., pp.691 ­ 694. 55 Husik, I (1916) A History of Mediaeval Jewish Philosophy, New York: MacMillan Company, p322. 56 Ibid., p327. 57 Ibid., p360. 58 Ibid., p 360. 59 Birnbaum, R. (2007) Maimonides, then and now, Judaism, p67. 60 Mosley, A. (1995). Translating philosophical meaning, Africa Today, Vol. 42, (3), p68-73. 80
61 Ibid., p68. 62 Ibid., p69. 63 Kaphagawani, D.N. (1998). What is African philosophy? in Coetzee, P.H. and A.P.J Roux (eds), 1998. Philosophy from Africa: A Text with Readings. Johannesburg: International Thompson, p98. 64 Ibid., p98. 65 Fasiku, G. (2008). African philosophy and the method of ordinary language philosophy, The Journal of Pan African Studies, Vol.2 (3), p102. Chapter 4: Narrative Non-Western thought (III) 1 Dasgupta, S. (1922). A History of Indian Philosophy, Volume I. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, p371. 2 Ibid., p374. 3 Ibid., p375. 4 Ibid., p383. 5 Ibid., p404. 6 Chan, Wing-Tsit. (1963). A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy. Princeton: Princeton University Press 7 Ibid., p136. 8 Ibid., p137. 9 Ibid., 10 Ibid., p143. 11 Ibid., p177. 12 Ibid., p178. 13 Ibid., p179. 14 Ibid., 15 Lai, K.L. (2006). Philosophy and philosophical reasoning in the Zhuangzi: dealing with plurality, Journal of Chinese Philosophy, p365. 81
16 Sheikh, M. S. (1982). Islamic Philosophy. London: Octagon Press, p85. 17 Fakhry, M. (1983). History of Islamic Philosophy. Second Edition, New York: Columbia University Press, p35. 18 Albertini, T. (2005). Crisis and certainty of knowledge in Al-Ghazali (1058-1110) and Descartes (1596-1650), Philosophy East & West, Volume 55, (1), p3. 19 Ibid., p4. 20 Fakhry, M. (1983).History of Islamic Philosophy. Second Edition, New York: Columbia University Press, p36. 21 Sheikh, M. S. (1982). Islamic Philosophy. London: Octagon Press. 22 Ibid., p95. 23 Halevi, Judah (1905) Kitab al Khazari. Translated from the Arabic by Hartwig Hirschfeld, New York: E. P. Dutton [Scanned at sacred-texts.com, March 2006.] 24 Ibid., p35. 25 Ibid., p39. 26 Ibid., pp36 ­ 40. 27 Ibid., pp. 40 ­ 42. 28 Ibid., pp. 42 ­ 44. 29 Ibid., pp. 44 ­ 87. 30 Husik, I (1916) A History of Mediaeval Jewish Philosophy, New York: MacMillan Company, p204. 31 Ibid., p206. 32 Ibid., p206. 33 Ibid., p222. 34 Ibid., p223. 35 Ibid., p225. 36 Berger, M. S. (1992) Toward a new understanding of Judah Halevi's Kuzari, The Journal ofReligion,p210. 82
37 Kaplan, L. J. (2011) `The starling's caw': Judah Halevi as philosopher, poet, and pilgrim, The Jewish Quarterly Review, Vol. 101, No. 1, pp. 97 and 98. 38 Oladipo, O. (1995). Reason, identity, and the African quest: The problems of self-definition in African philosophy, Africa Today, Vol. 42 (3), pp.26 ­ 39. 39 Ibid., p26. 40 Kaphagawani, D.N. (1998). What is African philosophy? in Coetzee, P.H. and A.P.J Roux (eds) 1998. Philosophy from Africa: A Text with Readings. Johannesburg: International Thompson, pp. 86 ­ 98. 41 Appiah, K. A. (1998). Ethno-philosophy and its critics, in Coetzee, P.H. and A.P.J Roux (eds) 1998. Philosophy from Africa: A Text with Readings. Johannesburg: International Thompson, pp. 109 ­ 117. 42 Oruka, H. (1998). Sage philosophy, in Coetzee, P.H. and A.P.J Roux (eds) 1998. Philosophy from Africa: A Text with Readings. Johannesburg: International Thompson, pp99 ­ 108. 43 Ibid., p100. Chapter 5: Pragmatic non-Western thought (IV) 1 Dasgupta, S. (1922). A History of Indian Philosophy. Volume I, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 2 Ibid., p277. 3 Ibid., p217. 4 Ibid., p271. 5 Ibid., 6 Ibid., p272. 7 Chan, Wing-Tsit. (1963). A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 8 Ibid., p17. 83
9 Ibid., p16. 10 Ibid., p17. 11 Ibid., p16. 12 Ibid., p49. 13 Ibid., 14 Ibid., pp.86 and 87. 15 Khalidi, Muhammad Ali. (2003). Alfarabi on the democratic city, British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 11(3), pp. 379­ 394. 16 Ibid., p383. 17 Ibid., 18 Shariff, M.M. (Ed) (2004). A History of Muslim Philosophy. Pakistan: Pakistan Philosophical Congress, by Islamic Philosophy Online, Inc, p463. 19 Ibid., p463. 20 De Boer, T.J. (2003). The History of Philosophy in Islam. Translated by E.R. Jones, New York: Islamic Philosophy Online, Inc.,p123. 21 Ibid., p122. 22 Pakuda (Rabbi Bachye bar Joseph ibn Bakoda) (1909) The Duties of the Heart, translated, with introduction by Edwin Collins, Hellier Hebrew Scholar, University College, London, 2nd impression, John Murray, Albemarle Street, Printed by Hazell, Watson &Viney, Ltd., London and Aylesbury W. [Scanned, proofed and formatted at sacred-texts.com, February 2010]. 23 Collins, E, Introduction, In: Pakuda (Rabbi Bachye bar Joseph ibn Bakoda) (1909) The Duties of the Heart, translated, with introduction by Edwin Collins, Hellier Hebrew Scholar, University College, London, 2nd impression, John Murray, Albemarle Street, Printed by Hazell, Watson & Viney, Ltd., 84
London and Aylesbury W. [Scanned, proofed and formatted at sacred-texts.com, February 2010], p12. 24 Pakuda (Rabbi Bachye bar Joseph ibn Bakoda) (1909) The Duties of the Heart, translated, with introduction by Edwin Collins, Hellier Hebrew Scholar, University College, London, 2nd impression, John Murray, Albemarle Street, Printed by Hazell, Watson & Viney, Ltd., London and Aylesbury W. [Scanned, proofed and formatted at sacred-texts.com, February 2010], p15. 25 Ibid., p15. 26 Husik, I (1916) A History of Mediaeval Jewish Philosophy, New York: MacMillan Company, p135. 27 Pakuda (Rabbi Bachye bar Joseph ibn Bakoda) (1909) The Duties of the Heart, translated, with introduction by Edwin Collins, Hellier Hebrew Scholar, University College, London, 2nd impression, John Murray, Albemarle Street, Printed by Hazell, Watson & Viney, Ltd., London and Aylesbury W. [Scanned, proofed and formatted at sacred-exts.com, February 2010], pp. 17 and 18. 28 Ibid., p18. 29 Ibid., pp. 18 ­ 19. 30 Ibid., pp. 22 ­ 57. 31 Ibid., p57. 32 Ibid., pp. 57 ­ 59. 33 Birnbaum, R (2001) The role of reason in Bahya and Maimonides, SHOFAR, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 76 ­ 86. 34 Ibid.,pp. 76 ­ 86. 35 Birnbaum, R (2001) The role of reason in Bahya and Maimonides, SHOFAR, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 76. 36 Ibid., p79. 37 Ibid., pp. 79 ­ 80. 85
38 Ibid., pp. 84-85. 39 Mosley, A. (1995). Translating philosophical meaning, Africa Today, Vol. 42, (3), p68-73. 40 Ikuenobe, P. (1997). The parochial universalist conception of philosophy and African philosophy, Philosophy East & West, Vol. 47 (2), pp.189-211. 41 Balogun, O.A. (2008). Philosophy: What social relevance?, Philosophia Africana, Vol. II (2), pp.103-116. 42 Ibid., p106. 43 Ibid., p108. Chapter 6: Review of Non-Western thought 1 Pietersen, H. J. (2011). The Four Types of Knowing ­ Metaphysical, Scientific, Narrative and Pragmatic: A MetaEpistemology of Mind, New York: Edwin Mellen Press. 2 Pietersen, H. J. (2014). The Four Archetypal Orientations of the Mind: Foundational, Experiential, Organizational and Actional. New York: Edwin Mellen Press. 86
BIBLIOGRAPHY Albertini, T. (2005). Crisis and certainty of knowledge in Al- Ghazali (1058-1110) and Descartes (1596-1650), Philosophy East & West, Volume 55, (1). Balogun, O.A. (2008). Philosophy: What social relevance? Philosophia Africana, Vol. II (2). Berger, M. S. (1992) Toward a new understanding of Judah Halevi's Kuzari, The Journal of Religion. Birnbaum, R (2001) The role of Reason in Bahya and Maimonides, SHOFAR, Vol. 19, No. 2. Birnbaum, R. (2007) Maimonides, then and now, Judaism. Butterworth, C.E. (2001). Ethics in Medieval Islamic philosophy, Journal of Religious Ethics. Chan, Wing-Tsit (1963) A source book in Chinese philosophy, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Collins, E, Introduction, In: Pakuda (Rabbi Bachye bar Joseph ibn Bakoda) (1909) The Duties of the Heart, translated, with introduction by Edwin Collins, Hellier Hebrew Scholar, University College, London, 2nd impression, John Murray, Albemarle Street, Printed by Hazell, Watson & Viney, Ltd., London and Aylesbury W. [Scanned, proofed and formatted at sacred-texts.com, February 2010]. Dasgupta, S. (1922). A History of Indian Philosophy: Volume I. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. De Boer, T.J. (2003). The History of Philosophy in Islam, Translated by E.R. Jones, New York: Islamic Philosophy Online, Inc. Fakhry, M. (1983). History of Islamic Philosophy. Second Edition, New York: Columbia University Press. 87
Fasiku, G. (2008). African philosophy and the method of ordinary language philosophy, The Journal of Pan African Studies, Vol.2 (3). Friedlander, M. Introduction, In: Maimonides, Moses (1904) The Guide of the Perplexed. Translated from the original Arabic text by M. Friedlander, 2nd Edition, revised throughout. New York: Publications of the Hebrew Literature Society. Gabirol, Ibn Solomon (Avicebron) (1962) The Fountain of Life (Fons Vitae), specially abridged edition, translated from the Latin by Harry E. Wedeck, with an introduction by Theodore E. James, Wisdom Library, a division of Philosophical Library, New York. Halevi, Judah (1905) Kitab al Khazari. Translated from the Arabic by Hartwig Hirschfeld, New York: E. P. Dutton [Scanned at sacred-texts.com, March 2006.] Holzman, G (2006) Truth, tradition and religion. The association between Judaism and Islam and the relation between religion and philosophy in Medieval Jewish thought, Al-Masaq, Vol. 18, No. 2, September 2006. Husik, I (1916) A History of Mediaeval Jewish Philosophy, New York: MacMillan Company. Ikuenobe, P. (1997). The parochial universalist conception of philosophy and African philosophy, Philosophy East & West, Vol. 47 (2). James T E (1962) Introduction to: Gabirol, Ibn Solomon (Avicebron) (1962). The Fountain of Life (Fons Vitae), specially abridged edition, translated from the Latin by Harry E. Wedeck, with an introduction by Theodore E. James, Wisdom Library, a division of Philosophical Library, New York. 88
Kaphagawani, D.N. (1998). What is African philosophy? in Coetzee, P.H. and A.P.J Roux (eds), 1998. Philosophy from Africa: A Text with Readings. Johannesburg: International Thompson. Kaplan, L. J. (2011) `The Starling's Caw': Judah Halevi as philosopher, poet, and pilgrim, The Jewish Quarterly Review, Vol. 101, No. 1. Khalidi, Muhammad Ali. (2003). Alfarabi on the democratic city, British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 11(3). Lai, K.L. (2006). Philosophy and philosophical reasoning in the Zhuangzi: dealing with plurality, Journal of Chinese Philosophy. Maimonides, Moses (1904) The Guide of the Perplexed. Translated from the original Arabic text by M. Friedlander, 2nd Edition, revised throughout. New York: Publications of the Hebrew Literature Society. Mosley, A. (1995). Translating philosophical meaning, Africa Today, Vol. 42, (3). Ng, On-cho. (2008). Introduction: The Yijing and its commentaries, Journal of Chinese Philosophy. Oladipo, O. (1995). Reason, identity, and the African quest: The problems of self-definition in African philosophy, Africa Today, Vol. 42 (3). Oruka, H. (1998). Sage philosophy, in Coetzee, P.H. and A.P.J Roux (eds) 1998. Philosophy from Africa: A Text with Readings. Johannesburg: International Thompson. Pakuda (Rabbi Bachye bar Joseph ibn Bakoda) (1909) The Duties of the Heart, translated, with introduction by Edwin Collins, Hellier Hebrew Scholar, University College, London, 2nd impression, John Murray, Albemarle Street, Printed by Hazell, Watson &Viney, Ltd., London and 89
Aylesbury W. [Scanned, proofed and formatted at sacredtexts.com, February 2010]. Pessin, S (2010). Solomon Ibn Gabirol [Avicebron], Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. First published Thursday Sep 23, 2010. Pietersen, H. J. (2011). The Four Types of Knowing ­Metaphysical, Scientific, Narrative and Pragmatic: A Meta-Epistemology of Mind, New York: Edwin Mellen Press. Pietersen, H. J. (2014). The Four Archetypal Orientations of the Mind: Foundational, Experiential, Organizational and Actional. New York: Edwin Mellen Press. Shariff, M.M. (Ed) (2004). A History of Muslim Philosophy. Pakistan: Pakistan Philosophical Congress, at Islamic Philosophy Online, Inc. Sheikh, M. S. (1982). Islamic Philosophy. London: Octagon Press. 90
Four fundamental and interrelated intellectual orientations were found to characterize the thought of a global range of thinkers, disciplines, and cultures (Western, Eastern and African). This volume consists of a review of the four types in Non-Western thought. Professor Pietersen has made contributions to philosophy, theology, sociology, psychology, jurisprudence, and business and Human Resource Management. He is the author of: The Four Types of Knowing ­ Metaphysical, Scientific, Narrative and Pragmatic: A Metaepistemology of Mind (2011) and The Four Archetypal Orientations of the Mind: Foundational, Experiential, Organizational and Actional (2014), both published by Edwin Mellen, New York. ISBN: 978-1-86922-612-1

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