Greener Grass and Local Civic Engagement: the Effects of Housing Market Structures on Politics in Japan and the United States, L Schoppa

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Content: Greener Grass and Local Civic Engagement: the Effects of Housing Market Structures on Politics in Japan and the United States By: Leonard Schoppa Date: August 30, 2009 Prepared for the UCLA Conference on Japan's Politics and Economy (Sept 11-12, 2009) My older daughter started school in the United States. On the first day at her elementary school, my wife and I walked her to the corner where we joined several other children and their parents to wait for the school bus. A few minutes later she boarded the bus bravely, watched us wave goodbye, and sat down for a short ride to the school, where she was greeted as she stepped off the bus by the school principal. Her experience was pretty typical of children all across America. In 2001, about 30 percent of elementary school children arrived on a school bus. Another 50 percent arrived in a private vehicle, typically dropped off by a parent. Just 17 percent walked or biked to school, the modes that had been the most common way of getting to school in 1969, when over 40 percent of children traveled to school under their own propulsion.1 My younger daughter started school in Japan. Prior to the start of school, we received detailed instructions about how transportation arrangements would be handled on day 1. We were under no circumstances to accompany our daughter to school, on foot or by any other means. We were instead to wait with her in our home, and a neighborhood child would come by to escort her to school. As promised, a sixth-grade girl from our apartment complex pushed the doorbell at the assigned hour. She smiled at our nervous little one and led her out the door, where they joined a growing group of children who began to fill the sidewalks from several directions. All of the first-graders had back-packs covered 1 National Household Travel Survey, NHTS Brief, January 2008, p. 1. The results of the 2008 survey are not yet available. 1
by bright yellow plastic safety signs and bright yellow hats. At the cross-walk next to our building, a middle-aged volunteer held out a flag and made sure the children got across the busy street safely. The route to school took the kids along a busy trunk road, with a steady stream of truck traffic, but they were buffered from the road by a hedge row and a safety rail. After proceeding down this road for about ten minutes, the children turned down a narrow street. This one did not have sidewalks but was marked with yellow signs identifying it as a designated "route to school" (tsgakuro). Vehicles in this neighborhood would know to avoid this road at peak walk-to-school times or would move very slowly past the children. At the school gates about five minutes down this street, the children were welcomed by the school principal.2 Our daughter's experience on her first day of school was also typical of the Japanese experience. Only 8.7 percent of Japanese schools, mostly in very rural and mountainous areas, run school buses. Public schools uniformly ban private vehicle drop-offs.3 As a result, the vast majority of elementary school children arrive on foot in groups like those described above. All schools maintain designated walking routes to school. They employ crossing-guards and other volunteers who keep an eye on the children to help keep them safe as they walk to school. When traffic or other dangers are perceived to be a problem, committees composed of PTA representatives and representatives from the local neighborhood association (chnaikai) meet to work out a plan to improve the infrastructure. If one of these committees, together with the principal, calls on local elected officials to put in place a guard rail or a traffic light, the improvements happen almost immediately.4 2 The school route described is in Mitaka City, in suburban Tokyo. 3 Interview with MEXT official, November 2, 2007. He explained the MEXT and local schools usually arrange for a school bus if students live more than one-hour walk from the school, although they do so in a few cases where children's walking times are under an hour. 4 Interview with former elected representative of the City of Koganei, in suburban Tokyo, August 2009. 2
Walking to school was never this organized in United States, but it was once the most common mode. And yet today it has largely disappeared. Part of what has happened is that communities in the United States have spread out. The National Household Travel Survey shows that the proportion of children living over two miles from their school has grown from about 40 percent in 1969 to about 60 percent.5 Two miles is a long way for a small child to walk. But even in areas built in the 1950s, where the same schools serve the same neighborhoods and most children live less than two miles from school, the rate of walking to school has plummeted. The borders of the City of Charlottesville were frozen in 1980 and the area within them was largely built out by that time, so the homes and the schools in our city are virtually identical to those that existed in 1969. I don't have local travel to school data from past decades, but assuming children in our town were typical of children elsewhere in the country, 40 percent of them walked or biked to school in the 1960s. Today, just xx percent of children walk to their elementary schools in Charlottesville.6 So it is not just recent sprawl, but the failure of communities like mine to address concerns about traffic safety and crime that has led parents to deliver their children to the schoolhouse door in person or rely on school buses. Why have Japanese and American communities responded to the common challenge of getting our children to school safely in such different ways? This paper focuses on this specific puzzle, but it is part of a broader project that examines why Japanese have a higher level of civic engagement across a variety of local issue areas. The stress is on the word local because, as a variety of studies have noted (e.g. Pekkanen 2006), Japanese civil society is relatively weak at the national level. Outside the realm of interest groups set up to serve sectoral economic interests (Nokyo, Keidanren, Rengo), there are few 5 NHTS Brief, January 2008, p. 1. 6 Data compiled by the Alliance for Community Choice in Transportation during school year 2008-2009 under a grant funded by the Virginia Department of Transportation (data expected in mid-September). 3
powerful membership-based national organizations working to shape national policy in the "public interest." But as some of the same studies have noted (Pekkanen 2006, Haddad 2007, Aldrich 2008), civic engagement at the local level is vibrant in Japan, even in comparison to the situation in the United States, where observers have been extolling civic involvement since de Tocqueville in the 1830s.7 Membership rates in parent-teacher organizations at local schools is four times as high today in Japan as in the United States, while membership in volunteer firefighting organizations are twice as high (Haddad 2007, p. 5). Meanwhile, 90 percent of Japanese belong to chnaikai (neighborhood organizations), with an estimated 40-70 participating actively in these organizations' activities (Pekkanen 2006, p. 33). Civic engagement through (and alongside) organizations of these types has helped Japan achieve high levels of performance across a range of public policies that are carried out primarily at the local level. Not only has Japan managed to maintain a safe environment for children to walk and bike to school, it has built and maintained an infrastructure that effectively supports these alternative modes (and public transportation) for adults in most communities. More Japanese do their grocery shopping by car in recent years, but there are still large bicycle-parking areas in front of most stores, along with bike paths that allow even elderly men and women to do their daily shopping by bike. Shopping areas are also served by sidewalks and public transportation. In contrast, in most areas of the United States, grocery shops are largely inaccessible by any means other than the automobile. Another area where local civic engagement (e.g. the high levels of PTA membership) helps Japan achieve high performance at the local level is in elementary education. About 90 percent of Japanese school children attend local public schools in their own neighborhood, and these children earn among 7 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Penguin Ed, 2003; Hartz 1955; Lipset 1996. 4
the top test scores in the world. Two additional areas I am focusing on in the project is that of community policing, where effective interactions between police based in the community and civic organizations like the chnaikai have been a major factor keeping Japan's crime rates low, and NIMBY activism against projects like trash incinerator facilities and dumps, which have been ferocious in many areas of Japan. Rather than focus on all of these issue areas at once, however, I focus in this paper on the contrast in walk-to-school policies and performance between the United States and Japan as an initial foray into teasing out the forces that influence levels of civic engagement and policy outcomes. The paper is organized as follows. I begin by examining the most common explanations for differences in the ways Japan and the United States organize their transportation and land use systems, starting with those who attribute it entirely to differences in geography. As I raise questions about each of these explanations in turn, I develop an alternative explanation that emphasizes the path-dependent interaction between past policies and the political and economic choices made by Japanese households. A variety of scholars have emphasized path-dependent influence of past policies on later policies (e.g. Myles and Pierson 2001, Pierson 2004, Thelen 2004, Morgan 2006; Iversen 2005). In my view, however, these studies have under-theorized the relationship between political and economic choices available to political actors in response to past policies. My explanation draws on the insights of Albert Hirschman (1970) and his exit-voice framework to model how economic (exit) options interact with political (voice) opportunities to shape behavior. High levels of local civic engagement, the model suggests, are more likely when local residents find it costly to move to a new location. The Japanese housing market, I show, imposes much higher costs on residents who wish to move than does the housing market in the United States. Thus, I argue, the critical factor driving Japanese citizens to get 5
involved in their local communities to preserve safe walking and biking routes, and good schools, and low crime rates is the costliness of their exit options. Geographic Determinism? When confronted with this specific puzzle, the first reaction of most Americans and Japanese is to point to the well-known difference in population density between the two countries. Japan has 127 million residents living in 364 thousand square kilometers, for a population density level of 336 persons per square kilometer. In contrast, the United States has 307 million residents living in 9.8 million square kilometers, for a population density level of 31.3 persons per square kilometer.8 In other words, Japan is ten times as densely populated as the United States. Therefore, the argument goes, American cities and towns have naturally spread out over larger territories, making the automobile and school buses the only modes of transportation that serve the widely-dispersed American population. The problem with this argument is that it boils each country down to a single density figure when in fact different regions of each country differ greatly in their population density. The need to consider this variation becomes clear if you examine the density levels of counties and prefectures in Japan and California. I chose California as a reference point because its total area is similar to Japan's and its counties are roughly the same size as Japanese prefectures (See Table 1). California's statewide population density of 84 persons per square kilometer is still much lower than the 336 persons per square kilometer in Japan, but at the county level it turns out some areas of the state are just as densely-populated as Japanese cities. San Francisco County is more densely populated than Tokyo Prefecture. Orange County and Aichi Prefecture (Japan's fifth-most-densely populated prefecture) have similar levels of density. At the same time, parts of Japan are as sparsely populated as many California 8 From CIA World Factbook, access on August 17, 2009. 6
counties. Kumamoto and Okayama, for example, have population densities similar to San Diego and Santa Cruz Counties in California. What is striking about Japan's walk to school program is that it operates just as vibrantly in the less populated areas of Japan, like Kumamoto and Okayama, as it does in Tokyo. Again, I don't have locality-specific data for walk-to-school rates in San Diego and Santa Cruz, but my guess is that they are very low. Walk-to-school rates in San Francisco are probably higher, but my guess is that rates in Orange County are very low--despite the fact that it is just as densely populated as many Japanese urban/suburban prefectures. The geography of the two countries cannot by itself account for the policy difference we have observed.
Table 1: Population Densities of Japanese and Californian Localities
California County San Francisco County Orange County Los Angeles County Alameda County San Mateo County Contra Costa County Santa Clara County Sacramento County San Diego County Santa Cruz County Solano County Marin County Ventura County San Joaquin County Stanislaus County Sonoma County Riverside County Placer County Yolo County Napa County Santa Barbara County
Pop/sq mile 16,634 3,606 2,344 1,957 1,575 1,318 1,304 1,267 670 574 476 476 408 403 299 291 214 177 167 165 146
Pop/sq kilometer 6,423 1,392 905 756 608 509 503 489 259 222 184 184 158 156 116 112 83 68 64 64 56
Japanese Prefecture Tokyo-to Osaka-fu Kanagawa-ken Saitama-ken Aichi-ken Chiba-ken Fukuoka-ken Yamanashi-ken Hyogo-ken Okinawa-ken Kyoto-fu Kagawa-ken Ibaraki-ken Shizuoka-ken Nara-ken Nagasaki-ken Saga-ken Shiga-ken Hiroshima-ken Mie-ken Miyagi-ken
Pop/sq kilometer 5,788 4,647 3,655 1,862 1,415 1,178 1,016 950 666 602 573 538 488 488 384 358 354 346 339 324 323
Fresno County
Sutter County
Butte County
Monterey County
Merced County
Nevada County
Yuba County
Kings County
El Dorado County
San Bernardino County
Kern County
Tulare County
San Luis Obispo County
Amador County
Madera County
Lake County
Shasta County
Calaveras County
San Benito County
Humboldt County
Imperial County
Del Norte County
Mendocino County
Tuolumne County
Glenn County
Tehama County
Colusa County
Mariposa County
Plumas County
Lassen County
Siskiyou County
Mono County
Trinity County
Sierra County
Modoc County
Inyo County
Alpine County
Sources: Statistics Bureau, Statistical Handbook of Japan 2008 online at; and US Census Bureau, online at ds_name=DEC_2000_SF1_U&-format=ST-2, both accessed on August 17, 2009
The Timing of Urbanization Scholars who study land use and transportation patterns in localities around the world have established that a great deal of the variation can be attributed to the timing of population growth and urbanization.9 Cities that took shape when walking and horse-powered transportation were the only options continue to be much more densely populated today and tend to rely much more on transportation modes other than the automobile. Those that grew rapidly during the railroad boom, around 1900, are more spread out but tend to be well-served even today by public transportation. In contrast, areas that grew rapidly after the automobile became widely available (the postwar period) are the most likely to be auto- dependent and poorly served by alternative modes today. This explanation, according to Pietro Nivola (1999), accounts for much of the difference in land use and transportation patterns between the United States and Europe. Between 1950 and 1996, the United States population grew by 74 percent, while those of Germany and Italy grew by about 20 percent and the United Kingdom grew by just 14 percent. The fact that these European countries grew so little in the postwar period allowed their populations to find housing mostly in areas settled before the age of the automobile. In contrast, the United States' need to find new homes for its exploding population prompted Americans to carve out new suburban territories that were naturally designed around the availability of the automobile. While Japan is often better compared with European nations because of the timing of its industrial development and other similarities, it is striking that on this dimension, Japan more closely resembles the United States. Over the 1950 to 1996 period, its population grew by 40 percent--twice as fast as the major European nations. This was also a period in which Japanese surged out of the countryside (where half the population had been engaged in agriculture in 1950) into the cities in order 9 Newman and Kenworthy 1999 and Nivola 1999. 9
to find employment in the booming industrial sector. As a result, Japanese (like Americans) were forced to carve out new suburban territories to accommodate all of these newcomers during a period in which citizens in Japan too were purchasing "my car" (their own personal vehicles). Japan developed one of the world's leading automobile industries, and domestic sales boomed during the 1960s and 1970s. By 1970, most Japanese families with children had an automobile. It is this similarity that prompted me to compare Japan's policies in this issue area with those of the United States, despite the fact that the two countries have many other differences. Even though both were growing new urban and suburban territories during the postwar periods, Japan chose to grow in ways that maintained the viability of alternative modes of transportation--including walking to school, biking to shops, and taking the train to work. The explanation for their divergence in this policy areas must lie somewhere else. Crime? Americans' eagerness to spread out into the suburbs and rely on automobiles is often explained by the country's high crime rate. As Pietro Nivola notes in making this connection, "levels of serious crime in the United States have fluctuated considerably over the past 75 years, [but] even at their lowest point they far exceeded the rates of other leading democracies" (1999, p. 7). In 2006, there were 17,030 murders in the United States and just 1,307 in Japan. The murder rate per 100,000 persons was 5.7 in the U.S., compared to just 1.03 in Japan. 10 The gap was even larger in the period from 1970 to the mid- 1990s, when the US murder rate was in the 8 to 10 range and Japan's was close to 1.0. The gap has also 10 United States data from United States Department of Justice, Crime in the United States, table online at, accessed August 18, 2009; Japanese data from the MIAC Statistics Bureau, Japan Statistical Yearbook, table 25-1 available via a link online at, accessed August 18, 2009. 10
been larger for other crimes, such as robberies, with the United States robbery rate ranging from 140 to 240 in recent decades, compared to a Japanese robbery rate that has stood at around 4.0. Could this large difference in crime rates explain why Americans have pulled their children off the road even as Japanese have continued to allow their kids to walk to school? This difference is certainly a factor. It is no coincidence that the walk-to-school rate in the United States began dropping sharply in the 1970s through the 1990s when the media featured a series of sensational stories about child abductions. One of those that received the most publicity was the case of Adam Walsh, who was abducted from a shopping mall in 1981. His severed head was found two weeks later, but his body was never found. For years, the case remained unsolved, keeping it alive in the public sphere--especially after Adam's father, John Walsh, became the host of "America's Most Wanted," a television show focused on unsolved crimes.11 Other cases that became household names during this period included Polly Klaas, Danielle van Dam, and Elizabeth Smart (Shutt et al 2004, p. 128). Adding to public anxiety was the announcement by researchers who did some of the early studies on child abduction that the nation was experiencing an "epidemic" of this type of crime, with annual cases of child abductions estimated to total from 300,000 to 600,000 (Shutt et al 2004, p. 128). Milk cartons brought the "epidemic" home to families in the United States by featuring an ever-changing series of faces of missing children, including that of Adam Walsh. American community activists attempting to promote higher rates of walking to school under the banner of "Safe Routes to School" confirm that cases such as those listed above have led parents to choose buses or car-pool drop-offs as the preferred mode of delivering their children to school. One survey was conducted by a group seeking to increase walk-to-school rates for an elementary school in 11 New York Times, December 16, 2008. The case was finally closed in 2008 when police closed the case with the announcement that they were convinced the murder was a convicted serial killer who died in prison in 1996. 11
Nashua, New Hampshire, that had a small catchment area that put most children within five or six blocks of the school. Because the school was so close, the district did not provide school buses; yet about half the children were driven to school by their parents. Asked why, the parents pointed almost uniformly to their fears that their children would be victims of crime as they walked to school.12 Other Safe Routes to School surveys have confirmed this finding.
Table 2 Murder Rates in New England, 2006
New Hampshire
Rhode Island
Source: Department of Justice, Crime in the United States,, accessed August 18, 2009
So have we solved our puzzle? Not quite. As in the case of population density, national figures for crime obscure a great deal of local variation. It was noted above that the murder rate in the United States in 2006 was 5.7, over five times the rate in Japan of 1.03. A quick look at Table 2 below shows, however, that there are some states in the United States where the murder rate is not too different from Japan's. What is true at the state level is even more true at the level of specific cities and towns, or neighborhoods. There are many neighborhoods in the United States where there has not been a single murder in many years. Likewise, there are neighborhoods in Japan that have more murders than some of these American localities. Despite this local variation in crime rates, walk to school rates in the 12 Interview with former head of the transportation planning district in Nashua, August 17, 2009. 12
United States are consistently low, even in low-crime areas, while rates are close to 100 percent in Japan, even in high crime areas. This point can be made even more directly for the more specific crime of child abduction and murder. First, it turns out that the early estimates of an "epidemic" of child abduction in the United States were wildly off the mark. They conflated cases in which children had been taken by non-custodial parents in divorce disputes and other cases where the child was taken by a family member with cases of abduction by strangers. The most comprehensive recent study in the United States, published in 2002 based on 1997-1999 data, found that of 58,200 cases of non-family child abduction, there were just 115 "stereotypical stranger abductions" in which children were taken by strangers or slight acquaintances, kept overnight, killed, transported 50 miles or more, ransomed or kept with the intension of permanence (Shutt et al 2004, p. 130). Forty of these resulted in death. With just 115 cases of this type a year, there are many communities that have never been touched by crime of this kind. And yet Americans have pulled their children off the streets across the United States, even in the safest jurisdictions. The discussion so far has proceeded under the assumption that cases like this never occur in Japan. On the contrary, Japan has a large community of pedophiles and every year records many cases of crime victimizing children. In 2007, children were victims of abduction in 82 cases, indecent assault in 907 cases, indecent exposure in 73 cases, and murder in 82 cases.13 More germane to the issue of keeping children safe while walking to school, Japan experienced two cases within a short period in 2005 in which seven-year-old girls were abducted by strangers while walking home from school and killed. In the first case, seven-year-old Kinoshita Airi was found dead in a card board box shortly after leaving 13 National Police Agency, White Paper on Police 2008, p. 63. 13
school in Hiroshima on November 22. Her school bag became an important item of evidence after it was discovered carefully packaged for disposal by the killer, who had attempted to have it picked up for incineration.14 On November 30, a man of Peruvian-Japanese decent was taken into custody on suspicion of murdering Airi. The very next day, seven-year-old Yoshida Yuki was reported missing after she failed to come home after leaving school in a rural area of Tochigi Prefecture. Less than 24 hours later, her naked body was found on a mountainside in the adjoining prefecture where the killer was believed to have taken the girl after snatching her in his van.15 Despite the fact that a security camera captured the image of what was believed to be the suspect's van, her murderer has not yet been apprehended. Needless to say, these two cases attracted the full attention of the Japanese media, with television stations running lengthy coverage and the weekly tabloids featuring the story in large spreads. The Yomiuri Weekly featured coverage which focused on how the cases revealed dangers in the two girls' routes to school. Yuki had a daily walk to school of about two kilometers which took her through forested areas in which houses were often quite widely-spaced. She walked the first part of the way home from school with two friends, but at a certain point, she broke off to take the final leg alone. It was on this leg that she was abducted. The rest of the article reported on the many dangers that lurk on a typical child's route to school (tsgakuro) and consulted with experts about how best to keep children safe in these situations.16 14 Daily Yomiuri, November 24, 2005 15 Daily Yomiuri, December 5, 2005. 16 Takizawa Satoshi and Okuda Yko, "Wagako wo mamoru `kokoga kiken' mappu," Yomirui Weekly, December 25, 2005, pp. 24-27. 14
The Japanese public certainly responded to these incidents. Like American parents, they wanted their children to be safe on their way to and from school. What is striking, however, is how the Japanese response took such a different form from the American response to similar incidents. Instead of pulling children off the streets and putting them onto school buses or insisting on delivering children to and from school by private vehicle, Japanese parents demanded that their local PTA and chnaikai, as well as the national authorities, do everything in their power to keep the walking routes to school safe for their children. The Japanese weekly AERA, reporting just two weeks after the two incidents, found a high level of activism across the country.17 A PTA leader at a school in Saitama City reported that her school was stepping up a program which called on 20 assigned volunteers from her group to report to duty stations near their homes each day 15 minutes before walk-to-school time in order to greet all children which a vigorous "good morning" and keep their eyes on the street. Other efforts to increase the numbers of eyes on street, AERA reported, included bicycle patrols in the afternoons, greater use of police car patrols, and the enlistment of dog-walkers in the neighborhood to serve as members of organized "wan wan patrols" (`wan wan' being the sound barking dogs make in Japan). Members of these groups would be sure to walk their dogs at the time when children were going and coming from school. Many localities turned to greater use of technology. AERA found one school that was using email lists to notify groups of parents who subscribed to the service of the exact time their children had left the school. That would allow parents to meet the children part way, if they wished, by anticipating when they would arrive (which can vary greatly in the afternoon, when children go home at different times depending on club activities and whether they are enrolled in after school programs). Other 17 Ariyoshi Yuka, "Kodomo wo korosaseruna: tsgakuro no anzen wo mamoru," AERA, December 19, 2005, pp. 25- 27. 15
localities installed security cameras on vending machines along walking routes. Several schools made plans to install digital tracking devices into the children's school bags that were designed so that an email message would automatically be sent to parents once their child walked through the school gates on the way home. Many of these activities were already underway before the two incidents in 2005 but reporting of this kind and the efforts of the Ministry of Education (MEXT) helped spread programs like this across the country quite quickly. MEXT helped this process along by calling on schools to take additional measures to protect children on their way to and from school, identifying ways in which they could do so, and offering limited financial assistance with sums sufficient to buy sashes, for example, to identify volunteers in the "wan wan patrols." MEXT also called on the public to volunteer and assist schools that were seeking to do more, prompting approximately 80,000 individuals to step forward to help. Many of them joined local "hachi-san undo," movements to get residents to step outside at around 8:00 in the morning and 3:00 in the afternoon to check on the kids walking to and from school.18 In these ways, communities got through the panic by reinforcing, rather than abandoning, the walk to school programs that were in place. According to a MEXT official I spoke to, a few communities (including the rural town where Yuki was abducted) were interested in introducing school buses, but only a few took this step.19 AERA considered it newsworthy when one school in Niigata ordered nine school buses, not for the purpose of transporting students over long distances, but in order to keep children on rural roads safer.20 18 Interview with MEXT official, November 2, 2007. 19 Ibid. 20 AERA story cited above, p. 27. 16
A Strong State? The involvement of the Ministry of Education in coordinating the response to the child abduction incidents points to another possible explanation for the difference between walk-to-school policies in Japan and the United States. Perhaps the difference simply reflects the greater strength of the Japanese state: its ability to direct society's energies in the direction it sets. The argument that Japan has a strong state has a long and rich pedigree (Johnson 1981, Tilton 1996, Vogel 1996). In previous work on education policy (Schoppa 1991), I found the Ministry of Education to play a powerful role in blocking education reforms it opposed. Perhaps most relevant to the type of policy discussed here is the work of Sheldon Garon (1997), who has argued that the state plays a powerful role in influencing the "everyday life" of Japanese citizens, encouraging them to save, eat well, abide by high standards of public morality, and work hard. If Garon is right, the persistence of walk-to-school patterns in Japan might simply be a result of the state's success in pushing society in this direction in the name of health and public order. Robert Pekkanen's study of neighborhood associations / chnaikai (2006) takes a similar tack, arguing that these groups have remained a powerful and active force in Japan largely because the Japanese state and local governments have found them useful and have given them financial support. In all of these realms, the American state is widely described as pluralistic and weak. Instead of using social groups like the chnaikai to achieve its own ends, it tends to be captured and manipulated by the groups with the most organizational clout and money (Dahl 1961, Heinz et al 1993). If this line of argument is correct, schools and communities in the United States may have given up on walk-to-school support because they were captured by powerful interests that wanted life in the US to revolve around use of the automobile. There is certainly evidence that the auto lobby pushed and paid local governments across the country to tear out streetcar tracks in order to make way for buses and cars. It is also possible that local governments in the United States are simply responding to parental demands 17
that they be allowed to drive their children to school (or that school buses be made available) in order to keep them safe. In my view the state's role in each country is important, but it cannot be the sole explanation. Families in both the United States and Japan put the health and safety of their children at the very top of their concerns. It is difficult to believe that the two states (one out of its own sense of national goals and the other because it was captured by the auto lobby or parents) could push policy in such opposite directions entirely on their own. Where did the Japanese state's goals come from and how exactly does it force society to follow its leads in an area like this that is central to parental anxiety? And why do American parents seem to demand policies that are so different from those of Japanese parents? These questions are motivated not only by my specific doubts about the strong state / weak state thesis in this particular case but also by the work of many scholars who--in response to the work of Johnson and others--have demonstrated that the Japanese state is not as strong as we thought. In many areas of Economic Policy, it does what powerful interest groups want it to do, even if this calls for the support of inefficient industries (Uriu 1996). In recent work, Rosenbluth and Thies (forthcoming) and Estevez-Abe (2008) argue that social and economic policy in Japan consistently reflect the demands of society expressed through the electoral system. Kent Calder, in his work on city planning in Japan, argues that the Postwar Japanese state has been particularly weak in this area (Calder 1988, p. 395). Finally, Andre Sorensen comes to the same conclusion, writing: "The formal urban planning system has played only a minor role in the creation and maintenance of these inner city urban areas. They have instead been shaped by the legacy of the pre-modern street layouts, and by unplanned urbanization in the modern period, and are a product of enduring social structures and housing preferences" (Sorensen 2002, p. 4). 18
Structures Governing the Costs of Exit and Voice What we need in order to better understand how states interact with society to shape policy in an issue area like this, I propose, is a better model of how political actors evaluate their options and act. Most work in the field of political science has focused on the structures that shape choices in the political arena. Thus Estevez-Abe, Rosenbluth, and Thies, for example, focus on how the pre-1996 Japanese electoral system empowered certain interest groups (producer interests, employers, and others that could deliver organized votes and money to the long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party) and disempowered those who were less organized (taxpayers, consumers)--systematically biasing public policy in favor of producer interests. They then describe how the new electoral system adopted in 1996 and other institutional changes have empowered Japanese political leaders to respond more to the "median voter," thereby increasing the power of consumer and taxpayer interest in ways that shift policy in new more consumer- and taxpayer-friendly directions. Similarly, a great deal of scholarship on the United States has focused on institutional features that empower special interest groups. While these models of the political marketplace certainly identify an important part of the structure shaping public policy, they don't get us very far toward explaining the difference between US and Japanese policy in the issue area that is the focus of this paper. Perhaps US policy supported automotive modes for getting children to school because of the way American institutions empower automobile interests, but Japan's institutions have also empowered producer interests (like autos), so that doesn't seem to get us very far. The old Japanese electoral system encouraged politicians to compete for votes by lining up construction projects for the home district, so maybe that is why local governments there had an easy time finding the money to improve sidewalks and build bike paths along rivers. But then the US system too has been known to encourage pork-barreling too. Political institutions don't tell us much about what kind of public works were emphasized in the two countries. 19
Instead of limiting our attention to the political marketplace to explain policy outcomes in this case, we need to look at the structures affecting the opportunities actors have in the uncoordinated economic marketplace, the opportunities they have to "exit." If parents become worried that children walking to school risk getting abducted or hurt in some other way, they sometimes have options they can take on their own--instead of mobilizing in the political arena to force local governments and local schools to make the street safer. If school buses are already available, they could simply choose to put their child on a school bus. If they have a car and the school allows drop-offs, they could drive their child to school. If the school seems unsafe, they could move their child to private school and drive them there. And if the entire community seems unsafe and they can afford to move without financial hardship, they could simply relocate to someplace better. How and when parents mobilize to seek school or local government solutions, I propose, depends very much on whether these "exit" options are available and attractive. So what do we know about how the economic marketplace affects politics in this area? The most influential strand of the literature is one which argues that markets that make "exit" easy produce the best policy. Thus Tiebout (1956) and his followers argue that local expenditure will be optimal (taxes and spending will most closely match the desires of residents in all parts of a metropolis) if residents have many choices about where to live and can move between them at no cost. According to his model, local officials learn what public services residents are willing to pay taxes for by watching them "vote with their feet." With a "free" residential marketplace of this kind, residents will get exactly what they want from local government and no more. If this way of modeling the impact of economic markets on local policy is correct, we should see local governments responding more efficiently to citizen wishes in places where residential markets are highly mobile and citizens have other cheap exit options. 20
We get quite different predictions, however, if we derive hypothesis from the work of Albert Hirshman (1970). Like Tiebout, Hirschman was interested in the effects of "exit" options on political behavior and policy outcomes, but he was less uniformly optimistic about the effects of exit on policy outcomes. According to Hirschman, individuals frustrated with the status quo frequently have a choice between a "voice" strategy (mobilize through the PTA to improve the schools) and an "exit" strategy (move your child into private school). Hirschman pointed out that both of these mechanisms hold the potential to bring about improved performance, but that neither can be assumed to work efficiently under all conditions because: 1) organizations specialize in whether they are attuned to exit or voice; and 2) exit and voice are related to each other in "hydraulic" fashion: "deterioration generates the pressure of discontent, which will be channeled into voice or exit; the more pressure escapes through exit, the less is available to foment voice" (Hirschman 1993, 176). What this means is that when parents who are frustrated with the quality of their school system respond by moving their children into private school, this tends to make them less involved in groups calling on the schools to try harder. The availability of exit options draws those most concerned about the decline in the quality of education out of the political process. Since state schools have traditionally been structured to respond more to this political process than to enrollment trends, this hydraulic effect of exit on voice has a deleterious effect on the ability of the school system to recognize what is going wrong and respond. In the worst cases, the quality of education may simply spiral downward. While Hirschman does not offer a formal model demonstrating exactly how exit and voice are likely to interact, his logic (and the stylized example of the school system presented here) suggests that the key variable affecting the quality of a state's response to exit trends is the cost of exit relative to the costs of exercising voice.21 The reason school systems have particular difficulty maintaining their 21 For an effort to formalize Hirschman's logic, see Gehlbach 2006. 21
responsiveness to concerns about the quality of education is because it is moderately costly to take children out of public education and put them into private school. The price of private school is within reach of many families but is not so cheap as to enable mass defections when the quality of education first begins to fall. The cost is low enough to drain away the families that are most sensitive to educational quality (causing the voice mechanism to work poorly) but too high to allow the large and rapid outflow of children that would get the attention of school officials who aren't accustomed to worrying about enrollment declines. Advocates of a voucher system--building on logic similar to Tiebout's--have long pointed to this problem and argued that school systems would work better if all parents were able to move their children out of failing schools for free or at subsidized rates (Chubb and Moe 1990). Lowering the cost of exit in this way would allow market forces to go to work and force school managers to respond before they lost all of their pupils. Hirschman's logic suggests that the performance of public schools would also improve if parents were given no choice over where to send their children. With `no way out' (exit costs so high that exit is impossible), parents would have a strong incentive to voice concerns over declining educational quality, organize petition drives, attend PTA meetings, and volunteer in the school until results improved. Hirschman emphasized the role of `loyalty', the third term in his title, in improving performance by raising exit costs, but his logic suggests that any increase in costs would increase the propensity of frustrated parents to use voice and increase the likelihood of a voice-driven response. 22
Figure 1 shows in graphic form my interpretation of Hirschman's logic. It shows how, given fixed costs of mobilizing in the political arena and a given level of frustration with the status quo, the probability that a firm, organization, or state will respond effectively (`reform') has a U-shaped relationship to the costs of exit. If exit costs are low, market forces will force a response. So like Tiebout, Hirschman expects local communities to respond quite effectively to citizen concerns where the cost of moving is so low that people move (and threaten to move) all the time, or make use of other cheap exit options. But unlike Tiebout, who sees the relationship between exit costs and local government responsiveness as a straight downward sloping line, with the worst results when citizens are "stuck" with a local government and have no way to escape from poor governance, Hirschman expects more effective responses at this other extreme where citizens have "no way out." In such situations, he predicts, these citizens are likely to raise their voices and demand that their concerns be addressed. 23
In Hirschman's view, the worst outcomes come when exit costs are at a moderate level, too high to allow the volume of exit (or threats of exit) that will propel a market-driven response but too low to drive frustrated individuals to overcome barriers to collective action and mobilize in the political arena. In terms of residential mobility levels, this means that Hirschman expects local communities to respond most poorly when residents can and do move, but the cost of doing so is too high to signal the need for action through "voting feet" while at the same time too low to motivate residents to increase their civic engagement in order to improve the situation. Exit Opportunities Along the Walk to School When neighborhoods decline in the United States, whether the issue is worries about the safety of children on their way to school or some other concern, the first reaction of many residents is to think about moving away. The New York Times recently featured the comments of one resident dealing with neighborhood decline in Broward County, Florida, due to the foreclosure crisis: "'They tell me that when they moved in, it was different place,' said Stephanie Kraft, a member of the Broward County School Board. `They're seeing it change, they're seeing it go to hell and they're abandoning it.'"22 The Washington Post found similar sentiments expressed by a real estate blogger in Waldorf, Maryland, which had seen a spike in the murder rate, with seven murders in 2008. Waldorf is on what used to be considered the southeastern fringe of the Washington, DC, suburbs. It was settled by middle class residents who had fled crime in the inner suburbs of Prince George's County, which in turn had been 22 New York Times, August 15, 2009. 24
settled by residents escaping from crime in the District of Columbia. The blogger's response: "it's time to move further south."23 The sentiments expressed in these comments have contributed to a rate of residential mobility that is much higher in the United States than in most industrialized nations. In 2000, 10.3 percent of American homeowners had moved in the past 15 months. Renters moved even more frequently: 38.8 percent had moved within that time period.24 For the full population, including owners and renters, the proportion of Americans who moved over the past five years was 48.7 percent.25 It is not unusual for an American to live in nine different places between his departure from his parent's home and his death: three different rental apartments as a single person; a purchased townhome after marrying; a single-family "starter" home while the children are below school age; a larger home in a good school district while the kids are in school; a new "dream home" when their kids are teenagers; another home when employment opportunities force a relocation; and then, after retirement, a single-level condo where the couple can age in place. Many Americans are forced to relocate more often for job reasons, and divorce often adds at least one extra move. Concerns about crime and safety and the environment are just one factor among the many reasons that can drive this process of frequent relocation. Facilitating this lifestyle is a residential marketplace that makes moving quite cheap. Rental contracts typically provide for a one-year lease and charge only one month's security deposit (which must be returned if there is no damage to the apartment). After this one-year period, a resident can 23 Washington Post, December 29, 2008. 24 U.S. Census of Housing data for "Recent Movers"--online at, accessed August 27, 2009. 25 US Census Profile of Selected Housing Characteristics: 2000--online at ds_name=D&-_lang=en&-redoLog=false , accessed August 27, 2009. 25
usually move from one apartment into another without financial loss. Moving between owned homes is also cheap relative to the costs of selling and buying residential property in other societies. Ample financing is available for the purchase of existing, as well as new, homes. Down payments need to cover only 20 percent of the value of the land and home (less during the housing bubble!). Homes generally appreciate in value (except in the aftermath of the bubble), so many Americans have found that they can trade in a smaller, older home for a newer, bigger home, over the course of their lives, without significant financial loss. In fact, many consider "moving up" the housing ladder a strategy for building wealth. Even those with stagnant incomes have been able to trade one home for a similar one in a different neighborhood, without significant loss and with financing to make the deal affordable. These are the economic structures that allow most American families, faced with a decline in neighborhood quality such as threats to the safety of their children walking to school, to consider moving a relatively cheap and attractive option. Not free--as in Tiebout's theoretical world--but cheaper than most other societies. Faced with a decline in neighborhood quality, most Japanese do not move. Japanese rates of residential mobility are much lower than those in the United States. Whereas 10.3 percent of American homeowners had moved in the past 15 months, just 6.1 percent of Japanese homeowners had moved within the past five years.26 Japanese renters move less frequently as well, with the proportion reporting that they moved within the past five years in Japan (36.4 percent) roughly equal to the proportion of US renters who had moved in just one year (38.8 percent). For the full Japanese population, including owners and renters, the proportion who had moved within five years, stood at 26 A total of 1.751 main-earner homeowners moved since 1999, from Table 67 of the 2003 Housing and Land Survey--online at The ratio of 6.1 percent comes from dividing this number by the total number of home-owners of 28.665 million, from Table 37 of the same document. Rental move figures below come from the same tables. 26
28.1 percent at the time of the 2000 census, compared to the U.S. figure of 48.7 percent.27 Many younger Japanese move a few times, into a tiny unit designed for young singles or an employer-provided apartment. Young couples sometimes buy a starter condominium before trading up to a single-family home or nicer condominium. But unlike Americans, who often move frequently as their children's needs change, for job relocation, divorce, or because of neighborhood decline, Japanese couples who have settled into their home--often built on their parents' land--usually do not move again until they die. They may tear down their home and build a new one in the same spot, but they rarely move. This rootedness of Japanese families has often been attributed to the nation's culture: its attachment to the soil where farmers made their living for generations and where revered ancestors are buried. But it is also a product of residential market structures. Japanese renters don't move as frequently as American renters because Japanese rental contracts require several months of key money (which does not have to be returned when the contract is over) and security deposits (which is supposed to be used to protect against damage but is frequently used to cover routine maintenance after a tenant moves out). A renter who pays three or four months worth of rent upfront to take up a lease is therefore loathe to do the same thing all over again just a year later. Further encouraging renters to stay where they are tenant protections that make it difficult for owners to terminate leases or raise rents sharply, which function to create a system of effective "rent control" holding down rents for long- term renters (Ito 1994, p. 232; Seko and Sumita 2007). Selling one home and buying another is an even more expensive proposition. Loans have long been available to purchase land and a portion of a new structure's cost, but until recently financing was not available to purchase existing homes, pejoratively termed "used" (chko) in Japanese. Japanese tax 27 MIAC, Statistics Bureau, Population Census, Migration of Population by Sex and Age--online at, accessed August 27, 2009. 27
authorities have similarly placed little value on older residential structures, considering them to be depreciating assets--like a used car with a steadily declining "blue book" value. Single-family homes depreciate at a rate that makes them worthless in 20 years. Condominiums depreciate at a rate the makes them worthless in 30 or 35, depending on construction type. No one forces Japanese to peg the pricing of used homes to the tax-assessment, but these are frequently used as a guideline, so that five- year-old structures sell at a significant discount over what the house cost when new, and 10-year-old structures sell for much less. A structure that is over 20 years old is often considered to be worthless, worth only as much as the land that sits underneath it. Figure 2 shows what these market structures mean for the typical Japanese homeowner. This homeowner is assumed to have financed the total value of the land on which her new home sits, plus half the value of the structure, for a total debt (in dollars) of $350,000. The homeowner supplied the remaining $100,000 as a down-payment. The house and land initially cost $450,000, but like a new car, 28
it loses a significant share of its value as soon as it is "driven off the lot." The structure then continues to decline in value until the value of the land is all that's left. Although the homeowner has been steadily paying off her loan, for most of this time the sum she could net for selling the home is less than the down payment she would need to purchase a new one. By year 25, she owns the land and has sufficient net worth to consider moving. The structures I've described have helped to suppress the market in used homes in Japan to a level where it is only a tiny fraction of the size of the existing home market in the United States (see Figure 3). Whereas Americans buy about 20 used homes each year for every 1,000 residents, Japanese 29
buy only about 1.3.28 As a result, Japanese who become concerned about the deteriorating quality of their neighborhood have much less attractive "exit" options. The market for used homes is so small, and prices on used homes are so low, that selling one home and buying another almost always requires a family to take a financial loss. Staying and working to improve the neighborhood often turns out to be the more attractive option. Thus we arrive at my explanation for the diverging paths taken by Americans and Japanese as they confronted neighborhoods that grew more dangerous because of growing traffic and rising crime from the 1970s until today. In the United States, residents who confronted these problems had many exit options. No schools required children to walk to school, and many school districts already ran school buses, so parents whose children had been walking or biking to school and became worried about their safety could simply opt to have their child take the school bus instead. Few schools banned parents from dropping off children in person and most American schools were located in places that could be accessed by drop-off drivers, so delivering a child in this way was another exit option that was available to many American parents. If an school was in a location where school buses were not used and drop off was not possible, the US residential market provided parents with one more way out if they became worried about their children's safety. They could move to a new location. As more and more parents took one of these exit options, two things happened--and one thing didn't. First, with fewer children walking or biking to school and parents moving their children away from areas that were most unsafe, the possibility of abduction or some other crime actually went up. Parents and children had relied on the safety of numbers and the large number of eyes on the street 28 This difference in the size of two markets in used homes can also be measured in another way: in Japan, the used home market is only 10 percent the size of the new home market, whereas in the United States, the existing home market is typically four times the size of the new home market. See the discussion of the limited size of the used housing market in Shimada 2003. 30
that had been present when most children walked or biked to school. When their numbers declined to a trickle, hold-outs became worried and pulled their children off the streets as well. Second, high levels of residential mobility took families to cul de sac suburbs that were even less well served by sidewalks and bikes. The thing that didn't happen is that there was no local community civic engagement to try to address the problems that were causing traffic and crime to endanger children walking and biking to school. Exit led to more exit, so that rather than trying to fix the old system of getting children to school, Americans ended up creating a whole new system in the suburbs where children got safely to school on buses and automobile drop-offs. Twenty years after children stopped walking to school, there is finally a new movement today that is trying to revive this old way of getting to school--in the name of health. Safe Routes to School programs now exist in many US states, and they are starting to identify safe walking routes to schools, where the infrastructure allows it. They are also organizing "walking school buses" and walk-to-school days so that children walk to school in safer groups.29 So far, the impact of these programs has been marginal, since many families still prefer the perceived safety and convenience of buses and cars, but the parents that are getting involved--interestingly--are being motivated by one problem it turns out children can't "exit" from: their health. Parents can keep their children safe from crime by driving them everywhere, but children who grow up with this lifestyle are more likely to end up overweight and suffering from health problems. Why didn't the story play out this way in Japan? The story there starts in the 1950s when Japan was building and rebuilding a large number of schools. At the time, Japan was very poor. School districts could barely afford the cost of building and staffing schools, so they had no money for school 29 I serve as board president of a non-profit that runs these programs in the Charlottesville area. 31
buses. And many families did not own their own vehicle. It was at this time that schools, with support from the Ministry of Education (MOE), initiated tsgakuro programming that asked schools to identify the safest routes to each school and get all children to follow them. The ministry refused to supply money for school buses, except when schools were located in extremely rural and mountainous areas. Only if it took more than one hour each way for children to walk or bike would the MOE provide support for school buses. In the name of equal educational opportunity, which is enshrined in the Fundamental Law of Education (Kyiku Kihonh), schools adopted policies that encouraged all children to walk to school. What this meant was that when Japanese faced problems with growing traffic or crime, local parents had few exit opportunities. They couldn't put their children on school buses because there weren't any. They couldn't drive their children to school since school policy required children to walk or bike. Adding to the difficulty of moving in this direction was the fact that many Japanese schools are sandwiched into urban spaces that are not well served by roads. They were built with the expectation that students would be walking up narrow allies through the school gate and that even teachers would arrive by bike or public transport. It would be very costly to retrofit many of these schools to accommodate 200 carpool drop-offs every morning and afternoon, so few parents even thought of this as an option. Finally, Japanese families faced daunting costs of relocation. If they wanted to sell their home in an area where traffic or crime were seen as dangers to their children, they had to take a major financial loss for the reasons discussed above. Faced with such limited exit options, Japanese families behaved very differently from their American peers. They put more time into PTA and neighborhood association volunteer activities aimed at beefing up crossing guards and "wan wan patrols". Through the PTA and NHA, they contacted their local representatives to get the local government to install better crosswalks and signals, pedestrian 32
overpasses, bike trails along rivers, and other infrastructure improvements that would allow their children to get to school safely on foot. Yes, government support for the PTA and NHA organizations have helped make these organizations effective, but it is impossible to explain this kind of involvement and activism purely with a top-down strong state story. What made these organizations--and others that have worked to maintain local community safety and security--effective was the energy local residents have put into them because they have no easy way out from their neighborhoods. They are too invested in them. BIBLIOGRAPHY Aldrich, Daniel P. (2008) Site Fights: Divisive Facilities and Civil Society in Japan and the West. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Calder, Kent E. (1988) Crisis and Compensation: Public Policy and Political Stability in Japan, 1949-1986. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chubb, John and Terry Moe (1990) Politics, Markets, and America's Schools. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution. Dahl, Robert (1961) Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City. New Haven: Yale University Press. de Tocqueville, Alexis (2003) Democracy in America, Penguin Ed. Estevez-Abe, Margarita (2008) Welfare and Capitalism in Postwar Japan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Garon, Sheldon (1997) Molding Japanese Minds: The State in Everyday Life. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Haddad, Mary Alice (2004) Politics and Volunteering in Japan: A Global Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hartz, Louis (1955) The Liberal Tradition in America. Heinz, John P, Edward Laumann, Robert Nelson, and Robert Salisbury (1993) The Hollow Core: Private Interests in National Policymaking. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Gehlbach, Scott (2006) "A Formal Model of Exit and Voice." Rationality and Society 18 (4): 395-418. Hirschman, Albert (1970) Exit, Voice, and Loyalty. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 33
------- (1993) "Exit, Voice, and the Fate of the German Democratic Republic: An Essay in Conceptual History." World Politics 45 (2): 173-202. Ito, Takatoshi (1994) "Public Policy and Housing in Japan." In Yukio Noguchi and James M. Poterba, eds., Housing Markets in the United States and Japan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 215-237. Iversen, Torben (2005) Capitalism, Democracy, and Welfare. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Johnson, Chalmers (1982) MITI and the Japanese Miracle. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Lipset, Seymour Martin (1996) American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword. New York: WW Norton. Morgan, Kimberly J. (2006) Working Mothers and the Welfare State: Religion and the Politics of Work- Family Policies in Western Europe and the United States. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Newman, Peter and Jeffrey Kenworthy (1999) Sustainability and Cities: Overcoming Automobile Dependence. Washington, DC: Island Press. Nivola, Pietro S. (1999) Laws of the Landscape. Washington, DC: Brookings. Myles, John and Paul Pierson (2001) "The Comparative Political Economy of Pension Reform." In Paul Pierson, ed., The New Politics of the Welfare State. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 305-333. Pekkanen, Robert (2006) Dual Civil Society: Members Without Advocates. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Pierson, Paul (2004) Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Rosenbluth, Frances, and Michael Thies (forthcoming) Title?? Schoppa, Leonard J. (1991) Education Reform in Japan: A Case of Immobilist Politics. London: Routledge. Seko, Miki and Kazuto Sumita (2007) "Effects of Government Politics on Residential Mobility in Japan: Income Tax Deduction System and the Rental Act." Journal of Housing Economics 16: 167-188. Shimada, Haruo (2003) Jutaku Ichiba Kaikaku. Ty Keizai Shimpsha. Shutt, J. Eagle, J. Mitcell Miller, Christopher Schreck, and Nancy K. Brown (2004) "Reconsidering the Leading Myths of Stranger Child Abduction." CRIMINAL JUSTICE Studies 17:1 (March 2004): 127-134. Sorensen, Andre (2002) The Making of Urban Japan: Cities and Planning from Edo to the Twenty-first Century. London: Routledge. Thelen, Kathleen (2004) How Institutions Evolve: The Political Economy of Skills in Germany, Britain, the United States, and Japan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tiebout, Charles M. (1956) "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures." Journal of Political Economy 64:5, pp. 416-424. 34
Tilton, Mark (1996) Restrained Trade: Cartels in Japan's Basic Materials Industries. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Uriu, Robert M. (1996) Troubled Industries: Confronting Economic Change in Japan. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Vogel, Steven K. (1996) Freer Markets, More Rules: Regulatory Reform in Advanced industrial countries. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 35

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