Western mass media exposure and Chinese cultural values: The case of Hong Kong, BT McIntyre, W Zhang
Western media, Chinese cultural values, Western mass media, China, Hong Kong, Western, Western values, exposure index, traditional Chinese, Westernization, Singapore, cultural values, Confucian values, Lee Kuan Yew, FILIAL PIETY, empirical evidence, SENSE OF SHAME, Harwood, Confucianism, Chinese College, Cultural Value, personal harmony, Traditional Chinese Values, Asian Journal of Communication, Chinese Cultural, Mass Media, dependent variable, Hong Kong Identity, Milton Rokeach, cross-cultural research, Asia, Southeast Asia, Chinese University of Hong Kong Sha Tin, cross-cultural studies, Rokeach Value Survey, measurement system, Chinese population, mainland Chinese, Chinese Culture, Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media
fn: e:\mcintyre\research\ccv\erosion2.doc date: 16 January 2003 time: 1400 hrs length: 11,916 words no. tables:9 Western Mass Media Exposure and Chinese Cultural Values: The Case of Hong Kong
Bryce T. McIntyre, Ph.D. Associate Professor
Weiyu Zhang*, B.A. Candidate for the Master of Philosophy Degree School of Journalism and Communication The Chinese University of Hong Kong Sha Tin, N.T. Hong Kong Tel: (852) 2609-7680 Fax: (852) 2603-5007 Email: [email protected]
Topic area: Communication Keywords: Westernization, modernization, Chinese cultural values Paper submitted 16 January 2003 for presentation at the Second Hawaii International Conference on Social Sciences, 12-15 June 2003, Honolulu, HI . *Designated presenter.
Western Mass Media Exposure and Chinese Cultural Values: The Case of Hong Kong Abstract Mass media policymakers in China and Southeast Asia appear driven by a belief that Western mass media are a source of cultural pollution and a cause of moral decadence. Leaders in some of these nations point to high rates of economic growth as evidence of the superiority of Confucian values over Western values -and, in turn, call for restrictions on Western mass media products as a means to preserve local cultural values. In fact, however, such statements appear to be based on emotive responses to selected situations. No empirical evidence has been presented in support of these assertions. Indeed, there have been a few dozen empirical cross-cultural media effects studies in the past 20 years, but the findings are usually mixed or only marginally significant. One reason for the mixed findings may be the techniques used for measuring belief in cultural values. Most cross-cultural studies rely on the Rokeach Value Survey, developed in the late 1960s. Although this measurement system was not designed for cross-cultural use, some researchers believed it was so fundamental that it should be considered universal. Other widely used value measurement systems in cross-cultural research include the California Psychological Inventory and a system developed by Geert Hofstede -- but again it may be argued that these are too crude to measure belief in cultural values in a Southeast Asian setting. Consequently, a value measurement system developed by Chinese social scientists was used in the two studies reported here. It is known as the Chinese Value Survey. This paper reports the results of two quantitative studies of belief in traditional Chinese cultural values by Hong Kong citizens as measured by the CVS. The first study, based on random telephone interviews of 687 Hong Kong Chinese adults, relies exclusively on the CVS, and it provides the most convincing correlational evidence to date of negative effects of Western mass media on Chinese cultural values. The second study, based on scaled-down versions of both the Rokeach Value Survey and the CVS, draws on a convenience sample of 452 university students, and it shows no such effects when controls are introduced. The paper also includes a literature review of cultural effects of mass media, as well as a discussion of the effects of modernization on cultural beliefs and values. The authors conclude that, while Western mass media may have some effect on the erosion of traditional Chinese cultural values, modernization has preceded Westernization in Asian societies -- and, in any case, Westernization, as a media effect, is very small when compared to the effects of modernization.
Western Mass Media Exposure and Chinese Cultural Values: The Case of Hong Kong Asia is not going to be civilised after the methods of the West. There is too much Asia and she is too old. --Rudyard Kipling Asian Fears of Western "Cultural Pollution" Asia in the past few years has witnessed explosive growth in delivery systems for Western television programs and other cultural products. These are mainly satellite channels and satellite networks, but one should also include new cable systems, satellite master antennae systems, video clubs, and the Internet. This saturation of Asia with Western "cultural pollution" (Yao, 1994) prompted Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad to refer to the phenomenon as a recolonization project of Western global media (cited in Yeap, 1994). On another occasion Mahathir warned Asian leaders of Western news agencies' activities "to destabilise individual countries in Asia. . . (in order) to achieve an economic domination in the region" (cited in Yao, 1994). Fuelled also by public statements of former Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, the debate has become confrontational, with Lee and his subordinates claiming that Asia is culturally superior to the West.1 Lee Kuan Yew says Western liberalism is a corrupting influence on the Asian value system. This anti-Western attitude is a cornerstone of Malaysian, Indonesian and Singaporean press policies (Yao, 1994; Lingle, 1996). In the case of Singapore, as the world well knows, press policy is authoritarian, repressive and closed to debate.2 Asian nations' repressive press policies feed the antagonism toward the West in a curious way: While the failings and pitfalls of Western culture are plainly seen by everyone because Western nations have a free press, Singapore and other Asian nations are viewed as "model societies" -- precisely because the press cannot report on social problems in a free and open manner.3 4 Defects in these "model societies" 1This strikes many observers as odd, because Lee and the current prime minister were both educated in the West, and the two men strike outsiders as "Westernized" in their outlook and personal style. Lee is a Cambridge-educated lawyer, and Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong is a 1967 graduate of Williams College. His return to Williams College during the 1995 convocation to receive an honorary doctorate was met with protests from students and faculty because of Singapore's record on human rights. 2Satellite dishes are banned in Singapore, and many foreign publications are either banned outright or permitted only with restricted circulation or pages removed. Even owning an unapproved version of The Bible can lead to a jail term in Singapore. A few years ago, a 72-year-old grandmother was jailed in Singapore for owning a Jehovah's Witness Bible. Scores of Jehovah's Witnesses are arrested and imprisoned annually in Singapore. The issue has aroused the criticism of Amnesty International ("Jehovah's Witness grandmother jailed after Bible found in home." South China Morning Post, 3 July 1996 [Wednesday]: p. 12). 3Compare, for example, Ratnatunga's comments on the coverage, in Sri Lanka's
are deliberately hidden from view through suppression of the press. Indeed, in surveys of the numbers of journalists in prison, it is reported that most of those in prison are in Asian countries (Owais, 1996). As evidence of the superiority of Asian over Western values, Lee and others cite the rapid economic development of Southeast Asian nations -- which is due, presumably, to thrift, a strong work ethic and respect for authority. In fact, there is no empirical support for this view, and at the same time there are sound economic reasons for the rapid economic development of these nations (Lingle, 1996). Meanwhile, Lee Kuan Yew and others see the aforementioned Asian values as core values in the larger set of Asian values.5 Consequently, this paper is an attempt to explore "traditional" and "Western" cultural values, especially as an effect of exposure to Western television and film exports, while sorting through some related issues such as modernization. "Westernization" vs. "Modernization" With regard to Westernization it may be said that, while nearly everyone believes that such a process takes place, there is almost no empirical support for such a belief. Also, while nearly everyone believes that this process is a negative, rather than a positive, consequence of exposure to Western cultural products, there is almost no empirical evidence for this belief either: That is to say, there is no evidence that Western values are "worse" that traditional local traditional values, or vice versa. Indeed, there is little agreement on what "culture" means, let alone agreement on what is meant by "the West" or "Westernization".6 Westernization is rarely defined in the academic literature, but there have been a few attempts. Godelier (1995) defines it as some combination of a market economy, mass production, parliamentary democracy and the ideology of human rights. In this paper, Westernization is defined as the erosion of belief in traditional cultural values, and their replacement with belief in Western cultural values. The obvious problem with this definition is what values? That is, what values are uniquely press, of the personal failings of the British monarchy, versus the total absence of coverage of the personal failings of Sri Lanka's own president. In Sri Lanka, the president has been blamed for, among other things, arranging the murder of a press photographer who took photos of the first family (Ratnatunga, 1996). Likewise, Singapore's "squeaky clean" image may be due more to clever manipulation of the press than the reality of life in Singapore, where social, economic and political data are state secrets (Lingle, 1996). 4Not all Asian leaders go along with this mentality. Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim was quoted recently as saying, "It is altogether shameful, in ingenuous, to cite Asian values as an excuse for autocratic practices" (Owais, 1996). 5These values are elucidated in a white paper on Singapore's neo-Confucian shared values, published in 1991 the Singaporean Ministry of Community Development (Lingle, 1996). 6The term is used in this paper for expedience only.
"Western"? In this paper, Western values are presumed to be reflected in the Rokeach Value Survey, developed by Milton Rokeach (1968). The reason for this is that Rokeach developed his value survey to monitor changes in American values over time, and the scale subsequently became popular. The scale includes measure of belief in freedom, equality, ambition, competitiveness, individualism and so on. These values are in sharp contrast to Confucian values such as filial piety, harmony, having a sense of shame, courtesy, frugality and so on. Although some scholars regard the Rokeach Value Survey as universal, the scale has been criticized by others as being ethnocentric and inappropriate in Asia (Chinese Culture Connection, 1987). A concept related to Westernization is modernization, which is defined here at the social system level as intense application of scientific technology, specialization of labour, interdependence of markets, large concentrations of capital, and rising levels of material well being (Ward and Rustow, 1964). At the individual level, modernization may be viewed as informed contact with the outside world, a sense of personal efficacy, openness to new experience, educational and occupational aspirations, growth of opinion, and readiness for social change (Inkeles and Smith, 1974). A related concept is globalization, which may be defined as the erosion of the borders of nation-states through expansion of international companies, international communications, international financial networks, and homogenization of Consumer Culture (Sheehan, 1996). An obvious problem with the definitions of Westernization and modernization is that modern societies embody many of the values associated with Western culture. Social mobility, for example, which is a salient feature of modern societies, implies a certain degree of individual freedom. We argue that the distinction between the two concepts is partly a matter of degree. That is, a society can be relatively modern without being Western, as in South Korea or Taiwan. Hong Kong, on the other hand, is also modern but relatively more Western than South Korea or Taiwan. This makes Hong Kong an interesting case study. Literature Review This review of literature is divided into two parts. The first part focuses on ethnographic studies of cultural change, and the second part focuses on quantitative studies. The reason for this division is that cultural studies, especially field studies in anthropology and sociology, have a 100-year tradition that pre-dates the era of scientific sociology. One must go back almost a century to find cultural effects predating the modernizing effects of industrialization. Quantitative techniques emerged only in the past 60 years, and the approaches and findings are remarkably different. The emphasis in this review of literature will be on cultural change in Southeast Asia and East Asia, especially China, because this is where the East/West debate is most strident. Also, in light of the large amount of research, this review will summarize only what we consider benchmark studies. One thread we will follow through these studies is the relationship of women to the family social structure, because the emancipation of women during the last century was one of the most salient attributes of the passing of traditional societies. Ethnographic Studies. In this category one finds relevant research by Smith (1899); Fei (1939); Raper, Tsuchiyama, Passin and Sills (1950); Iddittie (1960); Glacken (1955); and Hsu (1971, 1972). Related studies are Osgood (1963) and Hinton (1966).
These books form a genre of "Village-Life-in-[fill in the blank]" treatises written by armies of anthropologists and sociologists bent on recording traditional ways of life in remote places of the planet. We turn first to Smith, a Christian Missionary who lived in China 26 years. His Village Life in China (1899) is noteworthy because it is the first such study done in that country and because it captures life in China before modernization -- and before any real effects of Westernization could be recognized. According to Smith, in the 19th century Chinese village, newborn boys were highly desirable, while infant girls were despised: If the child is a boy, the joy of the whole household is of course great, but if on the contrary it is a girl, the depression of the spirit of the entire establishment is equally marked. In such a case, the young wife is often treated with coldness, and not infrequently with harshness, even if, as sometimes happens, she is not actually beaten for her lack of discretion in not producing a son. [p. 212] Infanticide of baby girls, the sales of daughters at any time in their lives, arranged marriages, and foot-binding were commonplace. A quarter of a millennium of Tartar rule seems to have done absolutely nothing toward modifying the practice of foot-binding. . . . The only impulse toward reform of this useless and cruel custom originated with foreigners in China, and was long in making itself felt, which it is now. . . . [Smith, 1899: p. 261] Smith wrote that Chinese girls "live what is literally the existence of a frog in a well": A Chinese woman for many years employed in the writer's family, remarked that for a long time after she was married she was never allowed to leave the narrow courtyard in her hamlet. The wife of a tao-t'ai (minor government official) told a foreign lady that in her next existence she hoped to be born a dog, that she might go where she chose! [1899: p. 262] Educating young girls was unthinkable: The real difficulty is that to educate a girl is like weeding the field of some other man. [Smith, 1899: p. 264] Thus is the picture painted by Smith of rural life in China prior to Westernization or modernization. We turn now to Fei Hsiao-tung's Peasant Life in China (1939). Born in 1910 in China's northeastern Jiangsu Province, Fei was a 26-year-old doctoral student in social anthropology at the London School of Economics when he went alone to a village near Shanghai in 1936 and wrote a detailed account of rural life. His work was not intended to be a lifeless snapshot of peasant culture in the mid-1930s, but was meant to chronicle the immense changes that then faced Chinese rural
existence. Its purpose was to witness and record the phenomena of contact and diffusion. At this time in China, the pressure for cultural change came not from exposure to Western books, newspapers and films, which is a major theme of modern studies, but from industrialization, a process that began in the West, moved to Japan, and, only a few years before Fei's research, had made its way to the coastal regions of China. As mentioned above, industrialization is a major component of modernization (Ward and Rustow, 1964). The area around Shanghai has long been noted for silk production; however, in the mid-'30s, when Fei visited, there was a worldwide drop in the price of silk, and this had ripple effects throughout the region around Shanghai. The causes for the drop in price were partly economic, partly technological. The local weaving industry in one town near Shanghai had been noted for its high production, but when modern factories for silk production were introduced in Japan and China, the price dropped and the silk industry went into decline. According to Fei (1939): The rural silk industry began to decline when the modern factory for silk manufacturing with its improved technique of production was introduced both into Japan and China. This industrial revolution changed the fortunes of the domestic rural industry. [p. 16] The ripple effects were many. For example, in the village of Kaisienkung 80 miles west-southwest of Shanghai, there was a school, and, in accordance with the general prescriptions of the Minister of Education, the total term of study was six years. Typically children started school at age 6, thus freeing them at age 12 to work alongside silk farmers and learn the silk industry. When the price of silk dropped, however, sheep raising came to play a more important role in the local economy. But collecting food for the sheep became the responsibility of the children, and this conflicted with their school schedules. This problem was not isolated to the region around Shanghai, but, according to Fei, was reported by other scholars of the time to be a general phenomenon in China as industrialization grew. The people in the villages near Shanghai had no radio, television or film, and they had little, if any, exposure to newspapers. So the changes Fei witnessed were due more to modernization than exposure to Western mass media. A decade later in post-war Japan, the Allied Powers called for a comprehensive agrarian reform program calculated to replace feudalism with a democratic way of life. Consequently, Raper, Tsuchiyama, Passin and Sills (1950), on behalf of the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander, did a study of 13 villages beginning in June 1947 and ending in December 1948. The purpose was to assess changes as a result of the agrarian reforms. A typical farm consisted of about 16 plots of about one-sixth of an acre. To the Japanese farmer, the land has been the pearl of great price -- a means of earning a living, of perpetuating the family line, and generally of maintaining the pattern of human relationships, especially as these relationships are tied into rank and work, duties, and obligations. The determination of the people to hold on to their ownership and cultivation rights to the land, coupled with paddy farming, has resulted over the generations in much land subdivision. [p. 19]
Effects of the reform were nevertheless remarkable. At the beginning of the study period, for example, landlords owned 46 percent of the land in the 13 villages, while at the end of the study landlords owned 7 percent. The number of small and large farms decreased, while the number of medium-sized farms increased. Personal savings increased in most villages, and this resulted in purchases of consumer goods that long had been unavailable. These included newspapers and radios. At the beginning of Raper et al.'s study, slightly more than half of all rural homes had radios, but this increased to about two-thirds by December 1948. However, signals were weak and the power was cut off many hours a day because of inadequate water supply to drive hydroelectric generators. About 80 percent of households took newspapers. Only two of the 13 villages had movie theatres, but village cooperatives would, about 5 to 10 times per year, bring movies to villages without theatres. The movie show usually consisted of a historical drama, a newsreel, and an educational short feature. Western influences were most evident in changes of dress and hairstyles: The use of western-style clothes has increased perceptibly. Most men now have one or two more changes of western clothes, which they use fairly frequently, and some women are wearing western clothes. Those women who do occasionally wear them are usually from the nonfarming groups such as clerks and teachers. More permanent waves are being obtained, particularly by younger women. [p. 96] The number of divorces increased, but this was presumably because of a change in the Civil Code granting women the right to divorce. Under the new constitution, women also were given the right to vote and hold public office; in the April 1947 elections, 65 percent of rural women voted, and in January 1949 elections, 70 percent voted. In short, Raper et al.'s study suggests that modernization was followed by Western cultural styles, not preceded by them, as levels of affluence in Japan rose and social mobility increased. In urban Japan, the cultural changes were more dramatic. Iddittie (1960) reports that, in the early 1950s, American motion pictures dominated film imports: During the year 1952, 166 films of American production were shown on the Japanese screens, followed at a long distance by 14 British pictures, and French contribution of 10 pieces; while the native industry accounted for 259 movies. [p. 143]. To Iddittie, a professor at Waseda University, the foreign films had clear and unambiguous cultural effects. By the time Gone With The Wind debuted in Tokyo, tickets had been sold out in advance for up to two months: I was curious to see what sort of people composed the audience. About ninety percent of them were young girls, mostly school-girls. . . . They came, I believe, to see the film attracted by the love-affairs of the heroine, Scarlett O'Hara. The girl-audience had a special reason for that. The arrangement of marriage in feudal Japan was a social habit to which a strong objection had been felt by women of the younger generation. That custom gone, the young
women are now seeking for a new method of marriage. They are in a state of indecision and uncertainty. [pp. 136-137] Iddittie ascribes changes in courting behaviour to this exposure to Western films. Needless to say, kissing plays an important part in American lovemaking. . . . Now kissing, at least in public, had been unknown in this country before the advent of Hollywood. This form of love-making is now enacted by Japanese screen stars. . . . [pp. 143-144]. New hairstyles and new manners of dress also reflected Western culture. Hairdressing was an important part of a Japanese woman's toilette in the 17th and 18th centuries, and the names of reputed coiffeuses were well known. When. . . the first waves of Western influence came to wash the shores of the land the trade of ladies' hairdressing in native style commenced to decline. There was a time when what was called the English style (Igirisumage) dominated the field, affecting the business of professional hairdressers; for the new style was so simple as could be done at home. [pp. 133-134] In Iddittie's view, women adopted Western hairstyles and dress as symbols of their new liberation, the hallmarks of democratic culture. Here again, it should be emphasized that Western cultural influences are following modernization: Increasing urbanization and affluence brought people into more frequent contact with Western cultural products and lifestyles. In Glacken (1955), one sees mass media now intruding ever so slightly in rural post-war Okinawa as well, but the main changes again appear to be linked to modernization. Glacken observed that, in Okinawa in the early 1950s, one could see major changes from the introduction of American machinery and industrial techniques: Heavy earthmoving machinery works alongside the hoe. The airplane takes off in sight of a horsecart. New American homes with their yards and lawns overlook the thatched roofs of the village cluster. [p. 26] Influences on social life were varied and complex, writes Glacken. Compared to men, women led very restricted social lives in Okinawan villages, but there were a few malcontents: The few discontented exceptions are women who have lived in places under American influence like Hawaii,7 or who have experienced the metropolitan life of Japanese cities, or who have read in Japanese magazines the position of women in America or in the cities of postwar Japan. [p. 232] 7Beginning in 1899, many Okinawans emigrated to Hawaii to work on pineapple plantations. Subsequently tens of thousands of them emigrated to South America as agricultural workers.
Hairstyles and manners of dress were influenced in part by films. Some villages had outdoor fenced-in sites for viewing movies, where residents from several villages would sit on mats placed on the ground. Films came from both Japan and America. Local shops sold American beer, Coca-Cola, gum and American cigarettes (Glacken, 1955). One of the first explicit lists of Chinese cultural values was presented as "Good and Bad Characteristics" in Francis Hsu's Under the Ancestors' Shadow, originally published in 1948. This book, an anthropological field study of a Yunnanese community that Hsu called "West Town", relied on informants -- six priests and 15 "informants selected at random" -- and local sacred books to develop the lists of characteristics. The list includes filial piety, sexual fidelity (among women, especially widows), industriousness, frugality, harmony with neighbours and clansmen, and the "five human relations" and "three subordinations", which spell out interpersonal relationships (Hsu, 1971). In a subsequent work, Hsu, a native Chinese who received his doctorate in England and who was a professor of anthropology at Northwestern University, identified two cultural dimensions that distinguish Americans from Chinese. Americans and Chinese (1972) labels the two dimensions individual-centred and situation-centred: (I)n the American way of life the emphasis is placed upon the predilections of the individual, a characteristic we shall call individual-centred. This is in contrast to the emphasis the Chinese put upon an individual's appropriate place and behaviour among his fellow-men, a characteristic we shall term situation-centred. The second fundamental contrast is the prominence of emotions in the American way of life as compared with the tendency of the Chinese to underplay all matters of the heart [p. 10]. We see Hsu as a bridge between ethnographic and quantitative methods, because his list of values has the look and feel of a cultural value scale, such as was subsequently developed by Rokeach (1968). In summarizing this review of ethnographic studies, one can conclude that, while Westernization took place in almost every case, the effects of modernization were far greater and opened the door to Westernization. Quantitative Studies. Among the first major Empirical studies of mass media and cultural change in Asia was Cultural Change in Rural Taiwan (Chu and Chi, 1984). This was 14-year longitudinal study of cultural change in eight villages in northern rural Taiwan. This project began as a Pilot Study in four rural villages in 1963 before television had reached beyond the outskirts of Taipei. Farmers were interviewed before and after exposure to television, and, although some interesting changes were noted such as increases in knowledge about agricultural innovations, there was no control group. By the time the study was expanded to a 14-year longitudinal study, television had penetrated rural society to such an extent that finding a control group was impossible. A similar study was Social Impact of Satellite Television in Rural Indonesia (Chu, Alfian and Schramm, 1991). This was a 6-year study of the effect of Indonesia's new Palapa satellite. Indonesia was the first nation in Southeast Asia -- indeed, the first outside of the United States, Canada, and the Soviet Union -- to launch its own
communications satellite. The launch took place on 17 August 1976. The Indonesian government provided funds for a survey of 2,248 rural respondents, followed six years later by a post-television survey. Although the authors claimed that they were "concerned with cultural values and social and economic behaviour", in fact the study was of the impact of TV on national development -- the acquisition of knowledge of health and hygiene, agricultural innovations, participation in development programmes, and so on. While there were a few questions on religious practices and personal aspiration, they did not employ a range of cultural value measures such as one would find in Rokeach (1968) or Hofstede (1979). The "cultural" effects reported by Chu, Alfian and Schramm are really social effects -TV's effect on use of free time, on the use of other media, social interactions, most important source of news, and so on. These were fairly standard research questions for communication scholars at the time, but they do not really address the question of changes in traditional cultural values. In a later study, Chu and Ju conducted a major social survey in and around the Shanghai region, eventually published as The Great Wall in Ruins (1993). The study included media exposure measures. The sample was a stratified probability sample, with 1,199 respondents coming from the city of Shanghai, 304 from two towns in the rural county of Qingpu, and 497 from 20 villages in nearby rural districts. This study focused more on cultural values rather than economic development as a function of TV exposure. Findings are divided into chapters on family relations, social life, the work ethic, organizational relations and community life. In the chapter on family relations, the reader learns that some traditional family values persist, but with significant differences: About two-thirds of [the respondents] (65.4 percent) said they were living with their parents. Rural villagers were definitely more traditional than urban dwellers. Almost four out of five villagers (77.7 percent) said they were living with their parents. . . . These findings suggest a new trend in urban areas: if housing conditions permit, such as in small towns, more people choose to live away from their parents. [pp. 64-65] The most popular activity when the family members were together was watching television, and this was more popular in the villages (60.8 percent) than in Shanghai (56.5 percent), presumably because there are fewer distractions in the villages, and village residents have less disposable income. The researchers noted a marked change in some aspects of family life, such as the process of selecting a mate: We wanted to know the situation in the Shanghai area. We asked: "If you have a son, will you let him find his own mate, or will you find one for him?" An overwhelming majority of our respondents (90.3 percent) said they would let the son find his own mate. [p. 71] A question on finding mates for their daughters drew a similar response from parents, with 88.3 percent saying they would let their daughters find their own mates. A related, but counter-intuitive, finding was that this apparently has given
rise to frequent disputes between husbands and wives, reported by 40.8 percent of respondents: Frequent disputes over character compatibility between husband and wife are a new phenomenon. Such disputes were relatively rare in the past, not because married couples got along well, but because a distant relation prevailed to prevent such disputes from surfacing. The diffident position of the wife in the family was such that the issue of character compatibility hardly arose. Our findings therefore are highly significant. They indicate a major change in the Chinese family. [p. 75] Throughout the book, the authors attempt to explain some of the changes in terms of exposure to mass media, specifically to Western culture and to news information. They attempt to do this through tables and regression analysis. For example, among people with high Western influence, 86.3 percent of respondents said that divorce is acceptable, while among those with low Western influence, 68.7 percent said that divorce is acceptable. It is interesting to note, however, that about half the sample (50.7 percent) scored 0 on the Western cultural influence scale, meaning that they were not much exposed to Western cultural content in mass media and did not prefer Western films. If there is a weakness to this study, it is that the Shanghai sample is not generalizable to the rest of China. Shanghai is a city like no other. With a population of more than 11 million, Shanghai is the largest city on the Asian land mass. Shanghai also has a 100-year history as an entrepфt between the Chinese mainland and the West, a fact readily attested to by the European architecture of The Bund, the waterfront along the Suzhou River. So one cannot help but wonder whether the findings from the region around Shanghai would be reflected in the hinterlands of China. As they are in other respects, however, the authors were straightforward about the ungeneralizable nature of their findings: Since our objective was to select a sample with sufficient variability for statistical analysis, rather than as a representative of the Chinese population, it would be inappropriate to project the findings from the Shanghai area to China as a whole. [p. 45] Another weakness is that the study was cross-sectional -- that is, it was done at one point in time. The problem arising in cross-sectional survey research is illustrated in the authors' discussion of one of their findings, namely that people heavily exposed to Western culture were less serious about work compared with people having little exposure to Western culture: The differences are clear and unambiguous. What remains unproven is the direction of causality. Is it primarily those people who are not serious about work, and who are attracted to pleasure-seeking and short cutting, that are drawn to Western entertainment programs on television and Hollywood movies? Or is it because of what they have seen in Western programs they have developed these attitudes toward work and toward life? The correlational data we have collected cannot resolve this issue in and by itself.
We need longitudinal evidence to conclusively settle this question. [p. 307] A cause must precede an effect in time, so at least two measurements are necessary to determine the causal direction. In fact, the authors suggest that there is "mutual causation", or reciprocal effects: People who are alienated from Chinese society find respite in Western culture, and this, in turn, reinforces their alienation. Another problem with this study is that people over 65 years of age were excluded from the sample. However, one could predict with confidence that there is a strong positive correlation between age and belief in traditional Chinese cultural values. This may be due in part to the fact that younger people have lived a greater proportion of their lives under the People's Republic of China than their elders. Another problem is that illiterates were excluded from the Chinese sample, presumably because they could not read the questionnaire. The literacy rate in China is 76 percent, and one would suppose that there is a strong negative correlation between level of education and belief in Chinese cultural values, as will be reported below. Another problem with the Chinese sample is that Shanghai is not at all representative of the Chinese population as a whole. Yet another problem is that the value measures contained 18 based on traditional Chinese phrases, but these were not universally known. Also, the actual phrasing of the 18 values inevitably was perceived by some Chinese respondents to be remnants of Confucian ideology, which has been largely rejected by the Communists. In one of the most interesting follow-up studies ever done, Pan, Chaffee, Chu and Ju (1994) followed up on The Great Wall in Ruins by administering a similar questionnaire in the United States. Pan et al.'s study was thus a cross-cultural comparison of Chinese and Americans. The study compared the 2,000 respondents from Chu and Ju (1993) to 2,482 randomly selected U.S. respondents from six different states. Of 27 Confucian values listed, Americans scored higher than Chinese on 11, and there was no difference on 5 others. The measures Americans scored higher on included measures of obedience to "the three obediences and four virtues" (basically, a wife has an obligation to obey her husband); belief in benevolent fathers and filial sons (fathers should be kind to sons and their sons should be devoted to their fathers); approval of a house full of children and grandchildren; appropriateness of pleasing superiors; belief that human nature is basically good; generosity and virtues (we should be generous to others); belief in tolerance, propriety and deference; importance of connections; loyalty to state; respect for tradition; and the need for religious faith. The limitations of The Great Wall in Ruins must affect the comparisons in Pan et al.'s study. In fact the authors readily admit that these and other limitations, such as the problem of decentering (Chinese Culture Connection, 1987), may invalidate findings from their own study. The four book-length studies summarized here are largely inconclusive. Although Chu and Ju (1993) may have found some effects for Westernization resulting from exposure to Western TV, the findings are inconclusive because the study is methodologically flawed. This problem is confounded by Pan et al. (1994), who report Americans scoring higher than Chinese on certain values associated with Confucian ideology. Finally, recent research by Zhang and Harwood (2002) examined television's cultivation effects on perceptions of traditional Chinese values, including interpersonal harmony and hierarchical relations, among a group of mainland
Chinese college students. Hierarchical regression analysis indicated that the total viewing of imported programs negatively predicted viewers' endorsement of interpersonal harmony values. Televised Chinese musical performances, Chinese children's education programs, imported movies, and imported sports were negative predictors of the endorsement of interpersonal harmony values, whereas viewing Chinese sports was a positive predictor of hierarchical relations. There are two implications of this study. First, it provides some proof that Western media exposure negatively predicts belief in traditional Chinese values. Second, it shows that different types of Western media content have different influences on Chinese values. However, the generalizability of this study is weakened due to its limited sample of college students. Before leaving this section it should be noted that there are several journal articles reporting similar studies, but the findings are similar -- either nonexistent or somewhat mixed (see, for example, Willnat and Wilkins, 1997). The Hong Kong Context Hong Kong became a British colony in 1842, after the Chinese government lost the first Opium War with the British. As a colony, Hong Kong was treated as an entrepфt for mainland China. The British colonial government's rule took a laissez faire, or non-interventionist, approach. On the one hand, the governmental system was run along Western lines, favoring a free market system. On the other, the British colonial government was involved only in rudimentary social and economic development. This unique governance made Hong Kong a Petri dish for social pundits to observe the outcome when East meets West. The 155-year colonization raises a question, however: Is Hong Kong a good site for this study? The economy is capitalistic and the legal system is based on British common law. Both English and Cantonese are official languages. Western cultural products are as prevalent as Chinese ones. Hong Kong people are predominantly Chinese, but are they traditional? This question is taken up in the following discussion of the Hong Kong identity. The Hong Kong Identity. It is widely agreed among social scientists who have studied the matter that there is a distinct, local Hong Kong cultural identity. The local Hong Kong identity was largely constructed in the late 1970s, vis-а-vis the British colonial and mainland Chinese identities (McIntyre, Cheng and Zhang, 2002). It was formed largely through a deep-seated, de facto social distance from mainland Chinese. Hong Kong people consider themselves more Hongkongese -- or more Hongkongese and Chinese -- than merely Chinese (DeGolyer, 1997; Fung 2001; Leung, 1999). The distinction between Hongkongese and Chinese lies in modernization (Lam, Lau, Chiu, Hong and Peng, 1999). For example, Lam et al. demonstrated that modernity was correlated with positive perceptions of Hong Kong people, while Confucian values with those of mainland Chinese. Are Hong Kong people the heirs of Chinese cultural values, given their high degree of modernization? As argued above, Westernization typically follows modernization. So Hong Kong's high degree of modernization does not necessarily imply that it is Westernized, only that Westernization may follow from this fact. In fact, traditional Chinese cultural values are robust in Hong Kong. Hong Kong's population of 6.7 million is 95 percent ethnic Chinese, and the most popular religions are Buddhism and Taoism (McIntyre and Zhang, 2002). Hong Kong people worship local Chinese film, music and television
celebrities, and they have an undying faith in their ability to produce quality cultural products (McIntyre, Cheng and Zhang, 2002). Meanwhile, Hong Kong people are reluctant to identify themselves as merely Chinese because they want to be distinguished from mainland Chinese, whom they imagine as uncivilized and governed by a totalitarian regime. There is a multitude of ways to express "China and Chineseness" (Chun, 1996). "China" refers to at least five different Chinese political entities, past and present: (1) The Middle Kingdom under imperial rule until 1911; (2) Republican China under the Nationalists; (3) socialist China under the Communists; (4) Taiwan under the Nationalists after they fled from the Mainland in 1949; and (5) Hong Kong under the British (Anderson, 1983). As a result, the narrowness of Hongkongese as Chinese is not a barrier to the study of the relationship between Western media exposure and Chinese cultural values. Instead, it makes Hong Kong an interesting case as compared to the other four Chinese political entities, for three reasons. First, Hong Kong has experienced a longer history of modernization than both mainland China and Taiwan. Nowadays, the West and the East coexist in Hong Kong, and they function cooperatively rather than independently. A study of the relationships between media exposure and Chinese values in Hong Kong has implications for similar studies in China, China still being in the early stages of Westernization. As such, it can address the question of whether Asians should fear Western "cultural pollution". Second, local mass media have played an important role in the process of forming the Hong Kong identity. The Hong Kong identity stems mainly from Hong Kong's indigenous culture. The local media contributed to the development of this indigenous culture through film, television drama, and Popular Music. Cantopop, or popular songs in Cantonese, are a case in point. The rapid diffusion of television sets in 1970s was an impetus to the growth in popularity of Cantopop. For one thing, Cantopop groups gained exposure through appearances on television entertainment programs. In addition, there were immensely popular Cantopop theme songs for several locally produced television series. Such media content defined what it meant to be a Hong Kong Chinese person, as opposed to being a British colonial subject or a mainlander sojourning in Hong Kong (McIntyre, et al., 2002). In short, the local mass media have made a significant contribution to the creation of a local Hong Kong identity. Finally, compared to residents of mainland China, Hong Kong people can access Western media content much easier, making Western media exposure an important variable in a study such as this. In Hong Kong, an English newspaper, the South China Morning Post, ranks fourth in circulation among Hong Kong's top dailies (McIntyre and Zhang, 2002). Radio programs in English account for 29.5 percent of all radio programs. Each of the two main television stations, TVB and ATV,8 has its own English channel, and they broadcast about 600 hours of Western programs per month, nearly half of the total terrestrial broadcasting time. In contrast, only 28 percent of total broadcasting time in China is of foreign programs, but this includes Western programs and programs from other Asian regions such as Japan, Taiwan, and Singapore.9 The accessibility to, and the high percentage of, Western media 8 TVB, Television Broadcasts Ltd., ATV, Asian Television Ltd. 9 The State Administration of Radio Film and Television, http://www.sarft.gov.cn/page/sygk/dsgb2.htm
content in Hong Kong imply that there is a potentially greater influence on Chinese values in Hong Kong than in China.
The studies reported here differ from previous ones in using a set of
traditional Chinese cultural values that were developed without any reference to
cross cultural studies. They were written by Chinese scholars in Chinese script, thus
avoiding the potential problem of decentering (Chinese Culture Connection, 1987).
In the formulation of the list of this set of values, a "number of Chinese social
scientists were approached and asked to prepare in Chinese a list of at least '10
fundamental and basic values for Chinese people'" (Chinese Culture Connection,
1987). The lists were compiled and redundancies eliminated, and the final list was 40
Hong Kong was a good site for these studies because most residents are
either refugees from the mainland Communist regime, or descendants of refugees.
One would expect Confucian beliefs to survive there. Hong Kong's population of 6.2
million is about 95 percent ethnic Chinese, and 25 to 30 percent of them were born in
Methodology for the First Study. For the first study, a computer-assisted
telephone interviewing (CATI) system was used to collect data for this study. An
initial sampling frame of 2,000 residential Telephone numbers was selected
randomly from Hong Kong's three residential directories. Then the sampling frame
was expanded by generation of additional phone numbers by random changes in
the last digit of each telephone number taken from the directories.
Interviewers were students in a course at The Chinese University of Hong
Kong. Each interviewer received about 20 minutes of personal instruction in how to
conduct the interviews and was permitted to practice as long as necessary to feel
comfortable with the CATI system before interviews began.
To measure belief in the 40 Chinese Cultural Values (CCV), respondents were
asked to rate each of the 40 values on a 9-point scale. For filial piety, for example,
respondents were told: "First, I would like to ask you how important the following
values are to you personally. On a scale from 1 to 9, where '1' means 'of no
importance at all' and '9' means 'of supreme importance', how important is filial
piety to you?"
Similar phrasing was used for the other 39 values.
To measure exposure to Western mass media, respondents were asked to
recall the amount of time they were exposed the previous day to Western television,
music (radio, compact discs and audio tapes), newspapers, newsmagazines, and
videotapes. These were summed to create a "Western media exposure index". Aside
from the usual demographics, questions were asked also about place of birth.
Respondents were people with "the most recent birthday" in the household,
and a screener question eliminated potential respondents below age 18.
Western Media Exposure Measures. To measure exposure to Western mass
media, respondents were asked to recall the amount of time they were exposed the
previous day to Western television, newspapers, radio, music (including audio tapes
and compact discs), and videos (including videotapes and videodiscs). Hours
reading Western magazines was asked within one week and divided by 7 to get an
average time per day. These were summed to create an additive "Western media
Methodology for the Second Study. The second study was done using a
convenience sample of Hong Kong Chinese university students at The Chinese University of Hong Kong. The objectives were primarily to confirm the results of the first study and to develop a model of "Chineseness" that would include exposure to Western mass media, as well as other factors deemed important, such as closeness of family ties, socio-economic status and Westernization of parents. An important feature of the second study was the use of scaled-down versions of both the CCV and the Rokeach Value Survey. The purpose in doing this was to compare the two scales. From the Rokeach Value Survey six values were selected: ambition, competition, equality, freedom, individualism, and wealth. From the CCV the values selected were courtesy, filial piety, having a sense of shame, industry, resistance to corruption, and trustworthiness. Respondents were asked to rate their belief in the importance of each item on a 7-point scale. Findings The First Study. In the first study, there were 687 completed interviews, 49.5 percent males and 50.4 percent females. Regarding place of birth, 70.6 percent said they had been born in Hong Kong and 26.1 percent said they had been born in China. Most of the remainder were born in the nearby Portuguese colony of Macau. Respondents reported total Western media exposure ranging from none to 20.85 hours per day (mean = 1.47, s.d. = 2.20). Respondents spent their time per day as follows: watching Western TV programs, mean = 0.65, s.d. = 1.13; listening to Western music, mean = 0.23, s.d. = 0.70; reading Western newspapers, mean = 0.20, s.d. = 0.81; listening to Western radio programs, mean = 0.18, s.d. = 0.69; watching Western videos, mean = 0.16, s.d. = 0.61; and reading Western magazines, mean = 0.05, s.d. = 0.14. Table 1 shows the list of 40 CCVs, ranked from the most important to least important. Table 1 includes the zero-order correlations with the Western media exposure index. At first glance, it would appear that there are strong negative relationships between the CCVs and the Western media exposure index. Because age and education seemed plausible predictors of belief in traditional cultural values, partial correlations were computed controlling for these variables. To compute these, multiple regressions were undertaken in which age, education and the Western media exposure index were entered as independent variables in the equation as a block. Separate such regressions were done for each cultural value, which was the dependent variable in every case. When the partial correlations were computed controlling for age and education, the relationships weakened between belief in traditional Chinese cultural values and the Western media exposure index (Table 2), but there are still enough significant correlations to provide evidence of effects. Even more striking than the significant negative correlations is that every correlation in Table 2, significant or not, is negative. In a sign test using the binomial distribution, and with the assumption that the signs could be either positive or negative if purely random, it was evident that this pattern cannot be attributed to chance (z = 6.32, p < .0001). The CCV items were submitted to a principal components factor analysis with varimax rotation. The scree plot indicated that a two-factor solution was appropriate. Items with double loadings on the two factors (both loadings higher than .401) and those with no loadings greater than .401 were removed. The solution contained 36 items and accounted for 39.9 percent of the variance.
The first factor accounted for 33.9 percent of the variance (eigenvalue = 12.209) (Table 3). Our findings are similar to those in a study by Zhang and Harwood (2002), who used 30 items in a two-factor solution that accounted for 23.5 percent of the variance. We agree with Zhang and Harwood that these values are related to the principles of Confucianism and imply basic requirements of each individual. Since these requirements reflect the Confucian concept of xiushen (selfimprovement) and the pursuit of harmony within oneself, we call the factor personal harmony instead of interpersonal harmony -- the label assigned by Zhang and Harwood. The second factor in our analysis contained 12 items related to another Confucian concept, zhiguo (management of state affairs). These reflect the basic requirements for successful social integration. This factor accounted for 6.0 percent of the variance (eigenvalue = 2.155). We call this the social harmony factor because, if these values are respected and fulfilled, not only the individual, but also society, can achieve a harmonious state. To assess the reliability of these two factors, we used Cronbach's alpha. The alpha value for the personal harmony values was 0.93, and that of the social harmony values was 0.83, indicating high reliability in both cases. To find out whether the Western media exposure was significantly correlated with the two factors, we conducted bivariate correlations between the Western media exposure index, the factor score for the personal harmony factor, and the factor score for the social harmony factor. Western media exposure was significantly and negatively correlated with both factors (r1 = -0.201, p< .001); and r2 = -0.136, p< .001, respectively). Then partial correlations were computed controlling for age and education. The relationships weakened between the two factor scores and the Western media exposure index, but there was still enough significant correlation to provide evidence of effects (r1 = -0.188, P<.001; and r2 = -0.104, P<.01). To investigate the relationships between Western media exposure and Chinese cultural values further, multiple regressions were undertaken in which age, education, and the Western media exposure index were entered as independent variables in the equation as a block. Separate regressions were done for each factor, whose factor score was the dependent variable. In both regressions, the independent variables explained only a small part of the variance of the dependent variables (7.3 percent for the personal harmony values factor and 4.4 percent for the social harmony values factor). Only age and the Western media exposure index are statistically significant predictors of both factors, and education is not significant in the regression model of the social harmony values factor. Results of these regressions are reported in Tables 4 and 5. Thus, the data analysis reveals a significant negative association between Western media exposure and Chinese cultural values, including personal harmony and social harmony values, even when the age and level of education are controlled. However, Western media exposure has very limited ability to predict the Chinese cultural values. The question of whether Western media exposure causes the erosion of Chinese cultural values remains unanswered, in part because the statistical relationships are not strong, and in part because there are other factors that influence Chinese cultural values as well. The Second Study. In the second study, 452 ethnic Chinese students successfully completed the questionnaire. The first objective was to confirm that
respondents with higher exposure to Western mass media would be more Westernized. This was tested first with a bivariate Pearson correlation of Western media exposure and respondent Westernization, and the correlation was modest but statistically significant (r = .13; p = .01; n = 349). Because Westernization could be due to extraneous factors such as parental education and occupation, the hypothesis was tested again using a partial correlation controlling for parental socio-economic status. In this test, the relationship weakened to a point at which it was no longer significant at the p < .05 level (r = .12; p = .05; n = 286). While it may appear that the hypothesis is no longer sustained, it could be surmised that, with pairwise deletion of cases, the mere drop in number of valid cases whittled down the significance level. In any event, the relationship is weak. Regarding the "Chineseness" and "Westernization" scales, respondents scored higher on Chineseness than Westernization, as one would expect. The mean score for Chineseness was 33.9, while the mean score for Westernization was 31.1. These were statistically different (t = -12.4, d.f. = 367; p = .00). However, it turned out that the respondents' Chinese and Westernization scores were highly correlated (r = .51; p = .00; n = 424), suggesting that the two scales measured similar concepts. This called for a factor analysis, which is reported in Tables 6 and 7. In the first stage, a principal components analysis was used, and this generated three factors with eigenvalues greater than 1. Because it was unclear from this principal components analysis which variables loaded on which factors, the process was repeated using the varimax method. From this solution, it is clear that the Chinese values load regularly on Factor 1, while the Rokeach values load regularly on Factor 2 (Table 7). From these observations, it was concluded that Factors 1 and 2 represent "Chineseness" and "Westernization", respectively. Finally, Tables 8 and 9 are designed to provide a regression model of respondents' Westernization and Chineseness. In these models, Westernization and Chineseness are dependent variables, and the independent variables are: respondents' Western mass media exposure, parents' socio-economic status, parents' Chineseness and parents' Westernization. In both regression models, these independent variables explain only about 10-11 percent of the variance of the independent variables. In the model of respondents' Westernization (Table 8), exposure to Western mass media makes a statistically significant contribution; but in a stepwise solution that is not reported here, exposure to Western mass media accounted for only 2 percent of the total variance of the dependent variable. With regard to the model of respondents' Chineseness, we see no statistically significant contribution from Western mass media exposure; the main factors are parents' Chineseness, which accounts for most of the variance, and parents' Westernization, which has a negative relationship with respondents' Chineseness. Conclusion From the review of literature, it is clear that modernization of Asian societies was an ineluctable force even prior to the introduction of mass media. Indeed, it appears that modernization pre-dates intensive exposure to mass media, because modernization gave families the kind of disposable income necessary to buy newspapers and radios and go to the cinema. In the second study reported here, Western media exposure was positively correlated with parental socio-economic status (r = .14; p = .02; n = 291). This suggests that families who are well-to-do have access to more media products in general. In other words, we contend that
modernization is followed by affluence, and affluence is followed by greater exposure to Western culture -- a sequence of events attested to in the ethnographic studies mentioned above. Meanwhile, the effects of modernization are great and are often interpreted by policymakers are effects of Westernization, which they are not. In any case, it seems clear that Westernization and modernization go hand in hand, but modernization involves deep seated changes in fundamental social institutions, such as land reform and the granting citizens freedom of movement and universal suffrage; while Westernization, especially as transmitted through mass media, confines itself to relatively shallow social behaviours and customs that are nonetheless salient. The mass media themselves play only a bit part in the process. Meanwhile, scholars and policymakers have long braced themselves for the onslaught of Western culture, creating a mindset against it. Even in 1915 -- before radio, before films, before television, before the Internet -- Chinese scholars and policymakers were steeling themselves for the onslaught of Western culture. As Hobhouse wrote in his preface to Village and Town Life in China (Leong and Tao, 1915): That the Chinese social order is destined to great modification by the inrush of Western ideas, they (social commentators) are aware. Commercial industrialism is the doom of the modern world. Japan has succumbed, and China will not escape. (p. x) If we view modernization as the replacement of religious, familial and ethnic authorities by a single, secular national political authority; the emergence of new administrative hierarchies based on achievement; and increased political participation by broad sectors of society (Huntington, 1966), then it is fair to say that the cultural changes depicted by ethnographers, especially in Japan, were due to modernization rather than Westernization. It is fair to conclude also that Westernization, wherever it takes place, succeeds modernization rather than precedes it. To really understand Westernization well, one must delve into the works of European philosophers during the Enlightenment, the beginning of which arguably could be dated 1687 with the publication of Newton's Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy. This work illustrated the enormous power of science to reduce the external world to logical principles, and it opened the gateway to human inquiry in every facet of life. Morality, economics, religion, politics -- all of these were brought within the scope of human enquiry. Hence, the prevailing outlook during the Enlightenment was one of scepticism: All ideas must face scrutiny. But the power of reason raised the individual to new heights and gave rise to individualism. This in turn called for tolerance of others, cultural pluralism, liberalism and optimism about the individual spirit to rise above superstition and totalitarianism. Returning to Godelier (1995), if Westernization is inextricably bound up with human rights, then China cannot be classified as Western in any sense of the word, and it appears to have a long way to go. Political imprisonment, religious repression, closed criminal proceedings, capital punishment on a massive scale, coercive population planning, labour camps, denial of the right to strike, the lack of a free press, interference with foreign journalists, mistreatment of homosexuals, kidnapping and abuse of women and girls, lack of freedom of movement -- all these
are human rights abuses in China (Nathan, 1994).
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Table 1: Rank-ordering of 40 Chinese Cultural Values, from most important to least important, and their zero-order correlations with Western mass media exposure index.
Order Mean Value
Western Mass Media Exposure Index
7.80 FILIAL PIETY
7.55 RESISTANCE TO CORRUPTION
7.46 SENSE OF SHAME
7.29 SOLIDARITY WITH OTHERS
10 7.16 OBSERVING RITES & SOCIAL RITUALS
11 7.14 CLOSE, INTIMATE FRIEND
12 7.12 CONTENTEDNESS WITH ONE'S POSITION -.122**
13 7.11 ADAPTABILITY
14 7.01 ORDERED RELATIONSHIPS BY STATUS
14 7.01 KINDNESS, COMPASSION
15 6.93 CHASTITY IN WOMEN
16 6.91 PATIENCE
17 6.85 PERSISTENCE, PERSEVERANCE
18 6.75 STEADINESS, STABILITY
19 6.73 HARMONY WITH OTHERS
20 6.69 SENSE OF RIGHTEOUSNESS
21 6.61 HUMBLENESS
22 6.60 WEALTH
22 6.60 THRIFT
23 6.45 RECIPROCITY OF GREETINGS, FAVOURS -.138**
24 6.38 TOLERANCE OF OTHERS
25 6.37 FOLLOWING THE MIDDLE WAY
26 6.27 BENEVOLENT AUTHORITY
27 6.25 PATRIOTISM
28 6.23 RESPECT FOR TRADITION
29 6.15 LOYALTY TO SUPERIORS
30 5.83 SENSE OF CULTURAL SUPERIORITY
31 5.75 HAVING FEW DESIRES
32 5.65 REPAYMENT OF GOOD, EVIL
33 5.47 BEING DISINTERESTED AND PURE
34 5.39 NON-COMPETITIVENESS
35 5.32 BEING CONSERVATIVE
36 5.12 PROTECTING YOUR FACE
Table 2: Chinese Cultural Values correlated with age, education and the Western mass media exposure index, controlling for age and education.
Age Education Exposure Index
RESISTANCE TO CORRUPTION
SENSE OF SHAME
SOLIDARITY WITH OTHERS
OBSERVING RITES & SOCIAL RITUALS +.203**
CLOSE, INTIMATE FRIEND
CONTENTEDNESS WITH ONE'S POSITION +.193**
ORDERED RELATIONSHIPS BY STATUS +.237**
CHASTITY IN WOMEN
HARMONY WITH OTHERS
SENSE OF RIGHTEOUSNESS
RECIPROCITY OF GREETINGS, FAVOURS +.213**
TOLERANCE OF OTHERS
FOLLOWING THE MIDDLE WAY
RESPECT FOR TRADITION
LOYALTY TO SUPERIORS
SENSE OF CULTURAL SUPERIORITY
HAVING FEW DESIRES
REPAYMENT OF GOOD, EVIL
BEING DISINTERESTED AND PURE
PROTECTING YOUR FACE
+.041 -.007 -.056 -.001 -.036 +.001 +.009 -.020 -.022 -.019 -.087 -.050 +.055 -.196** +.045 -.070 -.033 -.003 -.094* +.049 -.098* -.064 +.022 -.007 +.068 -.108* -.102 +.017 +.076 +.070 -.086 -.143** -.060 -.079 +.025 +.061 +.052 -.046 -.085 -.071
-.071 -.085* -.068 -.058 -.075* -.046 -.059 -.055 -.076 -.063 -.099* -.045 -.111** -.054 -.025 -.049 -.056 -.112** -.050 -.037 -.048 -.078* -.123** -.066 -.074 -.078* -.091* -.002 -.069 -.078 -.057 -.019 -.068 -.078* -.112** -.016 -.068 -.089* -.119** -.062
Table 3: Principal components analysis of 36 values, 24 from Personal Harmony Values (+) and 12 from Social Harmony Values (*).
Filial Piety+ Industry+ Tolerance of Others+ Harmony with Others+ Humbleness+ Loyalty to Superiors* Observing Rites & Social Rituals + Kindness, Compassion+ Knowledge+ Solidarity with Others+ Following the Middle Way* Self-Cultivation+ Sense of Righteousness+ Benevolent Authority* Steadiness, Stability+ Resistance to Corruption+ Patriotism* Sincerity + Being Disinterested, Pure* Thrift+ Persistence, Perseverance+ Patience+ Repayment of Good, Evil* Sense of Cultural Superiority* Adaptability+ Prudence+ Trustworthiness+ Sense of Shame+ Courtesy+ Contentedness with Life+ Being Conservative* Protecting Your Face* Close, Intimate Friend+ Chastity in Women* Having Few Desires* Respect for Tradition*
Eigenvalue Percent of variance Cumulative percent
12.209 33.9 33.9
2.155 6.0 39.933
Table 4: Multiple regression models using the factor score for the Personal Harmony Values factor as the dependent variable. Independent variables are age, education, and the Western media exposure index.
Dependent variable: Personal Harmony Values
Age Education Western Media Exposure Index (Constant)
SE B Beta
T Sig T
.011 .002 .183 4.566 .000
.071 .031 .092 2.314 .021
-.086 .017 -.189 -5.008 .000
Multiple R R Square F Sig F d.f.
.271 .073 18.008 .000 685
Table 5: Multiple regression models using the factor scores for the Social Harmony Values factor as the dependent variable. Independent variables are age, education, and the Western media exposure index.
Dependent variable: Social Harmony Values
Age Education Western Media Exposure Index (Constant)
SE B Beta
T Sig T
.009 .002 .162 3.990 .000
.001 .031 .001 .020 .984
-.048 .017 -.105 -2.740 .006
Multiple R R Square F Sig F d.f.
.209 .044 10.401 .000 685
Table 6: Principal components analysis of 12 values, six from the Rokeach Value Survey(+) and six from the Chinese Value Survey(*).
Equality+ Trustworthiness* Competition+ Filial piety* Individualism+ Courtesy* Ambition+ Resistance to corruption* Freedom+ Industry* Wealth+ Having a sense of shame* Eigenvalue Percent of variance Cumulative percent
Factor 1 .5184 .7547 .3217 .6997 .4642 .7014 .5171 .7429 .6897 .6589 .2906 .6951 4.4357 37.0 37.0
Factor 2 -.1587 -.2202 .6623 -.2462 .4453 -.1779 .5158 -.2136 -.1009 -.0261 .6702 -.1299 1.5914 13.3 50.2
Factor 3 .7015 .0797 .0942 -.0987 .1949 -.2409 -.3144 .0002 .3113 -.3733 .1041 -.2058 1.0014 8.3 58.6
Table 7: Factor analysis using varimax method of 12 values, six from the Rokeach Value Survey(+) and six from the Chinese Value Survey(*).
Equality+ Trustworthiness* Competition+ Filial piety* Individualism+ Courtesy* Ambition+ Resistance to corruption* Freedom+ Industry* Wealth+ Having a sense of shame* Eigenvalue Percent of variance Cumulative percent
Factor 1 .1573 .6597 .0265 .7038 .1642 .7502 .4219 .6845 .4628 .7302 -.0065 .7144 4.4357 37.0 37.0
Factor 2 .0853 .0774 .7385 .0223 .5955 .0778 .6496 .0744 .1782 .1951 .7350 .1221 1.5914 13.3 50.2
Factor 3 .8683 .4281 .0698 .2533 .2650 .1131 -.1798 .3515 .5803 -.0549 .0640 -.1310 1.0014 8.3 58.6
Table 8: Multiple regression model using respondents' Westernization as the dependent variable. Independent variables are parents' Westernization, parents' socio-economic status, parents' Chineseness, and respondents' exposure to Western mass media.
Dependent variable: Respondents' Westernization
SE B Beta T
.010 .051 .011 .187 .852
Respondents' Western media exposure .033 .016 .121 2.095 .037
.084 .044 .126 1.920 .056
.147 .044 .221 3.379 .008
Multiple R R Square F Sig F d.f.
.343 .117 9.183 .000 .267
Table 9: Multiple regression model using respondents' Chineseness as the dependent variable. Independent variables are parents' Westernization, parents' socio-economic status, parents' Chineseness, and respondents' exposure to Western mass media.
Dependent variable: Respondents' Chineseness
SE B Beta T
-.099 .058 -.098 -1.693 .092
Respondents' Western media exposure .006 .018 .020 .337 .737
.244 .049 .327 4.984 .000
-.101 .049 -.135 -.2064 .040
Multiple R R Square F Sig F d.f.
.312 .097 7.458 .000 .267
BT McIntyre, W Zhang