Rhythms, patterning and articulations of social formations in South Africa, E Pieterse

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Content: Rhythms, patterning and articulations of social formations in South Africa Edgar Pieterse 101
DEVELOPMENT UPDATE So long as we confine our conception of the political to activity that is openly declared we are driven to conclude that subordinate groups essentially lack a political life, or that what political life they do have is restricted to those exceptional moments of popular explosion. To do so is to miss the immense political terrain that lies between quiescence and revolt, and that, for better or worse, is the political environment of the subject classes. It is to focus on the visible coastline of politics and miss the continent that lies beyond. J.C. Scott, `The infrapolitics of subordinate groups', in M. Rahnema and V. Bawtree (eds), The post-development reader, (London, Zed Books, 1997), p.323. Real local communities have rarely been egalitarian or progressive. Community decision-making has more often than not been in the hands of minorities able to control key resources such as land and to monopolize the use of violence, usually in alliance with local functionaries of the state. Social peace has typically depended on acceptance of traditional distribution of power and avoidance of issues that might bring conflict into the open. M. Wolfe, Elusive development, (London, Zed Books, 1996), pp.181­2. 102
SOCIAL FORMATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA Introduction In the context of almost 40 per cent unemployment, extreme income inequalities and high levels of tenure insecurity, the majority of South Africans lead precarious and tough lives. Development theorists often assume, or rather expect, that these people will recognise their collective interests and associate in various forms of voluntary group, and exercise social citizenship to advance their social and economic position. And those development theorists who hold a consensual view of political practice1 see the act of association as a crucial precondition for grounding development initiatives in the aspirations and needs of intended beneficiaries. Associations of the poor make it possible for the government to enlist the poor in various initiatives aimed at `empowering', `improving', `uplifting' and `developing' their livelihood strategies. However, it is expected that such associational formations broadly agree to the modernising agenda of the government, and that they will act within the institutional and ideological framework of the government in order to `benefit' from the plethora of development initiatives. These assumptions show themselves across most South African government policies including the integrated development planning system so central to municipal governance, the recent Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Strategy, and various sectoral participatory mechanisms such as water, health or school committees and the like. On the left, commentators assume a rather different role for associational formations. Broadly speaking, the expectation is that poor people will become `conscious' of the causal factors of their exploitation, and realise that by amalgamating their disparate energies they can shift power relations and improve their collective situation. In this view, since 1996 the primary causal factor of systemic poverty in South Africa is the government's neo-liberal macroEconomic Policy ­ the de facto national development strategy, according to the left ­ which itself is embedded in the neo-liberal globalisation agenda of the West, and associational formations of the poor must become the bedrock of militant social movements that will challenge the hegemony and technologies of the government's agenda.2 In South Africa, trade unions are often seen to be the vanguard of these social movements, but ideally positioned closely to communitybased social movements mobilised around the vicious manifestations of neo-liberal political expression, such as evictions and service cut-offs. The challenge, seen through this conceptual lens, is to expose as many poor people as possible to an analysis of how capitalist power reproduces itself through a neo-liberal government and globalised economy, and then for them to take up their historical mission of relentlessly attacking and dismantling the system in all its manifestations. 1 A consensual view of politics refers to an analytical perspective that believes all political differences and antagonisms can be resolved though procedural dialogue based on shared principles of free speech. 2 See P. Bond, Elite transition: From apartheid to neoliberalism in South Africa, (London and Pietermaritzburg, Pluto and University of Natal Press, 2000). 103
DEVELOPMENT UPDATE In both these visions about associational life at the grassroots,3 the rhythms, textures and patterns of everyday life are flattened by the implicit essentialism of identity. This essay seeks to move the debate forward in a less certain direction. Its analytical driving force is an assumption that a vibrant and plural civil society, richly endowed with associational practices, especially in poor communities, is essential for a `deep democracy' and a socially just `development project'.4 Its purpose is to take the veil off the scale, nature and dynamics of associational life in South Africa, especially amongst the poor. Its intention is to relate recent data on the size and scale of civil society organisations (CSOs) to the political project of the democratic government. It relies on secondary sources that include empirical data on the nature and scale of CSOs in South Africa and Qualitative Data on the practices of grassroots community organisations in relation to development politics. The essay is organised into four sections. The first is a reminder of the scale of poverty and inequality in South Africa and what this tells us about the livelihood options for, and contexts of, the poorest South Africans, and includes a snapshot of the nature and scale of CSOs. This contextual section relates the scale of poverty and inequality to the nature and scale of CSOs. Once the contextual markers are clarified it becomes possible to move to a more conceptual discussion, and in the second section a conceptual model differentiates between five domains of government-civil society engagement. Research on social formations tends to focus on more organised and visible CSOs, and as a result we know very little about the dynamics of the large numbers of so-called informal associations that function at the grassroots, where government interventions are arguably most significant. Section three explores the current approaches of the government in structuring ­ through legislative measures and development participation policies ­ the role of CSOs of the poor. The purpose is to draw attention to the incentives that are being used to shape the politics of civil society as part of the larger project of state consolidation and nation-building. This section also highlights some unintended consequences of various government policies. 3 I use the term `grassroots' to depict the lifespaces (following N. Long, Development sociology: Actor perspectives, (London, Routledge, 2001) of poor people in terms of where they live, work, move and associate. 4 See A. Appadurai, `Deep democracy: Urban governmentality and the horizon of politics', Public Culture, 14:1 (2002), pp.21­47; M. Douglas, `Beyond dualism: Rethinking theories of development in the global-local framework; in Regional Development Dialogue 13:2, pp.3­21; (1998); and J. Friedmann, Empowerment: The politics of alternative development, (Cambridge and Oxford, Blackwell, 1992). 104
SOCIAL FORMATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA The conceptual journey ends with a modest research agenda for developing a much more in-depth understanding of the shifting contours of social formations in South Africa. Contextual dynamics5 On poverty, inequality and the imperative to associate Despite considerable developmental action by the post-apartheid government, South Africa remains a profoundly unequal and violent country, especially if you happen to be poor. A direct consequence of the racist social engineering of apartheid is that the vast majority of those who comprise the poorest 60 per cent of South Africans are African. According to Nattrass and Seekings South Africa's Gini coefficient has remained persistently high since the 1960s, but the determinants of inequality have altered dramatically. Most importantly, the impact of racial discrimination has declined. Racial inequality remains large (nine out of ten households in the bottom six deciles are African, and three-quarters of the top decile are white).6 Furthermore, two social features tower above the many other challenges facing South African citizens: systemic unemployment and the impact of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. The South African economy has been shedding jobs at an alarming rate for the last 30 years. The labour absorption capacity of the economy declined from 97 per cent in the 1960s to 7 per cent between 1985 and 1990. In his Budget speech of 1994, then Minister of Finance Derek Keys suggested that between 1989 and 1993 more than 400 000 jobs in the formal sector (excluding agriculture) were lost.7 Since 1994, over 500 000 jobs have been lost.8 Recent data from Statistics South Africa suggest that 36 per cent of the population is unemployed. In practice this means that in certain (African) communities and areas the figure is much higher.9 This is partially captured in the figure on the following page. 5 This section suffers from an urban bias reflecting my own area of expertise. It is not meant to suggest that equivalent dynamics unfold in rural areas. 6 N. Nattrass and J. Seekings, Globalisation and inequality in South Africa, paper presented at Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development conference on Poverty and Income Inequality in Developing Countries, Paris, 20 November­1 December 2000, p.4. 7 H. Marais, South Africa: Limits to change: The political economy of transition, 2nd edn, (London and Cape Town, Zed Books and University of Cape Town Press, 2001), p.103. 8 Transformation for human development: South Africa 2000, (Pretoria, United Nations Development Programme, 2000), p.32. 9 T. Binns and R. Robinson, `Sustaining democracy in the "new" South Africa', Geography, 87:1 (2002), pp.25­37. 105
DEVELOPMENT UPDATE
TABLE 1: UNEMPLOYMENT (EXPANDED DEFINITION)10 BY RACE GROUP, SEX AND
SETTLEMENT11
Percentage unemployment
Urban male Urban female Non-urban male
African
33.7
48.9
40.8
Coloured
22.3
30.1
8.4
Indian
17.7
23.1
*
White
6.3
7.5
*
All race
26.2
37.9
37.4
groups
* number too small for analysis
Non-urban female 55.7 20.7 * * 52.7
Total male 36.7 19.3 17.8 6.3 30.0
Total female Total
51.9
44.0
25.4
23.6
23.8
20.2
7.3
6.8
43.2
36.2
In the absence of formal employment, and, more crucially, in the absence of the prospect of employment in the foreseeable future, people in these areas depend on non-formal opportunities.12 However, accessing such opportunities requires the incessant and expansive mobilisation of energy to foster and maintain useful connections in a multiplicity of networks.13 The imperative of remaining plugged into information switchboards and resource circuits requires people to participate in various associational forms, ranging from political parties to formal community-based organisations and less formalised, network-structured mutual-help associations such as stokvels (savings
10 Statistics South Africa uses the following definition of unemployment as its official definition: The unemployed are those people within the economically active population who: (a) did not work during the seven days prior to the interview, (b) want to work and are available to start work within a week of the interview, and (c) have taken active steps to look for work or to start some form of self-employment in the four weeks prior to the interview. The expanded definition of unemployment includes criteria (a) and (b) but it excludes criterion (c). Among those who are included in the expanded definition will be discouraged job seekers (those who said they were unemployed but had not taken active steps to find work in the four weeks prior to the interview). 11 South African statistics 2000, (Pretoria, Statistics South Africa, 2000), p.7.62. 12 See S. Friedman and I. Chipkin, A poor voice? The politics of inequality in South Africa, (Johannesburg, Centre for Policy Studies, 2001), research report no. 87. 13 See A. Spiegel, V. Watson and P. Wilkinson `Devaluing diversity? National housing policy and African household dynamics in Cape Town', Urban Forum 7:1, (1996), pp.1­30; and C. Cross, `Why does South Africa need a spatial policy? Population, migration, infrastructure and development', Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 19:1 (2001), pp.111­127.
106
SOCIAL FORMATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA clubs) and burial societies.14 Decisions on what to take part in, where and with what levels of intensity are shaped by the varying identities and localities that people inhabit. Thus, it is not uncommon for people to identify closely with organisations with contradictory cosmologies, both modern and traditional. More importantly, there clearly is no perceived problem in belonging to an organisation committed ideologically to socialist modernism (for example the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) and the South African Communist Party (SACP)) and being a devout spiritualist relying on the sanctions and guidance of ancestors as mediated by chiefs and sangomas (traditional healers). For example, Turrell reminds us, it is not surprising that our 500 000 traditional healers are more successful in treating neurosis than our 30 000 psychoanalysts and that our 10 million Zionist Christians are better able to understand misfortune than other Christians who live by a belief in sin and transcendental salvation.15 The culturally over-determined framework for association, which characterises South Africa, undermines instrumentalist political and development agendas. It may be helpful to turn now to the most recent empirical data about CSOs in South Africa. Size and type of civil society organisations According to a recent national study ­ The South African non-profit sector16 ­ there are 98 920 non-profit organisations (NPOs)17 across all sectors in South Africa, and in 1998 `nearly 1,5 million volunteers actively contributed their time and energy to NPOs.18 Just over half (53 per cent) of the CSOs19 are in fact informal voluntary organisations ­ that is not formally structured as non-profit companies, trusts, 14 See T. Bauman and D. Mitlin, The South African Homeless People's Federation: Investing in the poor, paper presented at the History Workshop and National Land Committee Rural and Urban Development Conference, Rietvleidam, 18­19 April 2002. 15 R. Turrell, Review of Witchcraft, power and politics: Exploring the occult in the South African lowveld, http://www.uni-ulm.de (accessed on 5 May 2002), p.4. 16 M. Swilling and B. Russell, The South African non-profit sector, (University of the Witwatersrand, graduate school of Public and Development Management, 2001), report for the Johns Hopkins University non-profit study, p.10. 17 The study uses the term non-profit organisation (NPO) for organisations that comply with the following criteria: organised, private, self-governing, non-profit distributing and voluntary (see Swilling and Russell for a detailed elaboration). The study uses this term because it allows Johns Hopkins University to do cross-country comparisons. I will use the South African term civil society organisation (CSO), which broadly coincides with NPO, except when I refer to data from the study. 18 Swilling and Russell, p.10. 19 Swilling and Russell, p.11. 107
DEVELOPMENT UPDATE churches, trade unions or co-operatives ­ and concentrated in poor communities. This points to significant sources of social capital in these communities, serving as the bedrock for holding them together despite the severity of everyday life. The following three sectors comprise the bulk of the NPO sector: culture and recreation (20 587), social services (22 755), and development and housing (20 382).20 Significantly, given the apartheid government's neglect in black areas, it was largely religious and cultural organisations that stepped into the breach to provide a plethora of welfare services. Over time, a number of dedicated welfare organisations emerged, which is why so much of the current welfare service delivery regime involves CSOs wedded to very marked religious origins.21 The lack of government presence in, and attention to, black communities also explains in part the significant layer of welfarist organisations that play a vital role in providing the various services of the government, such as child and youth care, abuse centres, and poverty relief initiatives. Furthermore, with the post-1994 reallocation of resources to attend to the vast infrastructure and service delivery backlogs in black communities, it is not surprising that there are many development-type organisations. Patterns and drivers of association To make some sense of the data it is important to distinguish grassroots social formations by function, as Andersson does. Members of households participate in a range of civil associations, or community-based organizations, as part of their efforts to produce a livelihood. These include burial societies, savings clubs or stokvels, religious groups, sports clubs, women's or youth groups, trade unions, small and micro-level enterprises, co-operatives, farmers' groups, civic associations, service organizations, cultural societies and many more. Differentiating these CBOs very broadly, it could be argued that they fall into three categories: (i) those devoted directly to economic aspects of livelihood production for the households that participate in them (e.g. stokvels, horticulture groups, small enterprises); (ii) those that provide households with greater ability to influence or benefit from the political process (e.g. civic associations, development forums); and 20 Swilling and Russell, p.11. 21 See L. Patel, Restructuring social welfare: Options for South Africa, (Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1992). 108
SOCIAL FORMATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA (iii) those that serve to build the social fabric or social capital of the community (e.g. crиches, religious groups, cultural associations).22 Critically, all three of Andersson's categories of association are shaped by individual and group identity issues that are profoundly spatial and place-sensitive.23 Thus, one category may work in one area and not in another because historical-cultural dynamics militate against it. It is crucial to keep South Africa's heavily loaded identity fault lines in view ­ race, gender, ethnicity, language, location, religion, age, sexuality. As argued below, much of the government's attempt to institutionalise participatory development planning fails to appreciate these complex dynamics. If we take Andersson's simple typology and relate it back to the extent and depth of poverty on the one hand and the plethora of political opportunities since 1994 on the other, it becomes easier to appreciate why there have been incentive drivers across all three categories of association. First, as the economy continued to shed jobs at a frightening rate after 1994 ­ in the wake of the adjustment effects of the Normative Economic Model policy, its successor the Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy, and prior structural trends ­ people were compelled to rely more and more on the informal economy and kinship-based support networks to access income, information, goods and services. In this respect it is crucial to bear in mind that because poor people have so few opportunities for relying on non-monetary resources,24 poverty in South Africa is linked particularly to lack of access to monetary income. Also, the evidence suggests that in times of economic hardship more people migrate in search of better economic opportunities, and rely heavily on non-territorial associational networks, typically kinship-based, to facilitate their movement.25 Second, it is clear that the democratically elected government achieved a largescale reorientation of service delivery towards the (previously) disenfranchised. Almost all of this effort was couched in participatory development rhetoric, no doubt informed 22 G. Andersson, Partnerships between CBOs, NGOs and government in South Africa: Insights derived from experience, (Pretoria, USAID South Africa, 1999), paper, p.2. 23 See J. Comaroff and J.L. Comaroff, `Millennial capitalism: First thoughts on a second coming', Public Culture, 12:2 (2000), pp.291­343; and A. Escobar, `Culture sits in places: Reflections on globalism and subaltern strategies of localization', Political Geography, 20:2 (2001), pp.139­174. 24 See J. May, `Meeting the challenge? The emerging agenda for poverty reduction in post-apartheid South Africa', in F. Wilson, N. Kanji and E. Braathen (eds), Poverty reduction: What role for the state in today's globalized economy? (London, Zed Books, 2001). 25 See Spiegel, Watson and Wilkinson. 109
DEVELOPMENT UPDATE by the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP).26 As a consequence, the centre of gravity in local politics shifted from oppositional politics to resource allocation decisions and the sequencing of development investments over time. Invariably, political formations such as African National Congress (ANC) branches, civics, development forums and other social movements remained vital after 1994.27 Third, given the pervasiveness of poverty and the narrow base of the social welfare system, CSOs remain important players in providing a safety net of sorts at the household and neighbourhood levels. Religious and cultural organisations have been pivotal in continuing their welfarist and support functions. The impact of HIV/ AIDS has fuelled the emergence of a new layer of support organisations that manage the consequences of ineffective government policy and capability.28 Community development forums took root in the late 1980s/early 1990s when local-level negotiations started between residents' associations, typically affiliated to the United Democratic Front (UDF), and white municipal councils around rates boycotts, evictions, service cut-offs, and so forth. Clearly, various association-based support mechanisms are crucial in buttressing the livelihood strategies of the majority of South Africans. In a context of pervasive poverty and social violence, mutual support is the primary concern of these associations, and they are not necessarily amenable to radical social mobilisation. At the same time, the associations contain a range of interests, and are characterised by inequality and patronage partially linked to the role of political party patronage in these communities.29 Such factors militate against idealistic assumptions about building autonomous centres of (socialist) power and social processes that can lead to social policy reforms `from below'.30 In fact, they raise difficult questions about exactly how one can shift the various sets of vested interests that feed off the existing patterns of associational life at the grassroots. The question therefore arises: To what extent has the government been able to appreciate the diverse nature of associational life in its development ambitions? Exploring this 26 See E. Pieterse and M. van Donk, Incomplete ruptures: The political economy of realising socioeconomic rights in South Africa, paper prepared for the Community Law Centre of the University of the Western Cape Colloquium on the Grootboom Judgement and Socio-Economic Rights, Strand, 15­17 March 2002. 27 See Friedman and Chipkin. 28 See H. Marais, To the edge: An examination of South Africa's national AIDS response 1994­1999, (Pretoria, Centre for the Study of AIDS, 2000). 29 See P. Heller and L. Ntlokonkulu, A civic movement or movement of civics? The South African National Civic Organisation in the post-apartheid period, (Johannesburg, Centre for Policy Studies, 2001), research report no. 84. 30 See Friedman and Chipkin. 110
SOCIAL FORMATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA requires a conceptual framework that can expose the multiple dimensions of government-civil society engagement, which is developed in the next section. Towards a conceptual framework for government-civil society relations Foregrounding agency Following Long's actor-centred conceptual approach,31 the starting point in this paper is that poor people need to be regarded as highly complex agents who actively make decisions and put strategies into play to enrol other actors into their initiatives. Any reductionist model that boxes poor people into categories (by their race or location or income level or whatever else) that in turn specify that they will behave in this or that way, is deeply problematic and theoretically unacceptable. Theories that ascribe certain fundamental characteristics to social formations that mainly comprise one such category or another are equally problematic if they read certain features into those organisations. The tendency is to do this with working class associations or movements such as trade unions or civics, but in practice it is impossible to analyse the behaviour or politics of such social formations outside of very particular times and very specific contexts. Of course, the binding interests of such formations do make it possible to ascribe to them certain expected behavioural patterns under particular structural conditions. In other words, autonomous actors are circumscribed and shaped by definite structural constraints and opportunities. That said, social formations can be categorised in relation to various types of political domain in society. Political domain is deliberately emphasised because this essay is part of a book that seeks to understand the transition and transformation processes in South Africa, and the transition was put in motion largely through a series of politically negotiated agreements. In other words, the terms and boundaries of the transition were largely defined and contested in the `political sphere' and legitimated through symbolic actions and discourses in the `public sphere'. At its core, transformation in South Africa is about democratising the various political domains and continuously constructing the hegemony of the national democratic project in the public sphere. For this reason, it is a decidedly open-ended and contested affair. Modelling political spaces of government-civil society engagement There are multiple spectrums that can be deployed to typify different kinds of social formations or CSOs. CSOs can be formal or informal in terms of national legislation such as the Non-Profit Organisations Act of 1997. In terms of Andersson's functional 31 Long, Development sociology. 111
DEVELOPMENT UPDATE typology, CSOs can be primarily economic, political, or cultural. But in many instances these distinctions would be difficult to discern, because many or all of the functions could be meshed together in one organisation. A typical example would be coalition organisations such as community development forums, which are designed to be malleable enough to fulfil a combination of economic, political and cultural functions. Furthermore, CSOs may be membership-based or not, which typically provides the distinguishing feature between grassroots organisations or communitybased organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). In conceptual terms it is possible to delineate at least five domains of political engagement between the government and civil society at various levels, ranging from the national to the local: n representative political forums and participatory mechanisms n social mobilisation through direct action n development practice at neighbourhood scale n symbolic politics through discursive action n neo-corporatist stakeholder forums. The illustration on the following page depicts these five domains in addition to distinctions between the political and public spheres that are continuously (re)constructed through engagement in each of these domains. The critical conceptual challenge is to map the nature and dynamics of social formations in each of the domains, and, moreover, to define the articulation between the domains. Also, certain social formations can be typified as operating at the interface of some of the domains. For example, an organisation like the Homeless People's Federation is clearly located at the interface of direct action and development practice.32 Larger, more resourced organisations with a national reach would function in all five domains. The most relevant example would be Cosatu, which acts as the lead voice in stakeholder-based forums such as the National Employment Development and Labour Council (Nedlac), and also tends to set the pace for alternative discourses in the public sphere about how systemic poverty and inequality can best be addressed. It is beyond the scope of this essay to list all the organisations in each of these domains and their interfaces. What follows is illustrative, and aims to establish an argument for more nuanced and context-specific empirical research. Hopefully, this overview will also allow us to begin to understand more clearly the implications of government policy on civil society, the subject of the final section of the essay. 32 See Bauman and Mitlin. 112
SOCIAL FORMATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA
FIGURE 2: DIMENSIONS OF THE POLITICAL INTERFACE BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS
`top-down'
rights-based democratic framework*
representative political forums and participatory mechanisms
neo-corporatist stakeholder forums
development practice at neighbourhood scale
politics sphere democratisation public sphere
social mobilisation through direct action
`bottom-up'
symbolic politics through discursive action
interfaces
* The human rights-based Constitution established the values and principles that underpin contestation in each of the five domains and at their interfaces.
Representative political forums and participatory mechanisms Political representation refers to the formal political system that characterises national, provincial and municipal government. The parameters of formal politics are established in the South African Constitution of 1996, which essentially makes provision for a proportional political system based on multi-party political contestation. The main avenue for political participation is thus through political parties elected on the basis of a proportional system, except at the municipal level where a combination of proportional and ward-based systems is in effect.33 The democratic effectiveness of the system depends in large measure on the democratic nature of the political parties themselves and on their rootedness in their constituencies.34 It also depends on the quality and maturity of the institutional rules and systems that structure the functioning of political chambers, council and
33 In terms of the Local Government Municipal Systems Act of 2000, local government councils are elected on a 50 per cent proportional basis and 50 per cent ward basis. 34 See A.M. Goetz and S. Lister, The politics of civil society engagement with the state: A comparative analysis of South Africa and Uganda, (Brighton, Institute of Development Studies, 2001); and P. Heller, `Moving the state: The politics of democratic decentralization in Kerala, South Africa, and Porto Alegre', Politics & Society, 29:1 (2001), pp.131­163.
113
DEVELOPMENT UPDATE committee meetings, and associated mechanisms for transparency, responsiveness and accountability.35 Typically, established and resourced organisations with substantial coverage are able to engage in formal representative political forums. National social movements and membership-based associations ­ such as Cosatu, the South African National Civics Organisation (Sanco), the Homeless People's Federation, organised religious bodies such as the Catholic Bishops' Conference, and so forth ­ are able to operate at this level in this domain. In addition, many professional NGOs gear their work at national and provincial parliaments and associated institutions in order to influence the policy agenda and the interpretation of policy review processes. One of the most recognised NGOs that does this is the Institute for a Democratic South Africa (Idasa), which has demonstrated some capacity to pre-empt parliamentary debates and comment timeously on current issues.36 Alliances of NGOs such as the South African National NGO Coalition (Sangoco) and the Rural Development Services Network (RDSN) also devote considerable energy to engaging with representative political institutions, with questionable impact.37 Two recent reviews by the Centre for Policy Studies on the impact of civil society on the national political arena suggest that Cosatu has been the most influential in this domain.38 Two issues stand out for further research and analysis in terms of the representative political domain. The first is the role of the ANC as a political movement, located within the ruling tripartite alliance (with Cosatu and the SACP), and with a substantial grassroots presence. The mood and attitudes of the ANC outside of government clearly have a bearing on the functioning and agendas of formal representative political forums. However, this bearing is highly circumscribed and varies from issue to issue, as illustrated by the debates about the government's position on HIV/AIDS, the arms deal and macro-economic policy. It is to be expected that social formations that are able to engage with the ANC as a movement that exists outside of government and riven with its own contradictions are more likely to have their agendas advanced than those who 35 See H. Blair, `Participation and accountability at the periphery: Democratic local governance in six countries', World Development, 28:1 (2000), pp.21­39; and O. Tцrnquist, Politics and development: A critical introduction, (London, Sage, 1999). 36 See C. Kabemba and S. Friedman, Review of Idasa, (Johannesburg, Centre for Policy Studies, 2001), research report no. 89. 37 See FMA Consulting, Sangoco evaluation, (Johannesburg, South African NGO Coalition (Sangoco), 2001), draft report; and G. Kraak, `The South African voluntary sector: A variety of morbid symptoms', Development Update, 3:4 (2001), pp.129­150. 38 See M. Reitzes and S. Friedman, Funding freedom: synthesis report on the impact of foreign political aid to civil society organisations in South Africa, (Johannesburg, Centre for Policy Studies, 2001) research report no. 85; and S. Mackay and M. Mathoho, Worker power: The Congress of South African Trade Unions and its impact on governance and democracy, (Johannesburg, Centre for Policy Studies, 2001), research report no. 79. 114
SOCIAL FORMATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA focus only on the formal access points of the parliamentary system. Yet we understand very little about the nature of such advocacy politics and what it may mean for the growth, autonomy and effectiveness of social formations working in this terrain. A second issue is the distinctive nature of representative politics at the local level. Political engagement here opens itself to a much wider spectrum of associations than at the national and provincial levels. The ward element of the municipal political system creates opportunities for much greater entanglement with neighbourhood political dynamics, with the result that a range of organisations and interest groups exert pressure on municipal councillors and the political compromises that shape municipal politics are complex and ambiguous.39 It is not surprising that researchers find a tendency amongst membership-based associations organising around shelter or access to land (such as the Homeless People's Federation and Sanco) to be more focused on local than on regional or national political processes. Furthermore, the legislative imperative to develop integrated development plans (IDP) engenders participatory systems in municipal planning and programme implementation and review.40 Various studies of grassroots political life suggest that opportunities for participation in IDP processes are taken up by civic organisations, street committees and community development forums,41 and raise a host of empirical and theoretical questions about the degree of inter-penetration between local councils and grassroots associations, and its democratic character. Social mobilisation through direct action Direct action involves various forms of collective action by (disadvantaged) groups aimed at stretching the liberal democratic constitutional framework to its limit.42 This implies that social movements and looser, issue-specific social formations must claim their rights and entitlements through non-violent social action focused on concrete issues that shape the quality of life of their constituencies. In South Africa's recent history, there are a number of examples where such action resulted in favourable constitutional judgements on the rights to shelter for children, protection 39 See Heller. 40 See E. Pieterse, `Participatory local governance in the making: Opportunities, constraints and prospects', in S. Parnell, E. Pieterse, M. Swilling and D. Wooldridge (eds), Democratising local government: The South African experiment, (University of Cape Town Press, 2002); and E. Pieterse, `From divided to integrated city? Critical overview of the emerging metropolitan governance system in Cape Town', Urban Forum, 13:1 (2002), pp.3­37. 41 See J. Cherry, K. Jones, and J. Seekings, `Democratization and politics in South African townships,' International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 24:4 (2000), pp. 889­905; Heller and Ntlokonkulu; and S. Oldfield, `The centrality of community capacity in state low-income housing provision in Cape Town, South Africa', International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 24:4 (2000), pp.858­872. 42 There are obviously many instances where (relatively) privileged groups also embark on direct action to get their political grievances across. 115
DEVELOPMENT UPDATE from forced evictions43 and access to essential drugs and medicines. Put differently, the South African Constitution creates substantial scope for a rights-based approach to social mobilisation that can entrench the accountability of the government for ensuring adequate measures to reduce poverty and destitution. At the same time, this rights-based approach reinforces the constitutional democratic framework and commitment to citizen empowerment, because the fulfilment of rights, especially socio-economic rights, implies addressing structural inequalities.44 On a more sobering note, it is important to acknowledge that the same Constitution, and especially clauses entrenching property rights, can be mobilised by elite or rightwing interest groups to thwart redistributive measures at national and local levels.45 In recent years there has been a noteworthy increase in social mobilisation against government policies from an anti-neo-liberal and anti-globalisation platform. At the national level, examples would include public protests against national debt, the arms deal and privatisation of municipal services. At the local level there has been a noticeable increase in community protests against the privatisation or commercialisation of some municipal services and the related disconnection of services or eviction of defaulters. The common thread in these protests is a radical analysis of the political economy, which ascribes the root cause of increasing poverty and inequality to GEAR. GEAR is seen to be a natural reflection of an elite pact to slot South Africa into the unequal system of globalisation, even at the expense of the working classes,46 and as a result a new brand of highly politicised social formations has taken root at the local level and in some sections of the NGO community. This group seeks to deconstruct and replace the mainstream development programme of the government, which signals the emergence of a series of more pronounced political fault lines cutting through the ruling tripartite alliance, the NGO sector and organised grassroots formations. Without empirical data and systematic analysis, it is difficult to anticipate how pervasive these new political identities are. However, the fact that Sangoco has been trapped in a quagmire of political contestation for years is telling. But political contestation tends to divert attention away from the very different rhythm and 43 See S. Liebenberg, South Africa's evolving jurisprudence on socio-economic rights, (University of the Western Cape, Community Law Centre, 2001), unpublished paper; and T. Roux, `Understanding Grootboom: A response to Cass R. Sustein', Constitutional Forum, 12, (forthcoming). 44 See Pieterse and Van Donk. 45 See E. Lahiff and S. Rugege, A critical assessment of state land redistribution policy in the light of the Grootboom judgement, paper prepared for the Community Law Centre of the University of the Western Cape Colloquium on the Grootboom Judgement and Socio-Economic Rights, Strand, 15­ 17 March 2002. 46 See Bond. 116
SOCIAL FORMATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA patterning of associational practices in the spaces of the everyday. This brings us to the politics of development practice. Development practice at neighbourhood scale The politics of development practice unfold at the neighbourhood level (and beyond), where autonomous and government-dependent projects are undertaken to improve quality of life and livelihoods, to protect against the vicissitudes of crime, violence and other shocks, and to deliberate future trajectories for the community in relation to other communities and the larger regional economic-ecological system. Elsewhere I have discussed the content and institutional dimensions of community-based development processes, with particular reference to anti-poverty programmes.47 In a similar sense, I would put shopfloor struggles to improve the quality of work and establish workplace democracy in this category.48 Both types of social action involve the establishment of practical rules and norms to regularise interactions between powerful interests and the subjugated in terms of the minimum standards of `human dignity' espoused by the Constitution. They also involve the active construction of systematic projects to address a variety of consumption, productive, information and political needs. The bulk of the government's development investments (in housing and related infrastructure, access to land, access to affordable credit and services, and so forth) are aimed at energising these kinds of initiatives. On the workplace side, the combination of legislation and policies on labour relations, skills development and industrial promotion is aimed at achieving the progressive normalisation and expansion of `workplace democracy' and efficiency.49 The massive post-1994 government investment in addressing basic needs backlogs and normalising labour relations has led to a high concentration of governmentcivil society engagement in this political domain. However, it is also in this domain that politics and research have been particularly skewed. At one level, the argument is straightforward. Local community life, in both urban and rural areas, is teeming with associational forms and practices that serve as the bedrock against total destitution and social exclusion for the majority of South Africans. This is borne out by the findings of The South African non-profit sector study.50 The recent report of the Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive System of Social Security for South 47 E. Pieterse, `In praise of transgression: Notes on institutional synergy and poverty reduction', Development Update, 3:4 (2001), pp.157­166. 48 See Mackay and Mathoho. 49 See Mackay and Mathoho; and South Africa official yearbook 2001/02, (Pretoria, Government Communication Information System, 2001), chapter 7. 50 Swilling and Russell. 117
DEVELOPMENT UPDATE Africa51 argues that government failure is widespread, and that social capital embedded in associational networks buttresses the worst excesses of systemic unemployment, poverty and inequality. At the same time, these associations are by no means automatically virtuous or impervious to currents of illegality. Informal associations are contested social entities that can provide support and relief and at the same time serve as conduits for powerful (local) actors to use their largesse and patronage to reproduce their control over resource flows in their communities. These ambiguously located entities ­ caught between altruistic mutual support imperatives and being complicit with undemocratic or illegal vested interests ­ can better be appreciated through a brief discussion of informal strategies to address safety and security issues. In numerous studies, safety and security is in the top three concerns for South Africans across class and race boundaries.52 It is unsurprising, given that South Africa is one of the most violent countries in the world, with very high rates of violent crime such as murder, rape and assault.53 Even more disturbing is that much of this is directed at women and children.54 Crime and violence, in all their insidious diversity, are effectively routinised as features of daily life. A large and profitable security industry has emerged outside of the government to address the problem. In wealthy areas it takes the form of security firms and gated communities, whereas in poor areas it tends to fuel the proliferation of vigilante groups and street committees, which take on policing and judicial functions through so-called self-defence units, self-protection units and kangaroo courts.55 Organisations that act outside of constitutional and legal frameworks will continue to flourish and find community support as long as the government remains incapable of fulfilling crucial policing and protection functions. As long as the government remains deficient in capability and resources (exacerbated in a context of fiscal conservatism), alternative, informal and democratically ambiguous formations will emerge to fill the vacuum. As these formations become more pervasive, they also 51 V. Taylor, Transforming the present. Protecting the future, (Pretoria, Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive System of Social Security for South Africa, 2002), draft consolidated report. 52 See South Africa survey 2000/01, (Johannesburg, South African Institute of Race Relations, 2001), `Security' chapter. 53 See J. Steinberg, `Introduction: Behind the crime wave', in J. Steinberg (ed.), Crime wave: The South African underworld and its foes, (Johannesburg, University of the Witwatersrand Press, 2001). 54 See O.A. Barbarin and L.M. Richter, Mandela's children: Growing up in post-apartheid South Africa, (London, Routledge, 2001), chapter 11. 55 See B. Baker, `Living with non-state policing in South Africa: The issues and dilemmas', Journal of Modern African Studies, 40:1 (2002), pp.29­53. 118
SOCIAL FORMATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA effect powerful cultural shifts that become encrusted in new lifestyle choices and identities. Steinberg notes: The point ... is that crime in South Africa is animated by far more than the exigencies of earning a living. It is also about lifestyle. Its members are seduced by the ensemble of ethics, values and tastes. The danger is that in some zones of our cities, the style and the signature of crime will outgrow its status as a counter-culture, living illicitly on the margins of ordinary life, and become hegemonic.56 It would have been ideal to explore similar socio-cultural processes in other areas that dominate everyday life in poor neighbourhoods (like access to land, shelter, health care, essential services, productive opportunities and useful information). Such a task is beyond the scope of this essay. But the key issue is the conceptual imperative of coming to terms with the lacunae in research and understanding about the complex processes of identity construction and articulation, through multiple layers of associational practice, that shape institutional space at the neighbourhood level where the politics of development practice are meant to unfold. Put another way: the empirical and conceptual challenge is to map out the relationship between different lines of stratification in poor areas with the associational opportunities for, and proclivities of, various categories of actors. Some examples of such research projects include the work of Beall, Crankshaw and Parnell57 on social stratification in Soweto in relation to livelihood strategies and political affiliation; and of Robins58 on the link between development failure and the one-dimensional construction of citizens by government agencies in upgrading initiatives in the Manenberg and Marconi Beam townships in Cape Town; and one will find fascinating insights into the complex determinants of development project success or failure in 18 communitybased projects across South Africa studied by Lyons, Smuts and Stephens.59 The 52 000-plus so-called informal associations identified in The South African Nonprofit Sector study60 are a critical component of the South African landscape. However, 56 Steinberg, p.4. 57 J. Beall, O. Crankshaw and S. Parnell, Uniting a divided city: Governance and social exclusion in Johannesburg, (London, Earthscan Publications, 2002). 58 S. Robins, Locating local knowledges and cultural brokers: A case study of CBOs and NGOs in Manenberg, (Cape Town, Isandla Institute, 2000) and Planning `suburban bliss' in Joe Slovo Park, Cape Town, (University of the Western Cape, Department of Anthropology, 2002), unpublished paper. 59 M. Lyons, C. Smuts and A. Stephens, `Participation, empowerment and sustainability: (How) Do the links work?', Urban Studies, 38:8 (2001), pp.1233­1251. 60 Swilling and Russell. 119
DEVELOPMENT UPDATE we know very little about the nature, identity and reproductive logic of these social formations. What we do know is that they are embedded in highly charged and politically ambiguous, place-based social relations that must be seen for what they are and not through the instrumentalist lenses of either government modernism or leftist instrumentalism. An important issue to watch in the unfolding transformation process is how the visible social formations, such as political, social and religious movements and government structures, relate to these pivotal formations. Will the resulting politics deepen democratic culture or not? Consolidate the national development agenda or not? Reverse the perverse levels of poverty and inequality or serve to stabilise the political economy of the transition? Facilitate access to meaningful social citizenship for more South Africans or not? No doubt, some of the answers are contingent on the interactions between this domain of political engagement and other domains, such as direct action and representative politics. Symbolic politics through discursive action Crucially, political acts in the domains of direct action and development practice will run into their limits in the absence of a broader intervention to shift public opinion and popular cultural images as they are reflected in the symbolism of the day. Potent examples of mainstream symbolism in the current era are the intertwined notions of an African Renaissance and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (Nepad). Acknowledging the importance of symbolic politics and their constitution through discourse rests on recognising the nature and dynamics of disciplinary power in society.61 Thus, the fourth political domain to recognise is discursive intervention aimed at achieving political `ground-clearing' ­ i.e. the discursive framework of what is considered legitimate, appropriate, sufficient, sustainable and so on.62 It is useful to draw on Flyvberg's discussion on why discourses are so crucial for research and symbolic political practice. He argues that it is vital to take account of the complex and unstable process according to which discourses can be both an instrument of power and its effect, but also an obstacle, a point of resistance or a starting point for a counterposing strategy. Discourses thus transfer and produce power, they reinforce power, but they also subvert and conceal it, make it fragile and contribute to 61 Disciplinary power refers to the quiet coercions of dominant discourses that shape our relationship to ourselves and our perception of our location in the world ­ internalised patterns of behaviour rooted in specified patterns of thought (G. Danaher, T Schirato, and J. Webb, Understanding Foucault, (London, Sage, 2000), p.80. 62 See B. Flyvberg, `Empowering civil society: Habermas, Foucault and the question of conflict' in M. Douglas and J. Friedmann (eds), Cities for citizens: Planning and the rise of civil society in a global age, (Chichester, John Wiley & Sons, 1998). 120
SOCIAL FORMATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA obstructing power ... Discourses are tactical elements, which operate in the field of force relations. Different and even opposing discourses can coexist within the same strategy ... Therefore, one must study discourses at two levels: (1) the level of their tactical productivity, where the question is, `What reciprocal effects of power and knowledge [do] they ensure?' and (2) the level of strategic integration, where the question becomes, `What conjunction and what force relationship make it necessary to utilise discourses in a given episode of the various confrontations that occur?'63 Building on these conceptual foundations, the analytic approach in this essay rests on the assumption that power functions in part through discursive contestation. Power operates through dominant discourses that seek to establish a taken-forgranted `reality' which ascribes particular roles to specific categories of subjects and also allows for certain topics to be recognised as problematic and others not. However, dominant discourses are always unstable, and incomplete in their quest for total control and hegemony. The incessant work of normalisation can best be observed and analysed where the `life worlds'64 and perspectives of various actors clash, or in moments of spectacular failure or institutional misfire. This is why it is so critical to link discursive strategies with the social-political dynamics that arise in the political domains of direct action and the painstaking, contentious processes of doing development at the grassroots. The most compelling example of discursive contestation linked to direct action and alternative projects in recent times is the multi-faceted work of the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC). It is an independent, voluntary and non-profit association of organisations65 and individuals. The TAC's initial appeal for the South African public was the result of its positive message in the face of the devastating HIV/AIDS epidemic, highlighting HIV/AIDS as treatable and not necessarily a death sentence. Its (partial) focus on babies and rape survivors may have increased its appeal. Furthermore, the TAC was set up at a time when other HIV/AIDS organisations 63 B. Flyvberg, Making social science matter: Why social inquiry fails and how it can succeed again, (Cambridge University Press, 2001), p.124. 64 Long, p.25. 65 Organisations affiliated to the TAC include trade unions (Cosatu, the National Council of Trade Unions (Nactu), the Federation of Unions of South Africa (Fedusa)), the South African Communist Party (SACP), Sangoco and various religious groups. 121
DEVELOPMENT UPDATE were struggling with internal problems and a lack of funding following the decision of the Department of Health to cut funding.66 The TAC positioned itself so that it could access an expansive repertoire of political strategies. It relied heavily on visible direct action to draw attention to its cause and to animate members to feel that they are acting positively in a very frustrating political context. However, the street marches and vocal criticism of aspects of the government and multinational corporations' policies also meant that the discursive strategies of government were profoundly undermined. In more ways than one, government's response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic was fought in the arena of symbolic politics. The TAC fashioned a consistent, compelling and accessible narrative about the nature of the epidemic, its causes, the reasons for its explosion, and what can be done to `solve' the problem. This narrative was layered enough to assign a potential role to all sectors of society, from mothers to multinational corporations, and it was flexible enough to make room for both co-operation with and opposition to the government. This strategic and tactical flexibility made the TAC come across as the `reasonable', `rational' and `caring' actor. As a result, government had finally to rescind some of its positions and make room for the demands of the TAC, albeit in the wake of court judgements against the government. There are many shortcomings and ambiguous dimensions in the TAC phenomenon beyond the scope of this discussion. Suffice to say that the strategic linking of all five domains of political practice through a broad-based coalition of solidarity has proved more successful than any other civil society campaign in the post-1994 period. Neo-corporatist stakeholder forums In South Africa corporatist politics find expression in stakeholder-based forums at almost all levels of society.67 Stakeholder-based forums are formal political institutions that provide a regulated space for negotiation and contestation between government, civil society and private sector representative organisations on issues of common concern. At the dawn of the transition process in the late 1980s, negotiation forums were established between organisations in black townships and white municipalities. The purpose of these forums was to find a settlement in order 66 Most funding for HIV/AIDS work was channelled through the Department of Health. Following criticism of the government's extravagant spending on Sarafina II (an educational roadshow), the Department of Health cut funding to HIV/AIDS organisations from R19 million to R2 million in 1998. 67 See D. Miller, `The ambiguities of popular participation in development: A South African case study', in E. Maganya and R. Houghton (eds), Transformation in South Africa?: Policy debates in the 1990s, (Johannesburg, Institute for African Alternatives, 1996). 122
SOCIAL FORMATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA to suspend or terminate rates and service charges boycotts.68 These institutional forms became somewhat paradigmatic, because they provided a model which allowed oppositional political organisations to retain their relative autonomy whilst renegotiating the terms of their relationship as democratisation shifted power to the black majority and their representative organisations. In other words, the negotiation forums provided a guarantee against unilateral decisions that would radically alter economic and political relations. It is for this reason that many regard the forums as reformist corporatist institutions that simply serve to entrench vested elite interests by diffusing militant social action by subjugated classes.69 The most prominent example of these stakeholder-based forums is Nedlac, the successor to the pre-1994 National Economic Forum. Nedlac's function is to forge consensus between organised labour, business and government on proposed labour legislation and new socio-economic policies. On certain matters, `representative' organisations from communities are also allowed into the club. Equivalent forums are also in evidence at the provincial level, like the Provincial Development Council in the Western Cape. More recently, a number of the large cities have also established, or are contemplating establishing, stakeholder-based forums in order to undertake city development strategies.70 Lastly, the community development forums that came into being at the turn of the 1980s have proven resilient, and continue to feature in many poor communities as the co-ordinating mechanism for disparate social formations which operate at neighbourhood and street levels.71 Much of our knowledge and analysis focuses on a very particular type of CSO, namely with a national reach and the ability to engage with the formal political agendas of the government. This type of CSO tends to restrict itself to formal political arenas and associated corporatist forums. Many continue to have a tendency to speak on behalf of civil society as a whole, even though their connection with other types of CSOs at the grassroots is somewhat tenuous and ambiguous. However, if we accept that the imperatives of statecraft and citizenship construction after 1994 have involved an elaborate attempt to `bring' development to the majority of disenfranchised South Africans, we must also note that large numbers of CSOs agglomerate at the grassroots, fulfilling a range of economic, political and cultural functions in grinding poverty. Yet, in the rhetoric of the government and high profile social movements, these formations might as well be invisible. Empirical data 68 See K. Shubane, `Revisiting South African conceptions of civil society', in R. Humphries and M. Reitzes (eds), Civil society after apartheid, (Johannesburg, Centre for Policy Studies, 1995). 69 See Bond. 70 See Beall, Crankshaw and Parnell; and Pieterse, `From divided to integrated city'. 71 See Cherry, Jones and Seekings; and C. White, `Democratic societies? Voluntary associations and democratic culture in a South African township', Transformation, 36 (1998), pp.1­36. 123
DEVELOPMENT UPDATE confirms that informal grassroots formations proliferate, and constitute a critical variable in understanding the politics of everyday survival and what they mean for the success of the government's national development agenda. The next section provides more insight into the evolving attitude of the government towards CSOs. Government approaches to structuring the role of civil society organisations The democratic government has demonstrated a commitment to promoting an independent and vibrant civil society. This is evident in a series of legislative and policy measures to create an enabling environment for autonomous CSOs in both financial and democratic-political terms.72 On the financial side, a number of special funds (the National Development Agency, the Lotteries Fund, amongst others) provide resources for CSOs committed to poverty reduction. In addition, a number of tax and other benefit schemes create a host of further fundraising opportunities.73 However, this favourable formal environment rests on assumptions that CSOs will buy into the government's national development agenda and act in ways that enhance the government's effectiveness in achieving its objectives, making it very difficult for government institutions to come to terms with the messy reality that is the full spectrum of CSOs in South Africa. This issue comes through more clearly if one reviews the government's shifting understanding about how best to enrol grassroots CSOs in its development ambitions. From the Reconstruction and Development Programme to the Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Strategy The RDP reflects a commitment to grassroots, bottom-up development which is owned and driven by communities and representative organisations... Beneficiary communities should be involved at all levels of decision-making and in the implementation of their projects ... 72 See T. Smith, Questioning the crisis: International donors and the reconfiguration of the South African NGO sector, (Durban, Olive, 2001), Avocado working paper series no.4. 73 See `The development agenda and the voluntary sector', Development Update 1:1 (1997); `Annual review: The voluntary sector and development in South Africa 1996/97', Development Update 1:3 (1997); `Annual review: The voluntary sector and development in South Africa 1997/98' Development Update 2:3 (1998); `Election 1999: Where have we come from? A balance sheet of the political transition', Development Update 3:1 (1999); and `Annual review: The voluntary sector and development in South Africa 1999/2000', Development Update 3:3 (2001). 124
SOCIAL FORMATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA [S]ocial movements and CBOs are a major asset in the effort to democratise and develop our society. Attention must be also be given to extending social movement and CBO structures into areas and sectors where they are weak or non-existent.74 At the dawn of democracy, the government approached the task of national development with clear assumptions about the importance and mechanics of participatory development. Stakeholder-based forums loomed large in government thinking as effective mechanisms to ensure `informed and empowered citizens'.75 Furthermore, various mechanisms of so-called direct democracy were also considered essential. A central tenet was that mass-based social formations would remain critical players in facilitating community development, albeit in partnership with the government. If they were weak or absent in certain areas, the government would ensure that they accessed capacity-building resources to extend their influence. Various street level structures would also be retained, and reoriented through community level forums to be partners of the government in development programmes to address basic needs issues in poor communities. The political approach of the Minister responsible for the RDP, Jay Naidoo, reflected the notion that CSOs had to be organised in particular ways to render them orderly and intelligible, or the government would simply bypass them. This was of course one of the key factors that led to the formation of Sangoco.76 Nowhere in the RDP or any other government statement at the time was much attention paid to the prevalence of large numbers of CSOs in poor communities that did not conform to the characteristics of progressive social movements or development NGOs. If such formations were acknowledged, it was as targets for mobilisation into communitybased forums.77 Significantly, The South African non-profit sector study found that most informal organisations in South Africa demonstrate longevity, which suggests that the majority date back to pre-1994 days.78 From this brief discussion we can conclude that the combination of government imperatives (namely the ineluctable bureaucratic logic of executing the functions of the government and reproducing its own legitimacy) and vanguardist assumptions 74 African National Congress, The Reconstruction and Development Programme: A policy framework, (Johannesburg, Umanyano Publications, 1994), pp.15, 28, 120­121 (emphasis added). 75 African National Congress, p.121. 76 See E. Pieterse, `South African NGOs and the trials of transition', Development in Practice, 7:2 (1997), pp.157­166. 77 See Miller. 78 Swilling and Russell, p.22. 125
DEVELOPMENT UPDATE about the appropriate hierarchy of progressive social formations shaped the politics of civil society engagement with the government. The outcome has been an extremely mixed picture of participatory development. In many cases, participatory processes have failed due to a lack of understanding and capacity in government departments.79 Another common problem has been elite capture, a situation in which either ANC or civic leaders, or a combination, emerge as gatekeepers in development processes, and as a result those outside their sphere of largesse do not benefit. In other communities, it is not necessarily political elites that capture the development processes, but entrepreneurial interlocutors that can move between the formal registers of developers and local government departments on the one hand, and the fluid, more informal registers of highly mobile residents on the other.80 Often, the combination of elite capture and bad participatory development practice has led to a waste of resources, because the wrong goods and services are provided, in the wrong places, for the wrong `beneficiaries'.81 Significantly, by the time of the second democratic government in 1999 it seemed some lessons had been learned, and new approaches began to characterise the government's attitude to civil society participation. The most significant of these is the new IDP system at municipal level. IDPs are ingenious systems to combine spatial, economic and development planning with democratic deliberation in order to produce medium-term frameworks that stabilise development investments.82 However, the utility of IDPs hinges on how embedded, legitimate and realistic they are. In the absence of sound participatory methodologies, strong community management capacity and accountable political leadership, they are likely to fail. Initial evidence from various sites across the country suggests that IDPs quickly become embroiled in bureaucratisation and a degree of formalism that make them redundant in capturing the complex identities and patterns of organisation in local communities.83 Another notable innovation by the government is the Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Strategy (ISRDS) and its urban equivalent, the Urban Renewal Strategy. The former is much further along in terms of conceptualisation and implementation, making it more relevant for review. In essence, the ISRDS is a 79 See D. Everatt and S. Zulu, `Analysing rural development programmes in South Africa 1994­ 2000', Development Update, 3:4 (2001), pp.1­38. 80 See S. Robins, Planning `suburban bliss'. 81 It serves my argument to highlight the unintended consequences of crude conceptualisations of `beneficiary communities'. However, there are a number of counter-examples that reflect genuine attempts by the government or parastatals to grapple with the complexity of community life and representation. 82 See Pieterse, `Participatory local governance'. 83 See Heller. 126
SOCIAL FORMATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA policy framework to promote the systematic co-ordination of current government initiatives and programmes within 13 specifically identified spatial nodes in rural areas. Its aim is `to attain socially cohesive and stable rural communities with viable institutions, sustainable economies and universal access to social amenities, able to attract and retain skilled and knowledgeable people, who are equipped to contribute to growth and development'.84 Its distinguishing feature is that it represents a departure from past approaches, which created special funds to do special things. Instead, the ISRDS sets out to reorient existing government programmes and budgets in various line departments to work in a more co-ordinated and integrated fashion in order to fulfil locally defined priorities. `A critical assumption in the ISRDS is the fact that there has been significant delivery in rural development, but its impact has been limited because of the fragmented and unco-ordinated approach to date'.85 In theory, locally defined priorities are reflected in municipal IDPs, which have gone through rigorous participatory processes that ensure the necessary `buy-in' from a wide-ranging number of local stakeholders.86 The noticeable aspect of the policy is the more disaggregated approach to defining `local stakeholders'. A typology is provided that goes beyond the references in the RDP to social movements and community-based organisations, and that acknowledges distinctive identities, for example students, women, traditional healers, and membership of community development organisations. Furthermore, with uncharacteristic candour the policy anticipates that many communities may be hostile or suspicious because previous government efforts to solicit participation may have yielded `limited returns and benefits'.87 Even more unexpectedly the policy suggests that one of the principles that should underpin stakeholder mobilisation is: `[s]trong social mobilisation and advocacy which could have a social movement for rural development as an outcome'.88 Yet, it is in this very sentence that the consensual politics assumption comes to the fore: social mobilisation and advocacy can be channelled and ordered to produce `a social movement for rural development'. Surely any organic process of social mobilisation is unlikely to produce such a neat outcome. On the contrary, it is more likely to raise the political temperature and induce conflict, leading to a series of disparate and unexpected outcomes that may or may not be consistent with the government's idea of rural development. For example, the political orientation of the Landless People's Movement is to step outside of the government's land reform 84 Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Strategy, (Cape Town, The Presidency, 2000), p.1. 85 Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Strategy, p.38. 86 Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Strategy, p.38. 87 Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Strategy, p.39. 88 Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Strategy, p.40. 127
DEVELOPMENT UPDATE and rural development programmes to demand much more redistributive policies.89 One wonders whether the drafters of the ISRDS will welcome this as a legitimate result of fostering stakeholder mobilisation. Towards the end of the section on stakeholder mobilisation, the ISRDS is more explicit about its consensual assumptions in stimulating and institutionalising community participation: Stakeholder mobilisation will yield [differential] outcomes over the short, medium and longer term. In the short term, a consensus framework for participation, co-ordination and integration will be established. In the medium-term, mobilisation will demonstrate the shift from a centralised, nationally driven and owned process to a decentralised, locally owned and driven process. In addition, the shift from supply- to demand-driven processes needs to be expressed in the mobilisation strategy. An outcome of this phase will be the institutionalisation of mechanisms for integration, co-ordinated delivery, partnership and participation.90 In summary, the more recent approaches of the government to civil society participation and mobilisation are certainly more differentiated and nuanced than those reflected in the RDP. Yet, the insecurity of the national political and managerial machinery, born out of limited control over the (fragmented) behaviour of all spheres of government, invariably leads to a controlling and centralising approach. This rests on a neat, consensual vision about managing political and institutional differences that makes it almost impossible ­ in terms of government ­ to acknowledge the inherent unpredictability of grassroots-based development. Consequences of government's approach to community participation At least three unintended but invariable outcomes can be ascribed to the consensual political model that the government relies on in defining its approach to community participation. Firstly, the corporatist slant, as evidenced in the proclivity for forumtype models, has led to a degree of demobilisation of grassroots structures, because oppositional rhetoric and social mobilisation are defined as unconstructive or 89 See A. Mngxitama, Supporting people's organisations: The dangers of paternalist vanguardism and romantic idealism, paper presented at the Workshop on Social Movements in the South, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 17­20 May 2002. 90 Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Strategy, p.40, (emphasis added). 128
SOCIAL FORMATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA unpatriotic.91 Secondly, many development interventions have fallen to elite capture due to a lack of appreciation of the hierarchical differentiation in beneficiary communities.92 In fact, in certain cases government programmes can arguably be said to reinforce lines of exclusion and oppression within poor communities.93 Lastly, there has been a definite tendency in government programmes to use participation as an instrumentalist tool to achieve legitimacy and financial sustainability, with questionable concern for entrenching social citizenship and empowerment.94 Theoretically speaking, the government's tendency to fashion social relations and institutional norms in ways that enhance its disciplinary power over society is not surprising.95 This is where my analysis shifts back to progressive CSOs that define their identities and roles in terms of advancing structural change in society to realise social justice for the poor and exploited. The shifting discourses of the government open up vital spaces ­ especially at the interfaces of direct action, development practice and representative politics ­ in which to advance political strategies that can reconfigure the political and public spheres to accommodate a more contested politics. It is only in the political moments at which the discourse of the government shifts and coincides with action at the interfaces of direct action, development practice and representative politics that it becomes feasible to shift discursive boundaries about which demands are `reasonable', `efficacious' and `appropriate'. In other words, shifting thinking about community participation and development partnerships provides opportunities for progressive CSOs to insert more expanded notions of social citizenship and redistributive justice. However, as long as the more formalised and powerful CSOs (for example social movements and progressive NGOs) remain incapable of coming to terms with the diverse and complex nature of everyday life and concomitant livelihood strategies, they are unlikely to redefine the emerging policy discourses about government-civil society interfaces. In other words: A more dynamic vision is needed of `institutions' and of `community', one that incorporates social networks and recognizes dispersed and contingent power relations, the exclusionary as well as the inclusionary 91 See Heller; Heller and Ntlokonkulu; and J. Seekings, `After apartheid: Civic organisations in the "new" South Africa', in G. Adler and J. Steinberg (eds), From comrades to citizens: The South African civic movement and the transition to democracy, (London, Macmillan Press, 2000). 92 See D. Everatt, Yet another transition? Urbanization, class formation, and the end of national liberation struggle in South Africa, (Washington, Woodrow Wilson Center for Comparative Urban Studies, 1999), occasional paper no. 24; and Goetz and Lister. 93 See Robins, Planning `suburban bliss'. 94 See Lyons, Smuts and Stephens. 95 See N. Rose, 'Governing cities, governing citizens', in E.F. Isin (ed.), Democracy, citizenship and the global city, (London, Routledge, 2000). 129
DEVELOPMENT UPDATE nature of participation. We need a much better understanding of local norms of decision-making and representation, of how these change and are negotiated, of how people may indirectly affect outcomes with direct participation.96 Conclusion: Towards an expanded research agenda The majority of social formations in South Africa are small and function at the grassroots. They tend to be the target of incessant attempts by the government and NGOs to enrol their participation in numerous development interventions within clearly circumscribed ideas about the nature and direction of the national development project. Despite these ambitions, both government and NGOs struggle to connect with informal grassroots organisations, mainly because grassroots organisations do not possess the required administrative infrastructure for undertaking development projects. The social formations that tend to capture our academic and policy attention are those which engage in visible direct action and symbolic politics at national or regional levels. Consequently the role of civics in specific communities or in regional and national politics is widely studied.97 Another favourite is the labour movement, and especially Cosatu,98 as is the women's movement, usually in relation to national political institutions or sectoral concerns such as sexual violence or health care.99 Similarly, the environmental movement has been documented and explored;100 and, related, is the substantial literature on the NGO sector and its relationship with membership-based grassroots organisations and the government.101 96 F. Cleaver, `Institutions, agency and the limitations of participatory approaches to development', in B. Cooke and U. Kothari (eds), Participation: The new tyranny?, (London and New York, Zed Books,2001), p.54. 97 See, for example, G. Adler and J. Steinberg (eds), From comrades to citizens: The South African civic movement and the transition to democracy, (London, Macmillan Press, 2000); and Cherry, Jones and Seekings. 98 See, for example, G. Adler and E. Webster (eds), Trade unions and democratisation in South Africa, 1985-1997, (London, Macmillan Press, 2000). 99 See, for example, C. McEwan, `Engendering citizenship: Gendered spaces of democracy in South Africa', Political Geography, 19:5 (2000), pp.627­651. 100 See, for example, D.A. McDonald (ed.), Environmental justice in South Africa, (Athens and Cape Town, Ohio University Press and University of Cape Town Press, 2002). 101 See, for example, Pieterse, `South African NGOs'; and Smith. 130
SOCIAL FORMATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA More rarely one can find material that makes an effort to link shifting class structures, spatial reconfigurations, political identities and associational patterns.102 Given the paucity of this kind of material, it is clear that Friedman and Chipkin are correct when they argue that `relatively little is still known about informal organisational life and its implications for egalitarian politics',103 essentially echoing Scott, quoted at the opening of this essay. To move in this direction it is vital to focus on current theoretical streams about `the infrapolitics of the poor',104 and Bayat's provocative notion, `the encroachment of the ordinary': the silent, protracted and pervasive advancement of ordinary people on those who are propertied and powerful in a quest for survival and improvement of their lives. It is characterised by quiet, largely atomized and prolonged mobilisation with episodic collective action ­ open and fleeting struggles without clear leadership, ideology or structured organisation.105 Clearly, much of what is unfolding at the grassroots in South Africa can be described in this way, yet we have little empirical data to give us a sense of scale, depth and form. The recent work of Evans and colleagues,106 organised around the idea of `synergy' and `embeddedness', provides useful entry points to understanding the interface between grassroots formations and government structures. Using these different conceptual paths as a loose set of diagrammatic co-ordinates it becomes possible to be more precise in defining what we do not know ­ what lies beyond Scott's `visible coastline of politics'.107 102 See, for example Beall, Crankshaw and Parnell; Everatt; Oldfield; Robins, Locating local knowledges; and White. 103 Friedman and Chipkin, p.45. 104 Scott, The infrapolitics of subordinate groups; and see C. Krohn-Hansen, `Resistance vs. self- inflicted bonds vs. tacit understandings: Or an essay on legitimacy and political practice in light of Bread and circuses and Weapons of the weak', Dialectical Anthropology, 20:1 (1995), pp.71­94. 105 A. Bayat, Social movements, activism and social development in the Middle East, (Geneva, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 2000), Civil Society and Social Movements Programme paper, p.24. 106 P. Evans, `Introduction: Development strategies across the public-private divide', World Development, 24:6 (1996); P. Evans (ed.), Livable cities? Urban struggles for livelihood and sustainability, (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2002); and J. Tendler, Good government in the tropics, (Baltimore and London, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997). 107 Scott, p.323. 131
DEVELOPMENT UPDATE n What are the relationships between the household imperatives of everyday survival and acting collectively? n What are the associational forms and norms that facilitate and mediate livelihood strategies and senses of place of belonging? How durable are these associational forms? n How are conflicting requirements for affiliation to different associational structures managed in practical, cultural and conceptual terms? n What are the political limits to fostering critical subjectivity in the context of survivalist associations? n Given the historically constructed identity of progressive social movements, how can interactions between them and informal associations be conceptualised and structured to enhance radical democracy, social citizenship and human rights? Is such structuring or engagement at all feasible? n Can (top-down) government initiatives to enrol meaningful citizen and civil society participation be recast to circumvent the invariable emergence of local elites and gatekeepers? n What is the scope for fostering a development politics that stimulates the mutually reinforcing links between livelihood imperatives (especially access to productive opportunities), meaningful citizenship, deepening radical democracy, individual empowerment and place-making? n How would such a development politics play out at local, regional and national scales in a co-ordinated way? These beg further questions about epistemological foundations and methodological consistency. Considering how much there is we still need to learn about the complex unfolding of social formation construction after 1994, it is only fitting to close with an incitement for further research and action that are politically grounded and empirically attuned to what is actually happening at the grassroots. References Adler, G. and Steinberg, J. (eds), From comrades to citizens: The South African civic movement and the transition to democracy, (London, Macmillan Press, 2000) Adler, G. and Webster, E. (eds), Trade unions and democratisation in South Africa, 1985­1997, (London, Macmillan Press, 2000) African National Congress, The Reconstruction and Development Programme: A policy framework, (Johannesburg, Umanyano Publications, 1994) 132
SOCIAL FORMATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA Andersson, G., Partnerships between CBOs, NGOs and government in South Africa: Insights derived from experience, (Pretoria, USAID South Africa, 1999), `Annual review: The voluntary sector and development in South Africa 1996/97', Development Update 1:3 (1997) `Annual review: The voluntary sector and development in South Africa 1997/98' Development Update 2:3 (1998) `Annual review: The voluntary sector and development in South Africa 1999/2000', Development Update 3:3 (2001) Appadurai, A., `Deep democracy: Urban governmentality and the horizon of politics', Public Culture, 14:1 (2002), pp.21­47 Baker, B., `Living with non-state policing in South Africa: The issues and dilemmas', Journal of Modern African Studies, 40:1 (2002), pp.29­53 Barbarin, O.A. and Richter, L.M., Mandela's children: Growing up in post-apartheid South Africa, (London, Routledge, 2001) Bauman, T. and Mitlin, D., The South African Homeless People's Federation: Investing in the poor, paper presented at the History Workshop and National Land Committee Rural and Urban Development Conference, Rietvleidam, 18­19 April 2002 Bayat, A., Social movements, activism and social development in the Middle East, (Geneva, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 2000), Civil Society and Social Movements Programme paper Beall, J., Crankshaw, O. and Parnell, S., Uniting a divided city: Governance and social exclusion in Johannesburg, (London, Earthscan, forthcoming) Binns, T. and Robinson, R., `Sustaining democracy in the "new" South Africa', Geography, 87:1 (2002), pp.25­37 Blair, H., `Participation and accountability at the periphery: Democratic local governance in six countries', World Development, 28:1 (2000), pp.21­39 Bond, P., Elite transition: From apartheid to neoliberalism in South Africa, (London and Pietermaritzburg, Pluto and University of Natal Press, 2000) Cherry, J., Jones, K. and Seekings, J., `Democratization and politics in South African townships,' International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 24:4 (2000), pp.889­905 Cleaver, F., `Institutions, agency and the limitations of participatory approaches to development', in B. Cooke and U. Kothari (eds), Participation: The new tyranny?, (London and New York, Zed Books,2001) Comaroff, J. and Comaroff, J.L., `Millennial capitalism: First thoughts on a second coming', Public Culture, 12:2 (2000), pp.291­343 Cross, C., `Why does South Africa need a spatial policy? Population, migration, infrastructure and development', Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 19:1 (2001), pp.111­127 Danaher, G., Schirato, T. and Webb, J. Understanding Foucault, (London, Sage, 2000) `The development agenda and the voluntary sector', Development Update 1:1 (1997) Douglas, M., `Beyond dualism: Rethinking theories of development in the global-local framework', Regional Development Dialogue, 13:2 (1998), pp.3­21 `Election 1999: Where have we come from? A balance sheet of the political transition', Development Update 3:1 (1999) Escobar, A., `Culture sits in places: Reflections on globalism and subaltern strategies of localization', Political Geography, 20:2 (2001), pp.139­174 133
DEVELOPMENT UPDATE Evans, P., `Introduction: Development strategies across the public-private divide', World Development 24:6 (1996) Evans, P. (ed.), Livable cities? Urban struggles for livelihood and sustainability, (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2002) Everatt, D., Yet another transition? Urbanization, class formation, and the end of national liberation struggle in South Africa, (Washington, Woodrow Wilson Center for Comparative Urban Studies, 1999), occasional paper no. 24 Everatt, D. and Zulu, S., `Analysing rural development programmes in South Africa 1994­2000', Development Update, 3:4 (2001), pp.1­38 Flyvberg, B., `Empowering civil society: Habermas, Foucault and the question of conflict', in M. Douglas and J. Friedmann (eds), Cities for citizens: Planning and the rise of civil society in a global age, (Chichester, John Wiley & Sons, 1998) Flyvberg, B., Making social science matter: Why social inquiry fails and how it can succeed again, (Cambridge University Press, 2001) FMA Consulting, Sangoco evaluation, (Johannesburg, South African NGO Coalition (Sangoco), 2001) draft report Friedman, S. and Chipkin, I., A poor voice? The politics of inequality in South Africa, (Johannesburg, Centre for Policy Studies, Johannesburg, 2001), research report no. 87 Friedmann, J., Empowerment: The politics of alternative development, (Cambridge and Oxford, Blackwell, 1992) Goetz, A.M. and Lister, S., The politics of civil society engagement with the state: A comparative analysis of South Africa and Uganda, (Brighton, Institute of Development Studies, 2001) Heller, P., `Moving the state: The politics of democratic decentralization in Kerala, South Africa, and Porto Alegre', Politics & Society, 29:1 (2001), pp.131­163 Heller, P. and Ntlokonkulu, L., A civic movement or movement of civics? The South African National Civic Organisation in the post-apartheid period, (Johannesburg, Centre for Policy Studies, 2001), research report no. 84 Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Strategy, (Cape Town, The Presidency, 2000) Kabemba, C. and Friedman, S., Review of Idasa, (Johannesburg, Centre for Policy Studies, 2001), research report no. 89 Kraak, G., `The South African voluntary sector: A variety of morbid symptoms', Development Update, 3:4 (2001), pp.129­150 Krohn-Hansen, C., `Resistance vs. self-inflicted bonds vs. tacit understandings: Or an essay on legitimacy and political practice in light of Bread and circuses and Weapons of the weak', Dialectical Anthropology 20:1 (1995), pp.71­94 Lahiff, E. and Rugege, S., A critical assessment of state land redistribution policy in the light of the Grootboom judgement, paper prepared for the Community Law Centre of the University of the Western Cape Colloquium on the Grootboom Judgement and Socio-Economic Rights, Strand, 15­17 March 2002 Liebenberg, S., South Africa's evolving jurisprudence on socio-economic rights, (University of the Western Cape, Community Law Centre, 2001), unpublished paper Long, N., Development sociology: Actor perspectives, (London, Routledge, 2001) Lyons, M., Smuts, C. and Stephens, A., `Participation, empowerment and sustainability: (How) Do the links work?', Urban Studies, 38:8 (2001), pp.1233­1251 134
SOCIAL FORMATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA Mackay, S. and Mathoho, M., Worker power: The Congress of South African Trade Unions and its impact on governance and democracy, (Johannesburg, Centre for Policy Studies, 2001), research report no. 79 Marais, H., South Africa: Limits to change: The political economy of transition, 2nd edn, (London and Cape Town, Zed Books and University of Cape Town Press, 2001) Marais, H., To the edge: An examination of South Africa's national AIDS response 1994­1999, (Pretoria, Centre for the Study of AIDS, 2000) May, J., `Meeting the challenge? The emerging agenda for poverty reduction in post-apartheid South Africa', in F. Wilson, N. Kanji and E. Braathen (eds), Poverty reduction: What role for the state in today's globalized economy?, (London, Zed Books, 2001) McDonald, D.A. (ed.), Environmental justice in South Africa, (Athens and Cape Town, Ohio University Press and University of Cape Town Press, 2002) McEwan, C., `Engendering citizenship: Gendered spaces of democracy in South Africa', Political Geography, 19:5 (2000), pp.627­651 Miller, D., `The ambiguities of popular participation in development: A South African case study', in E. Maganya and R. Houghton (eds), Transformation in South Africa?: Policy debates in the 1990s, (Johannesburg, Institute for African Alternatives, 1996) Mngxitama, A., Supporting people's organisations: The dangers of paternalist vanguardism and romantic idealism, paper presented at the Workshop on Social Movements in the South, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 17­20 May 2002 Nattrass, N. and Seekings, J., Globalisation and inequality in South Africa, paper presented at Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development conference on Poverty and Income Inequality in Developing Countries, Paris, 20 November­1 December 2000 Oldfield, S. `The centrality of community capacity in state low-income housing provision in Cape Town, South Africa', International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 24:4 (2000), pp.858­872 Patel, L., Restructuring social welfare: Options for South Africa, (Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1992) Pieterse, E., `From divided to integrated city? Critical overview of the emerging metropolitan governance system in Cape Town', Urban Forum, 13:1 (2002), pp.3­37 Pieterse, E., `In praise of transgression: Notes on institutional synergy and poverty reduction', Development Update, 3:4 (2001), pp.157­166 Pieterse, E., `Participatory local governance in the making: Opportunities, constraints and prospects', in S. Parnell, E. Pieterse, M. Swilling and D. Wooldridge (eds), Democratising local government: The South African experiment, (University of Cape Town Press, 2002) Pieterse, E., `South African NGOs and the trials of transition', Development in Practice, 7:2 (1997), pp.157­166 Pieterse, E. and Van Donk, M., Incomplete ruptures: The political economy of realising socio-economic rights in South Africa, paper prepared for the Community Law Centre of the University of the Western Cape Colloquium on the Grootboom Judgement and Socio-Economic Rights, Strand, 15­17 March 2002 Reitzes, M. and Friedman, S., Funding freedom: Synthesis report on the impact of foreign political aid to civil society organisations in South Africa, (Johannesburg, Centre for Policy Studies, 2001), research report no.85 Robins, S. Locating local knowledges and cultural brokers: A case study of CBOs and NGOs in Manenberg, (Cape Town, Isandla Institute, 2000) 135
DEVELOPMENT UPDATE Robins, S., Planning `suburban bliss' in Joe Slovo Park, Cape Town, (University of the Western Cape, Department of Anthropology, 2002) unpublished paper Rose, N. 'Governing cities, governing citizens', in E.F. Isin (ed.), Democracy, citizenship and the global city, (London, Routledge, 2000) Roux, T., `Understanding Grootboom: A response to Cass R. Sustein', Constitutional Forum, 12 (forthcoming) Scott, J.C., `The infrapolitics of subordinate groups', in M. Rahnema and V. Bawtree (eds), The postdevelopment reader, (London, Zed Books, 1997) Seekings, J., `After apartheid: Civic organisations in the "new" South Africa', in G. Adler and J. Steinberg (eds), From comrades to citizens: The South African civic movement and the transition to democracy, (London, Macmillan Press, 2000) Shubane, K., `Revisiting South African conceptions of civil society', in R. Humphries and M. Reitzes (eds), Civil society after apartheid, (Centre for Policy Studies, Johannesburg, 1995) Smith, T., Questioning the crisis: International donors and the reconfiguration of the South African NGO sector, (Durban, Olive, 2001), Avocado working paper series no.4 South Africa official yearbook 2001/02, (Pretoria, Government Communication Information System, 2001) South Africa survey 2000/01, (Johannesburg, South African Institute of Race Relations, 2001) South African statistics 2000, (Pretoria, Statistics South Africa, 2000) Spiegel, A., Watson, V. and Wilkinson, P., `Devaluing diversity? National housing policy and African household dynamics in Cape Town', Urban Forum 7:1, (1996), pp.1­30 Steinberg, J., `Introduction: Behind the crime wave', in J. Steinberg (ed.), Crime wave: The South African underworld and its foes, (Johannesburg, University of the Witwatersrand Press, 2001) Swilling, M. and Russell, B., The South African non-profit sector, (University of the Witwatersrand, Graduate School of Public and Development Management, 2001), report for the Johns Hopkins University non-profit study Taylor, V., Transforming the present. Protecting the future, (Pretoria, Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive System of Social Security for South Africa, 2002), draft consolidated report Tendler, J., Good government in the tropics, (Baltimore and London, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997) Tцrnquist, O., Politics and development: A critical introduction, (London, Sage, 1999) Transformation for human development: South Africa 2000, (Pretoria, United Nations Development Programme, 2000) Turrell, R., Review of Witchcraft, power and politics: Exploring the occult in the South African lowveld, http://www.uni-ulm.de (accessed on 5 May 2002) White, C., `Democratic societies? Voluntary associations and democratic culture in a South African township', Transformation, 36 (1998), pp.1­36 Wolfe, M., Elusive development, (London, Zed Books, 1996) 136

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