The Kashmir Conflict and its impact on democracy

Tags: India, Kashmir, Wolfgang-Peter Zingel, Jammu and Kashmir, Kashmir Conflict, Pakistan, Kashmir Valley, Muslim majority, Democratic traditions, chief minister, Department of International Economics The Kashmir Conflict, Governor Jagmohan, Indien und Pakistan, Center for Development Research, Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, Alastair LAMB, Bonn International Center for Conversion, Jammu und Kashmir, Maharaja Hari Singh, Hertingfordbury, Azad Jammu and Kashmir, Muslim Conference, Pakistan government, Native States, the State, officials, Sir Francis Younghusband, British provinces, Maharaja, Maharaja of Kashmir, National Conference, Sheikh M. Abdullah, Dr Farooq Abdullah, Sheikh Abdullah, Jammu & Kashmir, State elections
Content: Wolfgang-Peter Zingel South Asia Institute of Heidelberg University, Department of International Economics The Kashmir Conflict and its impact on democracy Symposium on "violent conflicts and their impact on democracy in South Asia", organized by the Center for Development Research (ZEF) and Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC), Bonn, 18 February 2004 central questions: 1. What is it all about in Kashmir? 2. Why is this conflict so important? 3. Impact on or absence of democracy? Questions, feedback, comments: [email protected] Literature: - Rudolf GEIGER: Die Kaschmirfrage im Lichte des Vцlkerrechts. Schriften zum Vцlkerrecht Heft 12. Berlin: Duncker und Humblot. 1970. - Alastair LAMB: Birth of a tragedy: Kashmir 1947. Karachi: Oxford UP. 2003 (Hertingfordbury: Roxford. 1994). - Alastair LAMB: Incomplete partition: the genesis of the Kashmir dispute 1947-1948. Karachi: Oxford UP. 2002 (Hertingfordbury: Roxford. 1997). - Alastair LAMB: Kashmir: a disputed degacy 1846-1990. Karachi: Oxford UP. 1994 (Hertingfordbury: Roxford. 1991). - Dietmar ROTHERMUND: Krisenherd Kaschmir. Der Konflikt der Atommдchte Indien und Pakistan. Mьnchen: Beck. 2002 - Robert G. WIRSING: India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir dispute: On regional conflict and its resolution. London: Macmillan. 1994 - Wayne Ayres WILCOX: Pakistan: the consolidation of a a nation. New York: Columbia UP. 1969 (1963). - Sir Francis Younghusband: Kashmir. New Delhi: Sagar. 1970 - Wolfgang-Peter ZINGEL: Indien und Pakistan: entfernte Nachbarn, nьtzliche Feinde, Wirtschaftspartner? In: Werner Draguhn (Hrsg.): Indien 1998. Politik, Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft. Hamburg: Institut fьr Asienkunde. 1998. pp.112-128.
Wolfgang-Peter Zingel: Kashmir Conflict (18 Feb 2004)
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What is it all about? 1.The princely ("native") state of Jammu und Kashmir and its parts: - The Kashmir Valley - Azad Jammu and Kashmir: Poonch, Mirpur and Muzaffarabad - Jammu - The Northern Areas of Pakistan: Gilgit, Hunza, Baltistan - Ladakh - Siachen-Glacier - Aksai Chin - The areas north of the Karakoram, ceded to China by Pakistan 2. The actors of the conflict inside and outside of Kashmir - The British overlords until 14 August 1947 - The British governor general and British high command - The (Hindu-)Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir and his family - The leaders of the Muslims: Sheikh Abdullah and his family - The Muslims of the Kashmir Valley - The Hindus of the Kashmir Valley (Pandits) - The refugees from Kashmir, in India and in Pakistan - Kashmiri "freedom fighters" and "terrorists" - The Pakistan army - Islamist groups - The Indian government, army and para-military forces - China - USA 3. The legal background - The Government of India Act, 1947 - Attempts at independence by the Maharaja and the Muslim majority leaders - The uprise in the north - Declaration of Independence for Azad Jammu and Kashmir - Intrusion of Pashtoon fighters; the Maharaja's asking for help - Accession to India by the Maharaja - Cease fire, arranged with the help of UNO with effect of 1 January 1949 - Referendum/plebiscite - The legal status of J&K in India (Art 370) and Pakistan - "The unequal treaties" of the colonial power with China - Annexation of Aksai Chin by China, border agreement Pakistan-China 1963 - Attempts at a military solution by Pakistan in 1965 - Pakistan's defeat in the war with India 1971 - Shimla Agreement 1972, status quo - The Lahore declaration of Feb 1999 and the Kargil adventure 1998/1999 4. The "real causes" of the conflict: domestic politics - Pakistan as the home of the Muslims of the subcontinent - India as a "secular" state - Kashmir, the home of the Nehru/Gandhi family - The threat perception keeps the states together - The threat perception as raison d'кtre for Military Rule/dominance in Pakistan
Wolfgang-Peter Zingel: Kashmir Conflict (18 Feb 2004)
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Why is the Kashmir Conflict so important?
Because the conflict of the two Nuclear Powers might escalate into a full blown nuclear war 1. The hope that the risk of massive retaliation would yield a nuclear deterrence as in the Cold War was not fulfilled: The Kargil War (1999) saw the exchange of heavy artillery fire and might have escalated if the big powers (China, USA) had not intervened 2. India and Pakistan share a common border; some of the border areas are densely populated (Lahore, Amritsar); in case of an attack (real or perceived), there would be hardly any time for early warnings or last minute negotiations 3. Safeguards seem to be hardly developed, the "red telephone" is said to have been our of function for weeks 4. The immediate impact of a conflict, even of "lesser" intensity, would be refugee numbers not seen before Because the conflict already has an impact on the world economy 1. Overland transport from Europe to South and Southeast Asia is possible only through China; there is only one border crossing (at Wagah/Atari near Amritsar and Lahore) between China and the Arabian Sea; there are no crossings in Kashmir 2. Pakistan und India have been engaged in Afghanistan and try to gain influence in Central Asia; laying pipelines from Central Asia to the sea or from Turkmenistan and Iran to India has not been possible so far due to the war in Afghanistan and tension between India and Pakistan 3. China, the main competitor of Europe and the USA for oil and gas from Central Asia, benefits most; India has no access Because the conflict is of geopolitical importance 1. China uses the conflict to widen its influence on Pakistan's politics; China built the road across the Karakoram, and presently is constructing a deep water harbour at Gwadar on the Gulf of Oman 2. US mediation helps them to gain influence in South Asia 3. India gets its weaponry traditionally from the Soviet Union and the successor states; it has a close cooperation with Israel; Pakistan had been and again is a close ally of the USA; Pakistan gets weapons from China and technology by way of "private deals" from North Korea; India and Pakistan both try to increase their influence in Afghanistan and Central Asia; they hope for more support from Iran and Arab states 4. Terrorist acts in India and Pakistan are blamed to "foreign hands" and the neighbour; Indian and Pakistani installations outside the subcontinent have not been targeted as yet
Wolfgang-Peter Zingel: Kashmir Conflict (18 Feb 2004)
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3. Impact on or absence of democracy?
Democracy: What people, what rule?
The perception of Kashmir as a conflict rather than the conflict as a problem for the Kashmiri
Root causes: Outside rule and exploitation
Democratic traditions in Kashmir
The threat perception in Pakistan helped the army to take over power, to abrogate or "suspend" the constitution, to rule directly or indirectly, and to avoid and/or rig elections, with the outcome of poorly developed and weak democratic institutions
"Azad" (= free) Jammu and Kashmir could not win any international recognition and is ­ although/because not officially part of Pakistan ­ ruled by the Pakistan government and army; this applies also to the "Northern Areas"
The Indian government repeatedly intervened in Jammu and Kashmir by way of "President's" or "Governor's Rule", the (Muslim) leader was dismissed from office and imprisoned; democratic institutions could hardly develop under conditions of permanent central intervention; the state elections of 2003 ended the rule of the National Congress (of the Abdullahs)
Plebiscite in Kashmir: Only in the vale, who is to vote, and on what?
Wolfgang-Peter Zingel: Kashmir Conflict (18 Feb 2004)
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Kashmir administration as described by Sir Francis Younghusband in 1909:
"Kashmir itself is administered by a Governor, and the whole State is ruled by a Maharaja. It is one of what is known as the Native States of India, ­ States, which are ruled by their own Chiefs, but feudatory to the British government, whose interests are represented by a British Resident at the capital. The present ruler, who succeeded his father in 1885, is Maharaja Sir Pratap Singh, G.C.S.I., a major-general in the British Army, and a Chief of strong religious tendencies, who is much respected in India and loved by his own people. He is advised by a chief minister, his very capable and business-like brother Raja Sir Amar Singh, K.C.S.I., and by three subordinates ministers [...]. The Judiciary is presided over by a Judge of the High Court. All of these officials are natives of India, and, except one, belong to the British service, and have been trained in British provinces. None are Kashmiris. They have been lent by the British Government to the Maharaja for a special number of years, and draw salaries of from Rs [Rupees] 1200 to Rs 1500 a month, or Ј720 to Ј800 a year. [...] This, in brief outlines, is the administrative system in the State. At the head is a hereditary ruler. Immediately responsible to him are a group of Indian officials mostly born, educated, and trained in the adjoining British province of the Punjab. The local executive is likewise chiefly presided over by Government of India native officials, and in charge of technical departments are European and American specialists. What is chiefly remarkable is the very small number of Kashmiris who are employed. Though the majority of the inhabitants are Mohamedans, very few Mohamedans are employed in high positions. Though the Kashmiris are very intelligent, extremely few have posts in the State service; and this anomaly, though remarkable, is paralleled in many other native States. They are are most of them dependent on officials trained or at least educated in British provinces. The Maharaja of Kashmir realises, however, the necessity of educating and training his own subjects, and most of the smaller officials and many of the clerks in offices are State subjects. [...] The chief revenue is derived from the land [...]. Out of a total revenue for the whole State of one hundred lakhs [1 lakh = 100,000] of Rupees, the revenue from land amounts to over forty lakhs. [...] [Old system of collecting the land revenue:] The name of the "owner" was entered, but "owner" is really an incorrect term, for all land in the Kashmir valley is "owned" by the State. The actual holders have a right of occupancy as against the State as long as they pay its dues, and are practically sub-proprietors; but they have no right of alienation or mortgage. [...] In old days the State claimed half the gross produce as it was stacked on the field at harvest time, and various perquisites of officials reduced the share left to the cultivator to only about one-third. Moreover, in collecting the revenue in kind, there was much room for abuse and loss to both the State and cuiltivator, and endless vexation. It was therefore the object of the new settlement to have the revenue paid as much as possible in cash rather than in kind, so that the occupant of a field would be able to know for certain what he would have to pay, and would not have coromant officials hanging over his fields at harvest time; and also so that the State on its side might know precisely what amount of revenue to expect in a year, and not to have the trouble of collecting in kind all its attendant risk and cost. [...] At first even the villagers, who were most to be benefited, distrusted the settlement and hampered the operations, and the old style petty officials, now happily extinct, encouraged them in their distrust. But gradually [...] the attitude of the villagers changed. When they saw that for ten years to come the amount of the State was to take was to be fixed and at a diminished rate, that only a small part was to be taken in kind, and enough was to be left to them for food, and that thereby the ever-present sepoy [soldier] was to be removed from the villages, the people began to realise that some good was to come of these operations for settling the revenues. Ruined houses and desolate gardens were restored, absentees returned, and applications for waste land came in faster that was for the time convenient. Formerly, exclusive of perquisites for local officials, the State would take half the yield. But it was now decided to take only 30 per ent of the gross yield and to take the money value of it instead of the actual produce in kind as in the old. [...] The period of the [second] settlement was fixed at fifteen years.
From: Sir Francis YOUNGHUSBAND: Kashmir. New Delhi: Sagar. 1970 (London: Black. 1909), pp. 183-193.
Wolfgang-Peter Zingel: Kashmir Conflict (18 Feb 2004)
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Democratic traditions in Kashmir:
"Until most Indian Princely States, Jammu & Kashmir possessed prior to the Transfer of Power in India 1947 an active and complex public political life of its own. Since 1931, a year in which the State became the scene of much popular agitation and violent clashes between protestors and the official organs of law and order, two major party groupings had emerged, both with a common origin, the National Conference headed by Sheikh M. Abdullah, and the Muslim Conference [...] Both, collectively representing the Muslim majority in the State [...], were opposed to the absolutism of the ruling Dogra Dynasty. Their agitation [...] had produced a degree of constitutional development. The 1934 and 1939 State Constitutions [...] had provided for a legislature with, in the 1939 Constitution, a majority (40 of 75) of elected members. The franchise was restricted and on a communal basis, and the powers of the legislature extremely circumscribed, but all this was much better than what was to be found in most parts of Princely India. In the 1940s there had even been a brief period when a few elected representatives held ministerial office." Source: Alistair Lamb: Incomplete partition. The genesis of the Kashmir Dispute 1947-1948. Karachi: OUP. 2002. p. 96.
Wolfgang-Peter Zingel: Kashmir Conflict (18 Feb 2004)
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Jammu and Kashmir: State elections and central interference
1947 Sep 29 Sheikh Abdullah released by Maharaja Hari Singh from prison and
made chief minister of Jammu and Kashmir
1953 Aug 8
Sheikh Abdullah dismissed from office and imprisoned
1964 Apr 8
Sheikh Abdullah released from prison and sent by Nehru for talks to
Pakistan
1965 May
Sheikh Abdullah interned in South India
1975 Feb 8
Kashmir Accord: Sheikh Abdullah again chief minister of J&K
1982 Sep 8
Sheikh Abdullah dies; succeeded by Dr Farooq Abdullah
1984 Jul 2
Dr Farooq Abdullah dismissed by Governor Jagmohan; G. M. Shah
new chief minister
1987 Mar 23 After the elections, Dr Farooq Abdullah chief minister
1990
Dr Farooq Abdullah resigns after Jagmohan becomes governor again
1996 Sep
Elections, Dr Abdullah Farooq again chief minister after six years
"President's Rule"
2003
Elections, opposition wins against third generation of Abdullahs
Source: Dietmar Rothermund: Krisenherd Kashmir. Mьnchen: C. H. Beck. 2002. pp.
145-147.

File: the-kashmir-conflict-and-its-impact-on-democracy.pdf
Author: Wolfgang-Peter Zingel
Keywords: Kashmir conflict democracy ZEF Bonn 2004
Published: Fri Feb 20 14:44:45 2004
Pages: 7
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